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Abstract
The standard historiography sees the working class as a passive bystander in the 
insurrectionary phase of the Cuban revolution, assuming that the real struggle was 
conducted by a rural guerrilla army. However, an examination of the archival evidence 
contradicts this view and shows that workers played a much more active role in the 
defeat of the Batista regime than they are normally given credit for. 
At the start of the 1950s, Cuba was suffering a crisis in profitability as the world 
price of sugar declined. This led the employers to conduct a productivity drive backed 
by the full repressive force of the Cuban state. Going on strike in a dictatorship is a life 
or death decision and workers need to feel some confidence in their chances of survival 
and in the possibility of successfully gaining a result that would be in their political and 
economic interests. Thus, following the defeat of a wave of militantly organised strikes 
in 1955, significant numbers of working class militants felt of the need for armed 
support to enable them defend their wages and conditions. Starting from the city of 
Guantánamo and spreading to cover most of the island, these activists constructed an 
impressive, clandestine, working class organisation in alliance with the rebel army 
which, after several failed attempts, proved capable of calling a successful general strike 
in January 1959. This strike was crucial to the rebel victory.  
This thesis, based on primary source material found in archives and private 
collections in Havana, Manzanillo, Guantánamo and Santiago de Cuba, will re-examine 
working class participation in the Cuban insurrection of the 1950s, concentrating on 
organised labour rather than the role of individual citizens.
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5Figure 1: Map of Cuba showing the principal sites of labour militancy during the 1950s
Preface
Several years ago, when I took the decision to embark on an MA in Areas Studies 
in Latin America at the Institute for the Study of the Americas, a friend gave me a copy 
of Burt Glynn's collection of photographs of Havana in January 1959.1 These stunning 
images, taken during those first few days after the fall of Batista, show a mass popular 
uprising, quite at odds with the popular understanding of the Cuban revolution as the 
work of a small rebel army engaged in guerrilla warfare up in the mountains. The 
images aroused my curiosity, and I decided that my dissertation would question the 
level of mass involvement in the rebel victory over the Batista regime. My initial 
research for the MA dissertation, undertaken in the archives of the Instituto de Historia 
de Cuba (IHC) in Havana during the summer of 2007, unearthed an untold story of 
working class struggle. As an active trade unionist, I found this highly intriguing and 
resolved to continue my researches. 
Over the years, the IHC has painstakingly amassed a collection of leaflets, 
pamphlets, clandestine newspapers and similar agitational material from the 1950s, 
most of which were produced by typing directly onto thin paper stencils for duplication 
by a mimeograph machine such as a Gestetner or Roneo. They evoked images of small 
groups of militant workers, perhaps aided by revolutionary students, meeting in the 
home of one of their number, secretly producing a few hundred copies of a leaflet to be 
passed from hand to hand at work, scattered from the windows of passing cars or left on 
the seats of public transport. The written content evidenced a lively working class 
political milieu, where the way forward was hotly debated between different tendencies, 
where strikes and demonstrations were commonplace, and where ordinary workers 
played an active part in shaping their own destiny. The number of leaflets to have 
survived is in itself astonishing, given that such material could be a death sentence if 
discovered during a police raid or at an army checkpoint. Yet no one has made a 
systematic examination of this remarkable collection.
The centre of such action, however, was in all likelihood not Havana, but rather 
Oriente province, which was distant from the seat of power and the heartland of the 
guerrilla struggle. I chose, therefore, to explore in particular detail the provincial 
archives in Manzanillo, Guantánamo and Santiago de Cuba. These largely untapped 
reservoirs of locally produced material testified to a revolutionary process far from the 
1 Glinn, Havana: the revolutionary moment (2001) 
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capital in which party political lines often counted for less than workplace and 
neighbourhood solidarity. The written documents from these and other holdings form 
the bedrock of this thesis, yet they required contextualising, and this came from 
interviewing surviving veterans in different parts of the country.  It was an honour to 
speak to these remarkable men and women; I hope I have done justice to their story.
I would like to thank my supervisors Kate Quinn and Jean Stubbs for their help, 
support, encouragement and constructive engagement. I am also extremely grateful to 
Angelina Rojas and Jorge Ibarra Guitart of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba, my 
mentors in Cuba and the source of much encouragement and advice. I would like to 
acknowledge the generous help of Alcibíades Poveda Díaz, Alejandra Lopez, Alejandra 
Serpente, Alex Ostmann, Alfredo Menéndez, Barry Carr, Beatriz Rajland, Belkis 
Quesada, Bill Booth, Brian Pollitt, Camillia Cowling, Carrie Gibson, Clem Seecharan, 
Colin Lewis, Daniel Kersffeld, Delio Orozco and the staff of the Manzanillo Archives, 
Fernando Carcases and the staff of the Library of the University of Oriente, Dylan 
Vernon, Emily Morris, Felipe Pérez, Francis Velázquez Fuentes, Francisco Monserrat 
Iser, Gary Tennant, Hal Klepak, Ian Burchall, Inés Enoa Castillo, James Dunkerley, Jana 
Lipman, Jerry Hagelberg, Jon Curry-Machado, Jorge Giovanetti, Jorge Ibarra Cuesta, 
José Puello Socarrás, José Sanchez Guerra and the staff of the Guantánamo provincial 
archive, Juan Carlos Gomez, Juan Venegas, Liz Dore, Ken Fuller, Kevin Middlebrook, 
Kristine Hatzky, Leonie Jordan, Luis Figures, Luis Suarez, Maku Veloz, Mandy Banton, 
Margarita Canseco, María Celia Cotarelo, María Victoria Antúnez Salto, Maritza 
Mendez and the staff of the IHC archives, Mary Turner, Maxine Molyneux, Mildred de 
la Torre Molina, Natividad Alfaro, Nicolás Iñigo Carrera, Olivia Saunders, Oscar 
Zanetti, Paulo Drinot, Pedro Machado, Philip Mansfield, Rafael Duharte and the staff of 
the Oficina del Historiador de Santago de Cuba, Reinaldo Suárez, Robert Whitney, 
Robin Blackburn, Servando Valdés Sánchez, Silvia Blanca-Nogales, Shirley Pemberton, 
Sue Thomas, Tony Kapcia, Vicente Perez and Victor Bulmer-Thomas.
Without their help, this study would not have materialized. The responsibility for 
amassing and interpreting the material, however, lies with me.
I would like to dedicate this work to Mary Turner (1931-2013), historian, teacher, 
comrade and loyal friend.
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Introduction: Researching Labour in the Cuban 
Revolution
The 50th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, in 2009, was marked by the 
appearance of two films: "Che" and "Ciudad en Rojo".2 The first, described as "A grand 
Hollywood war movie", depicts the revolution as the work of a band of heroic guerrillas 
with little or no reference to the ordinary people of the island.3 The second, a Cuban 
production, shows a day in the life of Santiago de Cuba during the final days of the 
Batista dictatorship. It portrays the brutal state terror, the organisation of the 
underground resistance and its relationship with the rebel army, as well as the political 
disagreements and class tensions within the revolutionary movement. These two films 
represent divergent views of the Cuban insurrection: that of the heroic guerrilla struggle, 
which is the one most widely held, and that of the middle class urban underground 
resistance, which has more recently come to the fore. However, archival research has 
revealed an additional dimension to the struggle that has been almost universally 
ignored, the participation of militant organised labour.
The research objective is to examine the activities of the organised working class 
in the period leading to the victory of the Cuban revolutionary forces in 1959. An 
analysis of these activities in the Cuban case can add to the wider academic debate 
about the relationship between working class mass action and the armed struggle in the 
context of opposition to an authoritarian regime. The political economy of Cuba in the 
1950s will be examined to determine the extent to which economic considerations 
affected the course of the revolution. The thesis will analyse why some groups of 
workers supported the rebels from an early stage, while others stayed loyal to their 
official leaders or to the communist party. The role of the communist party has been 
shrouded in ideological mist arising from the Cold War. An examination of the 
communist party's public statements and details from primary sources about the manner 
in which party members applied these policies will paint a more nuanced picture than is 
usually given. 
It is not the intention of this thesis to deny the importance of the guerrillas or the 
middle class underground in the fight to overthrow Batista, but rather to argue that 
neither view presents a complete picture, that there was a third arm to the rebel forces, a 
2 Soderbergh Che (2008)
Chavez, Ciudad en Rojo (2009)
3 Empire (2008) [quoted on the DVD case]
8
revolutionary labour movement. The findings of my research clearly suggest there has 
been a silencing of this third dimension, intentional or otherwise. One obvious reason 
for this is that the story of a few heroic guerrillas overcoming seemingly impossible 
odds makes for a romantic story, while the recounting of dogged labour activity does 
not have the same appeal. In the early days of revolutionary Cuba, this romance was a 
weapon in the hands of the more radical elements in the leadership in their battles with 
those, often associated with the urban underground, who wished to slow the pace of 
change. From the other end of the political spectrum, the idea that the Cuban revolution 
was the work of a few individuals without mass support also suited its enemies in the 
United States, and this helps explain their apparent belief that the death of Fidel Castro 
was all that was required to reverse the changes.
This thesis challenges the notion that the revolution emerged from a rural guerrilla 
struggle in which the organised working class played no role and that those workers 
who did participate did so as individual citizens rather than as part of an organised 
labour movement. My findings document substantial labour organising, which played a 
pivotal role in key places and times in the 1950s, especially outside Havana and 
markedly in eastern Cuba. It is my intention to give organised labour its due credit for 
the role it played in the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship. My research objectives 
will be addressed through the following questions.
What was the role of organised labour in the Cuban Revolution, 1952-59? There 
has been little previous work done on labour and working class politics during those 
years, which made primary empirical research vital to any assessment. This, I would 
argue, is much overdue. My examination of the archival material, whilst not exhaustive, 
points to a high level of working class political activity during the 1950s. This in turn 
begs further questions which this thesis attempts to address: 
What were the problems facing Cuban workers during the 1950s? What were the 
economic issues and political issues which might be construed as fuelling class 
struggle? 
How were Cuban workers organised beyond the formal structures of the 
Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC)? 
What was the relationship of political forces shaping the nature of labour 
participation in the revolution, in particular the communist Partido Socialista Popular 
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(PSP) and the July 26th Movement (M-26-7) led by Fidel Castro? 
How significant was the involvement of organised labour in determining the 
outcome of the conflict? 
To what extent were regional differences important?
How can the Cuban Revolution be characterised?
In disciplinary terms, a study of the role of organised labour in the Cuban 
insurrection sits between labour history and the history of revolutions. Therefore, some 
of the normal concerns of labour historians such as class formation, formal industrial 
relations procedures and patterns of everyday life are not particularly relevant in the 
crisis-ridden period under investigation. The struggles undertaken by working class 
people, their strikes and demonstrations will therefore be given greater prominence than 
a history of more peaceful or stable times. Likewise, in a revolutionary situation, the 
study of the formal organisations of the labour movement, such as trade unions, is 
frequently less important than the clandestine networks which were actually responsible 
for organising the struggles of the period. By focusing on the period from 1952 to 1959, 
the emphasis is on the insurrection rather than the outcome of the Cuban Revolution and 
thus the eventual effect on the structure of the state, the economy and society. 
Nevertheless, understanding the social forces involved in the insurrection phase of a 
revolution is essential to an understanding of the subsequent changes in the structure of 
society. It is a question of examining the level of participation of workers in the events 
of the time, acting collectively rather than as individual citizens, while analysing how 
workers' class interests fitted in to the wider class structure, national politics and the 
economy. In a period of dictatorship, the repressive role of the state becomes paramount 
and it is this aspect which will be mainly considered, along with an analysis of the 
sectional interests it represented. 
In order to determine how this approach relates to current analyses, the next 
sections will engage with the existing scholarship that deals with both labour and 
revolutions in the Americas. To situate the study in its time, these sections will be linked 
by a review of the literature on the Cold War. Finally, I would like to draw attention to 
two, in my opinion excellent, recent narrative histories of working class self-activity in 
revolutionary situations: John Lear on the workers of Mexico City during the 
Revolution and Chris Earlam's work on the Barcelona anarchists during the 1920s and 
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1930s.4 I aspire to follow their example in an attempt to rescue Cuban organised labour 
from the condescension of history. 
Labour and the political economy of Cuba
The fragmentation of the working class, along with the high levels of 
unemployment and underemployment which destabilised the relationship between 
individuals and the means of production, has led some authors to question the validity 
of the term "working class" in a Latin American context.5 This leads to a tendency for 
some writers, following Guillermo O'Donnell, to lump together, under the catch-all title 
clases populares, "urban and rural wage labourers, peasants, lower middle-class 
students, government employees and those involved in petty-commerce".6 This approach 
is problematic as it fails to identify those sections of the working population who have 
sufficient economic power to affect the course of events. Put simply, dock workers can 
exert considerable economic pressure, while informal street traders cannot. Establishing 
what is meant by "working class" is therefore necessary before we can investigate its 
history.
Under the title of Labour Again Debates, the International Institute of Social 
History in Amsterdam organised an on-line discussion on this topic.7 Marcel van de 
Linden argues that "there is an almost endless variety of producers in capitalism", 
which leads him to lump them all together again as a general class of "subaltern 
workers in a state of 'instituted heteronomy'" and to reinstate what he refers to as "the 
pre-Marxian concept of the 'labouring classes'".8 Enrique de la Garza replies by 
reminding us of the importance of looking at the essentials of the relationships of 
production, rather than minor differences of form. He argues that economic power and 
resulting political significance is not based on absolute numbers.9 
The numerical strength of the agricultural workforce in Latin America and the 
relatively small numbers of workers who make up the urban industrial proletariat has 
4 Lear, Workers, Neighbours and Citizens (2001)
Earlham, Anarchism and the City (2010)
5 Whitney, History or Teleology? (2001) p.231
6 O'Donnell, Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy (1979) 
p.70
Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba (2001) p.4
Pérez Stable , The Cuban Revolution (1999) pp.7 & 213
7 http://www.iisg.nl/labouragain/
8 Linden , Globalising the Working-Class Concept (2003) pp.4,12
9 Garza, Comentarios al articulo del Profesor Marcel Van der Linden (2003) p.2 
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led some authors to define this latter group as an "aristocracy of labour", who used their 
economic power to further their own narrow sectional interests to the detriment of wider 
political involvement and generalised class solidarity.10 Charles Berquist describes how 
this assessment, led to a "consensus over the relative unimportance and conservative 
nature of organized labour", a position he opposes by arguing that "the primary object 
of early-twentieth century Latin American labor history should be workers in export 
production".11 The political importance of Cuban sugar workers, related throughout this 
present study, certainly bears out this analysis.
Hobart Spalding, in his general survey of organised labour in Latin America, 
identifies different subgroups within the working class with different short term 
interests: industrial or agricultural, blue or white collar, and employees of domestic or 
foreign capital.12 Julio Godio takes this approach a stage further and argues that 
imperialism distorts development towards monoculture and inhibits industrial 
development. This in turn causes proletarian nuclei to form in areas of activity based on 
the economic needs of the metropolis.13 This is particularly significant in the case of 
Cuba, where the sugar industry has produced such concentrations of sugar workers. In 
taking a closer look at the class structure of rural areas, Sidney Mintz criticises those 
who speak of an undifferentiated "peasantry". He identifies the different strata of small 
agricultural proprietors and, once these have been excluded, he concludes that "we are 
left with the class of landless wage-earning workers, numerous and strong in Oriente".14 
Lest it be thought that this distinction is peculiar to Cuba, Kevin Middlebrook also 
clearly distinguishes between workers and small farmers in the case of Mexico.15
However class relationships cannot be properly understood outside of the wider 
economic circumstances in which they operate. When profits are high and business is 
good, employers have little need to resist the socio-economic demands of their 
employees. In times of economic difficulty, the very survival of an undertaking may 
depend upon reducing its employment costs. The state of the Cuban economy in the 
1950s is a major historical controversy, with academics such as Eric Baklanoff 
10 Roxborough, The Urban Working Class and Labour Movements in Latin America since 1930 (1994) 
Vélez , The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (1967)
Landsburger, Labor Elites (1967)
11 Berquist, Labor in Latin America (1986) pp.3-10 
12 Spalding , Organized Labor in Latin America (1977)
13 Godio , Historia del movimiento obrero latinoamericano (1983) pp.35-38
14 Mintz, The Rural Proletariat and the Problem of Rural Proletarian Consciousness (1977) pp.35-45
15 Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution : Labor, the state, and authoritarianism in Mexico (1995) 
pp.14-20
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providing data which indicates a high level of prosperity.16 The US Department of State 
sums up this argument as follows:
An enduring myth is that 1950's Cuba was a socially and economically 
backward country whose development was jump-started by the Castro 
government. In fact, according to readily available historical data, Cuba was a 
relatively advanced country in 1958, certainly by Latin American standards and,  
in some areas, by world standards.17 
The alternative position, describing the poverty in Batista's Cuba, particularly in rural 
areas, is perhaps most graphically expressed by the contemporary articles of Oscar 
Pino-Santos, recently republished for the 50th anniversary celebrations. For example:
The annual "per capita" income is barely $340. This is a consequence of the 
underdeveloped state of the economy, which is reflected in the material 
conditions of those social groups that make up the majority of the Cuban people,  
who are weighed down by unemployment, underemployment and generally low 
incomes.18
This argument seems to be informed more by post-1959 political considerations than by 
a real analysis of the economy at the time. The "Truslow" Report, compiled by a 
delegation from the World Bank in 1951, certainly points to a considerable number of 
economic problems faced by the country.19 This is substantiated by a contemporary 
report from the ILO which, while proposing different solutions, confirms Truslow's 
analysis of the problems and quotes wage data which largely confirms the analysis of 
Oscar Pino-Santos.20 Therefore, I argue, the real question was "Prosperity for whom?" 
The relative prosperity of middle and upper class Cubans was obtained at the expense of 
most ordinary workers, who saw their wages and conditions attacked in order to 
maintain business profitability.
Scholarship on the economic situation in pre-revolutionary Cuba tends to divide 
into two camps. Scholars from inside Cuba focus mainly on the economic problems 
which the revolution inherited; the best of these studies are those by Julio Le Riverand 
Alejando García and Oscar Zanetti. Le Riverend, in two different books with, 
confusingly, the same title, provides an economic history of Cuba, starting from the 
arrival of Columbus and finishing in the 1950s.21 Zanetti and García's book on the 
United Fruit Company, while specifically about that one company, gives a wealth of 
16 Baklanoff, Cuba on the Eve of Socialist Transition (1998)
17 US Dept. of State, Zenith and Eclipse (2002) n.pag
18 Pino-Santos, Los años 50 (2008) p.90 [my translation]
19 Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) 
20 Cox, Some human problems of industrial development (1952)
21 Le Riverend , Historia económica de Cuba (1972)
Le Riverend , Historia económica de Cuba (1974)
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information about the economic context in which it operated.22 Zanetti has updated this 
work in a recently published overview of the political economy of Cuba during the 
pre-revolutionary Republic.23 These, and similar studies from inside Cuba, seek to show 
that the economic development of the island was held back and distorted by the baleful 
influence of "North American Imperialism". Those authors not based on the island, 
whether sympathetic or not, tend to write about the attempted solutions the revolution 
proposed to the economic problems of the island although, while primarily aimed at 
discussing the political economy of post-revolutionary Cuba, nevertheless frequently 
give short introductions to the general state of the economy in the run up to the rebel 
victory.24 The picture that emerges from both of these camps is of an economy based 
very heavily on sugar export with most of the agricultural land held by huge plantations 
closely linked with US capital, which also dominated the financial services industry and 
the utility companies. The national industrial bourgeoisie were weak and politicly 
subservient to the interests of the sugar oligarchy.25 There is also general agreement on 
the high level of corruption involved in both business and political circles.
This thesis will re-examine the economic situation of pre-revolutionary Cuba as 
critical to understanding the working class response to the dictatorship as well as the 
authoritarian measures used to implement the economic policies of the regime. In so 
doing, the thesis contests the widely held belief among leading scholars of the Cuban 
Revolution that economic conditions did not contribute greatly to the rebel victory.26 
The dominant position of sugar in the Cuban economy has led scholars to 
privilege analysis of the island's relationship to the world market in general and to the 
United States in particular. Alan Dye, Richard Sicotte, Brian Pollitt, Oscar Pino-Santos 
and Arnaldo Silva have all written accounts of the international aspects of Cuban sugar 
production demonstrating that the falling price of sugar on the world market led to a 
22 Zanetti & García, United Fruit Company, (1976) 
23 Le Riverend, La República (1973)
Zanetti, La República: notas sobre economía y sociedad (2006)
24 Huberman & Sweezy , Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution (1968)
Boorstein , The Economic Transformation of Cuba (1968)
O'Connor , The Origins of Socialism in Cuba (1970)
Martínez Alier, Cuba: économía y sociedad (1972)
Mesa Lago, The Labor Sector and Socialist Distributionin Cuba (1968)
25 Marques Dolz & Fierro, The Nonsugar Industrial Bourgeoisie and Industrialization in Cuba (1995)
26 eg. Benjamin, The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution (1990)
Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (1978) 
Draper, Castro’s Revolution: Myths and Realities (1962) 
Pérez Stable, The Cuban Revolution (1999)
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crisis for the whole Cuban economy.27 Cuban sugar workers had a particularly militant 
history, establishing soviets and armed militias during their 1933 strike.28  This started a 
tradition in which the trade union, industrial action, self-reliance and solidarity became 
a defining part of the sugar workers' identity and self-image. The seasonal nature of 
their employment militated against bureaucratically stable trade union organisation, 
with union membership numbers fluctuating widely according to the time of year. 
However, this slowed the tendency towards conservatism inherent in traditional skilled 
trade unionism. Thus, sugar workers had a tradition of cane-burning sabotage as a tactic 
for enforcing their demands.29 The fragmenting effects of the seasonal harvest cycle 
were offset by the fact that most sugar workers lived in communities in which they 
formed the overwhelming majority, thereby reinforcing workplace solidarity with 
community feeling in times of industrial struggle. In many ways, despite the apparent 
dissimilarity, the sugar workers' tradition of struggle and their vital place in the national 
economy gave them a similar leading position in the life of the Cuban labour movement 
to that occupied by mineworkers in Europe. Also like European miners, sugar workers 
had a close relationship with railway workers. Not only is there an industrial link 
between the two trades, as the railway industry in Cuba was dependent on the sugar 
industry, but also, as Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García tell us, that economic link was 
reflected in a tradition of mutual solidarity.30
These structural considerations are important in defining the boundaries of the 
working class, but they need to be nuanced when considering the apparent paradox 
embodied in Geroge Orwell's remark:
I have no particular love for the idealised "worker" as he appears in the 
bourgeois Communist's mind, but when I see an actual flesh-and-blood worker 
in conflict with his natural enemy, the policeman, I do not have to ask myself 
which side I am on.31 
For policemen, along with those other "natural enemies" of organised labour, the 
scab and the manager, would appear to be "workers" in the structural sense of being in 
paid employment and having no ownership of the means of production. To resolve this, 
many writers have explored the question of "identity", "culture" or "consciousness".32 
27 Silva Leon, Cuba y el mercado internacional azucarero (1975)
Pollitt, The Rise and Fall of the Cuban Sugar Economy (2004)
Pino Santos, La cuota azucarera de Cuba en Estados Unidos (1955) 
28 Carr, Mill Occupations and Soviets (1996) p.141
29 McGillivray, Blazing Cane (2009)
30 Zanetti & García, Sugar and Railroads (1998) 
31 George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (1938)
32 eg. Nash et al., Ideology and Social Change in Latin America, Volume 1: the emergence of worker 
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E.P. Thompson argues that:
Class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or 
shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, 
and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually 
opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive 
relations into which men are born or enter involuntarily. Class-consciousness is 
the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in 
traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms.33
Nicolás Iñigo Carrera pursues this argument and adds that, in order to understand the 
nature of the working class in its totality, it must be seen in the context of the class 
struggle.34 This relationship between classes has been summarised by Judith Orr:
Under capitalism, a minority class owns and controls the means of producing 
and accumulating wealth. The working class only exists inasmuch as it is 
exploited by this class. The capitalists themselves depend on workers selling 
their labour power to them and creating a surplus off which they can live, invest 
in future production etc." 35
The class struggle takes place between the contending classes over the distribution 
of that surplus. Milciades Peña brings the argument full circle in arguing that class 
consciousness develops in struggle and that this development leads to further 
struggles.36 
There are two principal approaches to the study of labour history: the institutional 
history of workers' organisations and the history of militant, sometimes insurgent, 
movements. The former approach, most famously pioneered by Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb,37 concerns itself primarily with the activities of trade union leaders, official 
organisational developments and the relationship with national and international 
politics.38 In such studies, industrial relations and negotiations in times of social peace 
are generally given more coverage than the occasional strike or demonstration. 
A number of studies of the labour movement in Latin America have taken this 
institutional approach, perhaps the most typical example being Robert Alexander's, 
Organized Labour in Latin America.39 In this, he synthesises the larger studies he has 
consciousness (1975)
33 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (1963) p.9
34 Iñigo Carrera, El concepto de clase obrera (2003) pp.7-8
35 Orr, Marxism and Feminism Today (2010) p.43
36 Peña, Introducción al pensamiento de Marx (2000) 
37 Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (1920)
38 Recent examples of such work in the British context are:
Fraser , British Trade Unions, 1707-1918 (2007)
Sewell, In The Cause of Labour (2003)
Reid , United We Stand (2004)
39 Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America (1965)
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produced on Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, Bolizia, Peru, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Venezuela and, of course, Cuba.  A more recent book by Gerald Greenfield 
and Sheldon Maram catalogues and provides a brief history of the vast majority of the 
labour organisations on the continent, while Ian Roxborough's contribution to Leslie 
Bethell's Cambridge History of Latin America provides a general overview.40 These 
studies provide a useful base from which to compare the situation of labour in Cuba in 
the 1950s with that obtaining elsewhere in Latin America. A picture emerges of the 
1950s in which the Cuban CTC has the largest membership per head of the population, 
over one million members out of a total population of about 6 million.41 The nearest in 
comparable membership density were the unions in Argentina and Mexico. These were 
closely linked with the ruling parties, the Peronists and the PRI respectively. Like the 
Cuban CTC, they served as important props to their regimes, but with the important 
difference that they were actively involved in their countries' politics, while the 
leadership of the CTC provided support for Batista by endeavouring to keep the union 
membership away from political involvement. Brazil under the second Vargas 
administration was also able to incorporate organised labour, in part by the use of a 
compulsory check-off of union subscriptions similar to the Cuban model. The Chilean 
CUT followed a more European pattern, being led by socialists, communists and 
anarchists following its reunification in 1953. It would play an important role in the 
election of Salvador Allende. Bolivia and Cuba both have an economy dominated by a 
single industry, in this case mining. The miners' union (FSTMB) played a dominant role 
in the Bolivian labour movement and may be compared with the Cuban sugar workers. 
The major difference is that the FSTMB maintained a broadly democratic structure and 
a militant leadership, while in the 1950s the Cuban Federación Nacional de 
Trabajadores Azucareros (FNTA - National Federation of Sugar Workers) was far from 
democratic. The adoption of the "Thesis of Pulacayo" by the Bolivian miners' union in 
1946 was the only serious attempt in 20th century Latin America to bridge the divide 
between a stable trade union organisation and revolutionary class struggle.
The other approach to labour history, more concerned with the activities of rank 
and file workers and focusing on protests, strikes and similar confrontational behaviour, 
originates in the work of Marxists such as E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm; it 
sometimes referred to as "history from below".  This way of looking at labour has been 
40 Greenfield & Maram, Latin American labor organizations (1987)
Roxborough, The Urban Working Class and Labour Movements in Latin America since 1930 (1994)
41 see chapter 1, particularly Table 1
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common in the historiography of North American labour, with particular attention paid 
to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in the period around the First World War 
and the period of agitation and struggle associated with the founding of the Congress of 
Industrial Organisations (CIO) in the 1930s. Likewise there are many such histories of 
militant labour in Britain.42 The role of the trade union bureaucracy is rarely considered 
as a factor in determining the course of organised labour. The Webbs, writing in the 
1890s, described this bureaucracy as the civil service of the trade union movement, 
which became a "class apart" with their own interests but, with the exception of Mike 
Haynes, Tony Cliff and Donny Gluckstein, little has been done to extend this work.43 It 
is part of the task of this thesis to fill that gap.
When looking at the history of organised labour outside the metropolitan 
countries, the relationship between workers and employers is complicated by the 
subordinate position of Third World capital to the large multinational corporations and 
financial institutions, frequently supported by threats of intervention by the armed 
forces of Europe and the United States. This affects the nature of nationalist politics in 
underdeveloped countries and frequently gives working class politics a nationalist 
colouring. The work of Peter Alexander, Pete Dwyer and Leo Zeilig, from their research 
into labour struggles in Africa, has broadened our understanding of this factor. Parallel 
experiences in the Anglophone Caribbean experience have been well documented by 
Richard Hart.44 In the Latin American context, James Dunkerley's Rebellion in the Veins 
integrates militant, insurgent workers into the broader context of the Bolivian 
revolution.
There are a few studies of Cuban labour that cover the 1950s, but all of these have 
failed to take account of the complexity and multilayered nature of working class 
industrial and political organisation. Thus, James O'Connor concentrates on the labour 
42 eg. for the USA:
Preis, Labor's Giant Step (1972)
Newslinger , Fighting Back - the American Working Class in the 1930s (2012)
Renshaw, Wobblies: Story Of The IWW And Syndicalism in the USA (1999)
and some recent work on British labour struggles:
Raw, Striking a Light: The Bryant and May Matchwomen and Their Place in History (2009)
Barnsley, Breaking Their Chains: Mary Macarthur and the Chainmakers' Strike (2010)
43 Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (1920) pp.468-470
Cliff & Gluckstein, Marxism and Trade Union Struggle: The General Strike of 1926 (1989) 
Haynes, The British Working Class in Revolt (1984) pp.87-116
44 Alexander, Workers, War and the Origins of Apartheid: Labour and Politics in South Africa, 1939-48 
(2000) 
Hart, Rise and organize : the birth of the workers and national movements in Jamaica, 1936-1939 
(1989)
Dwyer & Zeilig, African Struggles Today: Social Movements Since Independence (2012)
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market rather than workers' self-activity, while Robert Alexander and Harold Sims 
centre their attention almost entirely on the official movement, particularly the actions 
of the leadership of the trade union federation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de 
Cuba (CTC). Efrén Córdova, who is frequently quoted by other writers, sees the 
working class movement through the eyes of the union leader, the employer and the 
government official, with little reference to the activity of the ordinary worker.45 
There are some studies of individual industries: Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro 
Garcia on the railway industry, Gillian McGillivray on the sugar industry, Jana Lipman 
on the workers in the US base in Guantánamo Bay and Jean Stubbs on the tobacco 
industry.46 Additionally, Angelina Rojas has studied important aspects of the working 
class movement in the 1950s, in particular the corruption of the trade union bureaucracy 
and the class struggles of the year 1955.47 There is also clearly a revival of interest in 
this area amongst regional historians in Cuba, for example the work of Pedro Machado 
on the Matanzas textile industry or the detailed account of the 1955 sugar workers' 
strike in the town of Ciego de Avila by the staff of the local archive.48 Gladys García 
Pérez and Clara Chávez Alvarez have provided us with valuable scholarship on the 
regional struggles of Matanzas.49 It is the inter-relation of the concrete experiences of 
these different groups of workers that enables an assessment of their ability to act 
together in defence of their common interests. Where I believe this thesis advances the 
contributions centred on individual industries is that, by considering the many different 
sectors of the Cuban labour movement taking part in militant industrial and political 
action during the 1950s, a more generalised picture emerges. Different responses were 
based on a mixture of factors, subjective and objective, but patterns can be seen and it 
becomes clear that the significance of the workers' struggles in this period is much 
greater than the sum of the parts.
45 O'Connor, Origins of Socialism in Cuba (1970)
Córdova, Castro and the Cuban Labor Movement (1987) 
Alexander, History of Organized Labor in Cuba (2002)
Sims, Cuba (1992), Cuban Labor and the Communist Party (1985), Cuba's Organized Labour (1998)
46 Zanetti & García, United Fruit Company, un caso del dominio imperialista en Cuba (1976) 
Zanetti & García, Sugar and Railroads (1998)
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Lipman, Guantánamo: A Working-Class History (2009)
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Christian Chevandier's study of French railway workers persuasively argues that 
their identity was formed in struggle with their employers. 50 Tony Kapcia's recent study 
of culture and identity in Cuba sees identity as a question of "collective self-confidence" 
which asserts that "we are this and not that".51 As nations are divided into classes, each 
socio-economic class will attempt to interpret national identity and the national interest 
in ways that are best suited to their own interests and reinforce their own "collective 
self-confidence". A Cuban example of this is the response of Jesús Menéndez, leader of 
the sugar workers union until his murder in 1948, to the slogan "sin azúcar no hay país" 
(without sugar there is no nation), which was used by the sugar oligarchy to justify their 
privileged position. Menéndez turned the tables by constantly repeating "azúcar al 
servicio de Cuba" (sugar at the service of Cuba), thereby attempting to reinforce the 
importance of those who cut the cane in the national myth.52
A particular theme emerges here in response to the economic domination of Latin 
America by capitalist interests from the United States and Western Europe. Thus, Olga 
Cabrera and Jean Stubbs both examine the origins of the mutually reinforcing 
combination of class consciousness and nationalism, which is a feature of the region and 
a distinct contrast with Europe, where these sentiments are normally in contradiction.53 
Similarly, Alan Knight writes of the Cananea miners' strike of 1907, where the US 
workers sided with the employers and opened fire on the Mexican workers, who were 
demanding the dismissal of foreigners and "Mexico for the Mexicans". This produced a 
nation-wide wave of sympathy which further reinforced working class nationalist 
sentiment.54 John Dumoulin, when considering the 1917 Cuban sugar strike, amplifies 
this point, situating the strike in the context of the world sugar crisis and the domestic 
class struggle, showing how the subordination of the Cuban bourgeoisie to US 
imperialism gave a patriotic flavour to the workers' industrial action.55 There is clearly a 
consensus that a culture of proletarian nationalism underpins working class identity in 
Latin America. In the Cuban context, workers developed an identity and political culture 
in which the concepts of class and nation are inextricably linked. Indeed, if the ruling 
elite are seen as pawns of a foreign power, they can be condemned as traitors to the 
50 Chevandier, Cheminots en grève: la construction d'une identité  (2002) 
51 Kapcia, Havana : the making of Cuban culture (2005) p.5-6, 13
52 García Galló, General de las cañas (1998) p.88
53 Cabrera, Los que viven por sus manos (1985)
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54 Knight, The Working Class and the Mexican Revolution (1984) p.70
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nation and give workers struggling against them increased self-confidence and self 
identification. 
If we see culture only as another word for "way of life", then white collar workers 
could present a difficulty. Those who base their concept of social class on dress, 
lifestyle, income, education or attitudes, have a problem when analysing the class 
position of white collar workers such as bank clerks.56 This is to fail to differentiate 
between an economic class and a status group.57 However, if we use Frederick Engels's 
definition of the working class as: "The class of wage labourers who, having no means 
of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live" 
there is no such problem because administrative workers sell their labour power in the 
same manner as train drivers and are therefore equally proletarian, merely having 
different skills and being better paid.58 Whether or not they saw themselves as "workers" 
is a factor of their self-identity, which varies over time with the ups and downs of the 
class struggle. We shall see how this was quite clear to the Havana bank workers when 
they went on unofficial strike in 1955 against attempts by the banking employers to 
forbid union membership to a large number of their colleagues on the grounds that they 
were involved in "confidential" work and that trade union membership would be 
inappropriate.59 The Havana bank workers' fight for trade union rights showed that the 
vast majority of them were in little doubt about their own class allegiance. Rural sugar 
workers and urban bank clerks have very different standards of living, work experience 
and cultural practices and such differences can give rise to sectional divisions within 
organised labour. However, Colin Lewis points to the role of ideology (in this case 
nationalism) as a vehicle for unifying groups from different backgrounds.60 Proletarian 
anti-imperialist nationalism is a powerful incentive to overcome divisions and 
fragmentation between different workers in culturally distinct groups.
The dominant and most politically charged element in 20th century Cuban 
historiography is the question of the relationship with the United States. In this area, it is 
therefore more important than usual to have an understanding of the point of view of the 
56 Smith, The Shape of the Working Class (2007) pp.49-70
57 Blackledge, Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History (2006) p.127
58 Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1971) p.48
59 "Bancarios", Bohemia (September 18th 1955) p.75 [Where articles from the news magazine Bohemia 
are credited with an author and a title, this will be given in the footnotes and the full reference made in 
the bibliography. Where the report is from the "En Cuba" section of the magazine, as here, the edition 
date and the short identifying title will be given along with, where available, the page number. Page 
numbering was sporadic in Bohemia during the 1950s and many editions were not paginated]
60 Lewis, Workers and 'Subalterns' (2003) p.9
21
author. In this respect, Louis Pérez's "Survey of Twentieth-Century Historiography" 
serves as a valuable guide to the historic relationship between Cuba and the United 
States.61 In particular, I have found the work of Morris Morley and Leland Johnson to be 
useful as they both consider the relationship from an economic point of view, examining 
the business interests which underpin the political and military interaction.62
By the start of the 1950s, the earlier crude interventions by the United States in 
Cuban affairs moved to a more subtle form of economic domination. This resulted in a 
reduction in anti-imperialist feeling. Indeed a fashion for US cultural products and 
consumer goods developed amongst those who could afford them.63 This trend was 
reflected in the newspapers and in formal political discourse, leading writers such as 
Samuel Farber to deny the existence of generalised anti-American sentiments.64 He does 
not, however, specifically consider class differences in attitude. Regional variations in 
attitude are also often neglected. Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García show US 
investment in both sugar and railways was concentrated in the eastern end of the island 
and it is here that the highest levels of working class militancy accompanied by 
significant anti-imperialist sentiment was to be found.65 The United Fruit Company 
forced its will on the Cuban state by a mixture of threats, blackmail and bribery. It 
controlled politics in Oriente province, where its operations were based, by corrupting 
local politicians.66 United Fruit had a close relationship with the US State Department, 
distributing anti-communist propaganda produced in Washington and using its 
economic position to advance US foreign policy. If "The Company" corruptly controls 
local politics and openly works to advance the interests of a foreign power, the struggle 
for workers' rights and broader questions of democracy and national independence 
become intertwined.67  The pattern described above is confirmed and extended by my 
examination of other archival sources. The railway strikes of 1954-55 (chapter 3) had 
their strongest manifestation in the east. The strikes and demonstrations against state 
terror mainly occurred in Oriente (chapter 5) and the August 1957 general strike started 
in Santiago (chapter 6).  The propaganda put out by the organisers of these activities 
61 Pérez, Essays on Cuban History (1995) pp. 115-143
Pérez , Cuba and the United States : Ties of Singular Intimacy (1990) 
62 Johnson, U.S. Business Interests in Cuba and the Rise of Castro (1965) 
Morley, The U.S. Imperial State in Cuba 1952-1958: Policymaking and Capitalist Interests (1982) 
63 Pérez, Cuba and the United States (1990) p.208
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show a higher level of "anti-imperialism" than equivalent material in the west of the 
island. The fact that this propaganda is associated with successful actions would 
indicate that it struck a chord with large numbers of workers.
As Maurice Zeitlin argues:
The workers' fight to win full citizenship in their society, their struggle to 
enlarge their social and political rights and to improve their conditions of life 
was in the main directed against foreign interests, essentially those of American 
corporations.68
These feelings reinforced working class nationalist politics and gave credence to ideas 
of economic nationalism as a solution to poverty and insecurity.
An important recent advance in labour history has been the challenge to the 
concept that organised labour is male. Sometimes, this has taken the form of "rescue 
history" such as Sandra Bloodworth's narrative of the part played by women in the 
miners' struggles at Broken Hill in Australia or Louise Raw's revision of the Bryant and 
May "matchgirl's" strike, wherein she establishes that the strike was not led by the 
middle-class journalist Annie Besant, but was initiated and run by socialist and 
republican women already working in the factory.69 In the context of the Americas, Joel 
Wolfe's work on the Brazilian textile industry not only sees beyond the formal structures 
of the trade unions, it firmly establishes the combativity and  capacity for self leadership 
of women workers.70 As far as Cuba is concerned, Jean Stubbs and Olga Cabrera have 
written on the tobacco stemmers but, as I have argued elsewhere, working class women 
have otherwise been largely ignored.71 Dana Frank's contribution to Three Strikes, 
which describes the fight of the Detroit Woolworth "salesgirls" in 1937, provides 
obvious parallels with the "commercial workers" in Cuba during the 1950s, a militant 
group of mainly women workers who were instrumental in starting the general strike in 
Santiago in 1957.72 In a direct parallel with Detroit, Woolworth's saleswomen in 
Manzanillo launched a town-wide general strike in 1955, in solidarity with the town's 
striking textile workers. However, the historiography still fails to accord any real 
significance to the role of female family members during industrial disputes in male 
68 Zeitlin, Revolutionary politics and the Cuban working class (1967) p.288
69 Bloodworth, Militant spirits: The rebel women of Broken Hill (1998)
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dominated industries. 
The "Women's Auxiliary" and "Women's Support Group" are normally treated as 
just that, a useful appendage, but far from being essential to the victory of a struggle. 
The literature seems to recognise the crucial, determinant role such groups can play in 
only one case; the Flint Women's Emergency Brigade during the 1937 General Motors 
sit-down.73 Yet the documentary film Harlan County, USA, vividly portrays the way in 
which an ultimately successful miners' strike would have collapsed if not for the 
determination of the miners' wives.74 My own earlier research into the 1941 French 
miners strike under Nazi occupation revealed the role of miners' wives taking over 
picketing when their husbands were in hiding to avoid being forced to return to work at 
gunpoint.75 Cuban women played a similar role in support of the Guantánamo railway 
workers in 1957-58. To deal with this gap in the literature, Elizabeth Faue proposes an 
approach that she calls 'community history' as a "vehicle to overcome the class-gender 
split". She produces a more rounded picture of workers' struggles by including women 
workers, male workers' wives and families as well as the wider neighbourhood in her 
analysis .76 In her study of the Minneapolis labour movement, she looks at the role of 
women as part of the wider community during the 1934 truckers' strike, which led to a 
city-wide general strike. She writes of the "union as a way of life which involved the 
entire community". Writing about Cuban workers in Tampa in an earlier period, Nancy 
Hewitt writes of: 
The intertwining of family, community and shop floor issues in pursuit of both 
Cuban independence and workers' control ensured that non-wage earning Latins would  
play crucial roles in Labor battles as well.77 
In terms of the history of the Cuban revolution, the literature has focused mainly 
on a few women leaders such as Vilma Espin or Celia Sanchez. There is some recent 
work published in Cuba on the role of women in the urban underground, for example 
Gladys García Pérez and Esperanza Méndez Oliva, while Linda Klouzal has published a 
book on women in the Rebel Army.78 However, these studies treat their working class 
women protagonists as individual citizens, divorced from their communities, rather than 
73 eg. Hassett, Never Again Just A Woman (1994)
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as participants in collective action. 
Tony Kapcia's concept of "cultural communities" provides a way of looking at 
community history which helps us to see similarities and differences between the 
self-images of different groups.79 This works best if it is seen as individuals belonging to 
several different, competing communities, defined by their profession, their perceived 
social status, their religious beliefs, their ethnicity, as well as their neighbourhood, their 
region and the nation as a whole. Political and class struggles are often fought out in 
terms of a struggle between these different identities, for example the intersection 
between race and class. In the historiography of labour in Latin America, most recent 
attention in this area has focused on indigenous peoples, for example Paulo Drinot's 
study of workers, race and the Peruvian state.80 Given that the "race" question in Cuba 
mainly concerned the descendants of African slaves rather then an indigenous 
population, the Cuban situation bears much closer comparison with North America or 
the Caribbean. Alejandro de la Fuente looks mainly at the question of race from the 
point of view of the integration of people of colour into employment and afirms that, in 
the 1950s, black workers were still concentrated in lower paid jobs with lower chances 
of promotion, although he finds a trend towards a reduction in inequality as one moves 
through the first half of the 20th century.81 De la Fuente does however make the point 
that no significant racial division in earnings existed amongst industrial and agricultural 
workers which, he asserts, points to successful anti-discrimination work by trade 
unions, arguing that "race made little difference amongst the poorest in society".82 The 
tone of the discourse on race in Cuba in the 1950s would seem to indicate that the main 
problem was not seen as racial divisions between workers undermining their ability to 
fight for their common interests, but rather a question of discrimination by employers 
and businesses. It should be made clear that, in the context of the present study, we are 
concerned with the collective reactions of workers and there is considerable evidence of 
white workers electing and loyally supporting black trade union leaders because of their 
organisational and representational skills. Black workers' radicalism in Cuba had, since 
the 1930s, mainly expressed itself through the trade unions and the communist party, 
particularly amongst the dock, tobacco and sugar workers, where they often took 
leadership positions. The solidarity with other groups in struggle, which was frequently 
79 Kapcia, Havana (2005) p.5-6, 13
80 Drinot, The Allure of Labor (2011)
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shown by black workers in these trades, would have also worked towards a reduction of 
racism elsewhere.
De la Fuente argues that the Cuban communist party had a long tradition of 
anti-racist activity, pointing out that "under communist leadership, the labor movement 
incorporated racial equality as one of its programmatic goals", while Hobart Spalding 
writes that "revolutionary politics represented one of the few areas in which minority 
groups got equal treatment".83 I would argue, following Phillip Foner, that it is a 
common experience that racist divisions between workers tend to decrease at times of 
heightened struggle.84 Not that this is always the case, for the outcome also depends on 
the political activities of people and parties. In the aftermath of the anti-Machado 
revolution in the 1930s, there was much racist violence directed at immigrant workers 
from the British Caribbean and Haiti, although this was more often a case of native-born 
workers against immigrants than white against black, as many Spanish immigrants were 
persecuted as well.85 There was considerable movement between Cuba and the British 
West Indies during the 1920s and 1930s, mainly of contract labourers coming to work in 
the Cuban sugar industry. The communist party and the Cuban trade unions had a 
significant influence on this labour force and it is a matter of record that, during the 
labour rebellions of the 1930s in the British West Indian islands, a number of the rank 
and file leaders of this uprising had learned their politics in Cuba.86  Later, some 
revolutionary working class militants in Cuba during the 1950s were of Jamaican and 
Haitian heritage. I believe that, in the 1950s, the prevailing relationship is typified by 
that of the largely black Santiago port workers and the predominantly white Bacardí 
rum workers, who repeatedly showed great mutual solidarity, as well as co-ordinating 
their struggles, despite having different political allegiances in addition to their ethnic 
diversity.
It is this identification with other workers, both in the same trade and more 
widely, that gives rise to the labour movement, almost universally in the form of trade 
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unions. Most studies use the terms "organised labour", "the labour movement" and 
"unions" more or less interchangeably.87  However, following Robin Kelley's references 
to the earlier work of George Rawick, in order to obtain a rounded picture, in addition to 
the formal trade union structure, it is necessary to consider the activities of shop 
stewards, independently minded union officials, strike committees, regional committees, 
mass meetings and unofficial networks of militants, all of which make up the wider 
labour movement and interact together to produce the dynamic of industrial action.88 
The shared experience of exploitation pushes workers to see themselves as a 
social class, but this has to be set against the fragmenting effects of competition for jobs 
as well as differences in status such as skilled or unskilled, rural or urban, administrative 
or manual, permanent or temporary. To this must be added the further potentially 
fragmenting effects of race and gender. The exact degree of fragmentation is not 
structurally determined, but rather it is the agency of real people acting within bounds 
set by the economic structures that determines the final outcome. Therefore, the 
question is not whether the Cuban working class existed as an abstract concept, but 
whether they showed a collectivist response to their problems that, when politically 
necessary, managed to overcome the fragmentation caused by the nature of the Cuban 
economy and the repression of a dictatorial regime. The Cold War would provide just 
such a test.
Revolution and Counter-revolution
Greg Grandin and Gilbert Joseph have interpreted the Cold War in terms of 
revolution and counter-revolution, a useful alternative viewpoint to those who base their 
approach on international diplomacy.89 During the Second World War, because of the 
need to gain popular support for the war against Nazi Germany, the United States 
government supported the development of socially oriented democracies in Latin 
America which granted rights and improved conditions to organised labour. At the same 
time, in order to ease the alliance with the Soviet Union, communist parties were 
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legalised in most Allied countries. These communist parties, in return, worked for 
internal social peace and, in exchange for a few reforms, prioritised the war effort over 
the normal economic concerns of their working class and peasant supporters. This 
situation changed radically after the defeat of the Axis powers and the USSR became 
the new "totalitarian" enemy. 
The post-war anti-communist hysteria, whipped up to justify the change of 
international allegiances by demonising the Soviet Union, was also used to cover the 
installation of pro-business, authoritarian regimes throughout Latin America as a whole, 
as Stephen G. Rabe describes in The Killing Zone.90  Batista's coup in 1952 and the 
subsequent dictatorship is an example of this trend. These regimes then proceeded to 
cancel the wartime reforms and moved to restore profitability in the difficult economic 
circumstances following the end of hostilities. In this context, the 1954 coup in 
Guatemala has been the subject of much scholarly attention, but until recently mainly 
seen from the US government point of view with discussion centring on the precise role 
of the CIA. Piero Gleijeses provides a more rounded account, seeing the affair from a 
Guatemalan perspective.91 Another recent revision of the history of the Guatemalan 
coup based on previously unused sources is Greg Grandin's and Naomi Klein's The Last  
Colonial Massacre.92
Guatemala provides an interesting point of reference with Cuba during the 
post-war era, not only because of the two countries' shared experience of hosting the 
United Fruit Company, which has been the subject of a recent resurgence of interest in 
Cuba, but also because of personal connections between the leader of the Cuban 
communist party, Blas Roca, and Guatemalan trade unionists, as well as the presence of 
Che Guevarra in the country during the coup.93 Fidel Castro also invited Jacobo Arbenz, 
the deposed President of Guatemala, to Cuba in the 1960s. Cindy Forster has produced 
an account, based on archival sources and oral history, which concentrates on local 
level, grass roots activism amongst Guatemalan agricultural workers and which argues 
that the employers' desire to curb the militancy of the banana workers on the estates of 
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the United Fruit Company was an important factor in the coup and the imposition of the 
subsequent dictatorship.94 This coup is an example of the use of anti-communist rhetoric 
to provide cover for a generalised attack on workers' living standards and as an excuse 
to victimise militant shop stewards, irrespective of their politics, a right-wing offensive 
that was not just a Latin American phenomenon. 
In June 1947, the US Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Law, which severely 
restricted domestic union activity and shifted the balance of forces away from labour 
towards the employers. The US trade union federations, the American Federation of 
Labour (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO), did not resist the 
Taft-Hartley legislation but, as Jon Kofas's study of the World Federation of Trade 
Unions shows, actively supported the US foreign policy agenda.95 In retrospect, 
Serafino Romualdi's 1947 article entitled Labor and Democracy in Latin America can 
be seen as a declaration of Cold War within the international labour movement.96 This 
resulted in the pro-US Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT - 
Interamerican Regional Organisation of Workers) splitting from the pro-Soviet 
Confederación de Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL - Latin American 
Confederation of Workers). Robert Alexander has recently produced an institutional 
history of international labour organisations in Latin America, while Jon Kofas provides 
useful perspective on the ORIT / CTAL division.97 
The two decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall have seen a new generation of 
studies to emerge on the history of the communist parties of Latin America, based more 
on academic research and less on the contemporary demands of Cold War politics.98 A 
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picture emerges of a developing communist movement in Latin America more or less 
following the same line until the mid-1950s, but with many variations based on 
adaptations to local conditions, alliances and bureaucratic infighting. The support given 
by the Latin American communist parties for the Allied side in the Second World War 
papered over many of these cracks, but the Cold War started a process of division. The 
"Duclos Letter" and the fall from grace of the US communist leader, Earl Browder, 
started the process of shaking up the region's communists; the Cuban party had been 
particularly enthusiastic proponents of "Browderism".99 Many started to question the 
"Popular Front" approach after the coup in Guatemala, but real divisions did not appear 
until after the triumph of the Cuban revolution. Hal Brands has written about the Cold 
War from an international perspective, covering the post-war decades in the region, 
while Tanya Harmer uses newly available archive material to consider Cuban 
involvement in Latin America in the early 1970s.100 These two books bring to the 
surface the internal conflicts in Latin American communism between those who would 
pursue what Barry Carr describes as "Eurocommunism in the Americas" and those who 
wished to adopt guerrilla based tactics, following the path perceived to have been 
initiated in Cuba.101 Events outside Latin America also had an influence on this debate 
and Piero Gleijeses has written of the influence that the Algerian revolution had on 
events in Cuba through reporting in the weekly magazine Bohemia.102 Therefore, given 
the importance of the Cuban revolution for these realignments, a study of the 
developments in Cuban communism in the 1950s will shed light on this evolving 
situation. 
Nicola Miller's Soviet relations with Latin America, like much of the 
historiography of Cuba communism, is concerned with the impact of the Cuban 
revolution on international Cold War politics and treats the history of the 
pre-revolutionary communist party as background introduction.103 Where there is any 
consideration of the Cuban communists in the 1950s, it takes the form of a controversy 
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over the time-scale of the involvement of the communist Partido Socialista Popular 
(PSP) in support of the armed rebellion, with those who support the 1960 alliance 
between Fidel Castro and the PSP, as well as those exiles who wish to prove that Castro 
was always a communist, both trying to push back the date of PSP support for the rebels 
as early as possible. Thus Jorge García Montes, as one may expect from an ex-minister 
in the Batista government, places the date of the decision to support the rebels well 
before March 1958.104 On the other hand, there are those who downplay the relationship 
and deny the communists any credit for the success of the insurrection, thereby 
implicitly criticising Castro's later alliance with some senior former PSP leaders. They 
see the formal November 1958 agreement for joint work in the trade union field as the 
significant date.105 The standard Cuban work on the island's working class history, 
written for the third congress of the Cuban Communist Party, omits crucial but 
inconvenient details and is vague on this particular point.106 A more informed approach 
comes from Angelina Rojas who, in the recent third volume of her history of the 
communist party, while clearly sympathetic to the PSP, bases her analysis on a detailed 
study of the public statements of the party tracing the political development of the PSP 
as it converged with Fidel Castro's Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio (M-26-7).107 
The premise of political convergence between the July 26th Movement and the 
communists gives us a more balanced view than the more common discussion of 
conspiracies. It is one of the major tasks of this thesis to clear the air on this issue, 
tracing the political and organisational changes that such convergence implies; this 
requires a recognition that political opinions change over time under the pressure of 
events. It is to be hoped that such an approach can help clarify the place of the Cuban 
revolution in the historiography of Latin American communism.
Scholarly discussion of revolutions frequently start from the work of Theda 
Skocpol who, from examining state structures, international forces, and class relations 
arrives at a structuralist analysis that appears to marginalise the role of individual actors 
and indeed mass movements. She gives greatest importance to considerations of state 
structure, seeing little importance in the class basis of the revolution.108 Whatever the 
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merits of this state-oriented, structuralist approach in explaining the French, Russian 
and Chinese revolutions, Alan Knight, seeing more significance in the outcome of 
revolutions than in the causes, ably demonstrates its inadequacies in relation to Latin 
America.109 He thus differentiates between the Bolivian and Mexican revolutions on the 
one hand, which he sees as "bourgeois", and the Cuban revolution on the other, which 
he sees as "socialist". 
Nevertheless, there does appear to be common agreement that a revolution must 
involve both mass mobilisation and subsequent structural change.110 This would 
therefore deny the revolutionary pretensions of Peronism in Argentina. Despite the 
material improvements many workers derived from the process, Daniel James and 
James McGuire show that their mass involvement was largely choreographed by the 
regime along with its supporting trade union bureaucrats and can hardly be construed as 
self-activity.111 Where the Argentine experience does relate to a study of Cuba in the 
1950s is the way in which, during the dictatorship, some workers turned to armed 
struggle when conventional trade union activity failed in the face of murderous 
repression and a corrupt trade union bureaucracy.112 The failure of the 1969-76 
insurgency in Argentina, compared to the success of the insurrectionary phase of the 
Cuban revolution, cannot merely be put down to structural issues, but must also be a 
product of the ideas, decisions and actions of the individual and collective actors. James 
Dunkerley's work on the Bolivian revolution and Alan Knight and Barry Carr's writings 
on Mexico, as well as underlining the importance of human agency, give considerable 
attention to the role of organised workers. In the light of Knight's designation of these as 
"bourgeois" revolutions, it is ironic that so little work has been done on the role of the 
working class in the "socialist" Cuban revolution during its insurrectionary phase.113 
 In 1972, Cuban-American historian Andres Suarez, complained that "Nothing 
significant exists on the labor movement from 1952 to 1958".114 This still holds true 
today for general histories of the period, which see the overthrow of the Batista 
109 Knight, Social Revolution: A Latin American Perspective (1990)
Knight, Revisionism and Revolution (1992)
110 Knight, Democratic and Revolutionary Traditions in Latin America (2001)
111 McGuire, Peronism without Perón (1997)
James, Resistance and Integration (1988)
112 Werner & Aguirre, Insurgencia obrera (2009)
113 Dunkerley, Rebellion in the veins (1984)
Carr, El movimiento obrero y la política en México (1981) 
Carr, Organised labour and the Mexican revolution(1972) 
Knight, The Working Class and the Mexican Revolution (1984) 
114 Suarez, Cuban Revolution (1972) p.13
32
dictatorship as the work of a few hundred guerrillas, sometimes acting with the support 
of a middle class urban underground, but making little reference to the activities of 
labour.115 There is one partial exception to this. Chapter 5 of Hugh Thomas's 
monumental history of Cuba which, despite Suarez's trenchant criticisms, attempts an 
overview of the insurrectionary period that includes references to the clandestine 
workers' organisation; any significance is, however, lost in the overwhelming and 
sometimes inaccurate detail.116
Robert Whitney has written the definitive account of the revolutionary events of 
the 1930s, which pays considerable attention to organised labour, while Robin 
Blackburn, Maurice Zeitlin, Marifeli Perez-Stable and Steve Ludlam, amongst others, 
have addressed the role of working class politics following the rebel victory.117 
However, the only comprehensive overviews of the working class movement during the 
insurrectionary phase of the Cuban revolution to take any account of the whole range of 
working class activity are Marcos Winocur's short piece from 1989 and a few pages of 
Aleida Plasencia Moro's history of the Latin American workers' movement, both of 
which form an excellent base from which to start a more detailed study.118 In 
undertaking such a study for this thesis, I believe that I have uncovered sufficient 
evidence to contest Harold Sims's statement that: "CTC leaders' acceptance of the 
existing model of unionism was so pervasive that revolution was wholly unappealing".119
This thesis is based on a number of propositions that challenge the prevailing 
historiography of the Cuban revolution. The most important of these orthodoxies is 
115 eg. Balfour, Castro (2008)
Bonachea & Valdes, The Making of a Revolutionary (1970) 
Cannon, Revolutionary Cuba (1981)
Chomsky, A History of the Cuban Revolution (2011)
Darushenkov, Cuba, el camino de la revolución (1979) 
Farber, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered (2006) 
Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (1965)
Karol, Guerrillas in Power (1970) 
Kling, Cuba (1962)
Pérez Stable, The Cuban Revolution (1999) 
Pérez, Cuba : Between Reform and Revolution (2006) 
[there are many other books and articles in a similar vein, but these serve to represent the field]
116 Thomas, Cuba, or, the pursuit of freedom (1998) pp. 798-1034 
Suarez, Cuban Revolution (1972) p.22
117 Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution (1963) 
Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban working class (1967) 
Perez-Stable, Whither the Cuban Working Class? (1975)
Blackburn, Class Forces in the Cuban Revolution (1980) 
Ludlam, Cuban Labour at 50: What about the Workers? (2009) 
118 Winocur, ¿Dónde estaba la clase obrera cubana cuando la revolución? (1989) pp.117-133
Moro , Historia del movimiento obrero en América latina (n/d)
119 Sims, Cuban Labor and the Communist Party (1985) pp.43-59
33
summarised by Mike Gonzalez when he writes:
The nature of the guerrilla struggle and its leadership by the 26 July Movement 
under Castro meant that no mass organisations or organs of workers' defence 
had grown in the course of the revolutionary war.120
 As a result, there is an extensive literature concentrating on the military activities 
of the rebel army, but little on the clandestine apparatus supporting it.121 There are two 
works which do cover the role of the urban underground resistance, the recent work by 
Julia Sweig, who was granted unprecedented access to the Cuban Council of State 
archives, and an earlier book by Ramón Bonachea and Marta San Martín, which has 
become the standard reference on the subject.122 However, both of these books deal 
almost entirely with the actions of the well known leaders of the underground and pay 
scant attention to the role of working class activists or the mass action they organised. 
I argue that organised labour played a pivotal role in the victory of the Cuban 
insurrection and that Samuel Faber's estimation that the January 1959 general strike was 
merely a "well-deserved revolutionary holiday for the Cuban working class rather than 
an instrument of struggle" is incorrect.123 In so doing, the common characterisation of 
some working class action as "spontaneous" can be challenged by demonstrating that 
these actions were the product of conscious organisation. Historians frequently speak of 
"spontaneity" when, in reality, they do not know who actually organised the events.
There have been many descriptions of regimes that used coercive force in their 
attempt to defeat working class resistance to pro-business economic policies, for 
instance Daniel Guérin writing about Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy or Guillermo 
O'Donnell on Chile and Argentina under the Generals.124 In recent years, some scholars 
have re-evaluated the nature of popular resistance to dictatorial regimes and two books 
in particular have shed valuable light on the nature of this resistance: Tom Behan on the 
politics and practice of the Italian Resistance and Donny Gluckstein's more general 
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analysis of popular response to fascism and imperialism during the second world war.125 
These authors argue that, in a war situation, the participants often have very varied 
motives, based on class and other interests, and that people who are apparently on the 
same side are frequently fighting parallel but different wars. This approach is useful 
when attempting to characterise the nature of the Cuban insurrection. They both also 
argue that the transition from resistance to revolution depends on political decisions 
taken by active participants and is never automatic. In such situations, the activity of 
organised workers is crucial to the outcome.
Organised Labour to the Fore
It is one of my principal arguments that the masses of the Cuban working class 
engaged in direct intervention in the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban revolution. 
They did this not only through traditional industrial action such as strikes, go-slows and 
demonstrations, but also through sabotage, bombings and armed attacks on the police, 
as well as through intelligence gathering and logistical support for the rebel army. These 
previously neglected events made a significant contribution to the process of change in 
Cuban structural relations. The fact that this is not the widely accepted analysis is all the 
more peculiar, given the wealth of available evidence from primary sources. However, 
given the generally unknown nature of this data, a considerable part of this study will 
involve recounting, in narrative form, a revised history of Cuban organised labour in the 
1950s in order to provide a concrete basis for analysis.
Robin Blackburn offers an approach that fits the circumstances of this study:
In some quarters it is supposed that narrative history has little to offer and is 
incapable of identifying deep-seated structures of economy, mentality or 
political life. The present work was undertaken out of the conviction that if they 
are real and effective such structures will be visible at the level of events. And in 
the further belief that socio-economic forces and the discourses of ideology are 
so inherently antagonistic and contradictory that they open up a space of 
political choice and action which must also be registered if the dynamic of 
historical development is to be grasped. The attempt to construct a narrative 
therefore puts conflicting interpretations to the test. It can help to establish the 
respective weight and significance of the different forces and factors at work.126
The research which underpins this thesis is based on archival printed material, 
including contemporary newspapers and magazines, as well as interviews with 
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participants. Ordinary working class people normally leave little trace of their political 
or social debates and decision making; this is even more problematic for historians 
investigating a period of dictatorship. Formal minutes of trade union meetings are often 
a source of decisions taken, if not the process of arriving at those decisions. 
Unfortunately for the researcher, no such formal minutes seem to have survived the 
turmoil of the revolution, if indeed they were even taken, given the corrupt and 
inefficient nature of the bureaucracy. We therefore have to rely on newspaper reports of 
the discussions within the bureaucracy. In Cuba, the library of the Instituto de Historia 
de Cuba (IHC - Institute of Cuban History) contains almost complete runs of the 
principal Havana newspapers of the period. The weekly magazine Bohemia was 
particularly useful as it covered developments in the labour movement in considerable 
detail. Bohemia also had many other articles on the general political situation and 
organised written debates between leading political figures that give us a deeper 
understanding of contemporary arguments. In order to verify these reports, they have 
been cross-checked with other newspapers when they report the same incident and, once 
allowance has been made for the political bias of the other journals, there is sufficient 
correlation to make the Bohemia accounts believable. The IHC has a complete run of 
Diario de la Marina for the 1950s and the British Library Newspaper Archive has all 
the editions of El Mundo for the period. 
The British National Archive at Kew has the diplomatic reports sent to the 
Foreign Office from Cuba during this period. Given the important role of the British 
mission to Cuba in promoting British business interests, the diplomatic staff obviously 
maintained close relationships with both the Batista regime and with local businessmen. 
Thus, the reports give an insight into the thinking of the ruling elite during the period 
under investigation as well as providing another source of possible verification through 
the reports of events sent back to the Foreign Office. Similar verification can be 
obtained from the US diplomatic correspondence, much of which has been microfilmed 
and is available on-line; insights from this source have been deployed where relevant.127 
One might have hoped that there would be some information, perhaps of a 
statistical nature, in the archives of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), but the 
available on-line material was disappointing, being mainly concerned with the papers of 
127 Lester & Yanike, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files - Cuba (1986) available from 
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/us-cuba.htm
36
two international conferences held in Havana.128 Their statistical database (LaborStat) 
does not publish any data before 1969. Equally, the ILO journal, International Labour 
Review, only had one article on Cuba for the whole of the 1940s and 1950s, although 
this was one useful commentary on the World Bank Report on Cuba.129
Politics not only varied over time, there was also considerable regional variation. 
There has been a tendency in the literature to overemphasise events in Havana and, with 
the exception of the rebel forces in the Sierra Maestra, to pay scant attention to 
developments in the provinces. Two books on the rebellion in Matanzas have been 
published recently, both based on interviews with surviving militants and archival 
research, which, given the strength of rebel support amongst the textile workers of the 
province, take considerable account of the working class contribution.130 However, 
despite the efforts of the city historians of Manzanillo and Guantánamo to promote the 
study of their areas, little else has been published of a regional nature, either nationally 
or internationally. This is unfortunate, as the strength of popular resistance increased the 
further away from Havana one looks. 
In order to obtain a more complete picture of the Cuban insurgency, local 
newspapers provide a valuable resource. The municipal library in Guantánamo has a 
complete set of the local paper Voz del Pueblo for the period under investigation. The 
railway workers of Guantánamo play an important role in the history of working class 
involvement in the Cuban insurrection and the detailed reports of a local paper have 
proved to be most useful in uncovering their day to day militant activities. Guantánamo 
was also the home town of Eusebio Mujal, the general secretary of the Cuban trade 
union federation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC), who served as 
Senator for the district. It is interesting to see a different perspective on this 
controversial figure. The Elvira Cape library in Santiago de Cuba has a large collection 
of Santiago newspapers and, finally, I am most grateful to Pedro Machado for giving me 
access to his research using the Matanzas newspapers Prensa Libre and El Imparcial.131
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As an illustrated journal, Bohemia provides hundreds of contemporary 
photographs, which have proved to be a valuable source as they provide useful 
information on the numbers of participants in the activities they portray, as well as 
details of gender and ethnicity frequently ignored in the text. Susan Bloodworth writes:
The high points of struggle are of particular interest. In periods of ‘normality’ 
the divisive ideas in society are the most entrenched. If this is what we focus on, 
we miss the potential for change. This point is driven home by R.H.B. Kearns’ 
pictorial history of Broken Hill. The book is dominated by photos and graphics 
of men. But the chapter 'The Miners' stands out with illustrations of women in 
the struggles.132
My own interest in the role of working class women was first aroused by a photograph 
of a demonstration of striking railway workers in Camagüey, which was clearly led by 
women workers from the offices. This is evident from the photograph, but not from the 
text of the newspaper in which it appears. However, it is always necessary to remember 
that photographs can be posed, that they were frequently used for propaganda purposes 
by both sides and that they would only be printed if they fitted the editorial line of the 
publisher. A considerable number of photographs have been included in the text of the 
thesis, where I believe they expand upon the written word and thereby help the reader to 
a deeper understanding but, of course, such photographs must be viewed with a critical 
eye.
However useful newspapers might be, they only tell the publicly known events 
and must perforce be silent on the organisation of successful clandestine activity; the 
press only normally gives details of failed conspiracies. The underground press gives us 
more clues in this direction. From 1954, when the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) 
newspaper Hoy was banned, the communist party replaced it with a weekly clandestine 
paper called Carta Semanal (Weekly Newsletter), a complete set of which is held in the 
IHC library. This paper had a regular column, Lucha de Masas (Mass Struggle), which 
gives details of a large number of industrial disputes. A communist militant would 
interview workers engaged in industrial action and write a story for the paper. He or she 
would then return the following week to attempt to sell the paper on the basis of the 
story, in the hope that some new regular readers would be found. Any inaccuracy 
undermines this tactic fatally and so this can be considered a reliable source of 
information. When accounts of such disputes that appeared in Carta Semanal were 
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compared with the less frequent references in the legal press, such as El Mundo or 
Diario de la Marina, there is a high level of consistency, when the different political 
orientations of the sources are taken into account. 
In addition to the semi-public Carta Semanal, the archives of the Instituto de 
Historia de Cuba contain a large collection of leaflets and pamphlets issued by the 
principal clandestine workers' organisations and local workers' committees. The papers 
of the Comité Nacional de Defensa de las Demandas Obreras y por la Democratización 
de la CTC (CNDDO - National Committee for the Defense of Workers' Demands and 
for the Democratisation of the CTC), deal with the activities of the communist party's 
front organisation aimed at organised labour. Studying these documents alongside Carta  
Semanal and the papers of PSP, which are also in the IHC archive, enables the changes 
in party line to be chronologically determined. Reinaldo Suárez Suárez, of the 
Universidad de Oriente, generously gave me access to his personal collection of 
documents from the period, amongst which were a large numbers of surviving leaflets 
published by the local branch of the PSP from the Havana suburb of Luyanó. These 
gave an insight into the day to day interventions amongst industrial workers by 
communist militants. The IHC collection of papers of Frente Obrero Nacional (FON - 
National Labour Front) and the Archivo Nacional (AN - Cuban National Archive in 
Havana) collection of papers of the Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio (M-26-7 - 
Revolutionary Movement of the 26th July) give a similar insight into the very different 
agitation and propaganda carried out by the followers of Fidel Castro. 
There is, of course, always a question mark over the importance that can 
reasonably be ascribed to surviving leaflets. What proportion of the total output do they 
represent? Why did this particular leaflet survive and not others? Was it because they 
were never handed out? Were they produced by an isolated individual or a flourishing 
organisation? These questions must be borne in mind when drawing conclusions from 
leaflets as primary sources but, if treated sensitively and placed in the context of other 
sources, they provide valuable pointers, part of the trail of evidence. I was most 
fortunate, therefore, to have been accorded an interview with Alcibíades Poveda Díaz 
who, in the 1950s, was head of propaganda for the M-26-7 in Santiago de Cuba. He also 
generously provided access to his personal collection of propaganda material, which 
gave a view of the implementation of the M-26-7's politics in one of their strongholds 
and which also contained a number of copies of Vanguardia Obrera, the M-26-7's 
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clandestine newspaper for workers, very few copies of which have survived elsewhere. 
This was an invaluable opportunity to discuss questions of interpretation of the 
significance of printed propaganda with one of the principal organisers of this kind of 
material. He was also kind enough to invite me to meetings of the veterans' study group, 
La historia y sus protagonistas, organised by the staff at the Elvira Cape library in 
Santiago. The reminiscences of these veterans cast a light on the prevailing atmosphere 
during the dictatorship. 
There was a milieu of workers' militancy in the middle ground between the PSP 
and the M-26-7, in which both groups operated, sometimes collaborating, but always in 
competition for members and influence. This took organisational form as local 
committees, which operated under various names, but came collectively to be known as 
the Comités de Unidad Obrera (Committees of Workers' Unity). The IHC has a 
collection of papers, mainly Roneoed leaflets, associated with these committees, which 
show the process of convergence which took place between the labour organisation of 
the M-26-7, the Frente Obrero Nacional (FON) and the PSP and demonstrate that this 
convergence was more advanced, and involved more practical activity, in the ranks of 
organised labour than was the case amongst other sectors of the population. This 
process finally bore fruit in the Frente Obrero Nacional Unido (FONU) and the IHC has 
a collection associated with this organisation. Of particular interest are the papers 
associated with the two "Workers Congresses in Liberated Territory", about which little 
has been written elsewhere. 
I visited the provincial archives in Manzanillo and Guantánamo where, as well as 
their own collections of surviving local leaflets and papers from the period, there are 
many locally written studies, both published and unpublished, which shed light on the 
local experiences during the insurrection. Aleida Rodriguez Ramirez and Inés Enoa 
Castillo showed me their university theses on the revolutionary movement in 
Manzanillo and gave me the benefit of their recollections of the interviews they had 
conducted. In Guantánamo, there appeared to be no surviving working class militants 
from the period, but Luis Figueres of the Casa de la Historia de Guantánamo, gave me 
his notes of an interview he had conducted with Ñico Torres and we spoke at some 
length about his discussions with this M-26-7 workers' section leader. José Sanchez 
Guerra, head of the archives in Guantánamo, provided the unpublished report of the 
national history commission on the role of the city's labour movement in the rebellion, 
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informing me that it had been written by Torres himself.133 In Manzanillo, Delio Orozco, 
city historian and head of the archive, also gave me his notes of an interview he had 
conducted with Torres. The staff of the Manzanillo archive introduced me to María 
Victoria Antúnez Salto, who not only gave an interview of her recollections of being an 
activist in the Juventud Socialista (Socialist Youth, the youth wing of the PSP), but also 
provided copies of testimonials from Wilfred de la O, one of the leaders of the PSP in 
Manzanillo. I was also introduced to Francisco Monserrat Iser, a veteran PSP zapatero 
from Manzanillo, who gave me an interview and a copy of his unpublished monograph 
on the working class movement in the city.
In Havana, Angelina Rojas organised interviews with Alfredo Menéndez, an 
economist at the Ministry of Sugar who had been a member of both the PSP and the 
M-26-7 who situated political activity in the economic circumstances of the time, as 
well as with Vicente Pérez, who had been a tobacco worker and communist trade union 
organiser from Caibarién , who went on to become one of the leaders of the Frente 
Obrero National Unido (FONU - United National Workers' Front, the body uniting the 
workers' sections of the M-26-7 and the PSP). Vicente Pérez also gave me a copy of the 
testimonial of Leonal Soto another FONU leader. In Santiago, I met Francis Velázquez 
Fuentes, who was a member of the M-26-7 in Santiago and later of the rebel army in the 
Sierra Cristal. He was present at the funeral of Frank País and gave me his written 
account of the incident. I am also grateful to Jorge Ibarra Guitart for introducing me to 
his father, Jorge Ibarra Cuesta, who had been president of the University of Oriente 
students' federation in the mid-1950s. He gave me the benefit of both his recollections 
of the revolution and his advice as one of Cuba's most respected historians.
There are not many surviving working class militants from the 1950s and so I am 
grateful to Jana Lipman for her transcript of an interview with the head of the M-26-7 
group in the US base at Guantánamo and to Gary Tennant, for notes of his interview 
with Octavio Louit, a revolutionary railwayman from Guantánamo. In this context, the 
University of Oriente organised projects in the 1970s and 1980s, which required some 
final year history students to base their dissertations on interviews with surviving rebel 
activists. The records of the original interviews are lost, but the manuscripts of the 
dissertations are still available and these have proved to be an extremely valuable source 
of information.  
133 Comisión Nacional de Historia, Provincia Guantánamo (1980) 
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These primary sources paint a picture of a vibrant clandestine milieu in which 
working class militants debated, collaborated and competed for influence, but always in 
the context of organising active opposition to the dictatorship. It is on the basis of this 
material evidence that I hope to rewrite the history of organised labour in the struggle 
against Batista.
In order to recount the events considered vital to the analysis of the role of the 
Cuban working class in the insurrection, the narrative is organised on a chronological 
basis. Such an approach requires a periodisation in order to be intelligible and, in terms 
of working class politics and activity, we can divide the Batista years into distinct 
periods, divided by qualitative changes in the level of state repression. Tony Kapcia, 
when writing about 50 years of the Cuban revolution, punctuates this account by the 
various crises affecting Cuban society.134 This approach also proved useful as a method 
of dividing the period leading up to the rebel victory. Of course, it may be argued that 
the period was one of continual crisis, but within this, there were peaks and troughs 
which provoked changes and turns in the tactics of both the government and the rebels.
From Batista's coup in March 1952 until the fraudulent elections of November 
1954, little changed from the days of his predecessor, President Carlos Prío Socarrás. 
The fall in the price of sugar caused a crisis in the economy and from the end of 1954 
until the end of 1956, there was a concerted effort by the government and the employers 
to increase productivity by reducing workers' wages and decreasing staffing levels. This 
was achieved by a combination of collaboration with the trade union bureaucracy and 
relatively low levels of state repression, the police habitually beating workers with clubs 
and dousing them with fire hoses, but with very few deaths. The arrival of the Granma 
and the start of the rebel insurgency was a crisis for the regime, whose approach 
changed in early 1957 as the forces of the state began to confront the armed guerrillas in 
the mountains. From this point in time, the regime used death squads, routine torture 
and "disappearances" in an attempt to cow organised resistance to its rule. April 1958 
proved to be a crisis point for the rebels as their attempt at a general strike failed 
disastrously. This crisis caused both the M-26-7 and the PSP to rethink their tactics and 
their relationship with each other. It also gave increased confidence to the government 
and, during the summer and autumn of 1958, Batista launched a full-scale military 
attack on the rebels in their mountain strongholds. The failure to destroy the rebel army 
134 Kapcia, Cuba in revolution : a history since the fifties (2008) 
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was the regime's final crisis and created a situation where a successful general strike 
would force the dictator from office. The chapter structure follows this periodisation, 
with Chapters 1 and 2 forming an introductory background, Chapters 3 and 4 examining 
the period 1954 to 1956, Chapters 5 and 6 dealing with 1957 to mid 1958 and Chapter 7 
the second half of 1958, with Chapter 8 taking the history into the first year of the 
revolutionary government.
Chapter 1 examines the nature and history of the Cuban working class, its 
political and industrial organisation, informed by a theoretical discussion of the 
historical role of the trade union bureaucracy. Chapter 2 then considers the state of the 
Cuban economy in this period. I argue that, given the overwhelming importance of 
sugar in the national economy, the falling price on the world market led to an economic 
crisis. This in turn led the Cuban employers to seek to maintain their profit margins by 
means of a productivity drive which, given the strength of the trade unions, could only 
be achieved under an authoritarian regime. This is offered as an explanation for the 
support from business interests for the 1952 coup and subsequent dictatorship. 
Chapter 3 recounts the history of the class struggles of the year 1955 and stresses 
the importance of these strikes for the relationship between militant workers and the 
July 26th movement. In particular the battles of that year are analysed in terms of the 
success or failure of the previously mentioned productivity drive. 
Chapter 4 argues that the defeat in most of the 1955 disputes led some militant 
workers to draw the conclusion that they needed armed support if they were to be able 
to resist the government and the employers in order to defend their wages and 
conditions. In particular, the work of a group of experienced trade union militants from 
Guantánamo in eastern Cuba is studied to show how they started to build a clandestine 
cell structure in support of their aims. This network had its first real test at the end of 
1956 when it was able to organise significant action in support of the Granma landing, 
when Fidel Castro returned from Mexico. The detail of this M-26-7 workers' 
underground movement has not previously been published.
Chapter 5 examines working class responses to the government's increased use of 
arbitrary arrest, torture, disappearance and death squads. This campaign of state terror 
affected both the July 26th Movement and the communists. The political and 
organisational response of both organisations is outlined and analysed, with particular 
emphasis on the way in which local activists interpreted their own group's line, and how 
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this new situation affected their relationship. 
Chapter 6 subsequently examines two general strikes, August 1957 and April 
1958, the first a success, the second a failure. It analyses the reasons for the different 
outcomes and shows how these outcomes affected the politics of the PSP and the 
M-26-7. These two strikes are reassessed in the light of the process of convergence 
between the two groups. 
Chapter 7 continues this theme of convergence and traces its organisational 
form. In particular it gives details of two workers' congresses in territory under the 
control of the rebel forces. These congresses show the true level of working class 
organisation in support of the revolution and refute the arguments of those who say that 
such support was merely passive. In the process, it becomes clear that the trade union 
bureaucracy was marginalised by the activity of the rebel army and by grass roots trade 
union activists. 
A revolution does not succeed with the seizure of power, but with its 
consolidation. In the first year of the new Cuba, organised labour played an important 
role in that process of consolidation and in the final triumph of the more radical wing of 
the revolutionary forces. Chapter 8 therefore returns to the theme of trade union 
bureaucracy, as the disputes within the rebel leadership on the future course of the 
revolution are fought out inside the trade union federation.
A concluding section draws together the main themes of the thesis and answers 
the principal research question: "What was the role of the organised working class in the 
Cuban insurrection of the 1950s?"
Some definitions
In order to avoid confusion it may be helpful to define some of the terms used in 
this thesis. The obvious first question is about the exact definition of a "worker", 
"working class" and "organised labour". These are widely debated and will be dealt with 
fully in Chapter 1.
"Trade union bureaucracy". Trade unions under capitalism have developed a 
hierarchical full-time apparatus of paid functionaries. These operate at one stage 
removed from the ordinary rank and file member and have interests of their own which 
have a tendency to induce a socially conservative attitude. The term "bureaucracy" has 
44
its origins in the manner in which trade union officials frequently display an 
exaggerated respect for, and adherence to, petty rules and procedures in a manner which 
would be instantly recognisable to anyone who has had dealings with a North London 
Borough Council.  In some industries, shop stewards and local officers have reduced 
hours of work and other privileges giving them a material interest in conforming to the 
rules and practices of the union hierarchy. Where unions have a democratic structure 
this acts as a counterweight to these pressures. It is not suggested that these pressures 
absolutely determine the behaviour of trade union officials as there are competing 
pressures from the membership and individuals have their own political opinions to 
guide their actions. This will be further discussed in Chapter 1.
"Militancy". This term will be used to indicate a willingness by workers to take 
industrial action to defend and advance social and economic gains. It implies a belief 
that the interests of a group of workers or of the working class as a whole are more 
important than the interests of the employers. It also implies a belief that the right to 
take industrial action is more important than the duty to obey the law.  Above all the 
term is used to describe the self-activity of workers in struggle.
"Insurgent" "insurrectionary" and "rebel", in terms of organised labour, take the 
concept of "militancy" a stage further and refer to actions which are aimed at the 
overthrow of the incumbent regime in a country.
"Labour aristocracy". A term that is the source of much confusion, being applied 
either to the "Trade union bureaucracy" described above, or to workers in the 
metropolitan countries who, some Marxists argue, have been won over to supporting 
their own imperialist ruling class by "crumbs from the table", or to skilled workers who 
refuse to join in struggle with their less skilled brethren from a form of elitism; such 
elitism is normally considered a pressure undermining militancy. In this thesis, the term 
will be used in the last sense, although in nearly every case, it will be used to describe 
groups of workers of whom little was expected in terms of solidarity, but who overcome 
their externally perceived elitism to wage a militant struggle.
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Chapter 1. Organised Labour in the 1950s
An assessment of the state of the Cuban working class at the start of the period is 
necessary before examining the changes that occurred during the course of the 
insurrection, in order to gauge  the capacity of workers to defend their interests as a 
class. This initial assessment starts by recounting the history of the Cuban working class 
movement since the 1920s and then examining the three major currents within 
organised labour, the bureaucracy, the nationalists and the communists.
In the early 1950s, the Cuban trade union federation, the Confederación de 
Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC), headed by general secretary Eusebio Mujal, was widely 
seen as corrupt and undemocratic. It had not always been like this, but the Cold War 
attack on organised labour, which affected the whole of the Americas, north and south, 
was particularly successful in Cuba.  Following the 1947 CTC congress, the 
communists had been removed from their previous position of leadership and replaced 
by a new bureaucracy which seemed more interested in enhancing their own 
comfortable existence than in defending workers' wages and conditions. However, the 
actions of the trade union leadership cannot merely be explained by corrupt practices, 
but must be understood in relation to analysis of their politics, which prevented them 
from seeing  beyond the parameters set by the capitalist system. In the difficult 
economic circumstances facing post-war Cuba, the CTC leadership were prepared to 
restrict the demands they put forward on behalf of their members to the employers' 
"ability to pay". But while the leadership accepted that trade union demands had to be 
"affordable" and "realistic", growing numbers of Cuban workers did not see it that way. 
This resulted in tensions within the unions between the rank and file and the 
bureaucracy, which led militant Cuban workers to build unofficial structures in order to 
defend their interests.135 
Nevertheless, trade unions are never monolithic, relying on voluntary officials 
such as shop stewards and branch secretaries to maintain local organisation. There is 
therefore nearly always a space in which militants can organise to counteract the 
domination of the bureaucracy. During the crisis in which Cuba found itself during the 
1950s, there was still a lively independent milieu within the labour movement at local 
level, where the authority of the CTC bureaucracy was contested and which became a 
135 Spalding, Organized Labor in Latin America (1977) pp.227-238
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battleground between the various currents competing for influence within the working 
class. 
Historical Background
The organised labour movement in Cuba dates back to the guilds and craft unions 
of the 19th century, but the first nationwide trade union federation, the Confederación 
Nacional Obrera de Cuba (CNOC - Cuban National Labour Confederation), was not 
founded until 1925. In the same year, Gerardo Machado was democratically elected 
President but his regime became increasingly repressive as the effects of the economic 
crisis of the late 1920s raised the temperature of the class struggle. Cuba's sugar based 
economy was already suffering from reductions in US purchases as a result of political 
pressure from mainland producers, with the result that the Wall Street Crash of 1929 had 
a particularly devastating effect on the island.136 
The situation came to a head in 1933 when a strike by Havana bus drivers 
developed into a general strike which, in conjunction with an army mutiny led by 
Sergent Fulgencio Batista brought down the government. It is worth noting that the 
Cuban Communist Party (PCC), which had progressively gained control of the CNOC 
towards the end of the 1920s, tried unsuccessfully to call off the strike in return for 
minor concessions from the Machado government and this may be seen as confirmation 
of the politically moderating effect of having control of a trade union apparatus. The 
government of Ramón Grau San Martín, which took office after the uprising, proved to 
be neither capable of satisfying the aspirations of the workers, nor being able to bring 
them under control. The state of dual power that resulted from this contradiction was 
brought to a close by Batista who, working closely with the US ambassador, used his 
control of the army to defeat a general strike in 1935. Initially ruling through puppet 
presidents, Batista imposed a regime described by Hobart Spalding as being both 
co-optive and repressive, a model which operated by combining a mixture of nationalist 
demagogy and minor social reforms with repression of any attempt by workers to 
exceed the boundaries established by the government.137 
The CNOC did not recover from the defeat of the 1935 general strike, while the 
PCC, itself considerably weakened by police repression, reached an understanding with 
Batista whereby, in return for legalisation, they worked to broaden his narrow social 
136 Pollitt, The Cuban Sugar Economy and the Great Depression (1984) p.11
137 Spalding, Organized Labor in Latin America (1977) p.227
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base. One of the outcomes of this arrangement was the replacement of the CNOC by a 
new organisation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC), which was 
however, from the outset, a state sponsored trade union. A low level of subscription 
payment led to dependency on the state, a dependency that was increased by the CTC's 
approach to defending its members' interests, which mainly depended on the 
leadership's relationship with the Ministry of Labour, rather than industrial action or 
collective bargaining.138 This relationship left the CTC leadership vulnerable to a change 
of government.
Batista finally tired of indirect rule and, in 1940, with the support of the 
communists won the first honest general election in Cuban history. The PCC, now 
renamed the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), under the influence of Moscow, declared 
a class truce during the Second World War, which resulted in a wage freeze and 
no-strike deal. This reduced their credibility amongst the general CTC membership, the 
majority of whom were more interested in their material conditions than in the war in 
Europe. Thus, when Batista made a bid for re-election with 
PSP support in 1944, he was defeated by Grau San Martín and 
his Auténtico139 party. The communists' wartime 
"non-political" approach made them superfluous, while their 
trade union practice, a combination of undemocratic 
bureaucratic control and a reliance on government patronage, 
left them in a weak position. The logic of dependence on a 
relationship with the state is that, with the arrival of a new 
government, other factions could offer a closer relationship 
and thereby gain popular support. The Comisión Obrera 
Nacional Auténtica (CONA - National Labour Commission of 
the Auténtico Party) led by Eusebio Mujal (Figure 2) and linked to the ruling Auténtico 
party, did just this. Throughout the spring of 1947, the Auténticos made considerable 
gains in the sugar and port-workers' unions, while some PSP officials defected to 
CONA.
There were some armed skirmishes between members of the PSP and the CONA 
in 1944-5, but matters came to a head at the 5th CTC congress in 1947 when, following 
138 Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba (2001) p.169
139 The Partido Auténtico also known as the Cuban Revolutionary Party-Auténtico or PRC-A was a 
liberal nationalist party founded in 1933. It's two most prominent leaders had been Presidents Grau 
San Martín and Prío. By 1952 it had become a by-word for corruption.
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Figure 2: Eusebio Mujal,
from Bohemia (1955)
a violent dispute over credentials, the Minister of Labour, Carlos Prío, suspended the 
congress and then used the powers of his ministry to give control of the federation to the 
CONA, although initially the general secretary was an independent, an official of the 
electrical workers union called Angel Cofiño. The PSP did not have sufficient active 
support to prevent the take-over of the CTC and an attempted general strike called by 
the displaced communist leadership failed, with only the Havana dockers and tram 
drivers coming out in support. In areas where government intervention proved 
insufficient to impose a new leadership, gangsters linked to the Auténticos used violence 
to enforce the change of officials. This included the murder of three of the most 
respected communist workers' leaders, the docker, Aracelio Iglesias, the cigar-roller 
Miguel Fernández Roig and the sugar worker, Jésus Menéndez (Figure 3).140 An attempt 
to form a communist controlled breakaway federation failed when a new law required a 
union to be affiliated to the official federation before it could sign a collective 
agreement and this led many previously PSP-led unions to re-enter the Auténtico 
CTC(A) in order to preserve their legal status.141 
Thereafter Mujal, who quickly succeeded Cofiño as general secretary, used his 
links to Carlos Prío, who was elected President in 1948, to secure enough economic 
gains for his members to maintain his position and to prove that his grouping, referred 
to as mujalistas, were at least as effective as the communists they had replaced.142 Thus, 
in 1950, a Havana tram strike, led by communists was defeated by police repression, 
while bank workers were granted their demands on condition that they affiliated to the 
140 "El no.1 de la cordialidad", Bohemia (October 24th 1948), quoted in Osa, En Cuba (2005) pp.1-5
McGillivray, Blazing Cane (2009) p.254
Duarte Hurtado, La maquina torcedora de tabaco (1973) p.242
141 Sims, Cuba (1992) pp.230-236
142 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 2099, (1951) Labor Developments in Cuba 1950 [References to U.S. 
Department of State confidential files follow the listing in the most readily available digital source, 
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/us-cuba.htm, from where they may were obtained]
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Figure 3: Aracelio Iglesias & Jésus Menéndez,
from Museum of the Revolution, Havana
CTC(A). Reports from the British Ambassador in 
1952 are full of criticism of the "endless 
irresponsible demands of the labour movement", 
which he blamed on Mujal who "imposed his will  
on President Prío and secured satisfaction for his  
every whim, however irresponsible and 
prejudicial to the long term interests of the 
country it might be".143 The US Embassy made 
similar complaints; they used more moderate 
language, but their frustration with the strength of 
organised labour comes through just as clearly.144 
Cuba in the 1950s had the highest 
percentage of trade unionised workers in Latin 
America.145  The Cuban labour movement was 
organised in a single confederation, the CTC, 
which had a membership of over one million 
workers, out of a total national population of six 
million. This membership was divided into 
industrial federations (see Table 1 for the 1955 
figures) with the sugar workers federation, the 
FNTA, accounting for half the membership. 
These federations were in turn divided into local unions covering either a geographical 
area or a single employer depending on the structure of the industry. There were also 
provincial and city-wide confederations of all of the CTC unions in the area covered. 
The Cuban trade union movement was highly centralised, with the CTC leadership 
claiming and exerting authority over the individual federations. By the mid-1950s, this 
centralised control was exerted with the support of the Ministry of Labour, backed up by 
the police where necessary. The removal of the communists from office may have suited 
143 FO 371/97515 - AK1011/1 (1952) Annual Review of 1952
FO 371/97516 - AK1015/33 (1952) Cuban Political Situation [References to archival material to be found in 
the British National Archive at Kew will be given starting with the folder reference, where FO 371 refers to 
records created and inherited by the Foreign Office, General Correspondence from Political and Other 
Departments from 1906-1966. This is followed by the document reference where AK refers to Cuba related 
material originating in the American Department of the Foreign Office]
144 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 170 (1950) Cuban Labor Developments
145 Sims, Cuba (1992) p.217
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 1309 (June 29, 1955) Membership of the CTC
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Table 1: Membership of the CTC, U.S. 
Embassy Havana, Despatch 1309 (June 
29, 1955) 
Industrial Federation Membership
Sugar 550000
Tobacco 98000
Transport 80000
Construction 75000
Commerce 65000
Textiles 50000
Maritime 35000
Food Processing 32000
Petroleum 27000
Railways 25000
Cattle Farming 22000
Flour Processing 20000
Shoes 19000
Medicine 19000
Gastronomy 16800
Metallurgy 16000
Barbers 15000
Drinks 12000
Printing 10000
Furniture 8500
Electric, Gas, Water 7300
Cinema 5200
Insurance 5200
Banking 4000
Shows 4000
Musicians 4000
Salesmen 4000
Telephone 3500
Aviation 2000
Medical sales 2000
Telegraph 600
Total 1237100
the Cold War foreign policy objectives of the US government, but did little in itself to 
improve the productivity of Cuban workers. This would require a more structural 
weakening of their industrial organisation.
Much of the Cold War was fought on the battleground of organised labour and the 
mujalista takeover of the CTC and the subsequent purges can be seen as part of the Cold 
War anti-communist offensive. The 1950s were a period of great tension in the Cold 
War and the extent of communist influence in Cuba was a matter of great concern, often 
verging on paranoia as can be seen by the British embassy's pleasure that the singer 
Josephine Baker, "this hot gospeller of racism, peronism and communism" fell foul of 
the military intelligence authorities and was deported from the island.146 The Western 
powers had a firm public ally in the International Congress of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), which had its origins in an anti-communist split from the World Federation of 
Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1949. The CTC affiliated to the ICTFU at its 6th congress and 
would go on to organise the anti-communist work of the ICTFU's Latin American 
section, the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT - 
Interamerican regional organisation of workers), using money provided by Batista, who 
acted as a "laundry service" for the US State Department.147 A major figure in this 
process was Serafino Romualdi, who was employed openly by the AFL and covertly by 
the CIA.148 Romualdi worked closely with Mujal and Bernardo Ibañez of the Chilean 
union federation in the setting up of ORIT. Romualdi explains in his autobiography that 
the role of ORIT was not just political anti-communism, but also to create:
a new type of Latin American trade union leader who, abandoning the 
customary concept of the class struggle, would substitute constructive relations 
between the workers and the employers.149 
This may explain why the ICFTU was completely satisfied with the situation in 
Cuba under Batista, with the British Foreign Office noting the "refreshing spectacle of 
an American dictator enjoying the support of ICTFU".150 
146 FO371/103377-AK1016/1 (1953) Communism in Cuba
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 1271 (Feb. 13, 1953) Joint Weeka No. 7 for State, Army, Navy, and Air 
Departments from SANA
147 Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in Cuba (2002) p.148
Melgar Bao, El movimiento obrero latinoamericano (1988) pp.348-352
148 Kelber, AFL-CIO’s Dark Past (2004) 
Agee, Inside the Company (1975) p.620
149 Romualdi, Presidents and Peons (1967) p.5 cited in Melgar Bao, El movimiento obrero 
latinoamericano (1988) p.357 [my translation]
150 FO371/97516-AK1015/11 (1952) ORIT
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Mujal's anti-communism should not be seen as coming from any principled 
political position, indeed he had once been a communist party member, but he always 
managed to be affiliated with the group who most favoured his career prospects. His 
rapprochement with Batista should not therefore have been a great surprise. The logic of 
a trade union whose practice is based on maintaining a good relationship with the state 
requires a change of allegiance with each new government. This happened very quickly 
following Batista's coup. Apart from a few isolated strikes in particularly well organised 
workplaces such as the Matanzas textile industry and some Havana bus routes, there 
was little response from organised labour. Such working class resistance that did occur 
was quickly isolated and crushed.151 The official trade unions made a token show of 
resistance, with Mujal first calling a general strike and then rapidly calling it off before 
most workers even heard.152
The majority of the trade union bureaucracy quickly came to an accommodation 
with the new regime153 and Mujal went on to become one of Batista's most loyal 
collaborators. In return for this collaboration, the government turned a blind eye to 
corruption and obliged employers to deduct trade union subscriptions from workers' 
wages by means of a compulsory check-off, which isolated the CTC leadership from 
rank and file pressure.154 This measure was to prove deeply unpopular and, throughout 
Batista's period in office, the demand for the abolition of the cuota sindical appeared on 
every list of workers' demands. The Havana dockers, despite police intervention, made 
such an issue of the matter that the employers eventually paid the money over to the 
CTC without deducting it from their wages.155 Its abolition was one of the first acts of 
the revolutionary government on seizing power in 1959.
This therefore is the context in which mujalismo, nationalism and communism, 
the three major tendencies within Cuban organised labour, came to contest the 
leadership of the movement.
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Mujalismo
The mujalistas, as the leadership of the CTC around Eusebio Mujal have come to 
be known, were widely seen at the time as being extremely corrupt. This section argues 
that their corruption was indeed a contributing factor in seeking an explanation for their 
support of the Batista regime, but that another equally important factor can be found in 
the nature of the trade union bureaucracy in a capitalist society,
Trade unions, as their name implies, are organised around sectional divisions that 
reflect the economic structure of capitalism, which in turn institutionalises the divisions 
between different groups of workers. This allows the government to confront workers 
sector by sector and thereby avoid a generalised response, which could otherwise 
overwhelm the forces of the state deployed in support of the employers. As long as the 
role of a union is seen as defending workers' interests within the capitalist mode of 
production, with its differential wage structure, these divisions will remain. It would 
appear impractical in this context to discuss the wages of bank clerks and sugar workers 
in the same negotiations. The trade union bureaucracy is based on the sectional nature 
of the unions. It arises from a division of labour between the ordinary workers and those 
who negotiate on their behalf. This bureaucracy has developed interests of their own, 
different from the mass of workers they represent, which depend on their ability to 
mediate between capital and labour. This leads to a more conservative social view, even 
amongst those who started their trade union career as class conscious militants, with a 
resulting propensity to vacillate. The actions of full time trade union officials will 
largely depend on the balance of conflicting forces; employer or state pressure from 
above and rank and file pressure from below. 
One of the common traits of trade unions everywhere is a tendency to avoid mass 
working class involvement in politics, as any such involvement must raise the question 
of state power and on whose behalf it is being used. This in turn would bring the 
economic structure of society into question and threaten the comfortable position of the 
full time officials, who depend upon having two antagonistic classes to mediate 
between. This, of course, does not prevent individual trade union leaders pursuing 
personal political careers, but this is normally kept separate from their industrial 
functions, maintaining the fiction of a distinction between the "political" and the 
"economic" that lies at the heart of reformist labour politics.156 None of this is to say that 
156 Luxembourg, The Mass Strike (1905)
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individual trade union officials cannot rise above these pressures and act in a militant 
class-conscious fashion, but for them to do so requires a firm political position, which is 
normally only possible when they have considerable support and/or pressure from 
below.
It might be thought that the formation of a national confederation of unions, such 
as the Cuban CTC, would give the officials a more universalist approach and highlight 
the common interests of the working class, indeed this has always been the justification 
for forming such national federations. However, the leaders of a national federation 
form another bureaucracy which sits on top of the bureaucratic layer that already exists 
in the federating unions. Rank and file pressure on the national federation leaders is 
mediated by that intermediate layer. As a result, national federations tend to be more 
conservative than their component parts. The fact that they are balancing between two 
social classes allows a certain room for manoeuvre and this partial independence 
presents the bureaucracy with the possibility of working for their own interests. 
In the case of the Cuban republic, this self-interest expressed itself in the form of 
a level of corruption on a par with the corrupt nature of society as a whole and the CTC 
general secretary, Eusebio Mujal, was no exception. Not content with his salary of 
$280,000 a year, he was susceptible to manipulation by a government which was 
prepared to use its finances to corruptly advance its policies. Mujal and his associates 
therefore became an important prop of the dictatorship. The role they played arose from 
a combination of factors, with the position of the trade union bureaucracy in capitalist 
society and the corrupt nature of the individuals concerned becoming pressures that 
were pushing in the same direction. Most writers on the period speak of the evident 
corruption of the leadership of the CTC, but the idea that this merely reinforced the 
tendency towards caution and compromise inherent in trade union bureaucracy is 
normally neglected. Efrén Córdova, who is frequently quoted by other writers, typifies 
the approach that sees the working class movement through the eyes of the trade union 
leadership, the employer and the government official when he writes:
Moreover, unscrupulous labor leaders managed to obtain their illicit gains 
through dealings relating to the introduction of capital intensive techniques, the 
relinquishing of make-work practices or the dropping of exaggerated claims. 
Legitimate rights of workers were seldom compromised ...157 
157 Córdova, Castro and the Cuban Labor Movement (1987) p.55
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However, these questions of increased productivity were areas in which militant 
workers did indeed feel that they had legitimate rights and which the corruption and 
caution of their official leaders was severely compromising. 
Mujal 's arguments had a logic and were not incompatible with the economic 
nationalist politics which dominated working class political discussion, always provided 
the necessity of operating within the prevailing economic and political system was 
accepted. Thus he was able to report to a Mayday meeting in 1952 that he called off the 
March 10th strike against the coup in return for Batista's guaranteeing workers' rights 
and confirming the existing trade union officials in post.158 He argued for the trade 
unions to stay out of politics and claimed that his friendly relationship with Batista was 
merely pragmatic and was the best way to advance workers' interests, thereby avoiding 
any discussion of the nature of the regime.159 He constantly spoke of increasing 
productivity to help create new jobs and argued that it was true solidarity for those 
workers in employment to make sacrifices to help create jobs for the unemployed:
Traiciona a Cuba quien no coopera a fomenta sus riquezas nacionales...
El movimiento obrero está dispuesto a llegar a conclusiones y compromisos que 
permitan mayor trabajo y producción.160
Jana Lipman provides us with a typical example of the mujalista method in her 
description of his relationship with the trade union organisation in the US base in 
Guatánamo Bay. In 1950, the trade union for the base workers was set up jointly by the 
American Federation of Labour (AFL) and the CTC as a moderate, bureaucratic, 
anti-communist organisation with a no-strike policy, membership of which was 
confined to permanent staff, thereby excluding the daily-paid contract workers and 
potentially establishing the permanent employees as a sort of labour aristocracy. The 
Naval authorities were reluctant to recognise the union at first, but following the 
establishment of the Batista dictatorship in 1952 and under pressure from the State 
Department via Romualdi, saw that a moderate organisation which could channel 
workers resentments along harmless paths would be to their advantage. Mujal initially 
threatened to mobilise the whole Cuban labour movement in support of the base 
workers' union if it were not recognised but, as soon as he obtained this recognition, he 
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ensured that the union was run by moderate men, confining themselves to occasional 
nationalistic rhetorical outbursts, while practically achieving little to improve the 
material conditions of the membership. When even this rhetoric proved too much for the 
base commander in 1954, Mujal "intervened" and called fraudulent union elections to 
ensure that his own people organised matters without troubling the employer.161 
The CTC in the 1950s did manage to prevent some of the employers' worst 
excesses, but if a trade union accepts the principles of capitalism then, during an 
economic crisis, if the employer really cannot afford to pay, then the reformist trade union 
leader has no choice but to accept a cut in his members' wages. This is of course easier for 
the trade union bureaucrat to accept as he does not himself have to lose money. As 
Chapter Two will demonstrate, in the world economic situation of the 1950s, particularly 
given the falling world price of sugar, Cuban capitalism could neither afford to pay the 
existing level of wages, nor to maintain manning levels as they were. So, opposition to 
productivity increases required a revolutionary perspective at odds with the normally 
cautious attitude of most full-time trade union officials. Such a revolutionary perspective 
had its deepest roots in Oriente province, particularly in the town of Guantánamo which, 
ironically, was also Eusebio Mujal's home town. It was in Oriente that Cuban 
anti-imperialism found its strongest base.
Nationalism
Some sections of the Cuban manufacturing bourgeoisie were attracted to ideas of 
economic nationalism such as protective tariffs and import substitution, but they were 
hampered in their campaign for such measures by two main factors. Firstly there was 
considerable intermingling of commercial and manufacturing capital, which caused a 
conflict of interest as commercial capital was strongly attached to the link with the 
United States.162 Secondly, national manufacturing capital suffered from the same 
problems of low productivity that faced foreign capital and this would push many 
Cuban employers into an alliance of self-interest with American capitalism. 
At a "Conference for the Advancement of the National Economy" in 1947, Cuban 
industrialists called for higher productivity and for easier dismissal of unwanted 
employees, linking this with measures to attract foreign capital. There was also a trend 
161 Lipman, Guantánamo (2009) pp.75-87
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towards the merger of foreign and national capital in joint ventures, thereby increasing 
the convergence of interest between the Cuban industrial bourgeoisie and US capitalism 
as foreign investment increased in the hope of larger profit margins (see Figure 4).163 
This structural integration led to a lessening of nationalist sentiment amongst Cuban 
industrialists that was not reflected in working class attitudes.
While the integration of US and Cuban capital resulted in a more positive view of 
the United State amongst the elite, the attitudes of working class people, who often bore 
the brunt of US economic domination, became more hostile. Charles Page comments: 
"For years, the Cuban workers' bloodiest strikes were against the intransigence of 
certain American enterprises".164
This close relationship between US and Cuban capital could inflame nationalist 
passions when that relationship seemed to the detriment of other classes. An example of 
this is the Canal Vía Cuba. Popularly known as the Canal Rompe-a-Cuba, this was an 
American project to build a canal that would cut cross the whole island, from the Bay of 
Cárdenas in the north to the Bay of Pigs in the south. This elicited considerable 
opposition from many different sections of the community, but was most unpopular 
amongst the workers and students.165 Thus the newly elected president of the university 
students union, the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU - Federation of 
University Students), José Antonio Echeverría, described it as a direct attack on the 
island's sovereignty, while the railway workers of Guantánamo organised an opposition 
meeting jointly with the city's student federation which attracted many of the city's 
163 Ibarra Cuesta, Prologue to Revolution (1998) pp.31-32
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165 Mañach, El canal y la soberanía (1955) n.pag.
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Figure 4: US Direct Investments in Cuba, from Gente (January 5th 1958) p.80
leading citizens.166 Carta Semanal, the communist party's clandestine newspaper, called 
it a military project, which was designed to enable the US to deploy its fleet and which 
would make Cuba a nuclear target in time of war. The paper went on to condemn the 
proposed canal as an 80 km long port with lower wages and bulk loading of sugar 
where Cuban employment law would not apply.167 This last aspect drew the virulent 
opposition of the dock-workers union, the Federación de Obreros Marítimos Nacional 
(FOMN - National Federation of Maritime Workers), whose conference unanimously 
opposed the project, comparing it to the Panama Canal.168 Juan Taquechel (Figure 5) , 
leader of the Santiago dockers, sent a letter to all his fellow workers condemning the 
project in terms which mixed anti-imperialism, nationalism and anti-militarism with a 
promise to resist the canal's threat to jobs and conditions.169 The outcry was such that the 
project was quickly abandoned, an indication of widespread Cuban anti-imperialist 
sentiment just below the surface.
Any nationalist movement requires a mass base to 
advance its policies and, given the island's gross economic 
inequality, a Cuban nationalist programme had to address the 
region’s social problems if it were to attract support from the 
impoverished peasants and workers. This gave Cuban 
nationalism its characteristic nature as a mass popular 
movement. Such arguments attracted considerable working 
class support, with the close relationship between the Cuban 
bourgeoisie and US imperialism leading many workers to see 
the national question in class terms. However, this did not lead to the posing of 
socialism as an alternative, merely to seeing the ruling class as "traitors". Indeed there 
was no organisation in Cuba in the 1950s advocating an openly socialist perspective. 
While nationalist sentiments dominated Cuban working class politics in the 1950s, there 
were various forms they could take, ranging from the revolutionary to the reformist. The 
labour movement was to be one of the battlegrounds within which the competing 
approaches would seek support.
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Figure 5: 
Juan Taquechel López in 
2007, from Taquechel & 
Poumier, Juan Taquechel 
López (2009)
In addition to a well structured bureaucratic trade union organisation, there also 
existed a long tradition of independent action organised unofficially at rank and file 
level. The informal organisation behind this was still actively operating in the early 
1950s, despite the mujalista takeover of the official structure. This was particularly true 
in eastern Cuba where, far from the union head offices in Havana, militants found the 
need for a greater level of self-help. In so far as the militants who organised this 
independent activity were politically affiliated, they tended to be associated either with 
the PSP, or else with the Auténticos and the Ortodoxos.170 However, the behaviour of 
Eusebio Mujal and his associates largely discredited the Auténticos, with whom he had 
previously been affiliated, while the death of Eddie Chibas deprived the Ortodoxos of 
much of their attraction, which was largely based around his charismatic leadership171. 
In any case, the Ortodoxos had little to offer workers faced with an employing class and 
a government concerned to increase profitability. Therefore the tendencies previously 
associated with the reformist parties, or at least those who rejected the collaborationist 
policies of Mujal, were increasingly searching for a militant alternative. The newly 
formed Movimieto Revolucionario26 de Julio (M-26-7) would gain many of its first 
working class members from the disillusioned ex-supporters of these reformist 
organisations whose anti-communist political trajectory prevented them from seeing the 
PSP as a potential alternative. In order to understand the political development of these 
local activists, who were used to operating independently of the union bureaucracy, it 
may be useful to look at the earlier history of one particular group's involvement in the 
Cuban class struggle. 
In 1924, the Havana leadership of the Hermandad Ferroviaria (Railway 
Brotherhood), the main railway trade union, refused to support the railway workers 
employed by the Ferrocarril del Norte de Cuba (North Cuba Railway) in Morón, at that 
time members of an independent union, who walked out in solidarity with striking 
Camaqüey sugar workers. Nevertheless, despite the official attitude, the delegaciones172 
in Santiago and Guantánamo soon also walked out in support of their colleagues in 
Morón and put pressure on the national leadership to change its position. This incident 
170 The Partido Ortodoxo (Orthodox Party) also known as the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Party of the 
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is an example of the level of independence existing in the Eastern end of the island 
where local loyalties were often stronger than formal affiliations to national 
organisations. Thus in 1943, by which time the CTC was under communist control and 
had signed a no-strike truce with the first Batista government for the duration of the 
war, the Guantánamo delegaciónes launched a strike in an attempt to enforce the 
payment of a 15% wage increase that had been decreed by the government, but from 
which they were excluded.173 A strike during the Second World War was considered 
unpatriotic by the PSP, given their priority of maximum support for the Allied war effort 
following the German attack on the Soviet Union. They denounced the strikers' leaders 
as "Trotskyites" and for once this often misused accusation was true.174
In the 1930s, Cuban Trotskyism had its principal base in 
Guantánamo, where the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR 
- Revolutionary Workers' Party)175 was led by a railwayman, 
Ñico Torres (Figure 6).176 Torres was an experienced working 
class militant who started his working life in the sugar 
industry in the Guantánamo region, but was victimised in 
1931 for his involvement in a strike against the Machado 
dictatorship. In 1934 he joined the POR, along with Gustavo 
Fraga Jacomino, in time to participate in the party's 
intervention in the peasant struggles at Realengo 18, in the 
mountains near Guantánamo.177 Unemployed and black-listed 
for the remainder of the 1930s, Torres finally secured 
employment on the railway and in 1942 was elected Secretario de Correspondencia by 
the members of Delegación 11, from which position he became one of the 
acknowledged leaders of the Guantánamo labour movement.178 By the mid-1950s, he 
was part of a loose network of militants that operated very effectively in the 
Guantánamo region. This network would go on to play a significant role in the 
developing revolutionary resistance to Batista and were to later provide the 
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Figure 6 - Ñico Torres, 
from Bohemia (1959)
organisational framework and develop the tactics of the July 26th Movement, led by 
Fidel Castro. 
Oleg Darushenkov, basing his opinion on statements made by Castro at the 
founding conference of the Cuban Communist Party, contends that when Fidel Castro 
and 135 others attacked the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26th 
1953, it was with the intention of provoking an armed popular insurrection aimed at 
overthrowing the dictatorship.179 Sebastian Balfour, referring to a letter written by 
Castro to Luis Conte Agüero in December 1953, nuances this by suggesting the 
intention was to provoke a mutiny of army officers who were members of the Ortodoxo 
party and that this would, it was hoped, provide a backbone to the popular uprising.180  
Whatever the attackers' motivations, the action itself failed disastrously. However, the 
torture and murder of many of the attackers revolted a large number of ordinary Cubans 
and won a measure of sympathy for the young rebels. Castro himself was sentenced to 
15 years in prison, but was released in May 1955 following an amnesty campaign. 
However, finding it impossible to operate in Cuba with his life under threat from agents 
of the regime, he left for Mexico on June 24th .181 He was still technically a member of 
the Ortodoxos, and started organising the Movimiento Revolucionario de 26 de Julio 
(M-26-7) as a faction inside that party, issuing the first manifesto from Mexico on 8th 
August 1955.182 This proposed a solution to the country's problems based on agrarian 
reform, re-establishing workers' rights, profit sharing in industry, rent reduction, social 
housing, the nationalisation of foreign owned utilities, the establishment of a social 
security system and measures for the state to aid industrialisation. This was a radical 
programme, but not one that crossed the bounds of economic nationalism, nor was it 
explicitly anti-imperialist.
At the founding meeting of the M-26-7 on June 12th 1955, it was agreed to set up 
a workers' section, or Sección Obrera, to organise the movement's activities amongst 
organised labour, national responsibility for which was given to a sugar worker from 
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Camagüey, Luis Bonito.183 Thereafter every local group of the M-26-7 that was formed 
appointed one or more of the leadership team to be responsible for setting up a local 
Sección Obrera. The process was uneven to start with, with greater initial success in the 
east. The group of Guantánamo railway workers around Ñico Torres affiliated in 
September 1955, while the Santiago Sección Obrera was set up by a worker in the soft 
drinks industry, Ramón Alvarez Martínez who, by the middle of November, persuaded 
the entire workers' section of the local Ortodoxo party to join the M-26-7.184 There were 
also early organisational moves in Matanzas province around the textile workers' leader, 
Julián Alemán.185 Small and uneven as the M-26-7 Sección Obrera was, it had an initial 
membership with sufficient experience and contacts to be able to recruit from the series 
of strikes which would break out in 1955. This expansion would force the M-26-7 to 
consider its relationship with the PSP with whom it would find itself in competition for 
influence amongst the militant working class.
Communism
The Cuban Communist Party was founded in 1925. In common with the other 
official communist parties in Latin America, it supported a staged approach to politics 
which required the establishment of a "Bourgeois-Democratic" regime before a start 
could be made on the road to socialism.186 During the early 1930s, the Cuban 
Communists attempted a sectarian implementation of this policy and refused to work 
with other organisations that opposed the Machado dictatorship.187 Nevertheless, the 
party increased its influence and membership by its support for workers in the sugar 
industry from 1930 to 1933 and thereafter played an important role in the Cuban trade 
union movement.188 The party leadership was, however, taken by surprise when, in 
1933, a stoppage by Havana bus drivers turned into a revolutionary general strike. The 
party tried to settle the dispute in return for concessions from the government, but when 
the strike continued despite these attempts at compromise and successfully brought 
down the Machado government, the party sacrificed much of its credibility.
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After the Nazi victory in Germany, the Communist International (Comintern) 
became increasingly concerned by the growth of fascism and changed course, adopting 
the policy of calling for Popular Fronts, or alliances between the working class and 
progressive elements in the bourgeoisie. Communist Parties began to speak in terms of 
national unity against fascism and imperialism, while minimizing the significance of the 
class struggle.189 This tendency was exacerbated in Cuba as a result of the influence of 
the leader of the US Communist Party (CPUSA), Earl Browder who, in December 
1943, argued that all social problems could be solved through peaceful compromise. 
This approach, which became known as Browderism, argued that capitalism and 
communism could march hand in hand to a future of peaceful collaboration.190 This 
provided theoretical justification for the particular interpretation of the popular front 
policy that was adopted in Cuba, which resulted in an alliance with General Batista 
during his first government in the 1940s. Memory of this alliance would further reduce 
the party's credibility amongst Batista's opponents during his second regime in the 50s, 
despite having repudiated Browderism in 1945 along with the rest of the world 
communist movement. It has become common to apportion blame for this political 
approach entirely to Earl Browder, but it should be recalled that Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, leader of the CTAL, while not a communist, also spoke of the progressive 
nature of the Roosevelt administration and advocated alliances with right-wing 
governments as long as they were anti-Fascist. Fortunately for his historical reputation, 
Lombardo rejected the logic of the Cold War and denounced US imperialism after the 
Second World War, while Browder was purged and sank into obscurity.191
This relationship with Batista did, in fact, allow the party to claim credit for some 
reforms, such as the labour protection clauses in the 1940 constitution, which provided a 
space within which the CTC could function. It should be said that the PSP was probably 
the only consistently honest force in Cuban politics during the 1940s, as outlined in 
James O'Connor's account of the way in which they built the CTC with honesty and 
hard work.192 Nevertheless, their approach left the PSP dependent on its relationship 
with the state and, when Batista lost the election in 1944, the communists were 
dangerously exposed, particularly given the US pressure to repress communism in the 
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new atmosphere of the developing Cold War. They were eventually purged from the 
CTC leadership in 1948.
Therefore, The PSP could not be under any illusions that their previous good 
relations with Batista could be re-established following his 1952 coup, which they 
immediately condemned placing the blame on US imperialism.193 They called for the 
setting up of a Frente Democrático Nacional, with the aim of uniting the whole 
opposition in a popular front to resist Batista by legal means. K.S. Karol argues that, 
unfortunately for them, the Havana leadership of most of the rest of the opposition was 
more anti-communist than it was anti-Batista and the call fell on deaf ears.194 This was 
not always the case in the provinces with, for example, the local newspaper in Santiago 
de Cuba publishing a joint declaration by all the political parties, including the PSP, 
condemning the coup.195 Generally speaking however, such was the disillusion with 
politics felt by most Cubans, that the only organised social group to actively oppose the 
coup were the students, a social group with whom the PSP had little influence. Thus, the 
party failed to see any significance in Fidel Castro's attack on the Moncada barracks.
Having been falsely accused of complicity in the Moncada attack, the PSP was 
included in the generally increased repression which followed the incident. Their 
newspaper Hoy was closed down, the party was formally banned and the purge of the 
remaining communists in the CTC was intensified.196 In a widely circulated Carta 
Abierta a los Putchistas y Terroristas, they argued that individual action, such as the 
Moncada attack, disorientated the masses and gave the government an excuse for brutal 
repression197. There were, however, some signs of disagreement within the party, 
although mainly confined within the leadership. The following year, a well known 
member of the National Committee of the PSP, César Vilar, who had once been general 
secretary of the first national trade union federation, the CNOC, and had been both a 
National Assembly Representative and a Senator, was expelled for persistently 
criticising the manner in which the party handled the situation.198 
193 Hoy (March 11th 1952) 
194 Karol, Guerrillas in power (1970) p.129
195 Oriente, (10th March 1952) p.1
196 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 162 (July 27, 1953) Closure of Communist Newspaper
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 165 (July 28, 1953) Attacks Against Armed Forces in Santiago de 
Cuba
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 1501 (June 11, 1954) CTC Anti-Communist Resolution
PCC, Historia del movimiento obrero cubano (1985) pp.274-6
197 Archivo Suárez, Carta Abierta a los Putchistas y Terroristas (n/d)
198 Montoto & Vilar, Una hija reivindica a su padre (2011) pp.66-74
Rojas Blaquier, El Primer Partido Comunista de Cuba 1952 - 1961, tomo 3 (2011) pp.59-74
64
It is easy with hindsight, given the eventual victory of the M-26-7, to think that 
the PSP made an avoidable political mistake in criticising the Moncada attack. 
However, such an attitude does not take into account the real situation at the time. Fidel 
Castro was not the well known figure he would become and he did not have a track 
record of success. Indeed there was considerable confusion at the time as to who the 
actual attackers were. Juan Arauco, writing immediately after the events on behalf of the 
PSP in the New York Daily Worker, seemed to think that ex-president Prío was behind 
the attack and went on to criticise him for the loss of life and for giving the regime an 
excuse for repression.199 This last point is expanded upon in an open letter from the PSP 
National Committee which lists the measures taken in the aftermath of the attack. 
Despite the regime being well aware that the PSP were not involved, the attack provided 
an excuse to arrest and harass communists, to close the party's newspaper, to impose 
censorship on all the opposition press and to implement wage cuts and redundancies.200 
The footnotes of history are littered with forgotten glorious failures and there was no 
way of knowing that Castro would be able to turn this apparent disaster to his immense 
political advantage. At the time, as far as militants in the workplaces were concerned, 
the attack must have seemed irrelevant to their struggle, if not positively dangerous.
By the end of 1953, the communist party had reorganised and adapted to 
underground operation in the increased repression following the Moncada attack. Its 
main tactic in 1954 was to appeal, mainly through open letters published in the party's 
clandestine press, to the leaders of the "bourgeois opposition" for unity against the 
government.201 This initiative reached its most unlikely position when they proposed, at 
the end of May, a Frente Democrático Nacional, which was to include progressive 
sectors of the bourgeoisie and which would oppose the provisions of the 1951 report 
from the World Bank, known as the Truslow Plan.202 It strains credulity to think that 
even progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie would oppose a report which called for 
increased productivity. However, by July 1954, the regime's proposed elections in the 
coming November gave the PSP a more concrete slogan: "Voto negativo" (Negative 
Vote), a vote against Batista.203 The pages of Carta Semanal became increasingly 
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dominated by this idea, while militants were urged to set up Comités de voto negativo 
(Committees for a negative vote) in their neighbourhoods as the basis for a future Union 
Popular.204 Those other oppositionists who called for abstention were roundly attacked 
as playing Batista's game, while the federation of university students, the Federación 
Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU), was accused of "petty-bourgeois desperation".205 There 
were, however, inherent problems with this approach, not least in the naivety displayed 
in believing that there was the slightest possibility that Batista would allow himself to 
lose the election; after all, the original coup was staged because he had no chance of 
winning an election honestly. This time, the only opponent was Ramon Grau San 
Martín, who undercut the PSP's strategy still further by withdrawing from the contest at 
the last minute, leaving Batista as the sole candidate, despite which his supporters still 
fraudulently increased his vote to a scandalous degree. Faced with this farce, the PSP 
national committee reassessed its position and, recognising that there was little future in 
electoral politics for the foreseeable future, turned its attention to the working class.206 
Under the slogan "¡Unión y Lucha, Obreros!" (Workers, Unity and Struggle!), 
Carta Semanal would report in great detail the increased level of industrial disputes 
which followed the 1954 elections.207 The PSP's new alignment to the working class 
therefore came at a propitious time and the November 54 decision to set up locally 
based Comités de Defensa de las Demandas Obreras (CDDO - Committees for the 
Defence of Workers' Demands) created a useful vehicle to intervene during 1955.208 The 
demands in the manifesto published on the 30th anniversary of the founding of party, 
under the title of "A Democratic Solution to the Crisis", provide a useful resume of PSP 
policies at this time:
• Defend workers' and peasants' incomes
• Eliminate the Truslow Plan
• 80 pesos / month for the unemployed
• Agrarian reform that gradually distributes the land to the peasants
• Nationalisation of foreign owned public services
• Control of bank credit in the interests of the country
• Protection of national industry
• Unrestricted sugar harvest
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• Relations with the USA on the basis of mutual respect and equality
• Diplomatic relations with the socialist countries
• Eliminate racial discrimination
• Democratic rights, independence and peace
• For a National Democratic Front209
The new approach would enable the party to develop a sufficient base in February 
1956 to be able to organise a national conference to set up the Comité Nacional de 
Defensa de las Demandas Obreras y por la Democratización de la CTC (CNDDO or 
National Committee for the Defence of Workers' Demands and for the Democratisation 
of the CTC).210 With their wholehearted adoption of the rhetoric of national unity and a 
"bread and butter" approach to their work in the trade unions, the Cuban Communist 
Party did not offer a socialist alternative to challenge the hegemonic nationalist politics. 
Luis Aguilar argues that, as a result they remained content with tailing other, more 
militant nationalist currents such as the M-26-7.211 
Thus, while there were considerable differences in the tactics that the PSP and the 
M-26-7 proposed to implement their programmes, there was no great difference in the 
basic politics behind these programmes, with a shared concern for economic justice, 
national independence and an end to corruption. Both groupings also sought to unite the 
Cuban "people", a nebulous term that included workers, peasant farmers, the 
unemployed, small businessmen and professionals along with patriotic industrialists. 
However, while the M-26-7's tactics for the revolutionary overthrow of Batista centred 
on a general strike, they differed markedly from the PSP in stressing the need to 
combine that strike with an armed insurrection.212 The importance of these tactical 
differences would become clear as the struggle developed.
Conclusion
There is a contradiction in the nature of trade unions under capitalism. They are 
both hierarchical and bureaucratic with a top down structure, as well as being 
democratic, voluntary organisations whose authority comes from the base. However, 
there is a danger of oversimplification if we solely equate the bureaucratic side of 
unions with the full-time officials and the democratic side with the rank and file 
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membership and their local leadership. On the one hand, the full-time apparatus of a 
trade union depends on the support, or at least acquiescence, of local officials such as 
secretaries of local unions and workplace representatives and their wider support 
amongst the general membership. On the other hand, full time officials sometimes 
respond to pressure from below and lead militant action in defiance of instructions from 
their hierarchical superiors. Nevertheless, the tendency for the trade union bureaucracy 
to be cautious and conciliatory in their dealings with management and government is an 
important factor in all industrial disputes and one that is often neglected by many 
writers. 
The Cuban government appeared to be in a strong position in the 1950s and was 
recognised as being very pro-business. The legal political opposition was weak, corrupt, 
incompetent, divided and, in any case, had little interest in defending workers' wages 
and conditions, being composed of the traditional representatives of business interests. 
In any case, the de facto powers adopted by the government since the coup left little 
public political space in which the legal opposition could operate. The trade union 
movement seemed to be firmly under the control a corrupt bureaucracy who, given that 
their incomes were guaranteed by the compulsory deduction of subscriptions from 
workers' wages, were more dependent upon their good relations with the Ministry of 
Labour than on the support of the ordinary union members. 
However, the employers and their allies seem to have neglected the tradition of 
independent militancy. The workplace activists who would be responsible for reviving 
this tradition provided an alternative pole of attraction within working class politics 
opposed to the mujalista bureaucracy. This milieu was not politically homogeneous with 
the PSP and the M-26-7 competing for influence. However, both groups were pushing 
in the same direction as the competition for influence and membership would be won by 
the group which showed that its strategy was best able to advance the workers' cause. 
When a regime becomes involved in industrial relations, the class struggle 
becomes overtly political and so the government's close relationship with the United 
States, which still dominated the economy, would give credence to nationalist politics 
amongst militant workers. Having seen the manner in which the Cuban trade unions fell 
under the domination of a corrupt clique and having argued that this corruption 
exacerbated the normal trend of a trade union bureaucracy to reach an accommodation 
with the existing regime, there was clearly a political base, in the form a radical popular 
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nationalism, for internal opposition to this state of affairs within the labour movement. 
Thus, the labour movement was divided, on one side was the pro-government mujalista 
bureaucracy and, on the other hand, the anti-government forces within organised labour, 
principally represented by the Communists and the 26th July Movement, who were 
themselves in competition for political influence. 
This chapter started by questioning whether the Cuban working class of the 1950s 
was capable of acting as a "class for itself" and intervening in events to assert its own 
interests. The Cold War offensive appeared to have been successful in Cuba. It not only 
removed the communists and their allies from their controlling position in the CTC, but 
also replaced them with new leaders who were far more interested in their own interests 
than those of their members. This new bureaucracy seemed firmly entrenched, having 
subverted the internal democratic structures of the unions and marginalised the internal 
opposition. Thus, at first sight it would appear that those who doubt the political 
importance of the working class at this juncture might seem justified. 
Nevertheless, by the middle of the decade, there were signs of life amongst 
militant workers who were unhappy with this state of affairs. The PSP still had a base 
and, having recovered some confidence following the defeats of the late 1940s, was 
embarking on an new approach, based on the CDDOs, which was aimed at reconnecting 
with organised labour. There were also other, less formal networks of militants who 
were working to overcome the stranglehold of the bureaucracy and the M-26-7 was 
starting to seem an attractive home for these activists.
The tension between bureaucracy and democracy becomes more obvious at times 
of heightened class struggle and, by the middle of 1954, the scene was set for industrial 
confrontation. The fall in the price of sugar and the consequent crisis of profitability 
made the question of raising the level of productivity crucial for the Cuban employing 
class. In order to achieve this, they had to reduce staffing levels and wage rates. This did 
not seem to present too great a problem for the employers.
However, though workers may tolerate an undemocratic and corrupt leadership of 
their unions when their livelihoods are not in jeopardy, they can be much less tolerant 
when they see their wages and working conditions in jeopardy. The next chapter 
examines the increasing difficulties faced by the Cuban economy, along with the 
employers determination to maintain their profit margins at their employees expense. 
This seemed to call for a more robust response than the CTC leadership was prepared to 
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organise. Thus the question of working class action can be reformulated to ask whether 
rank and file militants were able to overcome the dead hand of the bureaucracy and 
organise their fellow workers to fight for their interests.
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Chapter 2. A Crisis of Productivity
Dye & Sicotte recently made the assertion that "Most leading scholars of the 
Cuban Revolution outwardly reject the proposition that economic conditions 
contributed to the downfall of Batista or the rise of Fidel Castro".213 The assumption 
that economic conditions were not a significant factor in developing mass opposition to 
the Batista regime has resulted in a neglect of the class struggle in period leading up to 
its overthrow, while the argument that Cuba was prosperous compared to other Latin 
American countries leads to the revolution being seen as an anomaly. This chapter will 
look at the Cuban economy with particular reference to the way in which workers were 
affected by changes in economic conditions. This is important in assessing the role of 
organised labour in the Cuban revolution, for if changes in the political economy of the 
island resulted in a deterioration of the working and living conditions of workers, then 
this will have a bearing on the form and degree of their involvement in the revolutionary 
process.
The whole Cuban economy was dependent on sugar which, in the 1950s, 
provided 80% of the island's exports. There was some other industry, but the tobacco 
industry was the only other major exporter, with the result that it was commonly said 
that "sin azúcar, no hay país" (without sugar, there is no nation).214 There was a large 
civil service, but this required a buoyant sugar market to finance it. This situation left 
the country highly dependent on the international price of sugar. As a result of this 
overwhelming importance of sugar, any deterioration in the price or the amount that 
could be sold in export had a serious knock on effect on the rest of the economy. It is 
therefore logical to set any investigation of the Cuban economy in the context of Cuba's 
position in the international sugar market and to ask whether the price fluctuations of 
the 1950s were serious enough to merit the reference to an economic crisis. Yet, if there 
were indeed severe problems, why do many authors refer to Cuba being "prosperous" 
during this period?215
The real question is how one defines "prosperity". It can be seen either as an 
environment in which business can make large profits, or alternatively as system which 
213 Dye & Sicotte, The U.S. Sugar Program and the Cuban Revolution (2004) p.674
214 Santamaría García, Sin azúcar no hay país (2001)
Curry-Machado, The Transnational Counterpoint of Sugar and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Cuba 
(2009)
215 eg Baklanoff, Cuba on the Eve of the Socialist Transition (1998) p.262
Smith & Llorens, Renaissance and Decay (1998) p.247-259
Cuba Transition Project, Socio-Economic Conditions in Pre-Castro Cuba (2008)
71
provides a high standard of living for the whole society, not just for the middle and 
upper classes. In Cuba in the 1950s, the productivity measures which business interests 
wished to implement in an attempt to maintain their profit margins were achieved by 
redundancies and by increasing workloads for the same or lower wages. An approach 
which only considers GDP and similar broad indicators, gives a distorted view.  As 
Jorge Ibarra Cuesta demonstrates, an increase in per capita income, when combined 
with higher unemployment and wage cuts for many of those in work, results in an 
increase in inequality.216 The struggle over the surplus produced by labour frequently 
takes ideological form in a discussion of the need for productivity increases, which can 
be portrayed by the employers as contributing to the common good. This argument was 
rejected by militant sections of organised labour, who had a tradition of fighting to 
defend what they saw as their rights irrespective of the economic problems faced by 
their employers. This led many employers in Cuba at this time to feel that they needed 
an authoritarian regime to defeat working class resistance to measures which would 
increase productivity. This chapter examines, therefore, the link between the fall in the 
price of sugar, the resulting crisis of profitability and the employers' need to increase 
productivity which, it is argued, provides an explanation for the 1952 military coup and 
the support given to the resulting dictatorship by business interests. 
Economic Dependence and the Power of Sugar
Following US intervention in the Cuban War of Independence, known to the 
North Americans as the "Spanish-American War", the island received its formal 
independence in 1902 on condition that the new constitution contained a clause, known 
as the "Platt Amendment" after the US Senator who proposed it, which gave the United 
States the unilateral right to intervene in Cuban affairs. This constitutional arrangement 
was accompanied by a Treaty of Reciprocity, which structured economic relations 
between the two countries to the advantage of the United States. In these circumstances, 
American capital quickly came to dominate the Cuban economy in general and the 
sugar industry in particular. Even if legally independent, the island was effectively a US 
colony whose economy was overwhelmingly dominated by the production of sugar.217 
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Between 1895 and 1925, world production of sugar rose from 1 million to 25 
million tons and, by the end of this period, Cuba, with annual harvests of around 5 
million tons, was the most important single producer.218 In the second decade of the 20th 
century, a speculative boom known as the "Dance of the Millions", largely financed by 
loans from US banks, collapsed and most of the Cuban sugar industry passed into 
American ownership when these banks foreclosed.219 US capital's control of the sugar 
industry throughout the early years of the republic ensured its domination of the wider 
economy.220 Even though the Platt Amendment was abrogated in 1934, following an 
uprising against the dictatorial regime of Gerardo Machado, a new reciprocity treaty 
was signed the same year, which Louis Pérez describes as even less favourable than the 
first.221 However, over the next 20 years the nature of the relationship between the two 
countries changed as US capital moved away from direct ownership of sugar production 
into indirect control through banking, as well as making considerable profit from the 
control of utility companies such as electricity and telephones. Nevertheless, by 1958, 
US capital still owned 42% of the productive capacity of the Cuban sugar industry.222 
Arnaldo Silva calculates that, between 1948 and 1955, 637 million dollars in profits 
from sugar alone was repatriated to the United States, which represents an important 
loss of capital that could otherwise have been used for internal economic development 
in Cuba.223
Robin Blackburn shows that, as the pattern of US involvement in the economy 
changed, there was a parallel process of integration of the Cuban bourgeoisie into US 
capitalism.224 The reciprocity treaty of 1934 gave preferential access for Cuban sugar to 
the US market while, in return, US manufactured products were subject to lower import 
duty, thereby impeding the development of a Cuban manufacturing industry. Jorge 
Ibarra Cuesta writes of the dual nature of the Cuban non-sugar bourgeoisie, who tended 
to spread their interests between commercial and manufacturing undertakings. This 
contradiction prevented them adopting a unified class position on such matters as 
import/export or industrial development because, as importers, they opposed local 
production of anything that might compete with their imports while, as manufacturers, 
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they wanted protection for their own locally produced products. This prevented the 
adoption of a united position on protective tariffs, as each manufacturer argued for his 
individual advantage, while having little material interest in supporting the claims of 
manufacturers of other products. Only the sugar-bourgeoisie had a consistent position, 
which was opposed to Cuban national industrialisation because they wanted the 
maximum trade in their sugar. Agricultural employers also gained an advantage from a 
high level of unemployment to ensure sufficient available cheap labour at harvest time, 
giving them another reason to oppose industrialisation. Thus, the most consistent 
business influence on government economic policy was in a direction which maintained 
Cuban dependence on sugar and against any industrial development or diversification.225 
Much of the rest of the economy was linked to sugar production, more or less 
directly. The major export traffic through the ports was sugar, while Zanetti and Garcia 
have demonstrated the dominant role that sugar played in the development of the 
railway system.226 Important sectors of manufacturing industry, such as rum and soft 
drinks, also required the availability of sugar as a raw material. The other major 
traditional industry, tobacco, had declined considerably, with cigar exports down from 
256 million per year in 1906 to only 21 million in 1949, while cigarette imports had 
risen from 1.7 million packets in 1935 to 15.6 million in 1949.227 The major utilities, 
telephones and electricity, were monopolies owned by US capital. The large profits that 
these companies made in return for a poor service and how little of those profits were 
reinvested in Cuba had long been subject to much criticism in the national press.228 
There were small textile and shoe industries, but these could not even supply internal 
needs. The position of the textile industry was made worse by the 1954 commercial 
treaty with Japan which allowed the Japanese to export cheap clothing to Cuba in return 
for a guaranteed import of Cuban sugar.229 This deal provides another clear example of 
the dominant political influence of the sugar oligarchy. The non-sugar manufacturing 
bourgeoisie was organised in the Asociación Nacional de Industriales de Cuba (ANIC - 
National Association of Cuban Industrialists) but it did not have sufficient political 
weight to push the government towards protectionist tariffs and industrial development 
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policies, which were opposed by the Asociación Nacional de Hacendados de Cuba 
(ANHC - National Association of Cuban Landowners) representing the interests of the 
sugar oligarchy. A further complication, which reduced the ANIC's ability to promote 
industrial development was the presence in its leadership of local representatives of US 
business interests, most notably Colgate-Palmolive and Firestone tyres, which had 
factories on the island. The parent companies of these US-owned manufacturers had 
profitable links with the Cuban sugar industry. Nor was the Cuban non-sugar 
bourgeoisie itself independent of US capital, however they were linked more closely 
with US finance capital, while the sugar oligarchy was linked to US exporters of 
consumer goods. Whilst these factors meant that the manufacturing sector was 
unsuccessful in its attempts to pressurise the government to adopt an effective industrial 
development policy, the ANIC and the ANHC were united in a belief that salary 
reductions were essential to make Cuban exports competitive.230 Another source of 
disagreement between the two associations was the corruption endemic in Cuban 
political and economic life, as the ANIC members were largely excluded from this 
source of income and therefore protested loudly.231 
A significant proportion of Cubans whose employment was not directly or 
indirectly involved with sugar worked in the top-heavy state bureaucracy, the service 
sector or tourism. All three sectors were riddled with corruption, particularly in the case 
of tourism, which Enrique Cirules's El imperio de La Habana shows was heavily 
influenced by the US Mafia.232 Nearly all the government intervention aimed at 
developing the economy was directed to unproductive capital products, mainly in 
Havana, which did little or nothing to aid diversification.
With this high level of dependence on sugar, any change in either the price 
received for the sugar crop, or the amount that could be sold, had a huge effect on the 
island's economy. Therefore, when the political threat of a reduction in the amount 
purchased by the USA coincided with a heavy fall in the price on the world market, the 
Cuban economy as a whole faced a crisis. 
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The International Sugar Market
While Cuba originally produced almost exclusively for US consumption, the 
growth of internal production of both beet and cane sugar in the USA caused the 
American government to increase import tariffs, thereby causing the Cuban share of the 
US market to decline as the price of Cuban sugar rose for US consumers.233 This in turn 
led Cuba to look elsewhere and, by the 1950s, about half of the Cuban harvest was 
aimed at the rest of the world, so that the income from the "world market" developed a 
considerable significance in the island's economic affairs.234 The heightened 
international tension at the time of the Korean War led to stockpiling of sugar, then 
considered an important strategic foodstuff, leading to considerable price inflation so 
that, by December 1951, the world price of sugar was 4.84 ¢ a pound, climbing to a 
brief high of 5.42 ¢ the following March.235 This high price encouraged a vast increase 
in worldwide production, with new areas being turned over to both cane and beet 
farming but, as there was not a comparable increase in consumption, the resulting crisis 
of overproduction led, within a year, to a collapse in the price to a mere 3.55 ¢ a 
pound.236 At this time Cuba was producing 18% of the world total and so the collapse in 
the market was disastrous for the Cuban economy. Cuban sugar farmers played their 
part in the general international scramble to grow more sugar and the 1952 zafra (sugar 
harvest) was the biggest in the island's history at over 7 million tons, compared to the 
previous record of 5.5 million tons the year before. Unfortunately for the Cuban 
producers however, of that 7 million tons, they were only able to sell 4.8 million, 
producing a general economic crisis for the whole island.237
In an attempt to cope with the immediate problems of the sugar industry, the 
government purchased 1.75 million tons of the 1952 zafra to be kept in reserve and off 
the open market, thus hoping to use Cuba's dominant position in the market to stabilise 
the price. Compensation was paid to the owners for this measure, which resulted in a 
balance of payments deficit of 82.6 million dollars.238 The Cuban unilateral cutback in 
production was implemented by decree number 78, which ruled that the 1953 harvest 
would be restricted to 5 million tons by shortening the length of time in which cane 
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could be cut.239 The tactic of restricting the length of the sugar harvest was designed to 
increase profits for the owners of the sugar companies at the expense of their 
employees. The sugar workers were only paid during the actual cane cutting period and 
therefore, if the harvest were of shorter duration, the wage bill would be reduced. 
Should the restriction be successful in raising or at least stabilising the price of sugar, 
this would maintain or increase the employers' income. Critics of the strategy of 
restricting production were clear at the time that only the sugar bourgeoisie could 
benefit from the policy of restriction and it was widely portrayed as being against the 
national interest.240 This illustrates the contradictions inherent in "economic nationalist" 
politics when the nation is divided into classes with divergent interests and, in 
consequence, there is no single "national interest".
As many of its critics predicted, this unilateral action was a complete failure, as 
other producing countries took advantage of Cuba's voluntary restriction to increase 
their output and the price continued to fall. The total national income from sugar fell 
from $655.5 million in 1952 to $404.9 million in 1953, while the total wage bill for the 
industry fell from $411.5 million to $253.9 million.241 Raúl Cepero Bonilla maintains 
that speculation, insider trading and corruption were rampant, with those who ran the 
Instituto Cubano de Estabilización de Azúcar ( ICEA - Cuban Institute of Sugar 
Stabilisation) enriching themselves scandalously.242 Moreover, the reduction in national 
sugar production was implemented by issuing production quotas to Cuban sugar 
companies, who were then able to trade these to their own immediate enrichment, while 
their employees faced redundancy when their employer sold their quota. An example of 
this is the 1956 protest at the closure of central La Vizcaya in Matanzas when its quota 
went to La Chaparra in Oriente.243 The UK government also profited from the 
unusually low price of sugar to end sugar rationing at home and buy a million extra tons 
from Cuba at less than 3¢ a pound.
Following the failure of Cuba's unilateral action to arrest the decline in the world 
price of sugar, an attempt was made to organise an international agreement to regulate 
the market. This approach had been tried before in the 1930s with the Chadbourne Plan, 
which had not been particularly successful because other countries, not members of the 
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scheme, simply increased their production and undermined the scheme.244 In 1953 
however, 44 governments were present at the negotiations and the Cuban government, 
one of the most enthusiastic backers of the approach, had greater hopes that the sugar 
price might be stabilised.
The chaotic situation in the world sugar market prompted the intervention of the 
United Nations. In April 1953, the UN invited 78 countries to send representatives to an 
International Sugar Conference in London, to take place in July of that year, with the 
intention of negotiating an International Sugar Agreement. The idea behind the 
agreement was to stabilise the price of sugar by allocating quotas to the different 
producing countries which would, in the words of the agreement, "regulate the world 
sugar market and reach an equilibrium between supply and demand that would allow 
the price to be maintained between the limits of 3.25 and 4.35 ¢ per pound".245 The 
Cuban quota was designed to allow a zafra of 5 million tons. In the event of the price 
falling below 3.25¢, quotas would be progressively cut by a maximum of 20%, at which 
point no further action was envisaged. The final agreement was signed in August by 
only 38 of the 44 participating countries, while the rest of the sugar producing world, 
particularly Peru, Indonesia, Brazil, Formosa and East Germany, was not bound by the 
treaty.246 Not signing the agreement and increasing production was only an option for 
smaller producers whose economies were not so dependent on sugar. This may have 
been short-sighted, but it represented an opportunity for growers in these smaller 
producing countries to gain an income they had not previously enjoyed. If Cuba were to 
have tried this approach, such was its importance in the world market that its 
withdrawal would have destroyed the agreement.
The partial nature of the International Sugar Agreement was to be its undoing, as 
those countries which did not sign the agreement could increase their production as 
much as they wished, while importing countries who were signatories to the agreement 
were not obliged to buy exclusively from other member states. Furthermore, the 
agreement only restricted production in exporting countries, but did not restrict internal 
production in participating importing countries; a particularly important loophole for 
European sugar beet producers. There were also two other important sugar regulation 
schemes, the Commonwealth Preference scheme and the United States Sugar quota 
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scheme. The latter accounted for about half the Cuban production and would have an 
important effect on the situation as US growers, eager to increase their own share of the 
domestic market, succeeded in their campaign to reduce the amount of sugar purchased 
from Cuba. This exacerbated the problem caused by the reduction in income from the 
rest of the world market. The Commonwealth scheme, which was designed to develop 
sugar production in the British Empire and which guaranteed an annual 2.5 million tons 
to Britain's colonies and ex-colonies, was an additional complication because it further 
reduced the potential market for Cuba.247 Thus, Cuba faced an unfortunate conjuncture, 
as falling prices due to overproduction coincided with a reduction in the American and 
British markets, as preference was given to internal US and British Empire production. 
Meanwhile some smaller producing countries took short term advantage of the London 
Sugar Agreement's attempt to reduce the amount of sugar on the market and undermined 
the agreement by increasing their own production.
These defects were obvious from the beginning as the price dropped to 3.14¢ in 
November 1953, thus triggering a 15% drop in quotas as soon as the agreement came 
into force. The price continued to fall and in May 1954 another 5% cut in quotas was 
decreed by the International Sugar Council, which had been set up under the agreement 
to manage the quota system. This intervention had little effect as, in June, the price fell 
to 3.05¢. The maximum cut in quota now having been reached, the agreement was 
powerless to act further, although the council did suggest a further voluntary cut.248
The failure of the London Sugar Agreement to achieve its objective of stabilising 
the world market sugar price between 3.25 ¢ and 4.35 ¢ per pound was to have serious 
political repercussions in Cuba, where opponents of the regime, like the economist 
Oscar Pino Santos who wrote for the journal Carteles, criticised the agreement as an 
unpatriotic betrayal of Cuban national interests, which he predicted was doomed to 
failure in any case.249 It is difficult to see how anything that the government might have 
done would have stopped the fall in the price of sugar, but the fact that they tried and 
failed left them open to criticism. However, the critics' recommended approach, which 
amounted to little more than aggressively trying to sell more sugar on an unregulated 
market, risked a further catastrophic fall in the world price which could have bankrupted 
the country. Nevertheless, the fact that the weight of the measures adopted fell most 
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heavily on the workers was to produce a strong reaction within the trade unions; a 
reaction exacerbated by changes in United States sugar purchasing policy.
The United States had never been part of the International Sugar Market, having 
sufficient supplies from its own internal sources and from its client states such as Cuba 
and the Philippines. During the first decades of the 20th century, Cuba supplied almost 
the entire US market and only then sold any excess on the world market, but the 
Jones-Costigan Act, passed by the US Congress in May 1934, imposed a system of 
quotas that were not mutually negotiated but decided unilaterally by the US Secretary of 
Agriculture.250 This reduced the Cuban share of the US market from 50% down to 30% 
and by the early 1950s the United States was only buying about half of the Cuban sugar 
crop. The US quota system was further complicated by the fact that, as well as its 
commercial function, it had a political dimension.251 So, in May 1955, following an 
aggressive campaign led by Senator Allan Elender, the US Senate passed a new "Sugar 
Law" which reduced Cuba's previously held right to 96% of any increase in US 
consumption down to 29.5%. This, according to Oscar Pino-Santos writing at the time, 
cost Cuba nearly 100,000 tons.252 This additional threat to the Cuban sugar production, 
which occurred despite a visit to Washington by a united delegation of Cuban employers 
and workers' leaders of all factions, served to increase anti-imperialist feeling amongst 
sugar workers.253
These feelings reinforced working class nationalist politics and gave added 
credence to ideas of economic nationalism as a solution to poverty and insecurity. This, 
in turn, further undermined the credibility of the London Sugar Agreement, which was 
popularly seen as being a surrender to foreign interests.254 It has been common since the 
1960s to assume that opposition to foreign ownership was directed entirely against the 
United States. However, it should be remembered that European capital held a 
significant minority stake in the Cuban economy and this was just as bitterly resented 
when it appeared to threaten the perceived Cuban national interest.
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As the failure of the London Sugar Agreement to prevent the continuing decline in 
sugar prices was becoming increasingly obvious, the government's inability to think of 
an alternative strategy further reduced its standing. Peru and Indonesia refused to join, 
Brazil and Formosa were unsatisfied with their quota and left, while many importers 
were never included. Moreover, the British Commonwealth received privileges which, 
given that London was the home of the agreement, served to further weaken the 
agreement's credibility. By early 1955, the price of sugar was ¢3.15 per pound, which 
was 10 points lower than the agreed minimum. Cuba appeared to be taking the majority 
of the restriction with a 30% reduction compared to the production levels of 1952, the 
impact of which would be much worse if the US quota were to be cut further as now 
seemed likely. The London Sugar Agreement appears from these figures to be working 
against Cuba's interests, but remaining a party to the agreement maintained a level of 
profitability for the employers, even if this was at the expense of working class 
employment and living standards. Yet living standards for agricultural workers were 
already appalling.255 The figures contained in the 1957 report by a Cuban Jesuit 
association, the Agrupación Católica Universitaria, are graphic, 64% of rural dwellers 
with no proper sanitation, 43% illiteracy, 91% undernourished, to give but a few 
examples.256 Cuba's sugar workers therefore had little to lose by resisting and, while 
hardship does not necessarily generate militancy, when combined with a sense of 
injustice, there is potential for industrial action.
These problems had already been foreseen by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) in 1951 when, following the request of 
the Cuban government for a loan, an American economist, Francis Truslow, was 
commissioned to produce a report on the state of the Cuban economy.
Productivity and Politics
The Truslow Report started from the position that international competition gave 
rise to the need to reduce sugar production costs and the recognition that mechanisation 
must inevitably displace some labour. The problem was summed up as: 
• employees strongly resist mechanisation and cost-cutting methods 
• the discharge of employees for legitimate cause [is] made difficult or impossible
• higher wages, coupled with opposition to methods for increasing productivity, 
255 Riveron Hernadez, Tiempo Muerto (1955) n.pag.
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endanger the competitive position of the basic sugar industry itself .257 
The opposition to productivity measures was rooted in the island's high levels of 
unemployment and underemployment, which explains the tenacity with which Cuban 
workers defended their jobs and the social clauses in the constitution that helped them to 
do so. The report recognises that the high level of unemployment deeply affected the 
consciousness of those in work. As Louis Pérez has argued, job security was always an 
important concern of unionised workers.258 Truslow sums up the situation as follows:
In Cuba it is usually easier, quicker and cheaper to divorce a wife than to fire a 
worker. Under prevailing conditions of chronic seasonal unemployment, it may 
also be easier to find a new wife than to find a new job.259
The report argued that increased productivity would attract investment, promote 
diversification and thereby produce jobs, although it does recognise that the workers' 
reluctance to co-operate was based on their doubt that that the money saved would be 
invested productively.260 Underneath the call for greater co-operation between 
management and labour lay the concrete proposal to make dismissal of employees 
simpler, faster and cheaper.261 In the particular case of the sugar industry, the report 
called for mechanisation, not of the planting and cultivating, but of the harvesting, 
which was the most labour intensive part of production and which would result in the 
redundancy of a very large number of workers.262 The employers wished to extend the 
mechanisation of the sugar industry beyond that recommended by Truslow to include 
modernisation of the refining process in order to process the cane faster. This would not 
only save time and thereby reduce wages in the sugar refineries, it would also put 
pressure on the cane farmers, the colonos, to increase the pace of work of their 
harvesting crews to supply the same amount of cane in a shorter time. The sugar 
workers called this process intensivismo, replying with the demand that they be paid for 
superproducción; this expression meant that they wished to be paid the same total 
amount as they had been before the new machinery arrived.263 Clearly this was not what 
the employers had in mind when they considered investing in new machinery.264
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The Truslow report was not merely concerned with the production of sugar, but 
also examined transport, which was an equally important part of the export procedure. 
The railway industry was close to bankruptcy and port labour was considered to be in 
need of reform to reduce its potential to disrupt loading. The report bemoans:
the strategic position occupied by men who load and unload ships, in view of the  
big investment tied up in ships and merchandise and the ease with which 
shipping companies can be subjected to important losses by sudden stoppages 
or delays. 265
This "strategic position" has been used by dockers everywhere to enhance their 
wages, improve their working conditions and maintain their manning levels. However, 
most employers would agree with Truslow in feeling that this obliged them to employ 
more staff than was strictly necessary, thereby reducing business efficiency. In 
particular, the report identified the main problem as the refusal to bulk load sugar. The 
universal nature of maritime productivity disputes is underlined by the contacts 
established at this time between the dock-workers of Caibarién in northern Cuba, who 
were fighting bulk-loading and the workers in the port of Liverpool in England, who 
were in dispute over attempts to introduce the fork-lift truck.266 The report further 
believed that wage levels were excessive, a factor which also exacerbated the precarious 
financial state of the railway industry:
With labor still making wage demands, it is believed that in many cases they 
have reached the limit that employers will tolerate.267
It should be noted that there is little mention of the question of inflation in the 
discussion of wage levels. In part this is as a result of the lack of reliable data. The US 
Embassy, in noting that it was "impossible to do more than conjecture as to the actual 
expenditure of the working classes", concludes from their own observations that there was 
a considerable increase in the cost of living as a result of food price inflation.268 This 
would have been another factor in stiffening labour resistance to wage cuts.
Thus, increased productivity was to be achieved by mechanisation and longer hours 
of work, both policies which would reduce the need for the existing number of workers in 
circumstances of a chronically high level of unemployment. To this was added the 
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proposal for a cut or at least a freeze in wages. There was therefore little prospect of 
workers voting for a party which intended to implement the Truslow report. 
In this context, the outlook for the 1952 general election looked unfavourable to 
the employers. Of the three candidates for President, Roberto Agramonte for the 
Ortodoxos, a recently founded anti-corruption party, was widely expected to beat rivals 
Fulgencio Batista, who had headed an earlier regime in the 1930s, and Carlos Hevia for 
the Auténticos, the current ruling party. The Ortodoxos were not a workers' party, but 
were relying on working class votes for their expected victory. The main plank of their 
election platform was opposition to corruption allied to a vaguely expressed economic 
nationalism which, while it did not go as far as outright anti-imperialism, called for 
recovery of national wealth and promised to implement measures of social equality. 
Such was the popular revulsion with the level of corruption of the Auténtico 
administration that it was widely expected that the Ortodoxos were going to win the 
election handsomely, while Batista seemed to be heading for a crushing defeat. The 
Ortodoxos displayed no interest in implementing the Truslow report and the report's 
concerns with productivity received no mention in their public statements. The 
Ortodoxos platform spoke of the "cubanisation" of the economy, "emancipating Cuba 
from foreign imperialism", nationalisation of foreign owned service industries and 
monopolies and redistribution of arable land.269  Carlos Alzugaray, in his recent study of 
US diplomatic correspondence, argues that this platform worried US business interests 
and their allies amongst the Cuban bourgeoisie.270 Eduardo Chibas, leader of the 
Ortodoxos until his suicide in 1951, would certainly have worried the First National 
Bank of Boston who led a syndicate that loaned the Cuban Government $200,000,000 
to build such projects as the tunnel under Havana Bay.271 He made it quite clear that, if 
he was elected, he would not repay the loan.272
When Batista and his associates in the armed forces staged a coup on the 10th 
March 1952, it was quickly welcomed by the United States. There was, in fact, 
remarkably little internal opposition to the army takeover, such was the cynicism with 
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politicians in general that developed over the first fifty years of the republic. The only 
social group to react strongly was the students.273 The ousted President went quietly, 
partly for fear that an Ortodoxo election victory might have investigated and punished 
his corruption. There was then an unseemly scramble by the majority of professional 
politicians to reach an accommodation with the de facto government in the hope of 
retaining their lucrative privileges.274 The literature contains a variety of explanations 
for the success of the coup, with different writers emphasising their preferred option. 
Thus Marifeli Pérez-Stable speaks of the restoration of order, Louis Pérez graphically 
describes the corruption and inefficiency of the Auténticos, Salvador Morales Pérez 
points to the desire of US economic interests to restructure the Cuban economy, while 
Morris Morley stresses the Cold War anti-communism of the US government.275 These 
factors all played a part in the coup and it is not the intention to propose a monocausal 
explanation. Nevertheless, given the lack of importance accorded elsewhere to the 
support given by business interests for the specifically anti-labour role played by the 
dictatorship, that particular aspect will be stressed here, not with the intention of 
downplaying other explanations, but of redressing the balance and bringing forward a 
neglected aspect of the history of the period.
The coup was indeed generally welcomed by capitalist interests, as it was felt that 
Batista would be more business-friendly than the alternatives. Within ten days of the 
coup, the major business associations had visited the presidential palace to offer their 
support: The Asociación de Hacendados, the Asociación de Bancos de Cuba, the 
Asociación Nacional de Comisionistas del Comercio Exterior, the Socios de la Bolsa de 
la Habana, the Asociación de Industriales de Cuba and the Cámara de Comercio.276 
Meanwhile, the main business daily paper, Diario de la Marina, contrasted the situation 
under the previous government where the "balance inclined monstrously toward the 
labour unions", with the statements of the new government, which were described as 
"serene and reasonable".277
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I am more and more convinced that the basic reason for the Armed Forces 
having staged the revolution was their utter disgust at the growing and 
unrestrained power of Labour278
later that year adding that: 
The business community, industry and commerce have all welcomed the new 
regime... If the coup d'état had to come, no better leader could in their view 
have been found and no more opportune moment chosen.279
The US Ambassador equally noted that businessmen were amongst the new 
regime's most enthusiastic supporters.280 The role of the state as ultimate guarantor of 
the interests of the ruling class was to be clearly demonstrated in the period under 
Batista's rule.
Conclusion
Attempting to influence the international market price of sugar was an important 
policy objective for the Cuban government, while the sheer size of the country's 
production seemed to offer the possibility of success in manipulating the market to 
maintain price levels. The government's attempts to achieve this, first by a unilateral cut 
in exports and then through participation in the International Sugar Agreement ended in 
failure as the price of sugar continued to fall. This fall made the question of labour 
productivity more urgent. The level of profitability was a serious problem for nearly all 
sectors of the Cuban economy by the middle of the 20th century, even without the fall in 
the world price of sugar. The Truslow report, identified the principal challenge facing 
the Cuban economy as low labour productivity and the task of resolving this problem 
would be made very much more difficult if the still-dominant sugar industry ceased to 
be profitable. To achieve this general increase in productivity, wages would have to fall 
and manning levels would have to be cut, which in turn would require state action. The 
report foresaw that that a dictatorship might result from this conflict of class interest.281 
Given the fear of most workers that the productivity measures proposed would be 
detrimental to their income and employment prospects, many employers thought that an 
authoritarian regime would be necessary to enforce the Truslow Report's proposals 
which, at least in the short term, could only result in a considerable increase in the 
already chronic level of unemployment. 
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One of the reasons for the success of the coup of March 10th 1952 was support 
from the business community for a regime which could reduce the ability of Cuban 
workers to defend their wages and working conditions. Such a regime could push the 
balance of national income in the favour of the employers. The new government sought 
to reduce opposition from organised labour by incorporating and corrupting the trade 
union bureaucracy, which would operate with the support of the Ministry of Labour and 
the police if necessary. Should that be unsuccessful, the regime had the army at its 
disposal to enforce its priorities. The year 1955 would put bring this conflict to the fore.
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Chapter 3. The Employers' Offensive
The year 1955 was a crucial turning point in the developing history of the Cuban 
Revolution. Up to this point, the Batista government had not tried very hard to enforce 
its productivity agenda and the mujalista bureaucracy had generally maintained its 
control of the union structures, with few examples of serious industrial action. This all 
changed during 1955, with important disputes in several key industries. These would 
have long term effects on the relationship between organised labour and the regime, as 
well as profoundly changing the balance of forces within the working class movement.
At the end of 1954, the Batista government had two pressing industrial problems 
on its agenda. The falling price of sugar meant that the employers in that industry were 
demanding wage and job cuts. They were particularly insistent as their demands for 
such cuts the previous year had been largely ignored pending the elections.282 
Additionally, financial problems in the US owned Ferrocarriles Consolidados (FFCC 
Consolidados), the railway company that operated the network in the eastern end of the 
island, meant that its owners also wished to cut their wage costs and staff numbers.283 
The government’s confrontations with the workers in these two powerful industrial 
sectors, as well as some other important groups of workers, made 1955 an important 
turning point in the history of labour mobilisation in Cuba.
The task of examining the class struggles of the year 1955 in detail has not been 
done elsewhere in the literature. Angelina Rojas, Marcos Winocur and Lazaro Torres 
Hernandez have provided general overviews. Rojas has relied upon the Havana 
newspaper Diario de la Marina, Winocur relies upon Bohemia and Torres has 
conducted a series of interviews with protagonists, most notably the strike leader 
Conrado Béquer.284 These short pieces serve as an introduction to the events of the year, 
but do not go into sufficient detail to assist with an analysis of the long-term effects of 
the struggles on Cuban politics. The outcomes of these disputes were different in each 
industry and the political trajectory of the leading protagonists was correspondingly 
different. This chapter argues that the degree to which each group of workers were 
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successful or not in their aims helped determine whether the politics of the PSP or the 
M-26-7 would come to dominate the anti-Batista opposition in different industries and 
regions. This analysis requires a more detailed study of the objectives, aims and 
outcomes of each different situation. There have been several interesting studies of the 
events of this period in individual regions, such as the unpublished account of the sugar 
workers' strike in Ciego de Avila in December 1955 that has been prepared by 
researchers in the provincial archive, or in single industries, such as Oscar Zanetti and 
Alejandro García's work on the railway industry.285 Such accounts where, as in these 
cases, their sources are substantiated,286  provide much useful detail but, because they 
are restricted in their scope, lack an overview of the whole situation. This chapter will 
attempt to strike a balance between detail and generalisation. 
Most other authors gloss over the events of this important year entirely, perhaps, 
like Bonachea and San Martín, mentioning in passing the relationship between the 
students and the sugar workers, but little else.287 Thus Robert Alexander in his History 
of Organized Labor in Cuba accords the sugar and bank workers' strikes less than a full 
page, while Jorge Garcia Montes and Antonio Alonso, in their history of the Cuban 
communist party, only allow the 1955 sugar workers' strike three paragraphs.288  If the 
majority of the historiography ignores widespread industrial action and apparently sees 
little connection with the developing revolutionary situation when the information is 
readily available in the daily press, it is hardly surprising that there should have been 
little research into the more obscure details of the later clandestine labour movement. In 
order to support the assertion that the sugar and bank strikes, as well as many others 
from 1955 which normally receive even less attention, were crucial to understanding the 
history of the Cuban insurrection, it is necessary to document the labour struggles in 
that year, both to rescue the story of the events from obscurity and to provide evidence 
for the contention that the working class played a significant role in the insurrectionary 
period of the Cuban revolution. 
If the role of workers in the Cuban insurrection has been overlooked, the role of 
women workers has disappeared completely from view. An examination of 
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contemporary sources, particularly photographs, demonstrates the importance of women 
both as workers themselves and as family members of workers in struggle. This chapter 
also examines the contribution made by women railway office workers, bank workers 
and shop assistants, as well as the solidarity provided by the wives and families of sugar 
and port workers. Two examples of this which are better documented, the office workers 
of Camagüey and the sugar workers of Delicias y Chaparra, serve as an illustration of 
wider women's involvement. Subsequent chapters highlight the same phenomenon in 
many other sectors.
The chapter starts by examining the troubles of the Cuban transport industry, 
continues with the bank workers' dispute, then tries to establish a balance sheet of the 
single enterprise strikes in industries such as brewing and textiles, before looking at the 
sugar workers strike, including their developing relationship with the country's students. 
The account of the events of 1955 can be given sector by sector with only minimal 
disruption of the chronological sequence, because the government was careful to avoid 
a generalised confrontation and so engineered disputes in one industry at a time. From 
this account, it emerges that the failure of these strikes at the hands of a repressive state 
and a corrupt trade union bureaucracy led a significant group of militant class-conscious 
workers to seek a different approach to the defence of their economic interests. In order 
to present a rounded picture, the chapter will also address the apparent success of the 
port and tobacco workers in resisting the employers' offensive when, all around, their 
compatriots were suffering defeat after defeat. Reflecting on why the employers 
productivity offensive was successful in some industries and not in others is key to 
understanding the later political development of different industrial sectors within the 
labour movement.
Batista planned his attack on working conditions carefully. He had reached an 
accommodation with the CTC but could not move too quickly because, if he 
undermined Mujal's base, that accommodation would be useless. Moreover, Mujal was 
accustomed to influencing government policy to a greater extent than would have suited 
Batista and the new dictator took a little time to subordinate Mujal to his project. We 
shall see how Mujal's relationship with the government changed over time and how he 
became increasingly identified with the regime. Having established a good relationship 
with the CTC leadership, Batista adopted an approach that would be reprised 30 years 
later by the Thatcher government in Britain using an approach that became known as 
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the "Ridley Plan": an attempt to restore profitability by defeating workers sector by 
sector, making sure that the field of battle is always chosen by the government and that 
any chance of generalised and united industrial action is avoided.289 Once the 
government had decided that the time was right to confront a particular group of 
workers, they acted with considerable brutality when this was required to overcome 
resistance. Nevertheless, they did not always win and particularities of each sector will 
be examined along with the political conclusions each group of workers drew from their 
victory or defeat. 
Previous chapters have argued that the Cuban employers felt the need for a 
productivity drive and that the trade union bureaucracy and the government were 
essential to their plans. This chapter examines the reaction of the workers to this 
productivity offensive so that we may assess the degree to which it succeeded. To do so, 
it takes a narrative approach to the events, record of which has been largely buried in 
the archives.
Public Transport
The first significant confrontation between the Batista government and organised 
labour came in the transport industry. The Cuban railways were suffering from a 
particularly severe crisis as a result of years of underinvestment, while transport 
workers were well organised and had maintained a significant level of independence, 
particularly in Oriente province at the eastern end of the island. The disputes in the 
transport industry in 1955 signify the first real defeat suffered by organised workers at 
the hands of the government and their employers. The government managed the conflict 
so that the railway workers were not given reason to go on strike until after the sugar 
harvest was in, thereby denying them the opportunity to make common cause with the 
sugar workers, with whom they had traditional relationships of solidarity. The railway 
companies also had substantial holdings in the bus industry, which had led to links 
between the the workers' organisations in both industries. It also meant that cost-saving 
measures would be applied on the buses as well the railway. It was in the bus industry 
that the new de facto government made its first attack on the labour movement, 
relatively quickly after the coup. 
289 The Economist (27th May 1978) pp. 21-23 
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In July 1952, with no warning, one of Havana's two bus companies was placed 
under military control, the leader of the union, Marco Hirigoyen, was arrested and 600 
out of the company's 6000 drivers were dismissed.290 This served the double purpose of 
removing one of Mujal's internal enemies in the CTC and cowing one of the most 
militant groups of workers in the capital, thereby reinforcing Mujal's sense that his 
future lay with the regime.291 This decisive action by the government also served to 
impress upon both the business community and foreign observers that Batista was 
serious in his intention to confront organised labour.292 The British Ambassador, wrote 
that Autobuses Modernos, one of the two bus operating companies in Havana, "had 
from the point of view of graft, rank inefficiency and financial loss become a crying 
scandal". He went on to "report this incident as an example of what can be achieved in 
Cuba by a strong man who is fearless of intimidation and is bent on cleansing public 
services of gangster and surplus elements. It is to be hoped that similar action, if 
required, will be taken at the appropriate moment to place the United Railways on an 
economic basis".293 
The United Railways to which he refers, called Ferrocarriles Unidos (FFCC 
Unidos) in Cuba, was the railway company that operated services in the western half of 
the island. It had a majority of British shareholders and was practically bankrupt. The 
British owners had been trying to extract themselves and their remaining capital from 
the company for some time, a fact which gave the British Embassy another reason to 
look kindly on the new Batista government:
the existence of a strong Government in Cuba greatly improves the chances of a 
settlement of the United Railways claim, which has been made more difficult by 
the attitude of organised labour in Cuba.294
Railways had developed early in Cuba, initially as a freight network that linked 
the sites of sugar production to ports on the coast, while a passenger network uniting the 
major centres of population on the island was a later development. This association 
between sugar and railways, described in detail by Oscar Zanetti and Alejandro García, 
was reflected in a history of solidarity between railway workers, dockers and sugar 
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workers that dates back to the beginning of the 20th century.295 Dagmary Durán 
describes how the main national trade union, the Hermandad Ferroviaria (Railway 
Brotherhood) had a socially conservative leadership that had close ties to the American 
Federation of Labour (AFL).296 This conservative attitude was, however, far from 
universal within the organisation and the local organisations, known as delegaciones, 
could be remarkably militant, particularly in the east of the island. By the middle of the 
century, the network was divided between two companies, the British-owned 
Ferrocarriles Unidos which operated in the west of the country and the US-owned 
Ferrocarriles Consolidados (FFCC Consolidados - Consolidated Railways) in the east. 
Both companies were in financial difficulties, but FFCC Unidos seemed to be in 
permanent decline.
The FFCC Unidos network infrastructure had badly deteriorated and was in need 
of massive capital investment. The report and accounts for 1948-9 painted a 
catastrophic picture of a bankrupt enterprise, operating under government supervision 
and kept alive by subsidies. The falling price of sugar, to which freight rates were 
linked, as well as the smaller crop led to revenue from sugar decreasing by half a 
million pounds sterling. The chairman complained that "the principal difficulty has been 
the refusal of the labour unions, ..., to permit the company to institute essential 
economies involving reduction of wages, dismissal of redundant staff and elimination of 
redundant services". 297 This led the writers of the Truslow report to conclude that the 
wages and conditions of the workers could no longer be sustained at existing levels and 
were an obstacle to further investment.298 In September 1949, FFCC Unidos finally 
managed to impose 800 job losses and had reduced wages to pre-1945 levels.299 By 
means of this cut, and with the help of a government subsidy of $100,000 a month,300 
the company was able to stagger on until 1952 when, with mounting debts, it sought 
further redundancies and early retirements. The new Batista government approved a 
plan, known after its author Luis Chiappy, whereby the government took a 51% stake 
and negotiated a loan from the Bank of America and the Hanover Bank to settle 
accounts with the British stakeholders.301 Gustavo Pellón, chairman of FFCC 
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Consolidados, the other railway company, was named as the interventor (government 
appointed administrator) and thereby took control without any financial liability.
In addition to taking action aimed at resolving the company's immediate financial 
future, the government announced its intention of imposing the job losses outlined in 
the Chiappy plan. The workers, having been disappointed by the response of their trade 
union in 1949, set up a rank and file based Comité de Lucha (strike committee) which 
called a strike at the end of June 1953.302 The government responded with military 
intervention and decreed that all who did not return to work immediately would be 
dismissed. Javier Bolaños, national president of the Hermandad Ferroviaria, ordered a 
return to work while saying that he would do everything necessary to ensure that the 
reduction in staff would be "strictly limited to the numbers that the company 
required".303 On the 26th July, an armed group led by Fidel Castro attacked the Moncada 
barracks in Santiago and, under cover of the resulting repression, the authorities 
managed to enforce the return to work order and forced further redundancies in August. 
There is no surviving evidence of workers' reaction to the Moncada attack, although the 
previous chapter described the hostile reaction of the PSP and it is likely that the 
outcome did not predispose the railway workers to support for Castro. Their victory 
over the FFCC Unidos workers left the government free to deal with the problems of 
FFCC Consolidados. However, before doing so, Batista managed to improve his 
position through the elections he called for November 1954. Despite a high level of 
fraud and the withdrawal at the last minute of his only rival, these elections gave the 
government a certain level of legitimacy, at least in the eyes of international diplomacy, 
with the British ambassador describing Batista as "the type of president best suited to 
the country".304 Once the 1954 elections were out of the way, the regime felt free to 
address the industrial issues confronting it, starting with the railways.
The financial problems of the Ferrocarriles Consolidados, while nowhere near as 
great as those of FFCC Unidos, were far from insignificant, with annual losses 
averaging $2.5m. From the start of the economic downturn which resulted from the 
drop in sugar prices in 1953, the owners had been proposing wage cuts based on the 
government's decree number 1155, which gave the company the right to set wages 
according to the economic situation. The company was faced by a trade union 
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organisation with a long tradition of militancy and these proposals were met with an 
outcry from the workers, which forced a delay in implementation that was financed by a 
government loan.305 Immediately following the November 1954 elections, FFCC 
Consolidados announced 1550 redundancies and a 20% wage cut to be implemented 
from 1st December 1954.306 The office workers in Camagüey, mainly women, were the 
first to receive the news as they would have to administer the cuts. They immediately 
walked out on strike (Figure 7). Some went down to the depot and the workshop where 
their action was swiftly joined by the drivers and engineers. Others produced leaflets 
and posters and took to the streets of Camagüey in an impromptu demonstration, which 
received considerable support in a town that relied on the railway yards for much of its 
prosperity.307 The wage cuts and redundancies were aimed mainly at the operating staff 
and so the actions of the administrative workers demonstrate a high level of principled 
solidarity, although it is also likely that they would find family and friends amongst the 
workers under attack. As word spread, the action soon extended to the rest of the region, 
with a large street demonstration bringing the centre of Guantánamo to a standstill.308 
The following day, the workers reported for work but initiated a Paso de Jicotea309, a 
go-slow that caused widespread disruption to the service.310 Taken aback by the level of 
resistance, the government declared a truce, suspended the cuts, set up a commission of 
enquiry with trade union and employer representation and gave the company a further 
loan.311 
FFCC Consolidados also owned four bus companies operating in Santiago de 
Cuba, La Cubana, La Cubanita, La Criolla and La Mambisa. It tried to use the period 
of the truce to impose cost-saving measures by locking out the workers in these 
companies. Many of their colleagues in the other two bus companies in the City 
withdrew their labour in solidarity; the strike in La Oriental was solid, but only partial 
on Autobuses Modelos. The army started rounding up drivers and forcing them to take 
out their buses. In protest, a number of drivers occupied their local union offices and 
started a hunger strike but were soon evicted by the police. The police intervention was 
said to be at the request of Prisciliano Falcón, a leading mujalista official in Santiago. 
305 Zanetti & García, Caminos para azúcar (1987) p.370
306 El Mundo (November 9th 1954)
307 "Los Conflictos Sociales" Bohemia (November 12th 1954) n.pag.
308 Voz del Pueblo (November 13th 1954)
309 "go-slow" literally "to move at the pace of a turtle", 
310 Cueto, Las condiciones de trabajo hacen insostenible a los Consolidados (1954) p.64-5
311 Voz del Pueblo (November 17th-22nd 1954)
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 522 (Nov. 24, 1954)  Consolidated railroad lay-offs supended
95
The hunger strike then moved to the offices of Delegación 12 of the railway union and 
continued for 72 hours, after which the company climbed down, the lock-out was 
suspended and arrears of salary were paid.312
The company also used the railway truce for an extensive press campaign, which 
consisted of newspaper advertisements, press statements and carefully placed interviews 
that argued that railway workers were being paid for hours they did not work and that 
wages had risen much faster than receipts.313 The advert shown in Figure 8 asserts that 
for every peso of income, the company expended one peso and 23 cents, of which 91 
cents was in wage costs. In particular, the company complained that it was not 
benefiting from its modernisation programme, giving the example that it only took 10 
hours to get from Santa Clara to Santiago, but the crews were still paid for the 20 hours 
it had taken before the company had invested shareholders money for infrastructure 
312 Carta Semanal (January 12th 1955)
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Figure 7: Office workers in Camagüey preparing for a demonstration,
from Bohemia (November 21st 1954) n.pag.
improvements.314 In this last argument, we see encapsulated the employers' position on 
productivity: having invested money for technological improvements, they expected 
their wage bill to reduce. However, with little prospect of other jobs, the majority of the 
workers saw no reason why they should have their staffing levels or pay reduced in 
order to to maintain or increase profit margins; a classic dispute about who should 
benefit from technological progress. There was little room for compromise between 
these two entrenched positions.
The railway workers were not idle during the truce 
period either, setting up a Comisión de Propaganda y 
Finanzas (Finance and Propaganda Committee) to 
co-ordinate the resistance. This body organised some 
short strikes in the Guantánamo region.315 Having access 
to typewriters and duplicating machines, as well as the 
skills to use them, the women in the administration took 
a significant role in the production of propaganda 
material. When the truce ended on January 20th, the 
company announced that it would withhold 35-40% of 
the workers' wages, suspend paid holidays and make 
other, similar economy measures.316 As soon as the 
announcement was made, the Camagüey office workers 
again demonstrated, loudly proclaiming that they would 
not implement the cuts.317 Despite government 
intervention to postpone the problem again, a move greeted as a victory by the CTC 
bureaucracy, the rail workers themselves did not trust the government and walked out 
on 3rd February.318 The strike spread throughout the network, with many violent 
confrontations between the police, army and striking workers, along with extensive 
solidarity actions by workers in other trades. Carta Semanal reports that in Morón, local 
bus and taxi drivers went on solidarity strike and a women's support group was set up in 
the town.319 Archival evidence shows the existence of a number of neighbourhood 
support networks set up by the female relatives of railwaymen, helped by the women 
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Figure 8: Advert by FFCC 
Consolidados, from Bohemia 
(December 12th 1954) p.78
from the offices, similar to the Women's Support Groups of the British miners' strike of 
1984-5. Women's groups would also be set up by the relatives of dockers and sugar 
workers during their own strikes later the same year. These actions by women were 
frequently a force for unity amongst workers of different trades as the women's groups 
were normally based in the areas where they lived and they were able to use their 
positions in the neighbourhood to build links of solidarity.
Many of the ports were also owned by the railway companies and dockers in 
Boquerón and Nuevitas struck in support of their railway colleagues, as a result of 
which, 58,000 sacks of sugar lay idle on the dock.320 Other port workers in Matanzas, 
Caimanera and Manzanillo took advantage of the opportunity to publicly demonstrate 
both in support of the railway workers, as well as to express their own opposition to 
bulk loading of sugar.321 It should be remembered that the port workers had a very good 
practical reason for their solidarity as they recognised that they might need railway 
support later in their battle to reject the "Sea-Train", a productivity measure with which 
their own industry was threatened. The most public demonstrations of solidarity took 
place in Camagüey where the CTC Federación Provincial (Provincial Federation), 
discussed the possibility of a general strike, while many workers independently took 
part in 10 minute solidarity strikes. All this activity resulted in numerous arrests, in 
response to which the women of Camagüey organised a demonstration demanding the 
release of all prisoners.322
The zafra, (sugar harvest) having only just started, following some difficult 
negotiations that had left many sugar workers deeply unhappy, Batista was concerned 
not to provide a pole of resistance which might have inspired disgruntled sugar workers 
in a movement which could have escaped the control of the trade union bureaucracy. 
The government therefore decreed another truce on 8th February while the Tribunal de 
Cuentas, the government accountancy service,investigated the situation of the company, 
this time for 100 days. This new truce was funded with another 700,000 pesos.323 The 
official union Comité conjunto (joint committee), which had been set up by the CTC to 
oversee the action, ordered a return to work without consulting mass meetings in the 
depots. In Guantánamo, Delegación 11, the local organisation of the Hermandad 
Ferroviaria covering the membership who worked for FFCC Consolidados, denounced 
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the truce as a sell-out and continued the strike until the 11th, when, following Mujal's 
personal intervention, they were paid in cash, thereby overcoming the company's 
attempt to pay 70% in cash and the rest in script until the government subsidy arrived.324 
A special congress of the Federación Nacional Ferroviaria325 was called to ratify the 
actions of the officials and, given that most of the delegations had not been elected by 
assemblies of the workers, such ratification was granted, although only after 
considerable bureaucratic manipulation from the chair.326 Once assured that the official 
trade union machinery was back in control and further unofficial action was unlikely, 
the regime moved against some of the militants, with the Santa Clara courts 
condemning 18 bus drivers and 72 railwaymen for huelga ilícita (illegal strike 
action).327 
Following the end of the sugar harvest, the report of Tribunal de Cuentas 
recommended an 8% wage cut, forced retirements, scrapping the collective agreement, 
abolishing many bonuses and lengthening the working day, as well as extensive service 
cuts.328 Batista accepted the report and published decree number 1535 on 7th June, the 
so-called "Laudo Ferroviario" (railway arbitration decision), which implemented the 
recommended measures and gave the company an annual subsidy of 600,000 pesos.329 
Within 48 hours Guantánamo was again out on strike, quickly followed by Camagüey 
and Santiago, 10,000 workers in all.330 Now that the sugar harvest was safely gathered 
in, the full force of the state was moved against the workers, the army was mobilised 
and the Ministry of Labour denied the very existence of the strike, while the CTC 
leadership condemned it out of hand. The strikers replied by organising 
ciudades-muertas across the region, completely shutting down Camagüey, Guantánamo, 
Morón, Nuevitas and Santiago. The tactic of ciudad-muerta (dead town) was a form of 
civic general strike in which not only did the other workers in a town strike in 
sympathy, but most business and commerce also closed their doors. The bus workers in 
Santiago who worked in companies owned by the FFCC Consolidados also walked out 
again and, on 9th May, set up camp on the town hall patio in protest.331 The CTC, 
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realising that the action was escaping its control, sent a committee to mediate but still 
failed to authorise the strike, although claiming to understand the grievance. Javier 
Balaños, leader of the Federación Nacional Ferroviaria, met the directors of FFCC 
Consolidados while appealing to the President to suspend the laudo for 30 days. Batista 
refused to meet union representatives as the police, army and secret policemen started 
rooting drivers and signalmen out of their houses and forcing them back to work at 
gun-point. 
The role of women in this strike is worthy of note. We have already seen the 
importance of the women from the offices in launching the strike and that the solidarity 
actions of family members were of significance. Given that the army was rounding up 
train-operating and signalling staff, forcing them to work at gunpoint, it was difficult for 
these workers to publicly demonstrate and picket. In a pattern that was repeated in other 
industrial disputes of the time, this public role was often taken over by women, either 
railway office workers or the families of the strikers, who also played a leading role in 
setting up neighbourhood solidarity committees. While women only made up 10% of 
the Cuban workforce and many of those were in the notoriously difficult organisational 
territory of domestic service, the comparatively few trade unionised women workers in 
the Cuba of the 1950s played a vital role in initiating and sustaining militant action out 
of all proportion to their numbers.
The Comité conjunto capitulated after 5 days. They ordered a return to work 
despite the continuing strength of the strike and growing solidarity from other workers. 
The final agreement was denounced by Gerrado Villariño, local president of the 
Hermandad Ferroviaria in Santiago, while the local leaders in Guantánamo went into 
hiding to avoid having to implement the order to return to work.332 In return for a few 
minor concessions, the Comité conjunto accepted an 8% wage cut, 600 redundancies 
and signed a no-strike agreement, thereby placing the strikers outside the law.333 This 
was the signal for the forces of repression to increase their physical attacks on the 
workers and, amid the demoralisation caused by the perceived sell-out, the strike was 
broken.334 In the days that followed, many of the leading militants were dismissed.335 
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This should not be seen as the end of the matter and the next chapter will describe the 
way in which the militants who led this dispute, particularly those from Guantánamo, 
would take stock of the defeat and produce new tactics for which they would soon 
develop a mass base.
However, the defeat of the workers in one of the oldest unionised sectors of the 
Cuban economy gave the government and the employers a considerable boost in 
confidence, so it was surprising how much difficulty they would have in dealing with 
another group that some did not even see as part of the working class.
Banks
The next important industrial struggle to take place in 1955 was the dispute in the 
banking industry. This was significant for several reasons. Vicente Pérez, a communist 
trade union organiser at the time, told the author that he considered this to be a highly 
significant dispute as the bank workers were often thought to be part of the "aristocracy 
of labour" or even "middle class". They certainly had no history of industrial action, yet 
they fought an extremely determined struggle, using strikes, go-slows and other 
traditional forms of direct industrial action.336 The essence of their dispute concerned the 
right to join a union. They finally went down to defeat after a bitter struggle that left 
many of their leaders victimised, in part because the employers were able to provoke the 
dispute after the railway workers had been defeated, thereby isolating their movement.
From the beginning of June 1955, the newly elected leader of the Havana 
bank-workers, José Maria de la Aguilera (Figure 9), initiated a press campaign for a 
wage increase of 20% and against the existence of the so-called "Anexo A" (Appendix 
A).337 This was a list of those who were considered to be "confidential employees" and 
who were forbidden to join a trade union. The demand for abolition of Anexo A was 
therefore a struggle for the right to organise.338 The Ministry of Labour became involved 
and, on the 30th June 1955, when they felt confident that they had broken the resistance 
on the railways, the government rejected the bank workers' demands and proposed a 5% 
increase.339 At a mass meeting in Havana, Aguilera attacked the huge profits of the 
banks, contrasting the difference between those profits and bank workers' pay, after 
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which he received a unanimous vote of support for his call for an immediate paso de 
jicotea.340
Meanwhile José Ignacio de la Cámara, 
president of the employers' association, 
counter-attacking the new leadership of the union, 
maintained that the contract of employment was 
more appropriate for the bull market of previous 
period and that the banks needed to build up their 
reserves. He claimed that, at a time when other 
industries were cutting wages, the banks were 
increasing the number of their employees, so 
therefore a wage freeze was the best they could 
offer. After Ministry of Labour mediation in the 
dispute, Aguilera told the government that the 5% 
offer was ridiculous, given the low wages in some parts of the country, and that it broke 
the constitutional right to a living wage for heads of families and, furthermore, that 
senior employees had received much larger rises.341 In fact, 1,300 of the 2,300 the bank 
employees in Havana were earning less than $200 per month while only 230 earned 
more than $300, even as bank profits were rising significantly. The full 20% claim 
would only amount to 9% of the banks' profits.342
Following a strike on the 7th July, the employers started to victimise known 
militants. The CTC initially supported the industrial action, but Mujal's return from a 
trip to Washington changed the situation as he accused Aguilera of indiscipline. The 
Havana bank workers begin a huelga de brazos caídos (strike of fallen arms), a form of 
action that involved the workers reporting for work but doing little or nothing while on 
the premises. At the end of July, this movimiento de brazos caídos was extended to all 
banks nationwide as the government issued a decree freezing wages in the sector and 
giving the strikers 72 hours to return to normal working, after which dismissals would 
be authorised.343 The complete paralysis of the country's economy that had previously 
been predicted was avoided as senior staff managed to run a limited emergency service. 
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Figure 9: José Maria de la Aguilera, 
from Bohemia (1955)
Representatives of business and commerce fell in behind the banks and condemned the 
breach of the government decree while, on 30th August, the Ministry of Labour used its 
powers of "intervention" to seize formal control of the Havana branch of the bank 
workers union; an action solicited by Mujal with the support of the leadership of the 
national federation.344
The strike hardened as control of the union became an issue when the CTC 
executive voted to support government intervention. This gave the green light to police 
repression, with many arrests and violent attacks on striking workers.345 Strikers, ejected 
from their own premises by the police, set up a new strike office in the premises of the 
Juventud Obrera Católica (JOC - Catholic Labour Youth), a Social-Christian 
organisation, of which many bank-workers were members, which was led by Padre 
Enrique Oslé, a friend of the bus workers' leader Marco Hirigoyen.346 This involvement 
of the Catholic Church provoked a ferocious debate between Mujal and Padre Oslé of 
the JOC, enabling Mujal to claim that he was defending secular trade union 
independence against Church interference.347 There was considerable rank and file 
support for the bank workers within the CTC nationally and the communist party 
newspaper, Carta Semanal, reported solidarity stoppages of 10 -15 minutes in an 
impressive list of workplaces but, despite the concerns expressed by some of Mujal's 
internal rivals on the CTC executive, such as Angel Cofiño, the leader of the electrical 
workers' union, the CTC apparatus remained loyal to Mujal.348
On the 8th September, in a last ditch attempt, a delegation of 500 strikers went to 
the Cardinal-Archbishop's palace and asked him to intervene, but this was construed as 
a mark of weakness by the employers who refused the Church's offer of mediation. The 
Diario de la Marina, the main right-wing daily newspaper in Havana, was quite clear 
that, in order to win, the strikers needed to paralyse the economic life of the whole 
country and, having failed to do so, they went down to defeat.349 The role of Mujal in 
orchestrating the return to work is significant, as he played a much more active and 
devious role than in the earlier railway dispute. On the 6th September, Mujal met both 
President Batista and José María de la Aguilera. Two places on the "intervention 
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committee", set up to implement the seizure of the Havana branch of the union by the 
Ministry of Labour, were offered to the old executive as well as freedom for arrested 
strikers, 98 men and 2 women, in return for normal working, with a promise that the 
government would study the wage claim.350 Demoralised and undermined, the workers 
returned to normal working on the 12th and 13th, while Mujal promised to work for the 
release of the detainees and the reinstatement of the 174 dismissed workers; to little 
effect in the case of the sackings, with the announcement on the 15th that they would 
stand in the majority of cases.351
This incident is a good example the mujalista method. In his report to the 
executive of the Federación Bancaria, Mujal spoke of the need to achieve a wage 
increase and that, while he rejected all dismissals, there was an absolute need to stop all 
industrial action and to restore internal discipline by taking disciplinary action against 
the leaders in Havana who had "provoked the difficulty".352 As may be expected, he 
expended much more energy on the question of internal discipline than on reversing the 
dismissals, which had to wait until the revolutionary victory in 1959.353 On the 31st 
October, the Ministry of Labour awarded a wage increase of 10% but greatly increased 
the number of workers on Anexo A, thereby indicating that the real issue at stake was 
not the employers' ability to pay an increase, but rather an attack on militant trade 
unionism.354 Immediately following the dispute, Andrés Valdespino, writing in the 
weekly journal Bohemia, correctly argued that the attack on bank workers was part of 
an emerging pattern of wage cuts and mass redundancies.355
Other trades
The pattern of cuts of which Valdespino speaks continued to be implemented 
sector by sector, with every effort made to prevent generalisation of the resistance. An 
example of this is the dispute with the telegraph workers, which started over a 
government cut in seniority payments in the summer of 1955. Given the situation 
described above in the banking industry and fearing that they were in danger of fighting 
350 Diario de la Marina (September 7th 1955)
351 Diario de la Marina (September 13th, 14th 1955)
352 Diario de la Marina (September 20th 1955)
353 Revolución (February 14th 1959)
354 Diario de la Marina (November 1st 1955)
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on two fronts, the government offered a compromise of a 4% cut for everyone. A partial 
strike at the beginning of July won a promise of continuation of the seniority payments 
but, at end of month, these were much reduced. An apparently spontaneous strike broke 
out and, in response, the authorities at first tried repression, with 205 arrests, 80 of them 
women, while the army took over the service. When it became clear that there was a 
danger of this dispute joining up with the bank-workers, the CTC negotiated a 
compromise that would restore seniority payments in September.356
In 1955 there were many single factory strikes, but the record is necessarily 
patchy and depends upon the presence of a reporter to write the story or whether the 
press had anything that was considered more important that week. A list of single 
enterprise strikes taken from the pages Bohemia and Carta Semanal for 1955 and 
displayed below in Table 2 gives some idea of the extent of the activity. This table 
indicates a high level of industrial action in a wide range of industries. What is 
noticeable is the militancy with which the actions were fought, with attempts to spread 
the action through demonstrations and symbolic occupations of public buildings. 
However the government, in collaboration with the trade union bureaucracy, managed 
to isolate each action in its immediate locality, preventing a widening of solidarity. This 
permitted the police and army to crack down on the strikers in many cases without 
having to worry about the action becoming more generalised. Nevertheless this did not 
always lead to defeat. 
Table 2: Industrial Strikes in 1955
Date Place Factory Activity
26 Jan Havana La 
Galleteria
(bakers)
Strike against imposed contract
Police intervene to declare "Huelga ilicita"
9 Feb 
23 Feb 
Manzanillo Zapateros
(shoemakers
)
400 on strike against wage cuts and job losses
Street and workplace collections. Demonstrations. 80 
arrests
9 Feb Havana Havana Post
(newspaper)
On strike, paper is only published because of 
management strike breaking
6 Apr Luyanó, 
Havana
Hatuey 
(brewery)
"Paso de jicotea" against management abuse.
356  "Telegrafistas", Bohemia (28th August 1955) p.78 
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27 Apr Pinar del 
Rio
Las Minas 
de 
Matahambre
48 hour strike
8 Jun Havana La Tropical, 
La Polar
(brewery)
Brewers strike and occupy factory. Police dislodge 
workers and arrest leaders. Charged with "huelga ilícita" 
y "ocupación illegal de fábrica"
Manzanillo La Oriental
(foodstuffs)
Obreros de fideos on strike against 52% wage cut - 
occupy town hall
15 Jun Manzanillo La Oriental Removed from town hall by police, move to Centro de 
Veteranos, but moved again.
6 Jul Havana La 
Ambrosia
(brewery)
Strike
13 Jul Luyanó, 
Havana
Hatuey 
(brewery)
"Paso de jicotea" still continuing
27 Jul Manzanillo Zapateros Strike against CRIC (Comité Reguladora de la Industria 
del Calzado or Regulatory Comittee for the Footwear 
Industry). Army occupies town, barricades in response, 
broken by army.
16 Aug Guanbacoa, 
Havana
Zapateros 500 demonstrate against CRIC
28 Sep 
2 Nov 
Matanzas La 
Rayonera
(textiles)
½ hour first day, ¾ 2nd, 1hour third
Strike ended 300 redundancies suspended
2 Nov -
14 Dec 
Marianao, 
Havana
Tejaleros
(roofing 
tiles)
Against wage cuts. Finally win after 51 days
23 Nov
7, 
14 Dec 
Cotorro, 
Havana
Hatuey 
Brewery
Strike starts after 4 weeks of agitation. 
Reject truce and retain CTC support.
Finally sold out by CTC
It is worth looking more closely at two of these strikes, the Tejaleros or 
roofing-tile makers of the Havana suburb of Marianao and the textile workers from la 
Rayonera factory in Matanzas. These strikes had very different outcomes. The textile 
workers suffered a wage cut although they did manage to prevent redundancies, while 
the tejaleros were ultimately successful in winning their demands. We shall see that 
these two different outcomes resulted in the workers concerned drawing different 
conclusions, with the Rayonera workers moving towards the politics of the M-26-7 and 
the tejaleros retaining their traditional support of the PSP.
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There had already been a significant level of conflict in the Matanzas textile 
industry when, in September 1955, Gerado Fundora Nuñez, spokesman for the workers 
of la Rayonera textile factory, summed up his view of the situation as follows: 
There is a campaign to convince the people and government of Cuba that 
industrial development requires the higher profits that result from wage cuts and 
changes to social legislation.357
Previously, in 1952, la Rayonera had tried to abrogate the collective agreement 
and impose redundancies on the grounds of unprofitability. This ended in a series of 
riots which were repressed by the police and army on October 2nd, during which the 
union local office was seriously damaged.358 In February 1953, following a 20% wage 
cut, there was a 103 day strike by the province's sisal workers which received 
considerable solidarity from the workers in la Rayonera, who went on to refuse to work 
fabric with less than 30% Cuban fibres.359 The army again intervened in June 1954 to 
defeat a factory occupation at la Rayonera against proposed redundancies.360 The 
situation finally came to a head in August 1955, when the end of a tax-break led the 
company to go on a productivity offensive, claiming lack of financial viability. 
Management demanded 277 redundancies with the same level of production and 8 hours 
work instead of 6 for the same pay. They threatened otherwise to close the business in 
October, while bringing troops into the factory to intimidate the workers; indeed it was 
an army officer who read out to the workers the list of names of those who would 
continue to work. The workers responded first with a slowdown and then with a rolling 
strike, with half an hour on the first day, three quarters of an hour the second, one hour 
the third, until the company locked them out and used the army to eject them from the 
factory (see Figure 10).361
The workers set up a strike headquarters in the provincial CTC offices but the 
army and police expelled them from there as well. This led the movement to become 
generalised and escalated to a cuidad-muerta in the city of Matanzas. The shop 
assistants in the Woolworth store in the city, almost entirely women, were amongst the 
leaders of this movement of solidarity, defying the army who attempted to force them to 
reopen. The army organised strike breaking and attempted to force shops to open while 
357  Cueto, En la Rayonera hace tiempo que los obreros están 'levantando parejo' (1955) pp.54-5 [my 
translation]
358 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 510 (Oct. 3, 1952) Henequen workers strike
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361  Carta Semanal (September 28th 1955)
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soldiers drove the buses.362 However, repression failed to break the strike and, with the 
situation getting out of hand, Batista called in Mujal and the two agreed a truce to await 
the report of a commission of enquiry. This took the heat out of the situation and 
allowed the company to introduce the pay cuts, although not the redundancies, in a 
piecemeal fashion over the course of the next few months.
While in most of the disputes we have discussed so far, the government and the 
employers were able to get most of what they wanted, they did not have it all their own 
way, as can be seen from the dispute in the Havana suburb of Marianao between the 
tejaleros (roofing tile makers) and their employers. The dispute started in November 
1955 against a management attempt to impose wage cuts. The action started as a paso 
de jicotea which soon escalated into an occupation. The army violently ejected the 
strikers from the factory and the employer locked them out. In response, the strikers 
occupied the local offices of the CTC Federación provincial. The locally high profile 
provided by this occupation of the union offices enabled them to organise a 
demonstration of support by other workers and students, as a result of which the army 
occupied the neighbourhood. The strikers elected a strike committee and family 
members set up an Asociación de Mujeres y Familiares de los Tejaleros (women's 
362  Rojas, 1955 (1998) pp.53-4
"Conflicto" Bohemia (October 30th 1955) pp.69-71
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Figure 10: Picket line at La Rayonera poses for Bohemia (December 4th 1955) p.55
group) to organise solidarity. After 4 weeks, the Ministry of Labour threatened dismissal 
to all who did not return to work. The workers responded with demonstrations outside 
the Ayuntamiento (Town Hall) and managed to win the support of the Alcalde (Mayor). 
The CTC leadership proposed a compromise of a reduced wage cut of 10%, but the 
workers rejected this. Finally after 51 days on strike, management capitulated and the 
strikers won. 
It is hard to say why these workers were successful when so many other were not, 
but the factors in their success would have included the history of solidarity in the town, 
the presence of a large communist party branch capable of generating solidarity outside 
the immediate area, the community involvement through the women's support group 
and the approaching showdown with the sugar workers. Whatever the reasons, the 
political consequences of these two strikes present examples of an oft repeated 
tendency; workers who mange to defend their conditions by traditional trade union 
practices, such as the Marianao roofing tile makers, stayed loyal to the communist party 
and its policy of peaceful mass action, while those who were defeated turned towards 
the July 26th movement and its policy of violent confrontation with the forces of the 
state. Thus, the textile workers of Matanzas led by Julián Alemán, who joined the 
M-26-7 in September 1955, would provide one of the earliest working class bases for 
the 26th July Sección Obrera.363
Students
Students are not workers in the sense of the term defined in the Introduction but, 
nevertheless, in Cuba they had a long history of making common cause with organised 
labour. Students commonly felt that their prospects would be improved by an economy 
run in the interests of local industry, which attracted them to revolutionary nationalist 
politics in considerable numbers. Given that many were educated in fields in which 
there was scant chance of employment, they shared the experience of economic 
insecurity with the sons and daughters of the workers and peasants and this gave a 
material basis to the alliance between revolutionary nationalist students and class 
conscious workers. Take, for example, the journal Taína, produced by the Asociación de 
Alumnos del Instituto de Segunda Enseñanza de Santiago de Cuba (Santiago 
Association of Secondary School Students) in the period 1954-56. Its politics spoke of 
the need to industrialise the country, called for patriotic Cubans to buy Cuban products 
363 Machado, El movimiento obrero henequenero (2011) n.pag [manuscript in author's possession]
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and expressed opposition to redundancies, to wage cuts and to bulk loading of sugar.364 
This tradition of mutual aid between workers and students would be of particular 
importance in 1955.
Significant numbers of students had opposed the Batista regime from the outset 
with strikes, demonstrations and riots. On 6th April 1952, the Federación Estudiantil 
Universitaria (FEU - federation of university students) in Havana symbolically buried 
the constitution and declared a strike until 28th April. Indeed, the first martyr to the 
violent repression with which the regime met overt opposition was a student, Rubén 
Batista Rubio, who died as a result of injuries received on a student demonstration on 
15th January 1953, called to protest at the desecration of the monument to an earlier 
student leader, Julio Antonio Mella.365 Cuban students proved themselves adept at using 
patriotic occasions for demonstrations against the regime, thereby giving themselves a 
cloak of nationalist legitimacy. Thus, in Santiago de Cuba, the first fights between 
students and police took place on 7th December 1952 as the students boycotted the 
official commemoration of independence war hero Antonio Maceo and organised an 
alternative event which was attacked by the forces of order.366 This use of official events 
for unofficial demonstrations was also useful for joint events to build unity between 
students and workers. For example, on Mayday 1953 there were two events in Santiago, 
the official Labour Day commemoration, where Guillermo Mestre of the electrical 
trades union, who represented the national leadership of the CTC, gave the address 
stressing the need to keep politics out of the unions, while an alternative meeting took 
place in the local premises of the Bacardi workers' union, the Sindicato de Licores 
(drinks workers' union). This was jointly organised with the federations representing 
university and secondary students and was addressed by the communist Juan Taquechel, 
leader of the Santiago dockers.367 This relationship between workers and students would 
be strengthened by developments within student politics.
364 Poveda Diaz, Propaganda y revolución en Santiago de Cuba (2003) pp.59-61
365 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 1100 (Jan. 16, 1953) Student Riots Quelled By Police and Firemen
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There was an ongoing political battle within the student federations between three 
principal tendencies: those students who wanted to get on with their studies and were 
not concerned with politics; those who felt there could be a political solution resulting 
from a compromise with Batista; those who felt an uncompromising hostility to the 
dictatorship.368 Elections were mainly won by the third group, although not always, as 
shown by the defeat of the Estudiantes Martianos in the Escuela Profesional de 
Comercio (Professional Commercial School) in Santiago by a slate dedicated to "no 
más hablar de política" (no more talk of politics).369 Generally though, the opposition 
performed better in the student elections and young men and women who would later 
become important revolutionaries, such as Jorge Ibarra and Frank País served as student 
union officers. The most significant election, however, was that of the openly 
revolutionary José Antonio Echeverría (Figure 11) as national president of the FEU, 
which represented a distinct radicalisation within the student milieu.370
The election of Echeverría in early 
1955 raised the stakes in the battle with the 
authorities. The first major student 
demonstration thereafter, in May in 
Matanzas to commemorate the murder of 
the nationalist leader Antonio Guiteras 
twenty years previously, was viciously 
attacked by the police and Echeverría 
himself was hospitalised.371 This was 
followed by a police raid, which destroyed 
the FEU offices in the university.372 There 
are two principal treatments of student 
struggles against Batista, one by Julio García Oliveres, the other by Jaime Suchliki 
which, while displaying radically different political biases, are broadly in agreement in 
their narratives.373 Julio García Olivares, a friend and political ally of Echeverría, writes 
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Figure 11: José Antonio Echeverría, from 
Bohemia (1955)
that the 1953 Moncada attack and the subsequent murders had convinced Echeverría 
and his immediate circle that there was no possible compromise with Batista and that 
there was need for a bigger change than just a return to the situation before the coup.374 
There was a process of political development among the more radical students as the 
struggle progressed and by the end of 1955, Echeverría was openly talking of "la 
Revolución Cubana".375 
In parallel with these developments, the violence of the regime showed that 
traditional tactics of demonstration and strike were no longer sufficient in themselves. 
The repressive response to the election of Echeverría failed to intimidate the new 
student leadership but caused them to rethink their tactics, resulting in an open turn 
towards the organised working class while, in parallel forming a clandestine armed 
organisation called the Directorio Revolucionario.376 There were traditional bonds of 
solidarity between the students and militant workers, who frequently came to the 
university seeking support.377 The police reaction to a student march in Santiago 
provided the opportunity to give the relationship a practical application. 
On 27th November 1955, the students in Santiago celebrated their traditional 
event to commemorate the execution of a group of patriotic medical students by the 
Spanish authorities in 1871. At the same time, they also raised the issue of a colleague, 
Narciso Mártinez, who had disappeared the previous July and was commonly believed 
García Oliveras, El movimiento estudiantil antibatistiano y la ideología de la Revolución (2009)
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Figure 12: Press photos of student demonstrators, from Bohemia (December 11th 1955) n.pag
to have been murdered by the police. This infuriated the police who attacked the 
demonstration. The students tried to barricade themselves in the Town Hall, but were 
ejected violently and three days of rioting ensued.378 This spread to Havana on the 30th 
where the FEU executive called a 72 hour strike in solidarity with Santiago. There was 
more violence on the 7th December when students tried to lay a wreath at the 
monument to the national hero Antonio Maceo, but this time photographs of the results 
of the police brutality appeared in the press (Figure 12). 
Most of FEU leaders were now in prison, so the 10th December executive 
meeting was composed mainly of deputies, one of whom, quoting the student worker 
alliance of 1933, proposed a five minute national strike on the 14th. Student organisers 
visited a large number of workplaces where they received a positive response from 
workers disillusioned with the performance of their official union leaders. The CTC 
officialdom, with the exception of the Gastronómicos (hotel and catering workers), 
opposed the action, but nevertheless, it was very well followed, particularly in transport, 
banks, docks, tobacco, shops, hotels and restaurants, indicating a growing disillusion 
with both the official unions and the regime. the list of workplaces taking action in 
support of the students filled a whole page of Carta Semanal.379 According to Bonachea 
and Valdés, dockers in the ports of Havana, Regla, Santiago, Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, 
Matanzas and Manzanillo, "simply refused to work for the rest of the day causing chaos 
in busy ports".380 It was widely reported that Mujal himself was kept waiting for five 
minutes for his coffee when the waiters refused to serve him in a café.381 The success of 
the strike helped to raise political tensions and Echeverría, on his release from prison, 
promised to return the solidarity.382 Following a visit to the university by the Las Villas 
sugar workers' leader, Conrado Béquer, he would shortly get the opportunity. 
Sugar
While the government and the employers had been relatively successful in their 
productivity drive up to this point, the real test would come in their battle with the sugar 
workers, which was widely recognised as being inevitable as the harvest season 
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approached at the beginning of 1956. The nature of the Cuban economy meant that the 
sugar workers union, the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Azucareros (FNTA - 
National Federation of Sugar Workers) had always been the most important part of the 
Cuban labour movement and because of this, defeating the sugar workers was vital to 
any attempt to force through productivity increases. A government failure to impose its 
will on the sugar workers would have given heart to other industrial sectors and 
undermined the employers' productivity drive. The fall in the international price of 
sugar in the early 1950s made this battle doubly important as there was a real crisis in 
the industry. From the point of view of the labour movement, this dispute is also 
significant as it was followed by the first major split in the trade union bureaucracy. The 
subsequent intervention of the Ministry of Labour in defence of Mujal's position in the 
union, following similar intervention in the earlier bank workers' dispute, shows the 
increased dependence of the mujalistas on state support as they lost influence amongst 
the rank and file. Faced with this attitude on behalf of much of the official leadership, 
the workers displayed an ability to organise independently. All of these themes will 
recur in the following years leading up to the revolution. 
Chapter Two described how the government, as part of the strategy outlined by 
the London Sugar Agreement, had reduced the length of time that cane was harvested. 
This caused a reduction in the overall annual wage earned by the sugar workers. The 
failure of the London Sugar Agreement to stop the fall in prices meant that this 
reduction in their wage bill was still not enough for the employers to make profits. They 
therefore needed further cuts, which could now only be achieved by a cut in the actual 
rate of pay and a reduction the numbers employed, with the remaining workers being 
expected to work harder. This dispute would leave the sugar workers defeated in their 
immediate gains, but at the cost for the government of alienating a significant number of 
workers and causing the first of several splits in the CTC bureaucracy. The employers 
were also dissatisfied by the outcome, as they were still expected to pay a bonus, albeit 
at a lower rate than the workers demanded. They had expected the government to 
destroy all resistance and the first signs of a cooling of business support for Batista are 
visible.
In 1953, as part of its attempts to stabilise the international price of sugar, the 
government had restricted the harvest to 4,750,000 tons and reduced wages.383 A further 
383 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 1203 (Feb. 4, 1953) High Court Rules Against Payment of Union 
Dues by Employers
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reduction was under consideration for 1955.384 In 1954, wages and conditions were 
frozen to 1953 levels, perhaps to avoid trouble before the elections, but the employers 
considered this to be economically unviable in view of the fall in prices.385 As a result 
the employers proposed a pro-rata wage rate based on the price of sugar.386 This 
produced an outcry, even from the moderate leader of the FNTA, José Luis Martínez.387 
The FNTA in Oriente province called for 
a 24 hour strike to demand the dismissal of the 
Minister of Labour.388 The FNTA national 
conference in January 1955 supported 
Martínez's stand, with more militant elements 
agitating for an all-out strike.389 Following a 
round table discussion with both the employers 
and the unions, the government decreed a 
harvest of 4,400,000 tons and a 7.31% wage 
cut, which would result in a saving for the 
employers of 23 million pesos, 15% of their 
wage bill.390 The decree also authorised bulk 
sugar loading, a measure which would have led 
to thousands of job-losses.391 There was uproar in the FNTA conference, but Mujal 
persuaded the delegates to refer the strike call to a joint CTC/FNTA executive meeting. 
There, away from the pressure of the conference, Martínez and Mujal opposed a strike 
as impractical, saying that the FNTA was not prepared. The final vote was 53 - 19 
against strike action.392 
This conference is the first sign of a developing schism in the CTC bureaucracy 
and the emergence of a left-wing opposition centred around Conrado Rodriguez and 
Conrado Béquer, known popularly as los dos Conrados (Figure 13). Béquer was deputy 
general secretary of the FNTA and they were both Auténtico parliamentary deputies. 
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Figure 13: Conrado Béquer & Conrado 
Rodriguez ("Los dos Conrados"), 
from Bohemia (1956)
They would go on to play significant roles in the Cuban revolution. This conference was 
also the first report at national level of an intervention by David Salvador, a shop 
steward from central Stewart near Ciego de Avila, who would soon become a founder 
member of the M-26-7 and would lead the revolutionary CTC after the revolution. 
Following the formal acceptance of the government decree, employers in the 
province of Las Villas started declaring mass redundancies while Conrado Rodriguez, 
the provincial FNTA leader, publicly accused Mujal and Martínez of betrayal.393 There 
was considerable disillusion at this climb-down, both within the rank and file and 
among a minority of the FNTA leadership. On the other side, the employers had been 
looking for a much greater cut in their wage bill.394 The Ministry of Labour repaid the 
FNTA bureaucracy for their help in defusing the situation by delaying the scheduled 
union elections in which it was unlikely that any of the mujalistas on the executive 
could have retained their seats.395 The scene was therefore set for a confrontation the 
following year, by which time, having defeated the railway workers and the bank clerks, 
the government would feel more confident. Meanwhile, both sides limbered up with a 
series of increasingly bitter skirmishes as can be seen in Table 3 below on sugar 
industry strikes during 1955, which details reports from Carta Semanal and Bohemia 
during 1955.
Table 3: Sugar industry strikes during 1955
3 Jan396
12 Jan 
23 Feb 
Oriente Delicias-Cha
parra
Strike over job losses started previous October. 
200 women prevent arrested workers being taken 
to Holguin by train, then prevented strike breakers 
entering workplace. Women's group goes to Tunas 
y Holguin to seek solidarity
Strike Continues
Zafra starts with no job losses but needed strike to 
get overtime pay.
12 Jan Oriente Central 
Carolina
15 day strike against 4 day week -"¡Trabajamos 
semana completa o no trabajamos!" (we work the 
whole week or not at all) - Successful
12 Jan Camagüey Central 
Morón
Paso de jicotea - army surrounds assembly
393 "Trabajo", Bohemia (February 6th 1955) n.pag.
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12 Jan Guantánamo Ingenios 
Esperanza,
Soldedad, 
Isabel
Management agree to start of repairs on the same 
conditions as last year and withdraw threats of 
wage cuts following threatened industrial action
16 Feb Camaguey Central 
Florida
Strike against job losses
23 Feb
(20 Feb in 
Bohemia)
Las Villas Central 
Estrella
 84 redundancies lead to strike - 60 workers 
arrested but released as strike continues and 
company give way. Women active in solidarity. in 
Central Estrella.
FNTA plenary attacked by police in Las Villas. 
Matanzas Central 
Dolores
Strike
Central 
Tacahó 
Strike
20 March
(Bohemia)
Central 
Soledad
Sugar workers' wives and families occupy 
company offices, but dislodged by army.
Conrado Béquer arrested397
6 April Havana Central 
Hershey
48 hour strike to defend "escalafón" (seniority 
agreement)
14 Sep 
(11 Sep in 
Bohemia)
6 Nov
Las Villas Central 
Washington
(owned by 
Batista)
Assembly to discuss proposed 40 redundancies. 
Police attack, 9 gunshot, 20 machete wounds.
CTC equivocate, strike threats in Las Villas.
Sugar workers occupy site hospital, start hunger 
strike, families occupy school, then occupy church 
and ayuntamiento. Solidarity strikes in the region. 
Company claims bankruptcy. Mujal washes his 
hands of matter. Dos Conrados occupy church 
tower, intervention ordered. More army violence, 
intervener eventually concedes to workers and 
redundancies are withdrawn
23 Nov Sancti Spiritus Central 
Amazonas
Demonstration in support of strike against sacking 
of 84 workers.
Detailed information on most of these local disputes is scarce, but Gillian 
McGillivray, basing her research on interviews with survivors, as well as Díaz's earlier 
interviews, writes in some detail about the strike at Delicias y Chaparra, in the region 
of Las Tunas (her account tallies with contemporary details in Carta Semanal).398 This 
dispute shows the use of tactics that would become widespread in the national strike 
which would break out at the end of the year. This dispute demonstrates the problems 
faced by the employers and the government in their later full scale onslaught on the 
397 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 916 (March 22, 1955) Congressman detained by military
398 McGillivray, Blazing Cane (2009) pp.261-263
Díaz, La huelga que dicidieron las mujeres (1990) p.160-167
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sugar workers. It is also important because of the detailed description of the role of 
women who provided solidarity.
The strike started in October 1954 following an announcement by the company 
that there would be job cuts in the forthcoming harvest. A group of strikers occupied the 
town hall, but were quickly ejected by the Rural Guard. Women from the strikers' 
families, supported by the local branch of the communist women's organisation, the 
Federación Democrática de Mujeres Cubanas (FDMC - Democratic Federation of 
Cuban Women), then retook the town hall and held it. They also managed to intimidate 
the Rural Guard into giving them the keys of the union local office which they then kept 
open throughout the dispute. This is an example of the frequently seen phenomenon, 
whereby agents of the state were prepared to use a high level of brutality against male 
strikers, but were reluctant to beat women in the same way. Militant women were able 
to use this reluctance to the strikers' advantage. Most of the mujalista union officials had 
disappeared at the first sign of trouble and the strikers organised themselves in the 
absence of their official leaders by holding daily mass meetings, despite the presence of 
Rural Guardsmen on horseback with drawn sabres. Dockers in the local port of Juan 
Claro refused to load sugar for the duration of the strike while women from 
dockworkers' families joined the women's support groups set up by the families of sugar 
workers. In confirmation of the role played by women in this dispute, a contemporary 
report in Carta Semanal also tells us that 200 women managed to prevent police taking 
workers who had been arrested to Holguin by train and also stopped would-be strike 
breakers from entering the workplace.399 Further, it was reported that the women's group 
went to the nearby towns of Tunas and Holguin in order to seek solidarity. The fact that 
Delicias y Chaparra was owned by an American company gave the strike a nationalist 
twist and there was considerable public support and material solidarity from all over 
Cuba, with the strikers being able to paint themselves as the true patriots. It was 
probably this patriotic solidarity that put sufficient pressure on the Ministry of Labour to 
rule in favour of the workers and give them a victory after an action which lasted 104 
days.400 This local victory had an important encouraging effect for the mass of sugar 
workers.
399 Carta Semanal (January 3rd 1955)
400 McGillivray, Blazing Cane (2009) pp.261-263
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As the 1955 tiempo muerto401 progressed, workers at local union meetings started 
formulating their demands; a process that the authorities tried to intimidate by the threat 
of violence up and down the country. The police attack on the workers of central 
Washington in Las Villas was one example of many, but one which received wider 
attention because it was owned by Batista himself. When the central Washington 
workers met in August 1955 to discuss the threat of 40 redundancies, the police attacked 
the assembly, leaving 29 workers hospitalised with gunshot and machete wounds.402 The 
sugar workers responded by occupying the site hospital and began a hunger strike while 
female members of their families staged a sit-in, first of all in the school, then, after they 
had been ejected from there, occupying the church and the ayuntamiento. As solidarity 
strikes spread through the region, Béquer and Rodriguez occupied the church tower.403 
As the confrontation escalated, the Ministry of Labour intervened, conceded to the 
workers and the redundancies were withdrawn.
Feelings in the industry were further inflamed by reports of corruption in the 
sugar workers' pension fund involving both the government and the FNTA bureaucracy, 
while pressure increased when the American sugar import quota was threatened with 
reduction following protectionist pressure from Southern US sugar farmers.404 In this 
atmosphere, the provincial union in Las Villas passed a resolution calling for opposition 
to the employers over the late start to repairs in the sugar processing plants and the 
threat of 10,000 redundancies, while rejecting what they saw as a return to 1950 wage 
levels. The FNTA Plenaria nacional (National Plenary Meeting) in November 
supported this approach and demanded a five million ton harvest, an end to wage cuts 
and the restoration of the previous year's 7.31% cut, along with the reinstatement of all 
sacked workers, pay for super-producción405 and derogation of Clause 4 of decree 3164 
401 Literally the "Dead time" as the period outside the sugar harvest period was known, when sugar 
workers had no income from their trade and had to subsist as best they could on other employment, 
subsistence farming etc.
402 Carta Semanal (August 24th & September 14th 1955)
403"Azucareros", Bohemia (September 11th 1955) p.69
404 Marquez-Sterling Injusticia con el Trabajador del Azúcar (1955) n.pag
Cueto Otro Escándalo en el Retiro Azucarero (1955) pp. sup 16-17
"Azúcar", Bohemia (June 26th) n.pag.
"Obreros" Bohemia (July 10th 1955) p.67
Casteñeda, Azúcar: causa común de todo un pueblo (1955) n.pag.
405 Superproducción is the term for the increase in production due to mechanisation. It was a common 
demand of Cuban workers in the face of such mechanisation that they be paid the same as before the 
new machinery arrived. This was strongly contested by the employers for whom mechanisation was 
aimed at reducing the wage bill.
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which allowed employers to leave vacancies unfilled. They also raised the demand for 
full payment of the "diferencial".406
Before the start of each year's sugar harvest, it had been the agreement to pay the 
workers a bonus, known as the diferencial, calculated on the increase in the cost of 
living in the United States. While this might seem a bizarre reason for a bonus, it was 
based on the fact that a considerable proportion of the island's food was imported from 
North America. The diferencial also had a symbolic significance as it had been won by 
Jesus Menéndez, the legendary sugar-workers' leader, who had been murdered by an 
army officer on Manzanillo station in 1948, while travelling the country to organise a 
strike to defend the right to payment of the full diferencial. No diferencial had been paid 
since 1951, but the idea captured the sugar workers' imagination in 1955.407 Alfredo 
Menéndez, an economist in the Ministry of Sugar who was secretly a member of the 
PSP, used his access to the ministry's data to calculate that the diferencial should be 9%, 
although Conrado Rodriguez popularised the figure of 7.5%.408 The fact that 
confrontation should erupt over the diferencial highlights the gulf of comprehension that 
existed between employers and employed in the sugar industry. To the employers, the 
fact that the international price had dropped meant that they considered that they had a 
reduced ability to pay their wage bill and that a bonus which dated back to better times 
was unacceptable. The majority of workers on the other hand, already living in 
conditions of miserable poverty, felt that they were being made to bear the brunt of a 
crisis not of their making and thus, the fight over the diferencial became hugely 
symbolic for both sides and a strike seemed unavoidable.409
The government, with the support of the CTC bureaucracy, refused to negotiate 
over the sugar workers' claim for payment of the diferencial and the leaders of the 
FNTA denounced the demand as unreasonable.410 Undeterred, starting on the 26th 
December in Las Villas province, but soon spreading nationwide, 500,000 sugar 
workers went on strike, while the union leadership, unable to stop the movement, tried 
to place themselves at its head. Then, following negotiations with Batista, the FNTA 
ordered a return to work on 29th December, saying that the government had agreed to 
their demands. Béquer and the opposition, calling themselves the Frente Azucarero de 
406 Carta Semanal (November 23rd 1955)
407 "Obreros", Bohemia (January 1st 1956) p.68
408 Interview with Alfredo Menéndez, March 2009
409 Feijoo, Desocupación endémica (1956) n.pag.
410 Rodríguez, La industria azucarera ha obtenido fabulosas ganancias (1955) p.71
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Acción Sindical (Sugar Workers Trade Union Action Front), called for a continuation of 
the struggle as the government had decreed a diferencial of only 4.02%, which was 
calculated to be worth a total of only 6 million pesos to the workers, considerably short 
of the 18 million pesos that it would have cost to pay the full demand which, it should 
be recalled, also included a demand for the reversal of the 7.31% wage cut from the 
previous year and compensation for super-producción.411 
When faced with a level of repression only previously used to attack militant 
students, the sugar workers themselves turned to violence, setting up road blocks, 
burning cane fields and occupying town halls and city centres; actions that resulted in 
hundreds arrested or wounded, with several strikers being killed (Figure 14).412 In 
addition to a complete stoppage of the sugar industry, there were solidarity strikes on 
the railways and in the docks. Despite the official instruction to return to work from the 
CTC, normal working was not fully resumed until the 4th or 5th of January. 
To get a better idea of the extent of the strike, Table 4 below records the reports to 
appear in the edition of Carta Semanal that immediately followed the end of the strike. 
This will inevitably be a partial account as it depended on the local presence of a PSP 
411 "Obreros", Bohemia (January 8th 1956) n.pag.
Fuentes, La huelga azucarera (1956) n.pag.
Rojas-Blaquier, 1955, (1998) pp.68-76
412 García-Oliveres, José Antonio Echeverría (1979) p.258
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Figure 14: Workers' road-block on Carretera Central in Santo Domingo, Las Villas, 
from the Museum of the Revolution, Havana
militant to file the report and we know from other sources that there were many other 
actions not reported here. Nevertheless, this gives a picture of the strike rarely seen in 
the literature.
Table 4: Sugar Strike Reports from Carta Semanal January 11th 1956
Pinar del Rio
San Cristóbal, 
Mariel,
Bahia Honda, 
SanDiego del Valle
Ciudad-muerta
Pinar del Rio city Solidarity strikes
Havana Province
Havana city Solidarity strikes in the port, Hatuey brewery and other factories.
Guanagay, Artemisa Sugar workers occupy buildings. Solidarity strikes by tobacco, shoe and
bus workers
Guines All refineries stopped. Demonstrations and partial ciudad-muerta. Army 
force shops to open. Church occupied.
Palos Demonstration attacked by police, one worker killed
Melena del Sur Sugar workers from central Merceditas demonstrate in town, traffic 
stopped and businesses close.
Madruga Running battles between sugar workers and police/army. Many arrests
San Nicolas Workers march into town from central Gímez Mena. Public meeting 
broken up by police. 500 workers occupy church and Union Club.
Central Hershey Complete stoppage
Santa Cruz del Norte Ciudad-muerta demonstrations and road blocks. Workers occupy Yacht 
Club. 14 arrests, women's demonstration for their release.
Guanabacoa Solidarity strikes by bus, shoe and garment workers
Marianao (suburb of 
Havana)
Solidarity from bus workers and staff of Tropicana nightclub, tile 
factory and quarry.
Regla Protest strike on bus routes 21 and 25.
Matanzas Province
Matanzas city Solidarity strike by shop workers, printers and La Rayonera & La Rex 
textile factories.
Colon General strike and demonstration
Unión de Reyes Workers from central Santo Domingo occupy town hall
Coliseo Joint demonstration by workers from 5 centrales accompanied by their 
families
Pedro Betancourt Workers from centrales Cuba y Dolores demonstrate and call on shops 
to shut. Army forces shops to open. Traffic brought to standstill.
Cardenas Ciudad-muerta Joint student, worker demonstration. Occupy education 
institute, evicted by army which patrols streets, many arrests.
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Alacranes Workers from central Conchita call the town to support them by ringing 
church bells. 1000 people join demonstration. Workers from centrales 
España y Tinguaro occupy Casino Español. Evicted violently
 Las Villas
(Cienfuegos, Sancti 
Spíritus, and Villa 
Clara)
"En la provincia de Las Villas la casi totalidad de los municipios y las
poblaciones azucareras se convirtieron en ciudades-muertas" .413
Santa Clara Strikers occupy the provincial CTC offices. Ejected by force and then 
townsfolk build roadblocks and stop circulation of traffic.
Santo Domingo Strikers occupy church and town hall, evicted by the army. March round 
town. Block carretera central and railway line by cutting down trees 
and burning litter. Army forces local people forced to clear up at gun and 
machete point. Many arrests
La Esperanza General strike
Ranchuelo Factory workers, tobacco, food, commerce and construction strike in 
support.
Zulueta Cuidad-muerta
Cruces Sugar workers march in town. Businesses shut in solidarity, police and 
army patrol town attacking passers-by.
Cienfuegos city Solidarity action by bus drivers, printers, port-workers. Demonstration 
by students and workers in conflict with police and army, who try to 
force businesses to open, but massive demonstrations cause them to shut 
again. Stones thrown at police and army.
Hormiguero y 
Portugalete
Rural Guard evict strikers form their own union local.
Palmira Workers occupy the church, Colonia Espanola and Masonic lodge. 
Evicted by force
Aguada de Pasajeros Workers from central Covadonga and colonias Perseverancia y M. 
Victoria
occupy the town hall. Street demonstration in support.
Sancti Spiritus Workers from centrales Tuinicó, Natividad y Amazonas march into 
town. Workers in Compañia Nacional de Alimentos, tobacco and 
construction workers, taxi and bus drivers in solidarity strike. 
Commerce shuts down. Burning tyres and rubbish block streets.
Quemados de Guines Ciudad-muerta. Electricity cut off. Tercio Táctico from Sancti Spiritus 
reinforces local military post. Many workers injured, one killed. 
Imposing demonstration at his funeral.
Sagua la Grande Town paralysed. Church occupied and bells rung to attract support. 
Evicted at gunpoint. Train derailed to block the main road. Several 
injured, two seriously. Surrounding area also paralysed
Placetas, Cabaiguan,
Guayos, Zaza del 
Medio,
Trinidad
Cuidades-muertas and demonstrations.
Fomento Cuidad-muerta . Army open fire on demonstration, many wounded.
413 Carta Semanal (January 11th 1956)
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Yaguajay, Narcisa 
and
Mayajigua
Cuidades-muertas and demonstrations.
 Camagüey Province
Camagüey City Ten minute strike stops city completely
Moron General strike, including bus and train crews which cuts town off.
Demonstrations and fights with police, many wounded and arrests.
Strikebreaking bus burnt as were several railway bridges.
Florida Joint strike committee from centrales Florida, Estrella, Céspedes y 
Agramonte organise actions. Summon towns-people by church bells, 
police and army open fire. Stones thrown. Many arrests, but local 
military chief forced to parley with strikers.
Ciego de Avila 5000 demonstrate. Shops that had remained open, forcibly shut by mass 
action. Traffic stopped, students and workers occupy financial centre 
and education institute, evicted by army at gunpoint. Children injured, 
one mother attacks soldiers with a knife. Roads to centrales Stewart, 
Baragúa y Algodones blocked. Railway blocked
Esmeralda, Jaronu,
Cunagua, Vertientes,
Francisco, Elia, 
Siboney,
Najasa, Minas
Strike complete and all shops and businesses closed.
Santa Cruz del Sur Dockers refuse to load sugar and ciudad-muerta
Nuevitas Mujalista officials order loading of sugar, but railway workers refuse to 
transport it.
Oriente
Santiago de Cuba Solidarity meetings, particularly in port and Bacardi
Guantánamo Stoppage complete in the area, students join workers demonstration.
Occupation of town hall and education institute
Manzanillo Stoppage complete in the area. Pilón dockers strike rather than load 
sugar. Sugar workers tour factories and a mass meeting agrees a 
ciudad-muerta
Bayamo Refineries in the region stop repairs. Marches in the sugar villages of the 
area, joined by other workers.
Puerto Padre Ciudad-muerta. Centrales Chaparra y Delicias stop work. Dockers of 
Cayo Juan Claro stop loading sugar.
Baguano y Tacajo Stoppage complete. Army try to force dockers to load sugar at gunpoint, 
but they resist and prevent further loading by derailing a train between 
the warehouse and the port.
Boston, Preston, 
Maceo,
San German, 
Cacocum,
Manati, Jobabo, 
Tanamo
Stop repairs to machinery in preparation for the harvest
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The picture which emerges from this account is of a widespread strike with 
extremely active and militant rank and file participation. The start of the strike in Las 
Villas province is clearly the result of a decision of the local leadership based around 
Béquer and Rodriguez. The speed with which the strike spread to the rest of the 
industry, despite the lack of any lead from the official union leadership, shows that there 
was a well established network of militants capable of acting independently. The local 
industrial action during the previous year, described in Table 2 above, would have 
played a part in reinforcing existing links and establishing new ones. Once the strike 
started, the level of solidarity coming from other workers, particularly dock and railway 
workers, is impressive. Where normal peaceful picketing proved ineffective in the face 
of police and army aggression, there was no hesitation in resorting to sabotage, such as 
bridge burning and train derailment. Street demonstrations, road blocks and the 
occupation of public buildings and town squares were also a common feature. Finally, 
where they were able, workers engaged in street fights with government forces, leaving 
many injured and several dead. It is hard to imagine what more the sugar workers could 
have done, within the bounds of "normal" trade union activity; indeed they had already 
pushed the boundaries of accepted trade union practice beyond its limits. Yet they were 
still defeated and it must be seen as a defeat, despite assertions to the contrary in some 
of the literature,414 not just because they only got 4.02% rather than the 7.5% diferencial 
that they were demanding, but also, it must not be forgotten, because they did not 
succeed in restoring the 7.31% pay cut of the previous year, no superproducción was 
paid, the zafra was not extended to 5 million tons and the full labour force was not 
re-employed. Conrado Béquer was quite clear that they had not won and blamed Mujal 
for what he described as a sell out.415
The violence used by the state against strikers forged a bond of solidarity between 
workers and students as they realised they had a common enemy. The FEU repaid the 
solidarity they had received on 14th December by sending student organisers out into 
the sugar fields to help the strikers. In many towns students joined demonstrations in 
large numbers and occupied their colleges. The support that they showed in the sugar 
strike gave the FEU enormous credibility amongst workers and the revolutionary 
nationalist politics of the student activists gained a greater working class following. 
When a section of the FNTA leadership tried to openly organise against what they saw 
414 eg. Massón Sena, Proyectos y accionar del Partido Socialista Popular entre 1952 y 1958 (2009) p.233
415 Bequer Diaz, Vendió Mujal las demandas azucaras (1956) p.61
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as a betrayal, they were disciplined by the CTC bureaucracy and turned again to the 
FEU for help.
The looming split in the CTC became a reality as Béquer and Rodriguez, along 
with some other officials who had supported the strike, were removed from the FNTA 
executive and some provincial leaders were expelled, with the CTC using the police to 
enforce the decision. New officials were imposed by the Ministry of Labour to replace 
those expelled, but in Las Villas and Camagüey no local sugar workers were available, 
so outsiders had to be used. Having been barred from their own building by the police, 
the anti-mujalista opposition in the FNTA met in the parliament building, using 
Conrado Rodriguez's position as congressional deputy to secure a meeting room. The 
meeting was attended by a clear majority of the FNTA executive. They declared 
themselves the real leadership of the union and proposed to go to court to establish it; a 
course of action which came to nothing.416 Attempts to form a breakaway sugar workers 
union with the help of the FEU were equally unsuccessful as the Ministry of Labour and 
the mujalista trade union bureaucracy worked together using the intervention 
procedures to isolate the opposition.417 
The news magazine Bohemia argued at the time that the diferencial represented 
much more than the money, but was rather a question of workers' rights and social 
justice.418 Although it was several days before normal working was fully resumed, the 
final outcome was a success for the government, even though many employers did not 
see it that way, expecting the complete smashing of all resistance. Thus the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU), having hoped in February 1955 that Batista "would override 
labour opposition", expressed disappointment in February of the following year saying: 
"A strike of 500,000 sugar and dock workers was settled in the short term by a 
government decision in favour of the workers"419. It is significant that the EIU includes 
dock workers in the strike as, completely unofficially, they involved themselves in the 
sugar dispute, taking advantage of an opportunity to use their solidarity action to further 
their campaign against bulk loading.
416 Cueto, El pleito sindical (1956) n.pag.
"Obreros", Bohemia (January 15th 1956) p.61 
417 "Obreros", Bohemia (January 22nd 1956) pp.sup11-13
418 Valdespino, Más allá del diferencial (1956) p.55
419 EIU, Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, no.9 (1955) n.pag. & no.13 (1956) n.pag.
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Ports
The Truslow report had 
recommended that sugar be 
bulk loaded (azúcar a  
granel).420 In Cuba at this 
time, the sugar was placed in 
jute sacks at the refinery, 
shipped on trains to the port, 
then, still in sacks, 
manhandled using cranes and 
conveyor belts into 
warehouses to await the 
equally labour intensive 
transfer into the holds of cargo ships (Figure 15). The technology had long been 
developed to mechanise this process so that the sugar could be poured directly into the 
bulk carrier ship's hold, but its use was highly controversial as it would have resulted in 
large scale job losses. The economic importance of bulk loading can be seen from the 
estimation that manual loading normally proceeded at a rate of 800 tons per day, while 
direct bulk loading could increase that to 400 tons per hour, with half the number of 
stevedores employed.421 The dock-workers were bitterly opposed to this measure and, 
while the previous government of Carlos Prío had issued decree number 501 authorising 
the loading of azúcar a granel, they had not dared to enforce it.422 Batista confirmed the 
decree early in his rule, but then immediately deferred its application, allowing him to 
set the agenda for full implementation.
Having decided that its priority after winning the 1954 elections was the financial 
difficulties of the railway companies and the sugar industry, the government did not 
attempt to impose bulk loading on the dock-workers immediately, although it did start to 
prepare the ground. The dockers were under no illusions about the forthcoming attack 
and, as early as May 1954, Carta Semanal reported on mass meetings of dockers in 
Nuevitas, Santiago, Cienfuegos and Matanzas, which mandated their delegates to the 
forthcoming national congress of their union, the Federación de Obreros Maritimos 
420 Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) pp.391-402
421 Menéndez, Interview (2009)
422 Rojas-Blaquier, El mujalismo en el movimiento obrero cubano (1983) p.84
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Figure 15: Manual Loading of Sugar, 
from Carteles (February 13th 1955) pp.46-48
Nacional (FOMN - National Federation of Maritime Workers), to vote against accepting 
azúcar a granel.423 When the conference actually opened at the end of January 1955 it 
became obvious to Gilberto Goliath, the mujalista general secretary of the FOMN, that, 
despite having persuaded a significant number of delegates to ignore their mandate and 
to vote in favour of bulk loading, there was still a majority who would vote against.424 
Mujal, who chaired the conference personally, therefore postponed the decision until he 
was able to pack the hall with extra, unelected delegates.425 Despite angry protests from 
the legitimately elected delegates opposed to the measure, it was passed by 143 votes to 
78.426 As a result of this official acceptance, Batista issued a decree regulating loading 
and unloading of primary materials, but he was careful not to provoke the dockers 
further at this stage by specifying reductions in manning levels.427 It was one thing to 
have a formal union policy which accepted bulk loading, it was another to enforce its 
acceptance at local level and following an unofficial meeting, the opposition delegates 
returned to their ports committed to organising resistance locally.
When a local union organisation appeared to be escaping from Mujal's control, the 
Ministry of Labour could "intervene", an expression meaning that they would take over 
the organisation, at police gun-point if necessary, and impose a safe bureaucrat to run it. 
This happened in Santiago in 1955, when the dockworkers, still under the leadership of 
the communist Juan Taquechel, started to organise against the threat of bulk loading and 
held some protest strikes428. The Ministry intervened, although with only limited success 
as the dockers still managed to hold their mass meetings.429 
Tension was raised further when, in January 1955, the British Ambassador passed 
a note to the government demanding that, in future, all sugar exported to England must 
be bulk loaded.430 This was considered particularly provocative as Britain held large 
reserves and was not intending to buy its usual amount of Cuban sugar that year. 
Following the British demand, the port-workers of Nuevitas set the lead in resisting 
423 Carta Semanal (May 22nd 1954)
424 Carta Semanal (February 9th 1955)
425 El Mundo (30th January 1955)
426 Carta Semanal (February 16th 1955)
El Mundo (30th January 1955)
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 955 (March 31, 1955) Labor Developments
427 Carta Semanal (March 16th 1955)
428 Fuente, A Nation for All (2001) p.242
Carta Semanal (March 30th 1954)
429 Carta Semanal (April 6th 1955)
430 "Azucar", Bohemia (January 23rd 1955) n.pag.
El Mundo (7th January 1955)
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embarques a granel, by refusing to bulk load a German ship, "Parnas", bound for 
England. Army strike-breakers were used to load instead.431 Faced with this threat and 
the undemocratic nature of the official union's acceptance, 78 local unions set up a 
Comité nacional contra los embarques a granel (National Committee against Bulk 
Loading) to organise opposition.432 However, the government had other, more 
immediate priorities and further delayed attempting to implement the decree.
Bulk loading of sugar finally reached 11% of exports by 1957, increasing to 25% 
by 1958.433 However, this was still not mechanised bulk loading; sugar cargoes were 
ferried out in lighters, still in their sacks and then dumped out of the bags into the hold 
of a ship lying offshore.434 The only advantage of this for the port employers was that 
they could thereby comply with the importing countries' requirements; apart from a 
small economy from the reuse of sacks, they saved no money at the Cuban end of the 
business. The first mechanised bulk sugar loading facilities were not established until 
the early 1970s with the inauguration of the new dock and warehousing arrangements in 
Guayabal and Matanzas, followed later by Cienfuegos.435 
Tobacco
The ports were not the only sector in which the Batista government's productivity 
offensive was less than successful; they were equally unable to force through 
mechanisation of the home cigar market. In order to understand developments in the 
tobacco industry in 1955, it is necessary to return to the late 1940s.
Before the 1952 coup, the major cigar companies were unable to impose the 
mechanisation of the internal market, despite the fact that Mujal and the Ministry of 
Labour had removed the traditional communist leadership from official control of the 
tobacco workers' trade union federation. It appeared that sterner measures of repression 
than those available to the Prío government would be necessary to defeat a determined 
and well organised group of workers who commanded considerable popular support.
 Cuban cigar exports had fallen from 256 million per year in 1906 to only 21 
million in 1949 and the Truslow report argued that the only way to reverse this decline 
431 Carta Semanal (April 13th 1955)
432 Carta Semanal (February 23rd 1955)
433 US Department of Agriculture, Sugar Reports (1959)
434 Hagelberg, Bulk loading of sugar in Cuba (2009)
435 Castro, Speech at the Dedication of a Bulk Sugar Terminal (1978)
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was by mechanisation.436 Such was the obvious crisis that trade unionists in the tobacco 
industry had accepted the argument for mechanisation for export, but were determined 
to resist mechanisation of the greatly expanded internal market, as well as demanding 
financial compensation for those displaced by machinery. This policy was formally 
agreed at a conference of the Federación Tabacalera Nacional (FTN National 
Federation of Tobacco Workers) in February 1948 and a campaign to defend hand 
rolling for domestic consumption was launched at a mass meeting in the Parque 
Central in Havana, addressed by Lazaro Peña, the recently deposed communist 
ex-general secretary of the CTC, who had himself been a tobacco worker. Jean Stubbs 
describes a situation where communists had a significant base in the tobacco industry 
and had strongly resisted intervention by the Ministry of Labour aimed at imposing 
mujalista officials. This had come to violence on many occasions, with gangsters linked 
to the Auténtico party operating inside the factories with the consent of the owners and 
with the intention of intimidating and demoralising the workers. Miguel Fernández 
Roig, union representative in La Corona factory and an established leader of the Havana 
cigar makers, was murdered by an Auténtico gunman, who escaped with the aid of the 
police.437 This campaign of violence was, however, only partially successful and the 
tobacco industry was one of the sectors where the PSP was to maintain a significant 
presence throughout the 1950s. Later attempts to intervene in the tobacco unions in Las 
Villas and Oriente in 1956 would be met with a series of strikes.438
In November 1948, José Diaz Ortega, a member of congress from Pinar del Rio, 
proposed a motion in parliament which would have legalised the complete 
mechanisation of cigar manufacture, both for export and for internal consumption. 
However, this was rejected following energetic lobbying by an alliance of tobacco 
workers and the owners of small factories who could not afford the investment required 
to mechanise.439 Despite this rejection, in March 1950, the government of Carlos Prío, 
with the acquiescence of the national union leadership, now firmly in the hands of the 
mujalistas, issued decree number 1073, which authorised mechanisation of 
cigar-making for export and for 20% of the home market, along with compensation of 
40 pesos per month for those workers who lost their jobs as a direct result of the 
436 Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) pp.856-864
437 Stubbs, Tobacco on the Periphery (1985) p.153
438 Carta Semanal (February 15th&29th, March 21st 1956)
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measure.440 Given the fact that over a third of Havana's cigar-makers were already 
unemployed at this time and would therefore not have received the compensation, this 
last measure fell well short of the workers' demands.
Despite the purge of most of the tobacco workers' union organisations by this 
time, the unitarios, as the communists and their allies in the workers' movement were 
known, still commanded considerable loyalty amongst rank and file tobacco workers 
and they set about organising a united front with the smaller employers, who stood to 
loose business to the large cigar companies as they could not afford the expensive new 
machinery.441 Opposition was already strong in Las Villas, so a group of experienced 
unitario organisers went to Pinar del Rio to stiffen resistance there.442 Feelings were 
running so high in Las Villas that the newly imposed union leadership was forced to act 
and in March 1951 a joint committee was set up to co-ordinate the struggle against 
decree 1073. By the end of June 1951, the joint committee had sufficient strength to call 
a strike for the 2nd July. This became a general stoppage, with many towns in Las Villas 
organising ciudades-muertas. In Cabaiguán the town hall was occupied and there was a 
massive demonstration of support for the tobacco workers, despite considerable violent 
police activity. Both Jean Stubbs and Ramón Pérez Linares describe how, in the 
province of Las Villas generally the forces of order were in some danger of losing 
control of the situation with the Carretera Central and the main railway line blocked in 
many places. The mayors of 31 towns in Las Villas went to Havana to lobby President 
Prío and a 48 hour truce was agreed. As a result of further negotiations, decree 2893 
withdrew permission for mechanisation of cigars aimed at the home market.443
Several points of interest emerge from this dispute, firstly the fact that the Prío 
government's purges of the unions were not sufficient in themselves to ensure that 
productivity measures such as mechanisation could be introduced. The new, mujalista 
leadership was still vulnerable to pressure from the rank and file, particularly in areas 
where the traditional communist leaders and their allies retained support and respect 
despite being ousted from office. This lesson would not be lost on the Batista regime in 
the years following the coup and the compulsory check-off of union dues, the cuota 
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sindical obligatoria, combined with greater police support for interventions, would 
reduce the bureaucracy's dependence on the rank and file. At this stage, the purges and 
"interventions" were only a partial success because, as soon as halfway democratic 
elections were allowed, unitarios were frequently re-elected. The success of the 
communist party's tactics, which took the form of an alliance between workers and 
businessmen who were opposed to the monopolising tendencies of the bigger 
companies, ensured their continuing popularity amongst tobacco workers. Secondly, 
although there had been a certain amount of fighting between demonstrators and police 
on July 2nd 1951, this had not intimidated the strikers and their allies. The Batista 
regime would remedy this by making sure that, wherever needed, its use of repressive 
force would not stop at the bounds normally accepted in a democratic society, but would 
wound, kill, torture and arbitrarily arrest where necessary, using the army to "aid the 
civil power" with fixed bayonets and live rounds. 
Following the coup, the eight large companies which had already mechanised 
their export business, sought to extend their use of the new machines to the home trade. 
The opening shots of the campaign were a short strike in Havana on 18th May 1953 and 
the setting up of a Comité de lucha contra la mecanización (Committee to fight 
mechanisation) in Santa Clara. The government, in response to pressure from the larger 
companies, issued decree 895 which authorised the Minister of Agriculture to gauge the 
state of opinion on the subject of extending mechanisation, which he was to do by 
consulting the official unions. Unfortunately for the supporters of mechanisation, 
anti-mujalista forces in the union were still in place in Las Villas and, at the V Congreso 
Tabacalero Nacional on the 20th and 21st June 1953, had enough delegates to sway the 
conference to opposition.444 Indeed Mujal was never able to exert the level of control 
over the FTN that he managed in most other organisations, in part because of the 
ineptitude and greed of those few leading tobacco trade unionists who supported his 
project, with the result that even anti-communist trade unionists were disgusted.445
The matter of mechanisation then lay on the table until late 1955 when the large 
companies announced the setting up of a "persuasive" fund.446 Two senators, Manuel 
Benítez and Ernesto Peréz Carrillo, as well as a congressman, José Luis Guerra Cabrera, 
444 Pérez-Linares, La lucha de los tabacaleros villareños contra la mecanización (2003) pp.145-6
445 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 19 (July 3, 1953) Six Communists selected to the Executive 
Committee of the Tobacco Workers Federation
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 434 (Oct. 25, 1954) Labor Developments
"Obreros", Bohemia (October 4th 1954) p.82
446 "un fondo para utilizar con carácter 'persuasivo'"
132
independently proposed laws which would legalise mechanisation, while the workers 
from H. Upman and Partagas staged demonstrations outside the building. The matter 
was more complicated than most productivity arrangements for several reasons. 
Mechanisation of the export trade had not increased sales or reduced prices, merely 
increased profits for those firms which could afford the necessary capital outlay. Any 
extension of mechanisation would not only bring redundancies to the mechanising 
factories, but would be likely to result in a concentration of the industry into the hands 
of a few monopolies, mainly based in Havana, reducing employment opportunities in 
the provinces. The proposed compensation for displaced workers and ruined small 
businesses was to be a charge on the state, thereby using the public purse to effectively 
subsidise a few large companies.447 This reactivated the alliance between the smaller 
producers and the unitario trade unionists in Las Villas, who relaunched the Comité de 
lucha contra la mecanización. With the sugar workers' dispute now firmly on the 
horizon, the government had enough to deal with and the attempt to introduce 
mechanisation was postponed. There was a half-hearted attempt to return to the matter 
in the new year of 1956, with Ministry of Labour interventions in some of the most 
intransigent local unions which resulted in strikes, most notably in Zaza del Medion in 
February 1956, Bayamo in early March and the whole province of Las Villas later that 
same month.448 Thereafter, with the exception of a public meeting in the Teatro La 
Caridad in Santa Clara in 1957, where Batista himself addressed interested parties to try 
to persuade them to accept semi-mecanización, the matter was quietly dropped.449 
Conclusion
The history of Cuba's port and tobacco workers' resistance to the government and 
employers' attempts to increase productivity poses the question: "Why did the attempt to 
impose mechanisation on both bulk loading of sugar and cigar production for the home 
market fail, when the government/employers' productivity drive was relatively 
successful in most other industries?" It is possible to use brute force and corruption to 
reduce the wage bill in industries such as sugar production, which rely largely on 
unskilled manual labour, or the railways, which were already mechanised. In both of 
these cases it was merely a question of intensifying workloads and paying lower wages. 
The problem with the docks was that the major productivity measure proposed by 
447 "Tabaco", Bohemia (October 16th 1955) n.pag. & Carta Semanal (November 23rd 1955)
448 Carta Semanal (February 15th & 29th, March 7th & 21st, April 11th 1956)
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Truslow, bulk loading of sugar, required considerable investment in new machinery. 
Before employers were prepared to make such investment, they had be reasonably 
confident that they could make the workers use the new equipment. An earlier attempt 
to introduce bulk loading of cement had proved a costly failure.450
In 1950, the El Mariel cement company had paid $100,000 to install bulk 
unloading equipment in the port of Havana. The Havana dockers used their industrial 
muscle to force the company to employ as many stevedores on the bulk discharge as 
would have been required for manual unloading. The company dismantled the 
equipment and returned to the previous practice.451 Given this experience, the port 
employers required a firm guarantee that their employees would operate any new 
equipment they installed for bulk loading of sugar; neither Batista nor Mujal could give 
such a guarantee. This structural difficulty for the employers' was compounded by the 
dockers own agency; their use of sympathy strikes.
Ever since James Connolly wrote a description of the effectiveness of sympathy 
strike action in the British seaman's strike of 1911, there has been considerable 
discussion in the literature on this subject.452 Apparently disinterested solidarity action 
also serves as a warning to the sympathy-strikers' own employer of a general 
willingness to take industrial action. It also builds up a "debt of solidarity" that enables 
them to call for a return solidarity in the future. An example of this occurs at the end of 
1955, when 34 Santiago dockers were dismissed for "communism", the Bacardí 
workers, themselves disputing attempts to mechanise rum production, held an assembly 
to protest and set up a committee to raise funds to support the sacked workers.453 Such 
solidarity action can be used as a more or less open threat during negotiations that 
serves to intimidate the employer and thereby reduce his determination to proceed with 
measures that will clearly be unpopular.
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Similarly, the failure to mechanise the home cigar market equally resulted from a 
combination of structure and agency. The problem of finding sufficient capital to 
purchase expensive new machinery was more acute in the cigar industry and 
mechanisation would inevitably lead to a few large monopolies dominating the market. 
This meant that the employers were divided on the measure. Such a split in the 
employers' ranks was then exploited by the tobacco workers, whose unofficial leaders, 
strongly influenced by communist party politics, found a group of employers who they 
could argue were "patriotic" and with whom they shared a common interest.
This all indicates that an authoritarian regime can be quite successful in forcing 
through cuts in wages and enforcing redundancies, but finds it much more difficult to 
impose the use of new machinery. The PSP, having given a successful lead in the docks 
and tobacco industry would continue to maintain an influential position in these sectors, 
but that the more militaristic approach of the M-26-7 would start to have a greater 
appeal for those workers who had been defeated in the class struggles of 1955. Thus, the 
success of the Marianao tejaleros dispute, in which communist militants played a 
leading role, further convinced the PSP of the soundness of their strategy which they 
defined by the slogans "Unity" and "Mass Struggle".
On the other hand, the workers of La Rayonera textile factory, whose dispute was 
described above, drew entirely different lessons from their dispute, which had 
demonstrated the collaborationist role of the official bureaucracy and their inability to 
resist state violence unaided. The provincial leader of the textile workers' union, Julián 
Alemán, was already a member of the recently formed Sección Obrera of the M-26-7, 
while Aldo Santamaría, a member of the national leadership of the M-26-7, was also 
employed in the industry in Matanzas. The M-26-7 was able to recruit one of the earliest 
branches of its Sección Obrera in the factory, which would go on to provide significant 
support for the revolutionary process and to organise solidarity with the sugar workers 
during their strike.454 Other strike leaders also joined the M-26-7 after the defeat of their 
disputes. José María de la Aguilera of the Havana bank workers joined sometime during 
1956 having been purged from the official structure of the bank workers' union by the 
process known as "intervención", which is discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
Aguilera had been a member of the Ortodoxos and as such had always been considered 
an opponent by Mujal. The sugar workers' leader Conrado Béquer on the other hand 
454 García-Pérez, Insurrección y revolución (2006) pp.105-6
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represented a split in the CTC bureaucracy. Having come from the Auténtico party, he 
had originally been part of the mujalista machine, but as the situation developed and 
became more polarised, he had to choose between the bureaucracy and the rank and file. 
He chose the latter and also joined the M-26-7, although it is difficult to be precise as he 
operated above ground for as long as possible. Thus the emerging leadership of the 26th 
July Movement's Sección Obrera came from different backgrounds but were all 
products of the defeats their sectors suffered in 1955-6. Of all these disputes, the sugar 
workers is obviously the most significant. As the most important sector of the economy, 
winning the battle in the sugar industry was crucial to the government's productivity 
offensive and the relative success heartened Batista and his supporters. However, their 
celebrations were premature as many sugar workers considered that they may have lost 
a battle, but not the war. 
Marrifeli Pérez Stable argues that the confrontations described in this chapter 
destroyed many illusions and convinced a significant minority of workers that there was 
no longer any reformist solution to their problems.455 The year 1955 marked an 
important shift in the balance of power and economic advantage in Cuba. Previously, 
despite the corrupt leadership of their trade unions, the majority of workers had seen 
their wages and conditions remain more or less stable and had not felt particularly 
troubled by the close relationship between their official leaders and the government; 
indeed, many probably welcomed it, as such arrangements with previous governments 
had become the norm in trade union practice. The employers' productivity offensive 
which followed the fraudulent 1954 elections marked a turning point. The trade union 
bureaucracy now proved to be an obstacle, rather than a support, as the government 
moved to implement the philosophy behind the Truslow report. 
It has been argued earlier that it would have been difficult to implement the 
Truslow report under a democratic regime. This is partly because, as the workers started 
to feel betrayed by their leadership, it became increasingly necessary for the Ministry of 
Labour to intervene in order to prevent the ousting of the mujalista officials, which 
would have undoubtedly happened if democratic elections had been permitted. When 
workers attempted to fight despite their official leaders, they were confronted by the full 
force of the state.
455 Pérez-Stable, Cuban Revolution (1999) p.55
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On the 30th December 1955, the train crews on the Ciego de Avila to Morón line 
were on strike in solidarity with the sugar workers. The army, with fixed bayonets, 
surrounded the workshop in Morón and the officer said: "Either the engines go out or 
there will be a bloodbath!" This broke the strike.456 Unarmed workers, whose trade 
unions are doing all they can to obstruct any generalisation of solidarity, cannot fight 
such a threat using traditional trade union methods. There were, however, small groups 
of militants who emerged from all of these defeated strikes who looked for new 
methods of defending their interests, the most energetic of which were some 
railwaymen from Guantánamo.
456  ¡Las máquinas salen, aunque sean bañadas con sangre! - Pérez-Garcia et al., Invierno Caliente 
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Chapter 4. Workers take stock
In the wake of the British miners' strike of 1984, Chris Harman argued:
There are two sorts of defeats workers can suffer. There are defeats like that 
which followed the 1848 revolution, the Paris Commune, the taking of power by 
Hitler in Germany, or the Pinochet coup in Chile. These set the workers’ 
movement back years, or even decades, and when it re-emerges it has to start 
virtually from scratch.
There are other defeats which are best seen as interludes between battles. These 
are particularly prevalent after a period of working class advance which has 
lost momentum. Then the employing class goes on to the offensive against one 
section of the class after another, trying to wrest back what it lost not so long 
before.457
This chapter argues that defeats of the workers in the majority of the class 
struggles of 1955-6 are much closer to "interludes between battles" and that the workers' 
movement did not have to "start virtually from scratch". Rather, there was a pause for 
reassessment during which new tactics emerged to deal with the dictatorship and its 
allies in the trade union bureaucracy. There were two very different responses to the 
challenges facing the working class opposition movement, on the one hand the approach 
of the July 26th Movement that was aimed at instigating an armed insurrection and, on 
the other hand, that of the Popular Socialist Party, based on attempts to generate mass 
action. The chapter examines in some detail the July 26th Movement in Guantánamo, as 
the railway workers in this area not only had the most militant tradition in Cuba, but 
would go on to make an important contribution to the revolution as they developed the 
concept of "Sindicalismo beligerante" (trade unionism on a war footing). This was the 
combination of mass action with sabotage, an approach that led telephone workers to 
cut phone lines, sugar workers to burn fields and railway workers to derail 
strikebreaking trains during strikes. In order to achieve this in conditions imposed by a 
dictatorship, they also pioneered a clandestine cell structure which would later be 
extended nationwide to form the basic organisational model of the M-26-7 Sección 
Obrera. 
The PSP national leadership profoundly disagreed with the approach of the 
M-26-7, which they criticised as being inimical to "la lucha de masas" (mass struggle), 
by which they meant widespread strike action, combined with demonstrations and other 
protests. In PSP terminology, the tactic of "mass struggle" was counterposed to armed 
457  Harman, 1984 and the Shape of Things to Come (1985) pp115-116
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resistance and sabotage which was decried as "putchism" or "individual terrorism". In 
practical terms, the communist approach was to build their front organisation, the 
Comité Nacional de Defensa de las Demandas Obreras y por la Democratización de la 
CTC (CNDDO - National committee for the defence of workers' demands and for the 
democratisation of the CTC) and to argue for a general strike to bring down Batista in 
the same manner as the August 1933 strike had removed President Gerardo Machado. 
However, despite their criticism of the M-26-7, the PSP leadership had to recognise its 
growing influence. 
One particular aspect of the class struggle during 1956 and early 1957 assumed 
increasing importance; the growing involvement of the state in the internal affairs of the 
unions. The "intervention" procedures used by Mujal and the Ministry of Labour 
became a significant arena of industrial tension and raised the question of control of the 
unions. The continued necessity for such external intervention in the trade unions at 
local and national level shows the increasing difficulty faced by the mujalistas in the 
battle to win the hearts and minds of the organised working class. Chapter 1 spoke of 
the three major political tendencies in the Cuban labour movement, the M-26-7, the PSP 
and mujalismo. The necessity for more government intervention is an indication of a 
shift in the balance of forces away from the bureaucracy.
Much of the historiography of the insurrection, with the notable exception of 
Bonachea and San Martín, starts with the landing of Fidel Castro in the Granma at the 
end of 1956.458 This approach tends to neglect the role of the underground resistance on 
the island, who had already established a network capable of sustaining the newly 
arrived nucleus of the rebel army, as well as conducting armed actions and sabotage. As 
part of this underground, the M-26-7 Sección Obrera in Guantánamo was able to 
produce significant strike action in support of the armed uprising in Santiago at the time 
of Fidel Castro's arrival in the Granma at the end of 1956. By this time, communists in 
Santiago had a much closer relationship with the local fidelistas than with the national 
leadership of their own party. This would lead to the Santiago PSP calling strikes in 
support of the M-26-7 armed action, in defiance of direct instructions from their 
leadership in Havana; an example of the regional differences which play such an 
important role in understanding the course of the insurrection. It also shows that the 
political convergence between the PSP and the M-26-7, which would culminate in the 
458 Bonachea & San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection (1974)
139
formation of the Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC or Communist Party of Cuba) in 
1965, had its roots in the working class movement in eastern Cuba.
This chapter looks in detail at the changes that occurred in the labour movement 
following the period of intense activity of 1955. It traces a relative lull in industrial and 
political activity, during which the various forces within organised labour regrouped and 
reorganised; the M-26-7 starting the work of building their Sección Obrera, the PSP 
building the CDDOs and the union bureaucracy attempting to shore up its position with 
the support of state. These developments are important in gaining an understanding of 
how organised labour responded to the next major turning point in the history of the 
Cuban insurrection, the Granma landing.
Guantánamo and the 26th July Movement
The city of Guantánamo and its surrounding region produced some outstanding 
workers' leaders who would go on to assume an important role in the insurrectionary 
phase of the revolution. The following section examines the responses of these militants 
to the defeats of the bank, railway and sugar workers' strikes of 1955. A group of 
railwaymen, who had many years of experience in industrial struggles, were attracted to 
the M-26-7 because they felt the need for armed support when faced with the failure of 
conventional trade union tactics in the face of a brutal dictatorship. This group would 
develop new tactics and methods of organisation that were more suitable to the context 
in which they found themselves and their approach would go on to be adopted by the 
M-26-7 nationally following their important contribution to the uprising of 30th 
November 1956.
Upon his release from prison in May 1955 following an extensive amnesty 
campaign, Fidel Castro founded the Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio , named 
after the date of the attack on the Moncada barracks. This was a formalisation and 
restructuring of a relatively extensive existing network of anti-Batista individuals and 
small groups, some of whom had been loosely cooperating since 1953.459 Finding 
himself unable to operate in Cuba because of government surveillance as well as being 
the target of government death squads, Castro almost immediately left for Mexico to 
prepare for the armed rebellion. He left Frank País (Figure 16), who was leader of one 
of the pre-existing constituent groups, the Santiago based Acción Nacional 
459 Espín, Déborah (1975) p.67-8
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Revolucionaria (ANR - National Revolutionary Action), to co-ordinate support for his 
return. As Jefe de Acción (Action Chief) for the province of Oriente, Frank Pais's work 
consisted of gathering and storing arms, searching for possible landing sites for the 
return, producing propaganda material and building the organisation.460 Shortly after the 
defeat of the FFCC Consolidados strike in September 1955, Frank País visited 
Guantánamo with a view to extending the organisation to this important centre of 
working class militancy. For those railwaymen in Guantánamo who wished to 
reorganise after their recent defeat, the M-26-7's approach had great appeal in that it 
placed the general strike at the very centre of its tactics, while also seeing the need to 
combine that strike with an armed insurrection.461 Frank País was introduced by a local 
student, Enrique Soto, to Octavio Louit, a railwayman, who agreed to form a branch of 
the revolutionary organisation in the city, an endeavour to which he quickly recruited 
another railway worker, the same Ñico Torres mentioned in the previous chapter.462
It will always be difficult for historians to write 
about successful clandestine opposition to a dictatorial 
regime, as one of the prerequisites for such success is to 
leave as few traces as possible. Thus, for example, the 
only contemporary public reference to Ñico Torres from 
this period that has so far come to light is one report in the 
Guantánamo local paper that Torres and two others had 
been arrested by the SIM, the regime's military 
intelligence arm, and charged with Actividades 
Comunistas (Communist activity).463 Guantánamo is off 
the beaten track and, even today, a difficult journey from 
Havana; most foreigners have only heard of the town in 
relation to the neighbouring US naval establishment. This isolation, while facilitating 
the growth of a revolutionary workers' movement, has helped to obscure the history of 
that movement from later researchers and may partly account for the sparse nature of 
the literature on the revolutionary movement in Guantánamo in the 1950s. Jana Lipman 
is the major exception; she lived there for six months, working in the archives and 
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Figure 16: Frank País, from the 
Museum of the Revolution
interviewing survivors, as part of her wider investigation of the history of the workers 
on the US base. In this study there emerges details of the revolutionary activities in the 
area in which the base workers played full part (see chapters 6 & 7).464  Cuban historians 
have not shown significantly greater interest and we have to rely on the work of local 
historians in the provincial archives, the city library and the Casa de Historia for 
published details other than than occasional scattered references.465 The report on the 
Guantánamo workers' movement by the Comisión Nacional de Historia (National 
History Commission) has never been published and exists only in manuscript.466 We are 
fortunate therefore that the University of Oriente in Santiago ran a project in the 1980s, 
which required some final year history undergraduates to write their dissertations on the 
struggles of the 1950s using interviews with surviving militants. Using these resources, 
this chapter will start by attempting to reconstruct the early development of the M-26-7 
in Guantánamo.
Guantánamo was a city with strong working class traditions that centred on the 
railway yards. At the time, the railway was the only practical land link with the rest of 
the island and this gave the railway workers a sense of their own power, which they 
frequently exercised, not only for the betterment of their own economic position, but 
also in support of their wider political demands and in solidarity with other workers. 
They had built equally strong links with local students and peasants. In the latter case 
these links can be traced back to the epic battles of Realengo 18 in the 1930s while, in 
the former, examples of  joint action between students and railway workers can be 
found in the demonstrations organised in opposition to the March 10th coup d'etat and 
the Canal Via Cuba (see chapter 1).467 It is therefore no accident that Frank País's first 
call to organise a revolutionary organisation should be to the railwaymen. 
The 1954-5 railway dispute was discussed in detail in the last chapter, but in order 
to trace the development of the M-26-7 in Guantánamo, it may be useful to return to 
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some of the specific details of the conflict in that locality. In 1954, as soon as the 
financial situation of FFCC Consolidados became public knowledge and a strike 
appeared to be inevitable, Delegación 11, the local branch of the railway workers' union, 
set up a Comisión de Propaganda (Propaganda committee), which distributed 12,000 
leaflets during the course of the dispute.468 Once the strike started, many workers felt 
that the strike committee based on the official leadership was too passive and a mass 
meeting elected a second strike committee, which was then ratified by a meeting of 
departmental representatives.469 This ability to react quickly and collectively to changing 
situations was to prove crucial as the situation developed. In another move which 
prefigured their activities during the later stages of the insurrection against the 
dictatorship, striking workers derailed the train to the US base that was being driven by 
strikebreaking managers; an early example of sindicalismo beligerante (Figure 17).470  
After the strike, in order to oppose the mujalista bureaucracy from the inside of the 
trade union movement, a Comité Central de Acción Ferroviaria (Raiway Workers' 
Central Action Committee) was set up.471 However, the defeat of a well organised strike 
by an economically powerful group of workers with considerable experience in 
industrial activity made some Guantánamo militants go a stage further. They concluded 
that, unless the Batista regime could be militarily defeated, they would no longer be able 
to defend and advance their conditions and wages, nor would they be able to regain 
control of their own trade union while Mujal, Balaños and their associates had the 
support of the state. The M-26-7 appeared to offer a solution to their problems. In return 
they would contribute their considerable industrial experience which would contribute 
enormously to the building of the underground resistance.472 
By the end of 1955, the Guantánamo group of the M-26-7 had a stable leadership 
composed of:
Co-ordination and Propaganda - Enrique Soto
Deputy for Propaganda - Samuel Rodiles
Chief of Action and Sabotage - Julio Camacho
Workers section - Octavio Louit
Deputy for Workers' Section - Ñico Torres
Other committee members - Amancio Floirán, Margot Hernández.
468 Noticias de Hoy (June 4th 1953)
469 Carta Semanal (March 23rd 1955)
470 Voz del Pueblo (February 7th 1955)
471 Carta Semanal (July 20th 1955)
472 Figueras Pérez, Interview with Luis Figures (2009)
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Initially, the work of the group mainly consisted of recruiting and building a 
clandestine workplace based cell structure, each cell composed of a member responsible 
for co-ordination, one for sabotage, one for fund raising, one for propaganda and one for 
mass action such as strikes and demonstrations. Each cell member, apart from the 
co-ordinator, recruited up to 10 others to help with the work. The co-ordinator was the 
only member who had any contact with other members outside the cell. There was a 
flexibility in the structure of the cells of the Sección Obrera, with the organisations 
following the industrial and union structures in each trade.473 
In order to grow, there was a need for propaganda to spread the word of the 
organisation's existence. In part this was a question of distributing national material 
such as Fidel Castro's courtroom speech, subsequently known as "History will absolve 
me", and nationally produced manifestos. The recruitment of several cells amongst the 
town's students gave access to the hand-operated printing facilities of the Instituto de 
Segunda Enseñanza (Institute of Secondary Education) and the teacher training college, 
which enabled the production of more specific and locally targeted leaflets. Further 
publicity was achieved by extensive wall-daubing of slogans, often simply writing "26 
de Julio" in a public place. This was combined with ingenious publicity stunts such as 
releasing a horse in the town centre with placards denouncing the dictatorship tied to its 
back, causing the police to look ridiculous as they rushed about trying to catch the 
terrified animal.474
473 Coma, El Movimiento 26 de Julio en Guantánamo (1981) p.31
Comisión Nacional de Historia, Provincia Guantánamo (1980) p.5-7
474 Sección de historia, Reseña histórica de Guantánamo (1985) pp.123-5
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Figure 17: Guantánamo train derailed,
from http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/railroad-destruction.htm
Throughout the insurrectionary period the propaganda produced by the M-26-7 
was very strong in its denunciation of the iniquities of the regime and its allies, but 
much less specific about the proposed solutions, contenting itself mainly with a general 
appeal to rebellion and revolution. In this, there is a notable contrast with the printed 
material produced by the communist party, which contains quite detailed proposals. This 
is because the M-26-7 did not see itself as a political party, but as a movement which 
could unite all patriotic Cubans who believed in democracy and social justice. Given the 
cross-class alliance that the organisation represented, any attempt to be specific about 
the concrete meaning of these terms would have risked a split, which all sides of the 
movement wished to avoid.
In a manner that is common to effective militant rank and file working class 
organisation everywhere, it was necessary to undermine the influence of the trade union 
bureaucracy.475 To this end, the M-26-7 cells started to organise short strikes and 
go-slows over any issue that came to hand. On the railway, this policy was often 
implemented by stoppages of only 5 or 10 minutes, which nevertheless proved 
extremely disruptive to the railway timetable while minimising the possibility for 
victimisation. For example, the strike to defend the right to paid sick leave in July 1956 
is evidence that the railway workers were still in a combative mood despite their defeat 
on the major issue a year earlier.476 As a result of this muscle flexing during 1956, the 
M-26-7 Sección Obrera was able to extend its organisation to other industries in the 
Guantánamo region, with sections amongst the workers in the US naval base at 
Guantánamo Bay, the sugar workers, shop workers, tobacco workers, bakers, electrical 
workers, telephonists, civil aviation, bus and taxi drivers.477
While building the organisation in the workplaces in Guantánamo, the newly 
recruited militants also started to prepare themselves for the forthcoming armed 
struggle. Some small arms were procured from the US base, purchased illegally from 
US military personnel, and over 200 volunteers spent time in remote rural areas 
familiarising themselves with their use. Gustavo Fraga, a worker on the US base, set up 
an explosives workshop which produced 600 grenades that Octavio Louit transported to 
Santiago using his position on the railway. Sugar workers in the workshops of central 
Ermita also constructed improvised explosive devices (IEDs). However, these early 
475 Pearce, Some Past Rank-and-File Movements (1959) pp.13-24
476 Carta Semanal (July 18th 1956)
477 Comisión Nacional de Historia, Provincia Guantánamo (1980) pp.4-7
145
explosives were unreliable and it took some time and experimentation before effective 
IEDs would be produced. It is easy for amateurs to underestimate the difficulties 
involved in clandestine armed activity and there would be many casualties and arrests 
before the organisation gained the necessary experience and organisation to pose a 
military threat to the regime. 
There was a similar problem with the early sabotage operations. Cane burning has 
a long history in Cuba and sugar workers, as Gillian McGillivray shows in her book 
Blazing Cane, had the necessary skills and experience. For instance, she speaks of the 
practice of soaking a rat in petrol, setting it alight and letting it run through the cane 
fields spreading the conflagration.478 However, most other industries did not have this 
experience and the early sabotage in the electricity industry was carried out with more 
enthusiasm than efficiency. This exposed the entire organisation to danger and it was 
quickly resolved to tighten the level of discipline in the selection of targets for sabotage. 
A major responsibility of the person in each cell charged with organising sabotage was 
to co-ordinate activity with the regional leadership to ensure organisational security. 
Once this approach was established, the number of sabotage actions was reduced, but 
their growing effectiveness helped to increase the atmosphere of crisis which 
undermined the regime's credibility.479 
Luis Figueras, of the Casa de Historia (House of History) in Guantánamo, 
following his own interviews with surviving veterans, asserts that there was a clear 
intention to use explosives to cause material damage and to avoid injury to passers-by, 
although it is the nature of explosives, particularly in untrained hands, that they will 
often kill and injure innocent bystanders as well as killing the saboteurs themselves 
when they explode prematurely.480 This attempt to avoid "collateral damage" did not 
spare the M-26-7 the accusations of the Partido Socialista Popular that they were 
terrorists. However, given that many of the guantanameros were ex-trotskyists, there 
was also a legacy of sectarian bitterness to add to the tactical differences with the PSP 
and such accusations had little influence on them. Thus we see the M-26-7 and the PSP 
drawing different conclusions from the defeats of 1955 and reorganising to face the next 
period in a very different fashion.
478 McGillivray, Blazing Cane (2009) p.140
479 Coma, El Movimiento 26 de Julio en Guantánamo (1981) based on interviews with Enrique Soto, Luis 
Lara, Antonio Torres, Octavio Louit, Caridad Rosa Rossell, Benito Bell, Bernado Betancourt and 
workers in Central Ermita.
480 Interview with Luis Figueras Pérez (2009)
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Partido Socialista Popular and Mass Action
The communist party's intervention in the sugar workers' dispute at the end of 
1955 appears to have been quite successful and the detailed local strike reports in Carta 
Semanal indicate widespread party involvement in the action.481 This success and the 
disappointing results of their participation in the electoral politics at the end of 1954 led 
the party to take a turn to the working class. This would bring them into closer contact 
with the M-26-7, as well as more direct competition. The resulting interaction would 
begin the process of convergence between the two organisations, although agreement at 
anything but local level was still a long way off. The public criticisms of Conrado 
Béquer in Carta Semanal, discussed in greater detail below, added personal antagonism 
to political differences.
The Comités de Defensa de las Demandas Obreras (CDDOs) had been active in 
the sugar industry since the end of 1954 with national leaflets issued in the name of the 
Comité en Defensa de los Demandas de la Zafra de 1955 (Committee for the Defence 
of Demands for the 1955 Sugar Harvest) along with more local propaganda referring to 
specific problems or demands482. The Havana CDDO felt strong enough to call for a 
demonstration outside the FNTA plenary which resulted in a group of militants staging a 
protest on the roof of the CTC headquarters, the Palacio de los Trabajadores (Workers' 
Palace).483 Archival evidence exists of CDDO propaganda amongst sugar workers 
continuing through 1955, as well as during and immediately after the strike itself. 
Moreover the government policy of blaming communists for the strike served to raise 
their standing amongst workers and, given the popular support for the strike, in some 
wider sections of the community as well.
Following a successful launch at a conference in April 1956, the national 
organisation, the Comité Nacional de Defensa de las Demandas Obreras y por la 
Democratización de la CTC (CNDDO), held monthly meetings which discussed quite 
detailed interventions in industrial disputes.484 For example, a copy of the report of the 
October 1956 national meeting has survived. This meeting discussed the elections in the 
481 Carta Semanal (January 11th 1956)
482 IHC 1/8:13A1/6.1/1.1/1 CDDO de Güines (December 12th 1954)
IHC 1/8:13A1/3.1/1 CDDO de Trabajadores Azucareros de la Provincia de la Habana (January 1955)
IHC 1/8:13A1/4.1/1 CDDO de la Habana "Todos a la plenaria nacional azucarera" (January 1955)
483 IHC 1/8:13A1/2.1/1.1/1 Comité en Defensa de los Demandas de la Zafra de 1955 "¡Alerta!" (January 
1955)
El Mundo (January 20th 1955)
484 Carta Semanal (April 4th & August 29th 1956)
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FNTA, provided data to show that profits in the sugar industry were rising considerably, 
which justified a 15% wage claim, reported on a victorious 3 week strike against 
victimisation at the Once-Once textile factory, as well as continuing industrial action on 
the Havana buses. It finished with a discussion of progress in forming regional 
CDDOs.485 Throughout 1955 and 1956, there are records of provincial CDDOs being 
formed in Havana, Matanzas, Las Villas and Oriente, while the pages of Carta Semanal 
regularly contained reports of activity by local CDDO groups.486 A document from the 
archives of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba lists 61 CDDOs for the province of 
Havana by industry (see Figure 18). There is also a report that 60 workers attended the 
founding meeting of the CDDO for one of the Havana bus companies, Omnibus Aliados 
(Allied Omnibus). This group went on to issue a professionally printed 4 page 
manifesto, accompanied by an equally professionally printed pamphlet, with a cover 
price of 5¢, entitled ¿Qué es un comité de defensa de las demandas obreras? (What is a 
Committee for the Defence of Workers' Demands), which explained the strategy in 
some detail.487 It is worth examining this bus workers' leaflet further as it gives valuable 
insight into the methodology behind the approach to industrial organisation taken by the 
PSP. The leaflet starts with a statement that the intention is not to divide or form a 
faction, but rather to unite all bus workers within the union with the intention of turning 
it into a fighting organisation which will defend and advance the workers' wages and 
conditions. The 18 point programme starts with a pay demand for a 30% increase and 
then goes on to list a series of specific grievances concerning Christmas bonuses, 
sick-pay, pension contributions etc. The programme continues with a series of measures 
to restore the democratic functioning of the union and calls for CDDO groups to be 
formed on each bus route. Significantly, the leaflet is signed by 32 named drivers. There 
are no overtly "political" demands.488 This would fit in with the PSP's general line of 
fighting for "immediate demands" as a means of advancing "la lucha de masas". 
485 IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/31-33 CNDDO, "Informe a la reunión nacional del CNDDO" (October 1956)
486 IHC 1/8:13A1/9.1/1 CDDO de Matanzas (December 29th 1955)
IHC 1/8:13A1/9.1/2 CDDO de Matanzas (September 30th 1956),
IHC 1/8:13A1/11.1/1 CDDO de Las Villas (February 1st 1956),
IHC 1/8:13A1/13.1/1-2 CDDO de Pieles, Santa Clara (n/d)
IHC 1/8:13A1/15.1/1-2 CDDO de Puerta Padre (November 1956)
487 Carta Semanal (July 25th 1956)
IHC 1/8:13A1/5.1/4-13 CNDDO, "¿Qué es un comité de defensa de las demandas obreras?" (n/d)
488 IHC 1/8:13A1/5A1/1-4, CDDO, "A todos los trabajadores de los Ómnibus Aliados"(July 1956)
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From the surviving evidence, it is hard 
to discern the extent to which the composition 
of the CDDO groups extended beyond the 
PSP membership and its immediate periphery, 
but there is sufficient detail to make it seem 
likely that, at least in some areas, they were 
able to intervene effectively in the labour 
movement at local level. Thus an account of 
the October 14th meeting of the local sugar 
workers' CDDO in Las Villas, the Comité de 
las Demandas Azucareras de Las Villas (Las Villas Committee for Sugar Workers' 
Demands), records a discussion of a number of interventions in local disputes as well as 
organising a hunger march, all in a way that any serious working class militant would 
recognise.489 Be this as it may, the development of the CDDO strategy was sufficiently 
encouraging for the communist party leadership to believe that their general political 
orientation was correct. It has become customary to belittle the part played by PSP 
members in the insurrectionary phase of the Cuban revolution, but this ignores the 
immense contribution they made to sustaining levels of working class discontent in 
areas where they had influence.490 However, the PSP's success in embedding itself in the 
labour movement had been accompanied by a growing political inertia and resistance to 
change. 
Nevertheless, with the notable exceptions of the ports and the tobacco industry, in 
nearly every case of industrial action in 1955 and early 1956, a combination of trade 
union corruption and government violence had proved too much for the unarmed 
workers, who saw themselves defeated sector by sector.491 This situation required an 
explanation and the PSP drew the conclusion that the reason for the defeat was the lack 
of trade union unity, which could be restored by the CDDOs. This tactic was also seen 
489 IHC 1/8:13A1/12.1/1-2, CDDO, "Reunión azucarera de Las Villas" (October 14th 1956),
490 e.g. Sims, Cuban Labor and the Communist Party (1985) pp.50-56
Farber, The Cuban Communists in the Early Stages of the Cuban Revolution (1983) pp.59-61
Bonachea & San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection, (1974) pp.25&220-21
Anderson, Che Guevara (1997) pp.205-206
Morray, The Second Revolution in Cuba (1962) pp.4-5
Thomas, Cuba, or, the pursuit of freedom (1998) pp. 923, 929, 981
Suárez, The Cuban Revolution: The Road to Power (1972) p.17
Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution (1963) p.87
491 Bohemia (January 22nd 1956) p.55
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Figure 18: List of CDDO's in Havana Province, 
from IHC 1/8:13A1/7.1/1-6 CNDDO 
"Rehorrir" (n/d)
as the way to overcome the the class-treason of Mujal and his associates, amongst 
whom they included sugar workers' leader Conrado Béquer.492 
The relationship between the PSP and the purged sugar workers' leaders was 
strained, as can be seen by the tone of the reports in Carta Semanal. The communist 
newspaper formally supported Conrado Béquer and his colleagues and opposed their 
removal from office. However, it was clear that they thought that Béquer had only acted 
under mass pressure rather than from any political conviction. Béquer and Rodriguez 
were also criticised for not challenging the anti-communist attitudes of Mujal and 
Martinez.493 Later in February 1956, the PSP went further and denounced Los Dos 
Conrados in the same terms as Martinez.494 In October of the same year, the CNDDO 
published an open letter to Béquer and Rodriguez, denouncing them for trying to sneak 
back into the official union structure.495 The PSP were not to know that Conrado Béquer 
had secretly joined the 26th July movement at the end of the strike and that he was 
striving to conceal this from the authorities in order to retain the advantage of his 
limited parliamentary immunity. Thus, for example, he was able to appear on television 
with Conrado Rodriguez in the lead up to the 1957 zafra, gaining a platform to call for a 
strike if the previous year's diferencial were not paid promptly as well as demanding 
that previous years' wage cuts be restored, which caused the U.S. Embassy to gave 
Béquer the credit for forcing the government's hand in the 6% sugar workers' wage 
increase of the following March.496 Such accusations would not make future 
relationships between the M-26-7 and the PSP any easier and serve as a demonstration 
of the difficulties experienced by public figures joining clandestine revolutionary 
organisations.
While the PSP had taken part in the campaign for the amnesty that had finally 
secured the release of the surviving Moncada veterans, it was slow to realise that the 
M-26-7 were potential allies.497 Nevertheless, the two organisations did not completely 
ignore each other. During Fidel Castro's stay in Mexico, he was in contact with several 
exiled Cuban communists, including Lazaro Peña, who had been General Secretary of 
492 Carta Semanal (February 1956 - special issue)
493 Carta Semanal (January 18th, 25th 1956 & special issue February 1956)
494 Carta Semanal (Special issue February 1956)
495  IHC 1/8:13/A1/1.1/27 CNDDO, "Carta Abierta" (12th October 1956)
496  El Mundo (November 22nd 1956)
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 651 (April 3, 1957) Sugar; Conrado Becquer [sic]; CTC; 
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 678 (April 12, 1957) Labor Briefs for March, 1957: Sugar wage 
increase 6%
497 Carta Semanal (April 1955)
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the CTC before the 1948 mujalista takeover, when the PSP was the dominant force in 
the federation498. It is hard to know whether these contacts were sanctioned by, or even 
occurred with the knowledge of, the communist party leadership, for while the PSP was 
far from monolithic and contained the factions and personal differences that are 
inevitable in any party, it was remarkably disciplined and nearly always presented a 
common front to the outside world. These contacts produced no agreement, but reflect 
an increasing realisation in some sections of the PSP that the M-26-7 was a force to be 
reckoned with. Thus we see, on the 15th August 1956, when commenting on one of 
Fidel Castro's statements, the PSP introduced the concept of armed insurrection as a 
possibility, all the while continuing to stress the necessity to link this with mass 
action.499 
The practical implications of the different positions held by the M-26-7 and the 
PSP can be discerned in their different interpretations of an earlier period in Cuban 
revolutionary struggle; the uprising against Machado in August 1933 and the subsequent 
general strike in 1935. In August 1956, the PSP began referring back to these events to 
argue for a mass general strike to bring down the government, a tactic which became 
central to their propaganda for the next period.500 However, their version of the history 
was only partially correct as they concentrated on the successful strikes of 1933 and 
ignored the failure of the 1935 strike.. The massive general strike in 1933 was combined 
with an army mutiny, ironically led by Batista himself. A general strike always poses the 
question of state power and the balance of armed force, but on this occasion, army 
involvement meant that the question of state repressive violence was not at issue.  The 
M-26-7, on the other hand, concentrated on explaining the failure of the 1935, which the 
army mobilised to smash, in terms of the failure to combine a general strike with armed 
insurrection.501 The latter approach appeared increasingly relevant to many working 
class militants, as the Ministry of Labour used state power to shore up Mujal's hold on 
the trade union machine through the process known as "Intervención", thereby making 
it increasingly difficult to operate within the official union movement. 
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Mujalista Interventions
If the M-26-7 and the PSP used the year of 1956 to consolidate and expand their 
strength in the labour movement, the mujalista bureaucracy was pushed onto the 
defensive and had to rely more and more on the support of the state. During the course 
of 1956 and 57, intervention in the internal affairs of the CTC's constituent federations 
and local unions became one of the principal sources of friction in Cuba's industrial 
relations. The methods used became increasingly draconian with each attempt and 
demonstrated the developing reliance of Mujal on the Ministry of Labour as his base in 
the unions withered. This section will examine the mechanisms that Mujal and his allies 
used to control the CTC structure, as well as the close relationship with the state that, on 
the one hand, enabled them to maintain their grip, but on the other increasingly bound 
their fate to the successes and failures of the Batista regime. The mujalista tactics 
included interference in union elections, removal from office of elected officials, 
expulsions of troublesome officials from the unions and discrediting individual leaders 
by false or exaggerated accusations of Communism, Peronism, racism etc. To these 
internal means of control, should be added the direct intervention of the state which 
ranged from the Ministry of Labour postponing or annulling elections through to the 
presence of armed soldiers intimidating those who dared attend union meetings that 
might vote to defy the leadership. This process led to greater discontent amongst the 
workers and alienated previously loyal sections of the bureaucracy. This discontent and 
alienation resulted in the necessity for ever increased use of the state to maintain Mujal's 
position, which in turn gave those opposed to the regime an argument that the return to 
trade union democracy required the overthrow of the regime.
The anti-communist purges of the CTC had begun in the late 1940s, when the PSP 
was removed from its leadership positions as part of the mujalista takeover.502 The first 
major use of the procedure against non-communist union officials occurred in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1955 bank workers dispute (see chapter 3). The purged 
officials were allowed to stand for re-election in the next set of elections and they won, 
only to be removed from office on a technicality.503 Learning from this incident, when 
the FNTA was purged following the sugar workers strike, the elections were rigged to 
prevent the purged officials gaining re-election. This proved counter-productive from 
Mujal's point of view and thereafter, officials were appointed with little or no pretence 
502 FO 371/67972-AK1689/14 (1948)  Labour and Communism in Cuba
503 Carta Semanal (March 14th 1956), Valdespino, Agresión totalitaria a la libertad sindical (1956)
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of democracy. We shall discuss these two cases in some detail to better understand the 
developing internal politics of the CTC and then examine a surprising turn of events in 
the electrical workers federation, where Mujal needed to request ministry intervention to 
secure his control of this previously docile trade union. It will be argued that this was an 
indication of the extent of disaffection amongst the Cuban working class at the time of 
Fidel Castro's return from his Mexican exile.
As described in chapter 3, the bank workers revolt was defeated in the middle of 
1955. An "intervention committee" took control of the Havana branch of the trade union 
and a large number of militants were dismissed from their employment. Nevertheless, 
the strike leader José María de la Aguilera and some of his comrades stood for office in 
the March 1956 national elections for the Federación Bancaria (Bank workers' 
federation) and, much to the surprise of the mujalista faction in the union, they won 
handsomely at national level as well as the provincial elections in Havana, Las Villas 
and Oriente. The Ministry of Labour was equally surprised, having allowed the rebel 
faction to stand because it was felt they had no chance of success. The Ministry now 
acted in a manner which would undermine the legitimacy of the mujalistas by 
disqualifying Aguilera's faction on the grounds that they did not work in the industry, 
having been dismissed at the end of the strike. This approach effectively gave an 
employer the right of veto in trade union elections as they could dismiss a candidate 
from his or her employment and thereby disqualify them.504 Apart from a brief notice of 
his arrest in October 1956, there is little further trace of Aguilera in the public record 
until he emerges as one of the leaders of the M-26-7 Sección obrera in January 1959.505 
We know, however, that he was one of the principal underground leaders of the M-26-7 
in Havana. His hand can be seen in the recruitment of the local M-26-7 Secciones 
obreras which, in almost every case where there is a surviving record, there seems to be 
at least one bank worker in a leadership position. It should also be noted that, if militant 
workers were learning new approaches to organisation, so too were the mujalistas, who 
did not make the mistake of allowing a free election again. 
The next union to suffer intervention at the hands of the CTC was the sugar 
workers federation, the FNTA. This trade union contained a significant group of leading 
officials who, while being members of the Auténtico party, were not supporters of 
504 Carta Semanal (March 14th 1956), Valdespino, Agresión totalitaria a la libertad sindical (1956)
505 Carta Semanal (October 26th 1956)
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Mujal. Their differences had come to a head over the sugar workers' strike at the end of 
1955 and they publicly expressed their opposition. The way in which Mujal dealt with 
this problem relied more heavily on the state than previously, in part because this 
represented the first real split in the CTC bureaucracy.
On January 4th 1956, immediately after the strike, Eusebio Mujal and FNTA 
general secretary José Luis Martinez were given a direct instruction from Batista to 
purge the opposition, receiving the full support of the police in so doing. The police 
surrounded the Palacio de los Trabajadores, the main building of the CTC in Havana 
where the FNTA also had its headquarters, and refused admission to Conrado Béquer, 
Conrado Rodriguez and their associates. At the same time, Martinez issued a press 
statement saying that they had been expelled. Three of the expelled sugar workers, 
Béquer, Rodriquez and Jorge Cruz were parliamentary deputies and they drew 
considerable media attention to the expulsions by staging a hunger strike in the Capitol 
building.506 Meanwhile Mujal accused Béquer of being a communist. As with the report 
of the arrest of Ñico Torres on a similar charge referred to above, these are examples of 
the way in which Cold War anti-communism was used as a cover for attacks on any 
militant worker, even those such as Béquer and Torres with a long history of political 
disagreements to the PSP. In the case of Mujal's attack on Béquer, the use made of "guilt 
by association" is particularly striking as Mujal's evidence for the accusation was that he 
had seen photographs of Béquer talking to known "reds". Béquer's reply was that he had 
seen pictures of President Eisenhower talking to known communist leaders such as 
Molotov at the United Nations and went on to ask if the FBI were investigating the US 
President on the same basis.507 
Mujal and Martinez's actions were endorsed by the CTC executive, although it 
was necessary to again surround the building with police to exclude those members of 
the executive who might oppose the intervention. The only mildly contrary voice came 
from Angel Cofiño of the electricity workers' union, the Federación de Plantas 
Eléctricas, who was concerned at the extent of the interventions rather than the 
506 "Obreros", Bohemia (January 15th 1956) p.61-65
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principle. Mujal explained that the intervention committee had been obliged to seek 
police and army support because of threats of violence from a some of his opponents. 
There was considerable opposition to the interventions amongst the union rank 
and file, with strikes and demonstrations in Yaguajay, Sagua la Grande, Morón, Ciego 
de Avila and Florida. While the workers at central Narcisa in Yaguajay were alone in 
staying out on strike against the interventions for nearly two weeks, workers in many 
other workplaces refused to work with the newly imposed "official" union 
representatives. In many cases the employers quietly asked them to leave in order to 
ensure that the harvest went ahead. The authorities matched this resistance from the 
workers by arrests leading to prison sentences, which ranged from 90 days for 11 
workers in Madruga to a year in a reform school for a 17 year old communist, Oscar 
Bengochea from Sancti Spiritus. An electrical worker, whose case was reported 
nationally when it was discovered that he was a personal friend of Angel Cofiño, was 
also imprisoned for a year for sabotage committed in solidarity with the strike; he had 
plunged the city of Cienfuegos into darkness. Even more generalised were the 
victimisations of known militants, with mass sackings of 50 or more workers not 
uncommon. The level of state support for the interventions can also be seen from the 
use of troops to seize control of the union offices in central Trinidad, which was 
Béquer's home base.508
The FNTA elections, scheduled for February 1956, were postponed by the 
Ministry of Labour in the aftermath of the recently defeated sugar workers' strike and 
eventually took place on 26th August 1956. In order to achieve the desired result, decree 
1559 introduced the idea of a sello de buen cotizante, a stamp to indicate that its holder 
was a member in good standing. When Béquer condemned the failure to distribute these 
in areas where the opposition had support, Mujal replied in a radio broadcast which 
must have shocked even some of his own supporters:
What do they want? The stamps are not for sharing out amongst those who 
oppose us ... If our enemies decide on violence on election day, blood will flow, 
not ours, but theirs.509
508 Carta Semanal (February 1st & 15th 1956)
"CTC", Bohemia (January 27th 1956) n.pag.,
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Some stamps finally arrived, although so did the rural guard and, while Béquer 
was allowed to stand for local office in central Trinidad and Rodriguez in Sagua la 
Grande, Mujal later used their victories to claim that this proved that the elections were 
fair. The PSP did not appreciate the stand taken by Béquer and Rodriguez and the 
CNDDO attacked the pair for writing an open letter to the new executive of the FNTA, 
criticising them for failing to recognise that the new executive was as bad as the old and 
accusing them of trying to sneak back.510 In most places the elections were openly 
corrupt, for example in central Dolores, out of over 500 workers, only 32 were allowed 
to vote in an election supervised by a platoon of soldiers. On the eve of FNTA congress, 
which took place a month later, Conrado Rodriguez placed proof of Mujal's corrupt 
misuse of the compulsory check-off before the court. Nothing came of this, but Mujal 
was spurred to issue an angry and unconvincing rebuttal to the press. Fearing for their 
safety, los Dos Conrados arrived at the congress armed with pistols, but were forcibly 
disarmed at the door. When Béquer spoke from the rostrum, he was booed and jeered by 
Mujal's supporters, which resulted in a fist fight.511 
These elections were obviously intended to give a measure of legitimacy to the 
mujalista faction but, in order to win they had to run the election in such an openly 
corrupt fashion that, if anything, their claims to legitimacy were reduced still further.  
Furthermore, the fact that they had to allow some opposition election victories meant 
that Béquer and Rodriguez were able to cause a scandal at the congress. From Mujal's 
perspective, however, there was one positive outcome; José Luis Martinez, who had 
been blatantly embezzling FNTA funds, was replaced by Prisciliano Falcón.512 Falcón 
had been the provincial secretary of the CTC in Oriente and had proved his loyalty to 
Mujal in Camagüey by assuming control of the sugar workers union there following the 
1956 purges, when no local candidate could be found. 
This election marked the end of Mujal's flirtation with democracy, the bank 
workers had proved that he could not retain control in the face of a genuine election, 
while a rigged election did nothing to enhance his reputation and could be used by his 
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opponents to undermine his position. Intervention in central Trinidad and the final 
removal of Béquer from all elected office, which took place in March of 1957, marked 
the end of any pretence of democracy within the CTC, which thereafter openly operated 
as Mujal's personal fiefdom. This meant that any trade unionist who seriously wanted to 
defend wages and working conditions had to align with the opposition. There were still 
some honest, but not particularly radical, union officials who had gone along with Mujal 
up to this point; Samuel Powell of the sugar workers union is probably the most 
prominent. The contradictions proved too much for a number of these, who left the 
Cuban labour movement entirely, further reducing Mujal's legitimacy.
The personal rule of Mujal within the CTC threatened 
even the "loyal opposition" based around Angel Cofiño 
(Figure 19), leader of the electricity workers' union. The final 
split came over the government's decree 538, published on 
13th March 1957. This decree forbade the employment of 
"communists" in public service and was warmly welcomed 
by Mujal.  There was considerable opposition to the wide 
ranging nature of this decree, which was summed up by a 
Bohemia columnist, Andres Valdespino, as giving the 
employers, who he described as the most reactionary in the 
world, the right to denounce anyone who disagreed with the 
current economic order as a communist.513 The U.S. Embassy 
recognised that Mujal could use control of the screening 
panel to whittle away at Cofiño's base in the electrical 
workers' union.514 Cofiño saw this as both a threat to his independence and, given the 
general political turmoil over the decree, an opportunity to gain independence from 
Mujal's tutelage for the Federación Eléctrica. The two men's relationship, never good, 
had deteriorated further when, in February 1957, Mujal had manoeuvred to replace 
Cofiño with Oscar Samalea as President of the Retirement Fund of the Electrical, Gas 
and Water Workers.515 Reacting to this situation, the executive of the Federación 
Eléctrica called a referendum amongst its membership on the proposition that the 
electrical workers leave the CTC on the grounds that decree 538 threatened the 
513 Valdespino, El decreto 538: ¿Contra el comunismo or contra la liberdad? (1957) pp.51&99
514 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 630 (March 28, 1957) Two Labor Federations Oppose Decree 538
515 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 486 (February 7, 1957) Angel Cofiño Replaced By Oscar Salamea 
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Figure 19: Angel Cofiño,
from Bohemia (1957)
independence of the federation. The Ministry of Labour proved them correct by using 
another decree to justify intervention and the executive of the Federación Eléctrica 
were suspended for 2 years. The telephone workers' union executive, often seen as allies 
of Cofiño, were silenced by the threat of a similar fate if they supported the electricians. 
The reaction of the workers in the electrical industry surprised everyone, as they 
had no tradition of militancy and were considered by many to be part of the "aristocracy 
of labour". Workers in Pinar del Rio occupied the company office until they were 
ejected by the police. The same thing happened in Santa Clara, but here they retreated to 
the union office and barricaded themselves in. The response in Santiago was a paso de 
jicotea, while Camagüey reacted with a half-day strike. However, Havana was the 
centre of resistance to the intervention, led by the women who worked in the offices. 
Despite Cofiño's attempts to reach a compromise to save his position, the dispute took 
on a life of its own. There were a series of demonstrations and walkouts which 
continued until late May, when the women from the head office of the electricity 
company used Mothers' Day as an excuse for a pro-Cofiño rally.516 Even the baseball 
matches at the sports clubs of bank, telephone and electrical workers became scenes of 
demonstrations for trade union democracy. Sabotage of the street lighting circuits 
started to occur and small bombs went off in electricity sub-stations. Mujal claimed that 
this proved that communists were involved, while the head of the national police offered 
a reward of 5000 pesos for information on the saboteurs. Decree 1045, issued on May 
14th, re-inflamed the situation by declaring whole layers of workers "confidential 
employees" who could not join the union. 
The women from the offices staged a demonstration outside the union building, 
the police opened fire with bird-shot and 30 were arrested (Figure 20). Cofiño, now in 
hiding, called for a go-slow which quickly spread to Oriente, Las Villas and Camagüey. 
On the 16th May, the telephone workers stopped work for 15 minutes in solidarity and, 
while Mujal was publicly denying the effects of the movement, the intervention 
committee felt obliged to declare another 80 expulsions from the union. All of this 
reminded the bank workers of their recent difficulties and, despite the best efforts of the 
imposed mujalista leadership, these workers struck for 15 minutes on the 21st May. 
516 "Obreros" & "Conflictos sociales" Bohemia (April 21st 1957) n.pag.,
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The government appointed a "military intervention officer" over the electrical 
workers' union who, working with the intervention committee, directed a strikebreaking 
operation. This had limited effect because of the skilled nature of many of the jobs in 
the industry. The army presence did, however, cause many workers to walk out entirely. 
The army gave the striking workers until the 23rd to return to normal working and by 
this date, most had gone back. Soldiers occupied the electrical plants, making notes of 
absences and slow or deliberately careless work, while many rank and file leaders, 
many of them women, were arrested. Press reports suggested that both the company and 
the ministry had tried to put pressure on Mujal to diffuse the situation but he refused to 
back down, perhaps because he realised that if he were to be seen to give in in the face 
of mass pressure, his hold on the apparatus of the CTC could quickly crumble.517 
An interesting side issue in the electrical workers' dispute is the question of 
racism. In the public dispute between Mujal and Cofiño, one of the accusations that 
Mujal raised is that of racism in the electrical workers union which, he points out, had 
only recently withdrawn its support for a colour bar on employment in the profession 
and was still overwhelmingly white.518 The fact that this accusation could be used as 
part of a justification for intervention implies a low level of racism within the Cuban 
working class. It is reasonable to suppose that there was little politically significant 
racism between workers or otherwise Mujal, not known for taking up unpopular issues 
of principle, would not have raised the matter. This denunciation of racism coincided 
517 "Obreros" Bohemia (June 2nd1956) pp.91-2
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 831 (June 5, 1957) Chronology re Intervention of the Federation of 
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518 "Obreros" Bohemia (April 28th1956) pp.85-6&94-5,
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Figure 20: Demonstrations by Electrical Workers in Havana, from Bohemia (April 21st 1957) n.pag.
with a large public anti-racist rally, which was organised by the main organisation 
representing Afro-Cubans, the Federación de Sociedades Cubanas (Federation of 
Cuban Societies) .This meeting took place in the CTC headquarters with Mujal and his 
close associates playing a leading role and denouncing racial discrimination in very 
strident terms.519 
The increasingly heavy-handed approach taken by Mujal and the Ministry of 
Labour in their use of the intervention procedures is clear evidence of the growing 
levels of disenchantment amongst the general union membership. This would provide 
fertile ground for the growth of the July 26th Sección Obrera, which would have its first 
serious test at the end of 1956 with the return of Fidel Castro. 
Granma and the Workers
Fidel Castro and his comrades planned to return to Cuba in the motor launch 
Granma at the end of November 1956. In Santiago, Frank País had the responsibility of 
organising an armed uprising to cover the landing. The plan also required supporting 
activity in Guatánamo. The actions in Santiago and Guantánamo were significant in 
several ways. They demonstrate a growing rapprochement between some elements in 
the PSP and the M-26-7, the strength of the organisation in Guantánamo was clearly 
shown and the concept of sindicalismo beligerante was given its first test. On the other 
hand, the military inexperience of the militants was clear and weaknesses that would 
need to be addressed in the future became apparent. 
On the morning of 30th November 1956, a group of men, dressed in olive green 
uniforms with red and black armbands marked "26 Julio" and carrying machine guns 
and M-1 rifles, attacked the customs office in Santiago, quickly managing to set it alight 
with Molotov cocktails (Figure 21). As soldiers arrived to reinforce those in the customs 
house, the rebels spread out through the city, attacking numerous other targets. In the 
chaos, a military Jeep collided with a jam delivery lorry and the frustrated soldiers shot 
the driver and his assistant. By 9am, the army and police, unaware of the strength of 
their opponents, had retreated to their barracks, leaving the rebels in command of the 
streets. It was several hours before the authorities could regain control of the island's 
second city, following the arrival of 400 reinforcements under the command of Colonel 
Barrera Pérez, who would be appointed military commander of Santiago, following the 
519 Otero Gonzalez, ¡La confraternidad humana no permite discriminación alguna! (1957) n.pag
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humiliation of his predecessor.520 The actions of the M-26-7 in Santiago were largely 
successful in their primary objective, which was to draw attention away from the arrival 
of the nucleus of the rebel army on the coast near Manzanillo, although they did result 
in important losses of life amongst the rebels. The national leadership of the PSP was 
aware of the impending Granma landing, but they thought that the whole scheme was 
adventurist and wanted no part of it. However, the local PSP organisation in Santiago 
had cordial relations with the Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio and took a 
different view. As a result, the military actions of the M-26-7 on 30th November 1956 
received the support of the Santiago communists led by Ladislao Carvajal, provincial 
secretary of the PSP, in defiance of a direct order from Havana.521 This cordial 
relationship was particularly important in the port where their co-operation extended to 
help with distributing each other's clandestine propaganda to reduce the risk of police 
detection.522 So, on the morning of the 30th November, Juan Taquechel successfully 
pulled the Santiago docks out on strike in support of the insurrectionary activities 
organised by the M-26-7.523 As a result Taquechel, Sergio Valiente and three other 
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Figure 21: Santiago customs house in flames, from Bohemia (December 9th1956) n.pag.
dockers' leaders were suspended from office and then dismissed from their employment 
by the Ministry of Labour in January 1957.524
Frank País had previously requested the M-26-7 branch in Guantánamo to aid the 
actions in Santiago in two ways, firstly by impeding the progress of reinforcements 
from Guantánamo to Santiago and secondly by forcing the military in the Guantánamo 
region to remain on a war footing, thereby distracting them from both the uprising in 
Santiago and Fidel Castro's landing near Manzanillo. Command of the M-26-7 actions 
was divided between Julio Camacho, Octavio Louit and Ñico Torres. Comancho's 
responsibility was to lead an attack on the barracks in central Ermita, while in the town 
itself, Louit organised sharpshooters to open fire on the post office, the police station 
and the barracks of the Guardia Rural. Torres had the responsibility of organising a 
general strike in the area and to prepare a group of guerrillas to start another front in the 
Sierra Canasta. The attack at Ermita, carried out by workers from the refinery itself, was 
relatively successful because of the element of surprise. Following this attack, the group 
managed to block the road out of town and shut down the train access to Santiago by 
holding up a train at gunpoint and disabling it. Some of those involved later returned to 
work believing they had not been recognised, but they were mistaken and they were 
arrested. On the other hand, the armed actions in town failed because the cartridges had 
become damp and would not fire.525 
Torres's group started by cutting the telephone connections with the outside world 
and set fire to several railway bridges. However, there was confusion around the start of 
the strike as the signal to walk out was to have been the shots fired in the attack on the 
police station. Given the problem with the damp cartridges, the signal could not be 
given and the strike did not start until the until the following morning. Once the word 
was passed successfully, the strike was fully observed and the town shut down 
completely. Government forces obliged some stores to open at gun point, but they 
quickly shut again when the soldiers had passed on. Soldiers also drove some buses, but 
these were boycotted by the townsfolk. Having achieved their objective of assisting the 
uprising in Santiago, the majority of workplaces returned to work on the 3rd December, 
while the railway workers stayed out until the 6th. Both Louit and Torres state, in later 
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162
interviews, that the Guantánamo PSP helped with the strike action, but insist that the 
action was clearly led by and under the control of the M-26-7.526 We should recognise 
the organisational achievement represented by a 5 day railway strike in solidarity with 
an armed uprising and which that posed no economic or political demands. There have 
been few parallels in history, perhaps the only comparable example is the French 
general strike of August 1944 at the time of the liberation of Paris from Nazi 
occupation, where the lead was also taken by railway workers.527 
Conclusion
The government must still have appeared to be in a strong position at the 
beginning of 1957, an assessment shared by the British Ambassador who reported that 
the government "has the backing of the Army, big business and the United States".528 
The clandestine preparations made by both the July 26th Movement and the PSP, even if 
they had been detected, cannot at this stage have appeared to pose any great threat to the 
stability of the situation, while the events surrounding the Granma landing must have 
seemed like a storm in a teacup. The greatly reduced number of strikes since the defeat 
of the sugar workers would have reinforced the backing the government received from 
big business and the United States, with those few strikes that did break out being 
quickly isolated and defeated. It was unlikely that the growth of the CDDOs would have 
seemed very impressive to the government, as the CTC remained firmly in the hands of 
Mujal and his associates. The interventions and purges in the trade unions would have 
appeared to be successful in removing a few troublemakers. Most importantly, profits 
were increasing, while wages were falling behind price increases on basic goods. 
This would, however, prove to be the last period of relative tranquillity for Batista 
and his government, as the industrial peace proved to be only a temporary lull. The 
growing concern and confusion in the U.S. Embassy reports indicate the general 
surprise at the militancy of the electrical industry workers' response to the purging of 
Angel Cofiño.529 It can be seen as a symptom of a new atmosphere of discontent and a 
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recovery in working class confidence. The M-26-7 in Guantánamo showed the 
important role that organised labour could play in an insurrectionary situation and, 
while this approach was still limited to a small area in the far eastern end of the island, 
their successes did not go unnoticed in parts of the M-26-7 leadership. Meanwhile, the 
PSP continued to fan the flames of discontent. 
However, an examination of the politics of 
the PSP during 1956 shows the hope that mass 
struggle for immediate economic demands would 
grow into more generalised action, which would 
lead to the end of the Batista regime by relatively 
peaceful means, based on their interpretation of the 
August 1933 strike which, in their analysis, led to 
the end of the Machado dictatorship; they 
conveniently ignored the role of the Army in the 
removal of Machado. The next chapter contrasts 
this with the developing politics of the M-26-7, who 
instead drew the lesson from the failed 1935 
general strike that such a strike needed to be combined with an armed insurrection in 
order to succeed.
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Figure 22: Cartoon referring to the 
overthrow of Machado in August 1933 
from Carta Semanal (August 22nd, 
1936)
Chapter 5. Responses to State Terror
The British Embassy's assessment of the situation in Cuba at the beginning of 
1957 was that "recent events drawing attention to anti-Batista feelings in the island 
should not blind us to the government's basic strength".530 The Ambassador was not 
alone in failing to recognise the threat that Fidel Castro and his forces might present to 
the regime, for the early days in the Sierra Maestra were extremely difficult for the 
rebels. However, as the year progressed and the rebel force grew in size and 
effectiveness, the diplomatic reports became increasingly concerned that "as long as the  
Cuban government handles affairs as badly as they have done up to now, there is little 
prospect of an improvement". The ambassador recognised the counter-productive nature 
of police brutality, nevertheless understanding that "when terrorism is rampant it is not 
easy to stop the police using unlawful methods".531 
As the year 1957 progressed, the opposition reacted to these "unlawful methods" 
with protest strikes and a number of women's demonstrations as well as an increase in 
armed actions and sabotage. These different tactics for handling violent state repression 
represent the tactical divergence between the PSP and the M-26-7, with the communist 
party insisting on la lucha de masas, while the rebels led by Fidel Castro were 
advocating a more military approach. Most of the historiographical discussion has 
hitherto concentrated on the pronouncements of the leaderships of these two groups 
without much consideration of the practical activity of ordinary militants. This approach 
fails to examine the interaction of ordinary militants of both organisations at rank and 
file level, where the realities of clandestine labour organisation often forced militants of 
different tendencies to co-operate in the workplace situation, frequently without the 
knowledge or approval of their leaders.532 
The response of the Batista government to the Granma landing and the start of 
rebel military operations in the Sierra Maestra represents a fundamental turning point in 
the history of the Cuban revolution. Up to this point, police action had been kept within 
certain limits. In the main, the security forces had used clubs, the flats of their machetes 
or fire hoses to repress dissent. From the start of 1957, we see increased use of firearms, 
530 FO 371/126467 - AK1015/8 Political situation in Cuba (February 22nd 1957)
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resulting in many more deaths and serious injuries. There was also the start of a 
systematic use of torture and semi-official death squads. The next two chapters consider 
developments from December 1956 through to May 1958. During this period the two 
principal opposition tendencies with influence amongst the working class, the PSP and 
the M-26-7, pursued different strategies in the face of this increased repression. Both 
organisations learnt from their experiences and, by the beginning of the summer of 
1958, there was sufficient convergence for them to discuss joint work; arguably the next 
important turning point in the history of the insurrection.
This chapter considers the activities of the various components of the working 
class movement during this period, as seen through their clandestine publications, in the 
light of the changing nature of the class struggle and the escalating government reign of 
terror. The nature of clandestine publication and distribution inevitably means that there 
is an unevenness in the archival record; to be caught with an opposition leaflet could 
have been a death sentence. Nevertheless, there is more than sufficient material in the 
archives to paint a rich picture of the lively political discussion which must have taken 
place in the workplaces and poorer neighbourhoods. It is surprising that so little use has 
been made of these sources; another example, perhaps, of "the condescension of 
history". A notable exception to this trend is the three volume history of the communist 
party written by Angelina Rojas.533 She has made a detailed examination of the archival 
collections in the Institute of Cuban History (IHC) and volume three of her study, which 
covers the period of the insurrection, is based upon and makes copious references to the 
surviving internal documents of the PSP and Carta Semanal. This chapter draws upon 
my study of these same sources, as well as the leaflets, pamphlets and clandestine 
newspapers in the IHC and provincial archives, along with the personal collections of 
some surviving militants. It assesses the changes which took place in this period of flux 
between November 1956 and April 1958. While the dramatic events in the Sierra 
overshadowed the day to day class struggle, some sectors of the working class showed 
clear signs of a recovery in confidence during 1957, the extent and nature of which has 
not previously been considered and will therefore be catalogued here. This recovery 
caused an exasperated government to respond by including militant workers' 
representatives among its targets for repression which, in turn, lead to a surprising 
amount of workplace activity aimed at combating the state violence. The failure of these 
533 Rojas, Primer Partido Comunista de Cuba 3 (2011)
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workers to fully defend themselves by traditional trade union action put pressure on 
both the PSP and the M-26-7. 
In particular, the chapter examines the debate over the best way to respond to the 
increasing government repression, which was taking place both between the PSP and 
the M-26-7 and internally within these organisations. The ferocity of the government 
response to any opposition began to move the communist party leadership to reconsider 
their attitude to armed action and their analysis of the nature of the July 26th Movement. 
This reconsideration was spurred on by the growing political significance of the rebels 
and their popularity among sections of the communist party, particularly the youth wing. 
Theodore Draper claims that there was even a division of opinion in the leadership but, 
as before, there is no real evidence as discipline was maintained.534 The growing 
acceptance amongst labour activists of the need for an armed response to state violence 
resulted in a change in the balance of forces, with the 26th July Movement increasing its 
implantation in the working class.
Class struggle
The year 1957 started with a wave of demands for large wage increases, with a 
20% increase and a $90 minimum monthly wage being the common demand. While 
many workers were fearful of the consequences of traditional strike action over 
economic demands, they still raised those demands in a form which unnerved their 
employers. While the picture is uneven, it would appear that some groups of workers 
were better placed to defend their interests than others and that this affected the political 
conclusions they reached. However, as the level of state violence increased, the major 
concern of most workers shifted from economic to political questions, leading to a 
series of strikes in protest at repressive government violence. However, before 
considering these developments, it may be useful to examine reactions to a wave of 
attempted victimisations starting in mid-1956, as these show that working class 
confidence was maintained in some industrial sectors.
There was a brief downturn in the number of reported strikes following the defeat 
of the sugar workers in January 1955, but the first signs of a revival appeared in 
mid-1956 when there are some significant disputes against the victimisation of union 
delegates and threats of closure in the textile industry. The first such strike broke out in 
534 Draper, Castroism (1965) p.31
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July 1956 in the Fábrica Las Vegas in Santiago de las Vegas. There is no record of the 
outcome, but a dispute later the same month in the Once-once textile factory, which was 
situated in the Havana suburbs, has left better records. In this case, three shop stewards 
were dismissed following two weeks of industrial action, which took the form of a 
huelga de brazos caídos. The mainly women workers responded to this victimisation by 
occupying the factory, but were soon expelled by the police. They continued their action 
outside the gates. After three weeks on strike, with growing local solidarity from 
workers in other textile factories, the management reinstated the stewards.535 At the 
same time, there was a week long strike in the Marianao textile factory of Damián y 
Hmos., which resulted in a wage rise. This was followed by a lockout in the Betroma SA 
factory in Matanzas, which management were threatening to close, unsuccessfully as it 
turns out, there being later references to other disputes at this workplace.536 There are 
also reports of a demonstration against the threatened closure of La Ribon textile factory 
in Marianao in January 1957. This was followed by protests against the threat by the 
management of La Rayonera that they would cut 300 jobs for "lack of markets".537 The 
fiercest struggle, however, took place in La Concordia Textil SA in Guanabacoa where 
the workers resisted a three month lock-out aimed at imposing wage cuts. The factory 
reopened in February, but there is a surviving leaflet in the Cuban National Archive 
calling the workers to a mass meeting on 10th April to resist further threats and to resist 
a potential betrayal by the national union federation.538 Much of the trouble in the textile 
industry at this time was as a result of competition from cheaper foreign textiles. The 
government had originally promised a subsidy to assist the local industry, but 
management claimed that this was no longer forthcoming and were attempting to force 
through job cuts and threatening to close factories.539 This industrial action provided 
useful recruits for the M-26-7 Sección Obrera, because the accusations of "dumping" 
cheap foreign textiles gave increased relevance to their politics of revolutionary 
nationalism. Indeed, under the leadership of Julián Alemán and Joaquín Torres, the 
Matanzas provincial office of the textile workers' federation, the FPTT, became a local 
organising centre for clandestine revolutionary activity.540
535 Carta Semanal (July 11th, August 22nd & 29th 1956)
536 Carta Semanal (July 18th, August 8th 1956)
537 Carta Semanal (February 20th 1957)
538 ANC 7-191-1391 Trabajadores de La Concordia Textil SA (26th march 1957) 
539 El Impacial (9th March 1957)
540 García Pérez, Insurrección y Revolución (2006) p.104
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Another example of resistance to victimisation can be seen in the railway 
workshops of the FFCC Unidos in Luyanó, a working class suburb of Havana. On 
Friday November 16th 1956 at 10.40 am, Eladio Cid, President of Delegación 2 of the 
Hermandad Ferroviaria came to the railway workshop and told workers that they must 
work at weekends because the company was in financial difficulties. At midday, 200 
workers out of the 300 employed in the workshops assembled for an impromptu mass 
meeting which refused to accept the new arrangements. The workers clocked off and 
went home chanting !Para trabajo extra, pago extra! (Extra work, extra pay!). On the 
following Monday, at 10am, a worker called Gabriel Canut was suspended without pay 
because of the speech he had made at the meeting on the previous Friday. All 300 
workers rushed to the office shouting that they would not work until he was reinstated. 
The police were called but, by the time they arrived, the workers had left the workshop 
and gone down to the train terminal, where they persuaded the train crews to stop 
working. Just before 11pm that evening, Canut was reinstated and weekend working 
without pay abandoned subject to future discussions.541 There was another strike in the 
same workshop against more attempted victimisations in January but, with management 
unable to force through the dismissals, 5 workers were arrested by the police.542 
Management finally succeeding in dismissing 20 workers in February 1957 with the 
help of the police, although unpaid weekend working was never imposed.543
The events in the textile and railway industries described above were essentially 
defensive, but show a recovery in confidence. A more offensive approach was displayed 
by the Caibarién dockers in the early part of 1957, when they felt strong enough to take 
action in order to enforce the agreed manning levels. In this particular case, they struck 
the port for several days to ensure that the full complement of workers were employed 
loading the sugar freighter "Aida"; management had employed one fewer than the 
contract specified. It is clear from the way this strike is reported that both sides realised 
that more was at stake than just one man's job; the breaking of the agreed contract was 
viewed by the dockers as the thin end of the wedge.544 This is perhaps untypical of the 
general feeling of the time, but evidence that a few groups of workers had managed to 
survive the bruising struggles of 1955-6 with their confidence intact. More significant, 
541 Carta Semanal (November 28th & December 12th 1956)
542 Carta Semanal (January 9th & 16th 1957)
543 Carta Semanal (February 20th 1957)
544  Parrado & Pérez , Breve relato histórico del sector marítimo-portuario de Caibarién (1972) p.162
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however, was the return to militant activity by the bus drivers of Havana who had been 
uncharacteristically quiet during the early part of the Batista era.
During the summer of 1956, the Havana bus drivers raised the demand for paid 
meal breaks and stopped work over a demand for the reinstatement of 60 duties, which 
had been cut four years previously.545 At the start of 1957, management of the two 
Havana bus companies refused to pay a traditional bonus which gave bus drivers an 
extra month's pay at New Year. The drivers in the depot of Autobuses Modernos that 
operated routes 23, 24 and 25 were the first to react by going on strike. The strike 
quickly spread until it affected 90% of the fleet, by which time management backed 
down and agreed to pay half immediately and the remainder on January 5th. Threatened 
with a similar response from the drivers of the other company, Omnibus Aliados, this 
company's management offered a payment of $50 in cash.546 It should be stressed that, 
similarly to the Caibarién dockers, this was seen by the bus workers as protection of 
their traditional rights from erosion; the original agreement for an extra month's salary 
at Christmas was negotiated as a form of savings scheme to enable workers to have 
extra money to celebrate with their families. On the other hand, the employers clearly 
felt that they were paying a month's wages for nothing and it became an obvious target 
for economies in strained economic circumstances. Rather like the dispute over the 
sugar workers' diferencial at the end of 1955, this is another example of the gulf of 
comprehension that existed between workers and their employers in such matters.
This renewed militancy continued in March 1957 with a partial strike on routes 30 
and 57 operated by Omnibus Aliados in protest at a cut of 18 duties. This was followed 
by a general refusal of all Havana drivers to operate the newly purchased larger 45 
seater buses, as this would have enabled the same number of passengers to be carried by 
fewer drivers, thus potentially reducing the number of drivers employed.547 Another 
strike broke out on route 79 in April to protest at the arrest of two bus drivers, followed 
by a similar incident on route 19 in May. In these last two strikes, strikebreaking 
soldiers drove buses, which would have contributed to the bad feeling that led to a half 
hour strike on routes 21 and 22 in November against the arrest of a colleague who had 
refused to pick up a soldier between stops.548 The Omnibus Aliados workers were also 
numbered amongst the union groups supporting the PSP's 1957 wage campaign, 
545  IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/31-33 CNDDO "Reunión nacional" (October 1956)
546  Carta Semanal (January 2nd & 16th 1957)
547  Carta Semanal (29th March1957) 
548 Carta Semanal (17th April, 29th May, 20th November 1957)
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discussed below, linking a 20% wage claim with the demand for compensation for 
driving the new, larger buses.
The Havana bus workers had a long and militant history. Their strike had started 
the anti-Machado rebellion in 1933 and they were amongst the few sectors who had 
struck both in support of Lazaro Peña during the 1947 anti-communist purges of the 
CTC, as well as in protest at Batista's coup in 1952 (described in chapter 2 above). 
However, they had been quiet ever since the arrest of the union leader Marco Hirigoyen 
and the dismissal of 600 drivers in July 1952.549 I would argue that this return to form by 
the Havana bus workers, perhaps influenced by the activity of the sectoral CDDO 
(described in Chapter 4 above), is symptomatic of a more general discontent, 
characterised by increased pressure for wage increases.550 
Some time in the summer of 1956, sensing a change in mood, the PSP decided to 
conduct a campaign for a 20% increase and a $90 per month minimum wage for all 
workers. The report of the October national meeting of the CNDDO contains a very 
detailed argument about sugar workers' wages. It argued that the forthcoming zafra 
would be 5 million tons and that the price had held up because of the poor harvest in 
Europe. This had resulted in large profits for the employers, for example the Vertientes 
Camagüey Sugar Company, whose profits rose from $392,900 in 1953, to $485,000 in 
1954 and $794,200 in 1955. Salary reductions for the workers caused by wage cuts and 
shorter zafras compared to 1952 resulted in considerably lower wage bills for the 
employers: for 1953 a total reduction of $157m, for 
1954 the wage bill was $160m less, for 1955 the 
reduction was $186m. Nineteen fifty-six saw a slight 
recovery, but the total was still $181m less than 
1952. Intensivismo and mechanisation had produced 
a situation where a zafra of 5 million tons, which 
would have taken 145 days in 1925, could be 
gathered in a mere 88 days in 1957. All this led 
Carta Semanal to the conclusion that the claim 
should be for a 20% increase, accompanied by the 
demand for full payment of the diferencial and a 
549  FO 371/97516 - AK1015/33 (1952) - Political Situation in Cuba
550 IHC 1/8:13A1/5A1/1-4 CDDO, "A todos los trabajadores de los Ómnibus Aliados" (July 1956)
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Figure 23: Cartoon, from Carta 
Semanal (September 11th 1956) 
prompt start to the pre-harvest repairs (see Figure 23).551 The PSP's intervention in the 
sugar workers' wage debate was implemented by large numbers of leaflets, both 
nationally and locally produced, aimed at propagating the policy.552 
The campaign for a 20% increase appears to have struck a chord with workers 
across a range of sectors, as illustrated in Table 5 below listing wage claims submitted 
in the first half of 1957. While these reports come from Carta Semanal, there is some 
independent verification in the legal press, for example El Mundo records the fact that 
the Havana bus drivers were demanding a 20% rise.553 The U.S. Embassy also reports 
"Mounting Pressure for Wage and Salary Increases".554
Table 5: Wage claims submitted in the first half of 1957
9 Jan Havana Omnibus Aliados Demand 20% wage increase
13 Feb & 
27 Mar
Matanzas Henequeneros Demand equal pay in whole of agriculture, 
based on parity with the highest paid. 
Management threaten lock-out
13 Feb Havana Omnibus Aliados Demand for 20% wage rise to compensate 
for larger 45 seat buses
20 Feb Federación Nacional de Comercio Demand 20% wage increase
27 Feb Havana Gastronomicos Demand $90 minimum wage and 20% wage 
rise
6 Mar Federación Nacional de Calzado Demand wage increase
6 Mar Havana Ten-cents 
(Woolworth)
Demand $90 minimum and 20% increase
6 Mar Luyamo Metalúrgicos Metalworkers demand wage rise
20 Mar Havana Sindicato de 
Laboratorios
Mass meeting demands 20% increase
20 Mar Havana Tuberias santiarias Demand 20%
20 Mar Las Villas Banks Demand 20%
27 Mar Havana Hotel Sevilla Demand 20%
27 Mar Havana Fabrica Larrañaga Tabaqueros demand 20%
27 Mar Havana Hotel Sevilla Demand 20%
27 Mar Provincia de la 
Habana
Central Portugalete Two short strikes win a 10% wage increase
27 Mar Havana Hotel Sevilla Demand 20%
551 IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/31-33 CNDDO "Reunión nacional" (October 1956)
552 IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/22 CNDDO "Llamamiento a los obreros azucareros" (July 1956)
IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/23 CNDDO "Trabajador azucarero" (October 4th 1956)
IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/49 CNDDO "¡Trabajadores azucareros!" (March 20th 1957)
IHC 1/8:13A1/12.1/1-2 CNDDO "Reunión azucareros de Las Villas" (October 14th 1956)
IHC 1/8:13A1/12.1/1-2 CDDO de Puerto Padre - "A los obreros azucareros" (November1956)
553 El Mundo (December 2nd 1956)
554 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 610 (March 21, 1957) Labor Briefs for February, 1957
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3 Apr Havana Hotels Hotels Vedado, Comodoro and Nacional 
demand $90 and 20% rise
17 April Havana Federación bancaria Demand 30%
29 May Caibarién Dockers Mass meetings protest at high cost of living
5 June Havana Brewery workers Assembly demands 20% wage rise
5 June Santiago Bacardi Assembly demands 20% wage rise
12 June Goodyear Newly elected union committee present list 
of demands, including 30% wage increase
12 June San José de las 
Lajas
Metalworkers Publish a manifesto demanding 20% 
increase and express solidarity with 
Concordia textil.
12 June Textil La Sedentia Assembly demands 20% wage rise
19 June Caibarién Stevedores Motion to FOMN demanding 20% increase
 Some official bodies such as the Federacion Nacional Gastronómica, which 
represented workers in the tourist industry, took up the demand and set up Comités de 
Lucha. However these official committees were organised in such a way as to make sure 
that they did not escape bureaucratic control, but rather representing a tokenist response 
to a popular demand. They were not given the authority to initiate action. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the bureaucracy felt the need for such a gesture is testimony to the 
popularity of the wage demands.555 By February 1957, similar pressure from below had 
also forced the Federación Nacional de Comercio (shop workers) and the Federación 
Nacional de Calzado (footwear) to formally raise the demand for 20%.556 These wage 
demands were rarely pursued by official industrial action because of a mixture of 
bureaucratic inertia within the official structure and fear of state violence amongst the 
rank and file. However, the widespread popularity of such a large figure for a wage 
claim indicates that many workers did not feel that they were sharing in the prosperity 
so often mentioned by supporters of the regime.557 Moreover, these demands would have 
worried many employers who must have hoped that, by now, their employees would be 
sufficiently cowed to enable further advances in productivity without undue difficulty. 
The tightened censorship means that there is little useful reportage in the legal 
press after March 1957. We therefore have to rely on reports in Carta Semanal. The PSP 
had a political interest in playing up the number of strikes, but while there appears to be 
555 Carta Semanal (September 11th 1956)
556 Carta Semanal (February 20th, March 6th 1956)
557 Baklanoff, Cuba on the Eve of the Socialist Transition (1998) p.262
Smith & Llorens, Renaissance and Decay (1998) p.247-259
Cuba Transition Project, Socio-Economic Conditions in Pre-Castro Cuba (2008)
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a measure of effervescence in terms of demands, protest meetings etc., very little of this 
develops into strikes or public demonstrations. Given the level of repression, 
particularly the increased use of government death squads, this is hardly surprising. 
Nevertheless, the defensive strikes and the agitation over wages described above lends 
weight to the argument that the repressive activity of the Batista regime had not 
succeeded in its aim to create a "more disciplined and docile workforce".558 Rather, the 
focus for working class activity shifted as many militants sought ways of restoring their 
bargaining position by taking action against state repression.
Reign of Terror
If there was not much direct industrial action over wages in this period, there was 
a surprisingly militant response to the spate of beatings, murders and disappearances 
with which the government greeted the start of the armed rebellion in the Sierra 
Maestra. This government violence was not merely aimed at supporters of the rebels in 
the Sierra, but was equally used to remove troublesome workers' leaders irrespective of 
their political persuasion. 
The government 
responded furiously to the 
outbreak of armed 
rebellion in Oriente. 
Following the events of 
November 30th 1956, there 
were 40 arrests, 17 from 
Guantánamo city and 23 
from the Ermita sugar 
refinary(see Figure 24) 
One of the arrested, Luis 
Raposo, was tortured to death, while Arnaldo García González was not even arrested, 
simply murdered by a government death squad on the 9th December. Most of the 
arrested were later released, but six received sentences of between three and six years in 
the Isle of Pines. Many others, including Julio Comacho, Octavio Louit and Ñico Torres 
had to leave their jobs and go underground.
558 Morley, Imperial State and Revolution (1987) p.39
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Figure 24: Trial of the November 30th combatants in Santiago,
from Coma, El Movimiento 26 de Julio en Guantánamo (1981)
The murder of members of the opposition was not confined to the Guantánamo 
region. The most notorious case was the so-called pascuas sangrientas in which, on 
Christmas Day 1956, 24 people from the Holguin district were killed by soldiers of 
Regiment number 8 and police of the 7th Division under the command of Colonel 
Firmin Cowley; some were shot while others were hanged from trees near their homes. 
At the same time, two more oppositionists were shot in Santiago. Amongst the dead 
were members of all opposition parties, including several members of the PSP. The PSP 
formally denounced Colonel Cowley to the Supreme Court, but unsurprisingly to no 
avail.559 This incident would be the start of a government policy of using death squads to 
eliminate suspected rank and file workers' leaders in the aftermath of confrontations 
with rebel fighters. Inevitably, many of the victims were not politically active, merely 
being in the wrong place at the wrong time.560 This heightened level of semi-official 
repression was combined with the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the 
formal introduction of press censorship.561
Despite these killings, the British Ambassador felt that "one is far from having the  
feeling of living in a police state" and that Batista "appears to have the real interests of 
his country at heart".562 The restrictions, which by most standards would merit the 
description "police state", were reported by the embassy as follows:
a)The right of assembly and procession is limited
b)Freedom of speech and writing is limited. Newspapers and periodicals are 
subject to pre-censorship before issue.
c)Private correspondence, private documents and telephonic, telegraphic and 
cable communications are subject to censoring and monitoring
d)Free entry into, exit from and movement within the national frontiers is subject  
to control.
e)No plea of habeas corpus may be made in respect of detained persons.
f)The clause laying down that detained persons may only be tried or condemned 
by a competent tribunal is suspended.
g)The clauses of the penal procedure code establishing that an accused person 
must be considered innocent until his guilt is proved, that he may not be held 
incommunicado, and that persons accused of political offences should be kept 
separate from those accused of common crime, are all suspended.563
559 ANC 5-74-868 PSP al Tribunal Supremo (December 28th 1956)
560 Carta Semanal (January 2nd & 9th 1957)
"Navidades de Sangre" Bohemia (January 6th 1957) reproduced in Osa, En Cuba (2008) pp.351-358
561 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 389 (January 3, 1957) 26 killed in Holguin; Sabotage at Chaparra 
and Delicias Sugar Mills; Shooting at Nicaro
562 FO371/126466 - AK1012/2 Report on leading personalities in Cuba (January 1957)
563 FO 371/126467 - AK1015/3 Effect of decree suspending constitutional guarantees (January 1957)
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Relaxed at the beginning of March 1957, these restrictions were soon reimposed 
following an attack on the presidential palace by militants of the Directorio 
Revolucionario led by José Antonio Echeverría on 13 March 1957. Thereafter, for most 
of the rest of the period of dictatorship, researchers are reliant almost entirely on 
clandestine publications for historical information on opposition activity, as the legally 
published press is silent on practically all matters which do not reflect to the credit of 
the government. 
The army, rural guard and police were clearly profiting from the situation to 
remove some troublesome workers' leaders. For example, in an incident at the central 
Delicias, not only were two PSP members murdered, but the secretary of the local union 
was only saved from abduction by the rural guard by the prompt actions of his 
daughters, who created enough of a commotion that the neighbourhood was alerted and 
the would-be abductors driven off.564 
This government policy of employing death squads can be seen developing in 
early 1957, with the Santiago newspapers containing frequent stories of the discovery of 
the dead bodies of young people who had been shot after being beaten and tortured.565 It 
was quite common for a Jeep full of plain-clothes police or off-duty soldiers to arrive 
outside the house of an opponent of the regime and shoot him in front of his family and 
564 Carta Semanal (January 9th 1957)
565 Poveda Diaz, Propaganda y revolución en Santiago (2003) pp220-224
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Figure 25: Women's Demonstration, Santiago, January 1957 from 
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban-revolution.htm
neighbours. Carta Semanal contains numerous reports of communists being killed in 
this period, with a common method being the reported release of the victim following a 
period of incarceration and then their body being subsequently found hanged from a tree 
near their home, with the official verdict being suicide.566 
The most public demonstration in response to these assassinations occurred in 
Santiago following the discovery of the bodies of five young men, all having been 
tortured before being shot.567 Over a thousand women, lead by relatives of the slain, 
attempted to hold a protest but were dispersed by the police (see Figure 25). This caused 
a stir in the press and contributed to the restoration of censorship following a brief 
relaxation.568 
It has already been noted that the police normally proved less likely to use the 
same level of violence against women that they showed towards men. When this proved 
not to be the case, the maltreatment of women roused greater indignation, as can be seen 
by the shocked reaction of the newly appointed US Ambassador when women were 
attacked by police using fire hoses while they were attempting to give him a protest 
letter during a visit to Santiago (see Figure 26).569 
Despite the censorship, 
which meant that many of the 
protests against state violence in 
the 1957 have gone unreported, 
there is a record of a number of 
short strikes, sometimes only 
lasting 5 or 10 minutes, in 
Havana in April and in Layunó, 
Caibarién, Cabaiguin and 
Remedios later in the year.570 
There is also a record of some 
short strikes against violence in 
566 Carta Semanal (January 23rd, April 10th 1957)
567 Carta Semanal (January 16th 1957)
568 Ramos Estives, Apoyo de la mujer santiaugera a la lucha contra la tiranía de Batista (1984) p.22
569 New York Times (August 1st 1957) p.8
Ramos Estives, Apoyo de la mujer santiaguera a la lucha contra la tiranía de Batista (1984)
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 93 (July 31, 1957)  Ambassador Smith holds press conference
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 107 (Aug. 7, 1957) Ambassador visites Oriente
570 Carta Semanal (April 10th, October 23rd & November 6th 1957)
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Figure 26: Women's demonstration in Santiago August 1957 
dispersed by police using fire hoses, from 
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban-revolution.htm
the railway workshops of FFCC Consolidados.571 An incident in the Ciénaga workshop 
described by Zanetti and García serves as an example that was repeated in many other 
workplaces. José Ramirez Casamayor, a PSP militant, had recently returned to work 
after a period of imprisonment for his political activities, when a security guard on the 
gate of the workshop calmly shot him dead in front of his workmates. There was a short 
work stoppage and a demonstration at his funeral, but the killings continued.572 It may 
be assumed that some of the workers in Ciénaga decided that sterner measures were 
necessary, as a group of railway workers led by veteran militants Ricardo Rodríguez and 
Emilio Delachaux began using the workshop facilities to prepare explosive devices.573 
An example of the new realities for organised workers can be found in the 
Santiago docks, where a M-26-7 cell had been established by Santiago Casacó, a 
long-standing and well-established activist. The police tried to clean up the port by 
means of arrests, vandalising the local union offices and similar acts of repression. In 
reply, in January 1958, person or persons unknown shot and killed Filipe Navea, a 
well-known pro-government official of the FOMN, the dockworkers' union, in the port 
of Santiago. Colonel Río Chaviano, military governor of the town, responded by killing 
5 dockers in their homes and the dockers, in turn, replied with increased sabotage such 
as the burning of a sugar warehouse in February 1958.574 Such tit-for-tat violence 
continued, albeit on a lower scale, up to the end of 1958.
While strikes and demonstrations were important for the developing mood of 
resistance to an increasingly brutal and dictatorial regime, in themselves they were 
insufficient to defeat the government or even to force meaningful change in government 
policy. Many rank and file PSP members were coming to recognise the inadequacy of 
the tactic that the party referred to as "la lucha de masas". KS Karol's argument that 
1957 saw the increasing popularity of the M-26-7 among the rank and file PSP members 
is certainly borne out in the case of Manzanillo, where the most successful mass action 
in the early part of 1957 took the form of a town-wide general strike to protest against 
police and army brutality on 28th January 1957. This was supported by partial action in 
Santiago and Contramaeste.575 Manzanillo had always been a communist party 
571 Carta Semanal (January 28th, February 6th)
572 Zanetti & García, Caminos para azúcar (1987) pp.375-7
573 Bohemia (March 3rd 1957) p.9
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stronghold; it was, after all, the home town of the party leader Blas Roca, and was now 
the nearest town of any size to the rebels in the Sierra Maestra. There was a personal 
relationship between many local militants of the PSP and the M-26-7 in Manzanillo. 
Local communists, particularly members of the party's youth wing, Juventud Socialista, 
often helped in the support networks for the rebel army, although how much of this was 
known by the leadership in Havana is uncertain.576 When Carta Semanal refers to the 
activity of a Frente Unico de Oposición (United Opposition Front) in opposition to a 
pro-government rally in Manzanillo, they are careful to speak of the support of 
"members of the 26th July Movement" rather than of the organisation itself.577 The 
importance of personal relationships in neighbourhoods and workplaces is often 
underestimated when considering the development of resistance to authoritarian 
regimes, where the success of any clandestine activity will depend to a large extent on 
personal trust, which is frequently more important than political differences.
While there is evidence of co-operation at local level in Manzanillo, there was 
still considerable distance between the manner in which the two organisations were 
organising against the government's campaign of terror. The PSP's response in its 
stronghold of Manzanillo was a simple withdrawal of labour. In contrast, the day the 
dead body of Rafael Orejón, leader of the M-26-7 cell in Nicaro, was returned to his 
family in Guantánamo, the workers in the electrical plant sabotaged the machinery and 
plunged the town into darkness for the whole night.578 
If strikes such as that which took place in January in Manzanillo are the normal 
first reaction of workers when confronted with repression, the ever increasing level of 
violence with which the state responded quickly overwhelmed such attempts based on a 
single district. This lent weight to the arguments of the July 26th Movement in favour of 
the armed struggle. The situation was extremely complex in which rank and file 
militants were grappling with competing strategies. The success or failure in winning 
support for either la lucha de masas or la lucha armada amongst the uncommitted 
would have encouraged or discouraged the proponents of that approach at leadership 
level. We have no record of such local discussions, but a careful reading of the leaflets, 
pamphlets and periodicals produced by opponents of the regime suggests that there were 
impassioned debates between advocates of the alternative positions. While such 
576 Interview with Daniel Orozco, Historiador de Manzanillo, (March 2009)
Interview with María Antúnez, former PSP militant, (March 2009)
577 Carta Semanal (27th March 1957)
578 Sección de historia, Reseña histórica de Guantánamo (1985) p.131
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discussions by their nature would have been held behind closed doors, the written 
sources provide an indication of the kind of issues that were raised. I would argue that 
the ability of ordinary workers to influence the decisions of their leaders is very 
frequently underestimated and that this is particularly true in circumstances where two 
organised political tendencies are competing for influence in a particular arena.
Competition and collaboration
The historiography of the Cuban insurrection has made scant use of the surviving 
clandestine propaganda material available in the archives, yet a study of these 
documents gives us a valuable glimpse of the ways in which the competing strategies 
for overthrowing the regime were argued out. They are a valuable guide to the 
relationship between supporters of the communist party and supporters of the July 26th 
rebels, not only at leadership level, but also at the grass roots. Increased state terror, 
particularly where this was directed against working class organisation, makes the 
question of collaboration between different opposition organisations a matter of 
urgency. Therefore the relationship between the M-26-7 and the PSP starts to take on 
greater significance at this time. As the 26th July Movement extended its political and 
organisational reach, the two organisations came into increased contact, thus raising the 
question of how their relationship functioned on a practical level, despite their 
ideological and tactical differences. While they were in competition for membership and 
influence, they were also confronted with decisions about possible co-operation. This 
section looks at the printed statements of both organisations to assess their formal 
political positions and then goes on to examine the daily practical application of these 
positions. A pattern can be seen emerging as the politics of the PSP and the M-26-7 
started to converge and the first signs of growing practical collaboration appear. This 
convergence was most pronounced in the milieu of the workplace where attitudes to 
collaborative activity were particularly relevant, both because of the pressures for joint 
action imposed by everyday industrial relations problems and because militant workers 
were most likely to suffer the same dangers from the increased state terror. 
In July 1957, the M-26-7 launched an underground newspaper, aimed at labour, 
under the name of Vanguardia Obrera. This paper was an extension to national level of 
the previously existing paper from Guantánamo entitled Línea Obrera.579 Early editions 
of Vanguardia Obrera were amateurishly produced, using Roneo duplicators and a more 
579 Coma, El Movimiento 26 de Julio en Guantánamo (1981) pp.46 & 54
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professionally printed appearance is not seen until mid-1958. The main reason for the 
difference in appearance between the Vanguardia Obrera and Carta Semanal is the 
relatively well established position of the latter. When the pre-existing PSP newspaper, 
Hoy, was banned in 1953, it had not been difficult to establish a distribution network for 
its underground replacement amongst a party membership with a tradition of selling 
papers to their workmates. Indeed, Hoy had been briefly closed down in 1951 and the 
first volume of Carta Semanal, produced for a few months in that year, had served as a 
dry run for the more serious conditions of clandestinity prevailing under the 
dictatorship.580 The M-26-7 had no such previous experience on which to base their 
practice. Carta Semanal also had an established political line, as well as a network of 
militants used to reporting local disputes. Vanguardia Obrera, on the other hand, was 
attempting to represent the ideas of a much more politically diverse organisation whose 
working class members rarely had the experience of being "worker correspondents". 
Therefore the M-26-7 paper was more prone to general exhortations to revolution 
without specifying the nature of that revolution. Moreover, the M-26-7 leadership had 
not yet learned the lesson of the sugar strike, which had shown the importance of the 
economic struggles in radicalising workers, and thus ignored the PSP's insistence on the 
importance of raising "immediate demands".581 
Local groupings of both organisations produced more simple material such as 
extracts taken from longer articles in the main newspaper, leaflets and bulletins 
commenting on local issues or disputes and small flyers for distribution at random from 
passing cars. A number of such leaflets have survived in the personal collection of 
Reinaldo Suárez of the University of Oriente, with a particularly important set having 
been produced by the local PSP branch in Luyanó. These, mainly dated around the end 
of 1957 and the beginning of 1958, give us an insight into the political debates and 
forms of organisation in this Havana suburb. They are hand typed and duplicated, but 
set out with considerable care. Amongst the surviving examples are bulletins aimed at 
the workers in the mineral water factory "El Copey", the "Aldesa" food distribution 
depot, the "Hatuey" brewery and the railway workshops, as well as more general 
leaflets aimed at particular trades such as lorry drivers and wood workers. The survival 
of leaflets from over 50 years ago must be a matter of chance and we can assume that 
580 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 455 (1950) Cuban Government Intervenes Communist Newspaper 
Hoy
581  Rodriguez, José Antonio Echeverría y la clase obrera (1967) p.55
Carta Semanal (28th August 1957) p.1
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Luyanó was far from the only place where such initiatives were undertaken. These 
leaflets appear to have been issued outside the workplace, but are clearly based on 
detailed information from within. In addition to the commentary on matters of 
immediate concern to the particular group of workers addressed, there are some 
common themes: the need for unity, the fight against state repression, the betrayals of 
the mujalista bureaucracy and the superiority of the old CTC under the leadership of 
Lazaro Peña. 
A series of leaflets, entitled "Bolos" and 
aimed at the woodworking industry, show the 
political dilemma faced by the PSP. On the one 
hand they wished to push their line of "Mass 
action" and opposition to what they saw as 
terrorism, while on the other, in order to 
campaign against the arrest and murder of their 
militants, they needed to work together with 
groups that they defined as "terrorist", most 
particularly the M-26-7.582 In Luyanó this was 
accomplished by setting up the Comité  
Revolucionario de Luyanó (Luyano Revolutionary Committee), which speaks in the 
name of the PSP, the local CDDO, 26 de Julio and other revolutionary organisations. A 
leaflet produced by this committee calls for a strike of 5 to 10 minutes on Friday 25th 
October 1957.583 As well as conventional leaflets, the Luyanó committee produced 
smaller flyers (see Figure 27) that were typed four to a page which was then quartered. 
These were designed to be scattered from the windows of a speeding car.584 The success 
of such initiatives can be seen from the report in Carta Semanal which records that the 
strike in Luyanó was observed in 10 factories and that similar 5 or 10 minute strikes 
took place in Caibarién, Cabaiguin and Remedios, crediting the local united front 
committees for organising the action.585
A larger leaflet, issued to call the strike in Luyanó is interesting in a number of 
ways. It specifically refers to the differences in programme and conception of revolution 
582 Bolos, Suarez collection (January 8th, 13th, 16th, 18th 1958) [copy in author's possession]
583 "Compañeros", Comité Revolucionario de Luyanó (October 1957) Suarez collection [copy in author's 
possession]
584 "El Viernes 25", Comité Revolucionario de Luyanó (October 1957) Suarez collection [copy in author's 
possession]
585 Carta Semanal (October 23rd, November 6th 1957)
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Figure 27: Comité Revolucionario de 
Luyanó from the Suarez collection
held by the constituent organisations, but states that, by uniting forces, the dictatorship 
can be overthrown. Moreover, the form taken is of an open letter, calling for unity, 
addressed to the national leaderships of the constituent organisations and others such as 
the students' union (FEU) and the Directorio Revolucionario. This initiative can be read 
as reflecting Karol's assertion that the end of 1957 saw the increasing popularity of the 
M-26-7 amongst the rank and file of the PSP.586 There is also evidence in the Instituto 
de Historia de Cuba of the existence of a Comité de Frente Unico de Trabajadores de 
la Roselia (Roselia Workers' United Front Committee) and a Comité Obrero 
Revolucionario de San Miguel del Padrón (San Miguel del Padrón Revolutionary 
Workers' Committee), both of which address themselves to the leaderships of all 
revolutionary opposition groupings in a similar way to the Luyanó committee. A leaflet 
from the San Miguel committee dated March 1958 is particularly interesting in that, on 
the one hand it uses the PSP formula "por un gobierno representativo de amplia 
coalición democrática" (for a government representing a broad democratic coalition), 
while on the other hand salutes the heroic guerrillas in the mountains using language 
reminiscent of the M-26-7.587 We have no way of knowing the extent to which sections 
of the leadership of either the M-26-7 and the PSP encouraged these local united fronts, 
but they coincided with the first negotiations between the two organisations which 
began when the veteran communist sugar worker, Ursinio Rojas arrived in the Sierra 
Maestra for discussions with Fidel Castro, sometime in October 1957.588 Clearly, the 
leaders of the PSP now recognised the political importance of the M-26-7 and were well 
aware that they were competing with them for influence in a working class that the 
communists had previously thought of as their private constituency. 
Towards the end of 1957, the M-26-7 Sección Obrera also came to be referred to 
as the Frente Obrero Nacional (FON).589 This name change was portrayed by the 26th 
July Movement as an opening out to other political tendencies, but at this stage was 
little more than a re-branding exercise, albeit a successful one as the M-26-7 grew in 
numbers and influence within organised labour. As a result, it came into greater contact 
with the PSP, which concretely posed the question of their practical relationship. An 
abstract call for "unity" is easy to make, the practical application of the slogan is much 
586 Karol, Guerrillas in Power (1970) p.150
587 IHC 1/8:13/27.1/1 Comité Obrero Revolucionario de San Miguel del Padrón, "¡Obreros Hermanos!" 
(March 1958)
588 Farber, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered (2006) p.156
589 Orozco, Interview with Ñico Torres (1990)
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more difficult. In December 1957 Vanguardia Obrera, asks the question "¿Unidad con 
quiénes?" (Unity with whom?). This is only answered in the vaguest of terms, 
completely sidestepping the relationships with the communists. It seems likely that this 
ambiguity was deliberate to enable the July 26th movement the maximum freedom of 
manoeuvre. Later in the same edition, another article calls upon all other revolutionary 
organisations to help build the FON from the base, as the organisation that would have 
responsibility for launching a revolutionary general strike to overthrow the 
dictatorship.590 Thus we see that the M-26-7 clearly saw itself as the directing 
organisation of the revolution and that other oppositionists had to accept their lead; 
"unity" was to be on their terms. Such an approach was a practical possibility for those 
in a leadership position charged with producing editorial content for a national paper. 
However, those militants at local level who had the task of implementing the party line 
found themselves having to take a more nuanced approach.
A long-established unofficial network of M-26-7, Communist Party and 
independent militants operated in Oriente province, a good example being the way in 
which employees of the FFCC Consolidados railway network were able to coordinate 
their militant activities591. The M-26-7 had established its influence on the FFCC 
Consolidados at a relatively early stage in its development, partly because of the work 
of the Guantánamo group, but also through Pepito Tey, who was an express messenger 
between Camagüey and Santiago. In an interview recorded in 1978, Armando Yuñuz, a 
Santiago railway worker and M-26-7 militant, recalls that by June 1955 there was 
already a sabotage cell of 12 railwaymen in the city and that, by the time of 30th 
November rising, they had 33 train crew, 9 express agents, 5 in track maintenance, 7 in 
the workshop, 5 in the cafeteria and 2 porters. Of these, Gerardo Poll and Efraín 
Palencia are listed as collaborating PSP members.592 Similarly, in another oral testimony 
given in 1984, Rogelio Arógestegui of the M-26-7 and Alvaro Vázquez Galago of the 
PSP speak of working together on the railways in Camagüey, although they say that this 
occurred against the wishes of the middle class local leadership of the M-26-7, 
commenting that the workers had a different attitude to other social classes. They also 
criticise the PSP leadership for being slow to recognise the 26th July movement as a 
590 IHC 1/17/3/21/7-14 Vanguardia Obrera "Obrero ¡Hacia el FON!" (December 5th 1957) 
591 Zanetti & García, Sugar and Railroads (1998) p.394
592 Portuondo Lopez, José Tey (2006) pp.293-4
Mendoza Bú, El movimiento 26 de julio en el sector ferroviario en Santiago de Cuba (1988) pp.32-36
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potential ally.593 We know of similar collaboration between working class militants of 
the two organisations in Vázquez, near Puerto Padre in Las Tunas, northern Oriente 
province.594 Equally, in the Bacardí factory in Santiago de Cuba a Comité del Frente 
Único (United Front Committee) had existed since 1954 when a group of Auténticos 
and Ortodoxos, later to form the July 26th Sección Obrera in the factory, joined with 
their PSP colleagues to protest at the official CTC refusal to allow Juan Taquechel the 
right to speak at the Mayday rally.595 The effectiveness of this joint work is confirmed 
by the repeated mutual support between the Santiago dockers, led by communists, and 
the Bacardí workers, the majority of whose leadership were supporters of the M-26-7.
It is clear from the study of the propaganda material of the period that there was a 
political flux as the leaderships wrestled with the problems of their chosen strategies. 
We also get a glimpse of the ways in which politics at local level developed and affected 
the official "party line" of both organisations. However, despite the increasing talk of 
"unity", it must never be forgotten that, despite the political convergence between them, 
the communists and the rebels were both manoeuvring for leadership of the resistance to 
Batista. 
Conclusion
The Granma landing in December 1956 represents a qualitative change in 
working class involvement in the revolutionary process in Cuba. Before this time, class 
conscious workers had attempted to defend their interests by the more or less traditional 
means of strikes and demonstrations, while the government had, with some notable 
exceptions, successfully defeated them with the help of a corrupt trade union 
bureaucracy. The police and security forces had freely used clubs and fire hoses, only 
occasionally opening fire, but generally kept their use of force within bounds. From the 
beginning of 1957, there was an escalation in the level of state violence against 
civilians, particularly in the east. This intimidation significantly reduced the number of 
strikes, although it does not seem to have reconciled workers to accepting their lot. They 
may have been cowed, but they had not been broken and there is clear evidence of a 
search for an alternative strategy to defend their rights and livelihoods.
593 Rodrígiez López & Martínez Rodríguez, La huelga de 9 de abril de 1958 en la cuidad de Camagüey 
(1984)
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The strikes in textiles, the railways and on the Havana buses were essentially 
defensive, seeking to preserve traditional bonuses, to prevent the victimisation of local 
union union activists or to stop threatened redundancies or closures. Unofficial 
industrial action can be very effective in defending the status-quo, it is much less so 
when offensive action is required, for instance in the case of wage claims, which are 
most successful when there is organisation extending beyond the individual workplace. 
This requires either the support of the trade union bureaucracy or a well-established and 
widespread unofficial network. Thus, although the PSP's campaign for a 20% wage 
increase received widespread support, the CTC official structures were not going to 
organise the industrial action required and the PSP itself did not have the capability of 
setting strikes in motion unofficially in the face of escalating state terror. 
A closer look at the list of those workers supporting the 20% claim shows them to 
be largely Havana based. However, by 1957, workers in the east of the island were 
becoming more concerned with government repression, which was much fiercer in 
Oriente and Camagüey as well as being increasingly accompanied by torture and death 
squads. The mounting repression during 1957 and early 1958 affected both 
organisations equally, with frequent reports of PSP militants joining the M-26-7 
members among missing, murdered, arrested or tortured.596 The ability of the M-26-7 to 
offer a possible solution to the problem of government organised violence accounts for 
the spread its Sección Obrera network in the east and its increasing attractiveness to 
ordinary communist workers. It would be a little longer before this growing 
co-operation at the base would be reflected at leadership level.
596 Carta Semanal (7th August 1957)
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Chapter 6. Two Strikes
In the period from the end of 1956 through to May 1958 there were two important 
mass strikes, the first, starting in Santiago de Cuba at the beginning of August 1957 was 
a great success, the second, called for April 9th 1958 was an abject failure. An analysis 
of these events is crucial in gaining an understanding of the developing tactics of the  
communists and the July 26th movement as the strikes may be used as a lens through 
which the issues may be examined. It is also possible to assess the growth of the rebel 
clandestine labour organisation by examining the extent of the areas affected by each 
strike. Finally, an examination of the lessons learnt by the rebels from the failure of the 
April strike shows that these resulted in far reaching organisational and political 
changes, arguably ensuring the final victory of the revolutionary forces.
When discussing the situation in Cuba in 1957, Zanetti and García contend that: 
The increased level of repression used by the dictatorship, with its continual acts  
of violence in all aspects of the life of the country, showed that any process or 
activity, whether conciliatory or not, was useless if it remained within the 
boundaries of the prevailing theoretical legality. Therefore matters of sectoral 
interest became subordinated to the decisive problem facing Cuban society: the 
overthrow of the dictatorship.597
In agreeing with this assessment, this chapter examines the response of the more 
militant sections of the Cuban working class, many of whose rank and file leaders were 
becoming increasingly drawn to the 26th July Movement. While Zanetti and Garcia's 
statement specifically referred to the railway industry, this chapter argues that it was 
equally true for nearly all industries as the predominant political and social question 
became the continued existence of the dictatorship. This change in priorities from the 
economic to the political, combined with the growing realisation that small scale 
industrial action was becoming impractical in the face of repression, resulted in a 
growth in workplace sabotage and clandestine aid to the rebels, while the frequency of 
local or sector based strikes decreased through 1957 and early 1958. 
As part of this process, the M-26-7 set up a committee, chaired by Ñico Torres, to 
organise the spread clandestine revolutionary working class organisation from its 
origins in Guantánamo and Santiago to the rest of the island while, at the same time, 
building a support network for the rebels in the hills. There has been little previous 
research on the July 26th Movement's working class underground. It is, of course, 
597 Zanetti & García, Caminos para azúcar (1987) p.372 [my translation]
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always difficult to trace the activities of successful clandestine movements; police and 
newspaper accounts only describe the failures. Nevertheless, there is evidence, in 
addition to the surviving leaflets and underground newspapers found in the archives and 
personal collections, there are also the recollections of participants, which can guide an 
attempt to reconstruct the previously untold history of the spread of the influence of the 
revolutionary workers' underground.598 This leads to a reassessment of role of 
clandestine organisation in the successful general strike in Oriente province, which was 
sparked by the death of Frank País, a popular national leader of the M-26-7 urban 
underground, who was murdered by the police in Santiago in August 1957. The 
common characterisation of this strike as "spontaneous" will be given a more nuanced 
explanation that considers the relationship between spontaneity and organisation. 
Following this strike, both the PSP and the M-26-7 stepped up their propaganda 
for a general strike to overthrow the regime. However, the leaders of these two 
organisations drew very different conclusions from the strike, both using the experience 
to reinforce an entrenched position. Nevertheless, starting in October 1957, the PSP and 
rebel army leaderships began talking to each other on a relatively formal basis. 
However, discussions with the PSP had not advanced greatly by the time the M-26-7 
called a general strike on 9th April 1958. This strike, which received almost no working 
class support in Havana, cost the lives of many of the movement's best underground 
activists. The subsequent repression was particularly severe, with Batista's chief of 
police issuing the instruction: "No wounded, No prisoners".599 The reasons for this 
setback are examined, the balance of forces in the opposition camp are discussed and its 
effect on the future course of the revolutionary process assessed.
In the aftermath, both the PSP and the M-26-7 took stock in May 1958. The 
changes in the practice which resulted from these internal debates are identified and the 
lessons drawn by both organisations are outlined. This leads to the conclusion that there 
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was a convergence in the tactics which both organisations advocated for the overthrow 
of the dictatorship. The PSP accepted the need for armed opposition to the dictatorship 
and the M-26-7 took a more open approach to working class organisation. This paved 
the way for practical joint activity and a new phase in the revolutionary process which 
marked another turning point in the history of the Cuban insurrection.
A Clandestine Network
Frank País, national leader of the July 26th urban underground, was one of the 
first amongst the organisation's leadership to see the potential importance of a 
revolutionary labour movement. He was killed before he could implement his ideas, but 
the seeds he planted flourished as the networks of militants he encouraged spread from 
their origins in Guantánamo.
 Frank País was arrested in March 1957 as part of the government crack-down 
following the November 30th assault on Santiago and an attack on the Presidential 
Palace by the Directorio Revolucionario on March 13th . Along with over 100 other 
M-26-7 defendants, he was released in May, when Judge Manuel Urretia defied pressure 
from the government and ruled that they were exercising their constitutional right to 
rebel in the face of tyranny. Upon his release, País immediately set about reorganising 
the M-26-7 underground movement. As part of this process, he decided that much 
greater attention was to be paid to recruiting and organising workers. As a result of the 
success of the strike in Guantánamo in support of the Granma landing, Ñico Torres, 
now a wanted man, was made coordinator of a committee charged with rolling out the 
workplace cell structure and spreading the Guantánamo example nationwide. He spent 
the next year criss-crossing the island with this objective. However, while Frank País 
was certainly in the forefront of those in the movement who saw the importance of 
labour support for the revolution, he still had an incomplete understanding of the need 
to organise workers around their specific class based interests. 
Of the senior figures in the organisation with a labour movement background, 
other than those from Guantánamo, José Maria de la Aguilera had only led a single 
strike in a white collar industry, while David Salvador's experience was limited to local 
activity in central Stewart. Conrado Béquer was still leading a double life, attempting to 
maintain a precarious legality and Julian Alemán was deeply involved in the ongoing 
troubles of the Matanzas textile industry and did not yet have effective lines of 
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communication with Santiago. From the beginning, the 26th July Movement had a 
perspective of organising workers, but their role had been seen principally as providing 
financial and logistical support for the rebels in the mountains, as well as engaging in 
sabotage. The success of the Guantánamo strikes in early December 1956 had 
impressed Frank País enormously with their power and potential, but he seems not to 
have realised the years of previous work that had been necessary to create the solid 
foundations that his M-26-7 compañeros in that city had been able to draw upon.600 
The PSP was continually urging the importance of "immediate demands" in the 
process of organising workers to resist the dictatorship, but the M-26-7 leadership 
would not come to realise this until later, after they had suffered a severe setback in the 
April of the following year. Thus the M-26-7 propaganda aimed at the working class at 
this stage of the movement's development was extremely general, concentrating on 
appeals to patriotism and rejection of corruption . There was some mention of the 
defence of wages and conditions, demands for trade union democracy and vague 
promises of social justice, but the lack of familiarity with the working class political 
milieu is clearly evident in their surviving leaflets and newspapers.601 
Nevertheless, when Frank País was released from prison, he wrote a report calling 
for serious attempts to be made to recruit workers saying that the movement had 
forgotten the importance of the workers who, if well organised and led, could overthrow 
the regime. He urged the creation of a disciplined and educated leadership which could 
lead small scale general strikes to gain experience, in the way that had already been 
done in Guantánamo, where he described efforts made to organise the workers as 
formidable and which had shown in practice what could be done.602 However, according 
to the memoires of Armando Hart, one of the leaders of the M-26-7 in Santiago, during 
these early months of 1957, Frank País's main priorities were to support and supply the 
rebel guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra and to win over the Conjunto de Instituciones 
Cívicas (Civic Institutions) to supporting an armed insurrection.603 This organisation, led 
by the President of the Cuban Medical Association, was a loose association of nearly 
200 professional and religious organisations ranging from the Freemasons to the 
Catholic Teachers' League and the Havana Bar Association. It had come to represent the 
600 Hart, Aldabonazo, en la clandestinidad revolucionaria cubana, 1952–58 (2004) p.163
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more liberal elements of the Cuban middle class who were becoming increasingly 
alienated from the regime as the violence worsened and the economy deteriorated.604 As 
part of the process of attracting support from the Instituciones Cívicas, a meeting of the 
26 de Julio leadership in the Sierra Maestra in February 1957 decided to set up the 
Movimiento de Resistencia Cívica (MRC). This organisation, while being firmly 
controlled by M-26-7 members, was nominally independent and acted as a bridge 
between the rebels and the Civic Institutions.605 It is clear from the memoirs of 
participants such as Armando Hart that the MRC received a much higher priority than 
did building the Sección Obrera.606 The Guantánamo militants, having received the 
blessing of the national leadership, would be given a free hand in building their 
organisation and spreading the ideas of sindicalismo beligerante.
To this end, Frank País asked Ñico Torres to write a 
report describing their organisation in Guantánamo. Frank 
País gave this report to Armando Hart, who in turn sought 
the advice of friends in the PSP and other Santiago trade 
unionists with whom he was in contact, such as a Bacardí 
delivery driver, Ramón Alvarez (Figure 28). This process 
led to Torres being appointed as head of a national 
committee charged with organising the movement's work 
in the labour movement. The committee consisted of 
Torres, a sugar worker called Asterio Hernández, a 
telephone engineer, José de la Nuez, and a bank worker, 
Jorge Gómez. It was in pursuit of this task that Ñico Torres began to tour the country in 
order to generalise the experience from Guantánamo, while Octavio Louit and Ramón 
Alvarez moved to become provincial workers' organisers for Las Villas and the central 
region of the island. It is hard to trace the progress of this work as its secret nature 
precluded the keeping of records and its success required that the activities of the group 
did not come to the attention of the authorities. Nevertheless, we can piece together the 
general lines of the organising drive from later interviews. 
For example, we know from the investigations of Delio Orozco, City Historian of 
Manzanillo, that Torres and Gomez were in the town of Manzanillo in May 1957. 
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Figure 28: Ramón Alvarez in 
1977 from Bohemia (August 
12th 1977)
Gomez knew another bank worker, Nardi Iglesias, who had already started building four 
person cells in his own industry. From this base, the Manzanillo Sección Obrera grew 
and formed cells in the unions representing electrical workers, transport, telephones, 
pharmaceuticals, bakers, shop workers, shoemakers and coffee roasters. The Manzanillo 
electrical workers specialised in sabotage, teaching workers in other trades the use of 
explosives, while the bus drivers of the "El Paraíso" company brought propaganda 
material from Santiago. Given the proximity to the rebels in the Sierra, raising money 
and supplies for the rebels was of considerable importance and the Manzanillo Sección 
Obrera sold bonds known as bonos, which served as propaganda fliers as well as fund 
raisers (see Figure 29). 607 
Torres and his committee were not the only M-26-7 activists organising amongst 
the working class. In Matanzas, recruiting out of the disputes in their industry, the 
textile workers became the backbone of their regional Sección Obrera. The struggles of 
the textile workers from 1952 onwards, the sacrifice of the Cuban textile industry to the 
interests of the sugar oligarchy in the 1954 commercial treaty with Japan and the 
anti-union attitude of the Hedges family, American owners of two factories, la 
Rayonera and Textilera de Ariguanabo, all served to increase nationalist sentiment and 
provided fertile grounds for the M-26-7 to recruit 
members. The local offices of the textile workers' 
union became the organising centre for the 26th July 
movement in the province, which also adopted an 
approach, similar to the Guantánamo militants 
described above, combining sabotage and strike 
action.608 
There is no surviving record of anyone from 
Guantánamo visiting Matanzas and it seems likely that 
textile workers of the province independently 
developed similar tactics to meet a similar problem. 
They were coordinated by Julián Alemán, regional 
secretary of the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores 
607 Orozco, Interview with Ñico Torres (1990)
Orozco, Manzanillo en los 50 (n/d) pp.63-68
Orozco, Manzanillo: El Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio (1989) pp.67-70
Orozco, Interview with Delio Orozco (2009)
608 García Pérez, Insurrection and Revolution (1998) pp.42-50
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Figure 29: A "bono" (representing 
the donation of a day's pay) from the 
National Archive, Havana
Textiles (FNTT). Julián Alemán was also national vice-general secretary of the union, 
but had managed to conceal his links with the M-26-7 and, along with Conrad Bequér 
and Conrado Rodriguez, was one of only three senior trade union officials to break with 
Mujal and join the rebels. He was succeeded in his role as co-ordinator of action in 
Matanzas by Joaquín Torres, who worked in La Rayona, when he was forced to leave 
the area to escape the attention of the police after helping to organise a strike at the end 
of July 1957 following the murder of Frank País in Santiago.609 
A "Spontaneous" Strike?
In the summer of 1957, Frank País, now M-26-7 National Co-ordinator of Action, 
was based in Santiago from where he was working both to promote the movement's 
clandestine operations and to organise support for the guerrillas in the nearby Sierra 
Maestra mountains. His murder at the end of July 1957 by a local police chief provoked 
a general strike in Oriente, which was probably the biggest public demonstration of 
opposition during the entire Batista dictatorship. These events are generally paid scant 
attention in the literature, with even the normally highly detailed Ramón Bonachea only 
according the matter three lines before turning to a long discussion of the effect the 
death of Frank País had on the internal politics of the M-26-7.610 Only Julia Sweig deals 
with it in any detail.611 Sweig's book is an important contribution to the understanding of 
the underground organisation of the M-26-7, particularly as it is based upon access to 
the normally secret archives of the Cuban Council of State, to which she was given rare 
access. However, detailed as her account is, the fact that it is based on the private papers 
of the leadership of the M-26-7 means that she is mainly concerned with the decisions 
and actions of that leadership and pays less attention to the organisation necessary to 
carry out those decisions. This section is written with the intention of using other 
primary sources to show how the strike was organised in practice.
Wherever the August 57 strike is mentioned in the literature, it is characterised as 
"spontaneous" and herein may lie the explanation for its neglect, as spontaneity is 
confused with lack of organisation and political direction. However, this betrays a 
failure to understand that a far greater level of organisation is required to produce a 
"spontaneous" strike, than one formally called by the bureaucracy. Statements by 
militants involved in the strike paint a more complex picture and lend weight to Daniel 
609 Machado, El movimiento obrero henequenero (2011) n.pag.
610 Bonachea & San Martín, Cuban insurrection, (1974) p.146
611 Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution (2002) pp.46-9
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Guérin's assertion that spontaneity and organisation are always intertwined. As he 
argues, "There is always someone pushing for spontaneity".612 Therefore, it is probably 
fair to say that, while the demonstrations and strikes at the time of Frank País's murder 
and funeral were spontaneous in the sense that no organisation had planned them in 
advance, the speed with which the strikes spread suggest a high level of clandestine 
organisation which was able to react quickly and seize an opportunity without requiring 
orders to do so.
Frank País was caught in a police round-up on 30th July. He was identified by a 
police informer and shot dead on the spot by Colonel José Maria Salas Cañizares.613 
This was part of a reign of terror that the colonel had imposed on the city of Santiago de 
Cuba in the period following the events of 30th November 1957. Frank País's funeral 
was the occasion for a massive show of opposition, not just to his murder, but in protest 
at the general level of brutality being visited on the city.614 Miguel Angel Yero (Figure 
30), an activist in the M-26-7 Sección Obrera, describes how he and his comrades went 
to the funeral with the idea of initiating some action, if at all possible. Seeing a large 
turnout, combined with the fact that very many Santiagueros shared their anger, they 
started to shout for a strike. The call was taken up and the 
60,000 people at the funeral marched through the town, calling 
workers out of their factories, offices and shops until the town 
was paralysed in a strike that lasted 5 days. Contemporary 
photographs and accounts of the funeral confirm the prominent 
part played by women in the demonstrations following the 
funeral (Figure 31).615 The July 26th movement had recently 
been working to organise the shop-workers in Santiago and 
these workers, predominantly women, played an important role 
in forcing their employers to close the city's commercial 
enterprises as well as picketing out other groups.616 Many of 
612 Guérin, Rosa Luxembourg et la Spontanéité Révolutionnaire (1971) p.13
613 Alvarez, Principio y fin del mito fidelista (2008) p.236-241
614 Velázquez Fuentes , Interview with Francis Velázquez Fuentes - Rebel Army veteran (2009) 
615 Ramos Estives, Apoyo de la mujer santiaugera a la lucha contra la tiranía de Batista (1984) p.25
Miranda, Trazos para el perfil de un combatiente (1983) p.294 [Figure 31 is a rare photo of the 
funeral, of which this is the only copy I have been able to find. The more common photo of the 
funeral, as shown on p.297 of Miranda's book and many other places, including the Museum of the 
Revolution, is taken a few minutes later when the women leading the procession have passed from 
view.]
616  Torres-Hernadez, Huelga de Agosto (1977) p.5
Velázquez Fuentes, Interview with Francis Velázquez (2009)
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Figure 30: Miguel Angel 
Yero in 1977, from 
Bohemia (August 12th 
1977)
these women attempted to present a letter to the US ambassador, Earl Smith and were 
attacked by the police using fire hoses. This shocked the newly appointed ambassador 
whose mission thereby did not start well.617 The vehemence of the popular reaction 
startled the police and army who, after a few skirmishes, retreated to their barracks 
where they were besieged for the rest of the day. 
The strike spread quickly in Oriente, Carta Semanal reporting complete 
shut-downs of Palma Soriano, Contramaestre, Bayamo, Manzanillo, Guantánamo, 
Campechuela and Jiguaní.618 In Manzanillo, the situation was considerably aggravated 
when two soldiers opened fire on a group of passers-by who were jeering at them and, 
in the process, killed two little boys, one aged five and the other aged eight, the Cordové 
brothers. The strike in Manzanillo lasted several days.619
617  New York Yimes (August 1st 1957) p.8
618  Carta Semanal (14th August 1957)
619 Rodriguez Ramirez & Ramos Cabrales, El Movimiento Revolucionario en Manzanillo (1988) pp.72-4
Monserrat Iser, Luchas obreras en Manzanillo (2009) n.pag.
195
Figure 31: The funeral of Frank País from Miranda, Trazos para el perfil de un combatiente (1983) p.294
An M-26-7 militant from Guantánamo, Demetrio Monseny Villa was in Santiago 
as the strike started and carried news of the events back home. The leadership of the 
M-26-7 in Guantánamo had been taken by another ex-Trotskyist, Gustavo Fraga, who 
worked on the US naval base. A strike committee was formed and, starting with the 
railways, the town and surrounding country went on strike the following morning, 
August 1st. Frank País was well known and respected in the area and the strike was 
completely solid; the railway, the electrical plant, the aerodrome, the banks and buses, 
along with most shops and businesses shutting down. To accompany this industrial 
action, strikers bombed some bridges and power lines as well as taking part in armed 
skirmishes with the police and rural guard. Here as well, the brutal behaviour of the 
forces of order helped spread the strike as the army broke open shops that were shut and 
threw their merchandise into the street, thereby giving a propaganda coup to the rebels, 
who ensured that the soldiers were the only ones engaged in looting. 
Fraga, as well as being in overall charge of the 26th July intervention in the strike 
in Guantánamo, was also running the explosives "laboratory" in a garage in the city. On 
the 4th August, there was an explosion which killed Fraga and several other members of 
the movement. The explosion in the bomb factory was a blow to the movement, as they 
not only lost some important militants, but also a considerable stock of weapons. 
However, it served to prolong the strike and deepen bitterness against the regime as the 
first act of the police on arrival at the scene was to shoot dead two neighbours who were 
not involved with the M-26-7, but merely trying to put out the flames and stop the fire 
spreading to the rest of the neighbourhood. Such acts of random brutality against 
uninvolved bystanders, similar to the the killing of the Cordové boys in Manzanillo, are 
a common feature of the times which did much to increase opposition to the regime. But 
with Guantánamo the only city remaining on strike by the 9th August, the national 
leadership of the M-26-7 ordered a return to work, fearing the army was planning to 
make an example of the town.620
Octavio Louit (Figure 32), now a clandestine organiser for the 26th July 
Movement, was in Santiago for consultations with the national leadership when Frank 
País was killed. He returned to Camagüey to spread the strike, while Torres continued 
on to Havana to see what could be done in the capital. In Camagüey, there was a 
620  Sección de historia, Guantánamo, apuntes para una cronología historíca (n/d) p.41
Comisión Nacional de Historia, Provincia Guantánamo (1980) pp.8-9
Coma, El Movimiento 26 de Julio en Guantánamo (1981) pp.58-61
García Faure & Canseco Aparicio, Algunas Manifestaciones Políticas en Guantánamo (2009) pp.73-5
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positive response from the rail workers, the intercity bus drivers, the banks and the 
airport. However, it did not prove possible to produce a similar result in Las Villas, 
where the army had rounded up as many militants as they could and succeeded in 
intimidating most of the workforce, with bus and truck drivers being forced to return to 
work at gunpoint. There were considerably more stoppages in Pinar del Rio province, 
most notably the town of Artemesia, a surprising result as it was not an area with much 
history of industrial militancy.621
Both sides saw Havana as key to the situation and the 
government concentrated its efforts here. The action did not 
spread to Havana immediately and the Havana strike committee 
called for the action to start on August 5th. There was little 
response although there was some action from bus drivers and 
construction workers, along with stoppages in the Coca-cola 
factory and by the tobacco workers in Partagas and H. Upmann. 
Little or nothing occurred in the suburbs or the rest of Havana 
province. The Matanzas textile industry saw some partial strike 
action and token stoppages, but Julián Alemán's base in "la Jarcia" was the only factory 
where the workers walked out completely.622 Once the strike had failed to get off the 
ground in Havana, it quickly petered out in the East.623
Although it is difficult to trace the organisation of a clandestine movement, given 
that its very success depends upon the utmost secrecy, reliable documents do exist, it is 
just that they have been overlooked or ignored. This strike gives us a snapshot of the 
development of the workers' underground in the summer of 1957. There was clearly an 
established organisation in most of Oriente province, given the speed with which the strike 
spread to other towns such as Bayamo. The response from Camagüey suggests a well 
rooted network there as well. It is probably significant that Octavio Louit, speaking 20 
years later, used the expression "núcleos obreros combativos" (combative workers' cells) 
for the organisation in Ciega de Avila, Jatibonico, Florida and other parts of the central 
zone, while talking of "compañeros muy valerosos" (very brave comrades) in Las Villas, 
621 Torres Hernández , La Huelga de agosto (1977) p.6
622 IHC 24/3.12/1:2.3/1-56 Informes del Jefe del BRAC sobre actividades subversivas. (1st - 9th 
September 1957) cited in Machado, El movimiento obrero henequenero (2011) n.pag
623 Torres Hernadez, Huelga de Agosto (1977) pp.5-7
Carta Semanal (14th August 1957)
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Figure 32: Octavio 
Louit from Revolución 
(1959)
thereby implying a real network in the former case, but more isolated individuals in the 
second.624 Of course, we need to remember that this strike happened in the middle of the 
tiempo muerto when there would not have been much activity in the sugar industry to stop. 
This is significant because we know that the M-26-7 Sección Obrera in Las Villas was 
based on the sugar workers around Conrado Béquer. Béquer was still operating legally at 
this stage and may not have prioritised building the underground network outside his 
traditional base. It may also be assumed that the Las Villas Sección Obrera was not yet 
organised to reflect the Guantánamo experience with its principles of sindicalismo 
beligerante, but was concentrating on support and supply for the guerrillas. Finally, Béquer 
had very sour relations with the communist party, as witnessed by the mutual public 
recriminations and accusations discussed in chapter four.625 
Generally speaking, areas where the August strike was most effective were those 
where there was established cooperation between the M-26-7 and the PSP, a point made 
indirectly by Carta Semanal in its analysis which was printed in the following weeks. 
The communist newspaper blames the failure to convince the majority of the Havana 
workers to join the strike on government repression and Mujal's "treason", but spends 
most time expressing the opinion that these could have been overcome had there been 
unity in the opposition. Indeed it goes further and, without presenting any evidence, 
accuses the "bourgeois opposition" of undermining the strike and being more interested 
in not offending the US ambassador. The M-26-7 is specifically named as one of the 
bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties against whom this accusation is levelled. While 
this is obviously unfair as, after all, it was the M-26-7 who called the strike in Havana 
for August 5th, what is certainly true is that the July 26th organisation in Havana did not 
involve the PSP in the planning of the strike call. There had been some contact between 
the M-26-7 and the communists through the Juventud Socialista, but Luis Fajado, the 
PSP contact person, was not present at the meeting in the Church of San Francisco 
where the decision to launch the strike on the 5th was taken and it probably took the 
communists by surprise.626 Therefore, in those areas of the capital's labour force, such as 
the docks, where the M-26-7 appears to have had little influence in the summer of 1957, 
by the time word had spread of the strike call, its failure would already have been 
apparent. The fact that some areas of communist influence, mainly bus crews and 
624 Torres-Hernadez, Huelga de Agosto (1977) p.7
625 IHC 1/8:13/A1/1.1/27 CNDDO, "Carta Abierta" (12th October 1956)
Carta Semanal (January 18th, 25th 1956 & special issue February 1956)
626 Torres-Hernadez, Huelga de Agosto (1977) pp.5-6
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tobacco workers, took part in the action testifies to the PSP's willingness to participate, 
while the disciplinary action taken against 200 bus drivers for taking part in the strike 
can only have increased the communists' sense of bitterness.627 
The question of disciplinary reprisals brings us back to the strong support for the 
strike in Pinar del Rio. In the Minas de Matahambre, attempts were made to arrest some 
workers after the strike, but the the rest of the miners refused to start work until their 
colleagues were released. The cry of "¡o trabaja todos, o no trabajo ninguno!" (Either 
all of us work or none of us!) was successful and the detainees were released.628 Little is 
currently known about revolutionary workers' organisation in Pinar del Rio, but these 
incidents suggest that the area would repay further study.
Finally, we must consider the lack of response from Matanzas, despite its militant 
tradition and strong workers' section of the 26th July Movement amongst the textile 
workers. Neither of the detailed surveys of the revolutionary period conducted by 
Gladys García Pérez and Clara Chávez Alvarez give any indication of strike action in 
Matanzas in August 1957, but do not offer any reason for the failure of the region to 
support the strike. Any explanation must be conjecture but, the previously mentioned 
lack of contact between the Matanzas militants and their comrades in the East may have 
meant that, by the time word had spread of the actions in Oriente, the strike had already 
passed its peak.
The search for explanations for the lack of success in Havana or Matanzas should 
not result in an underestimation of the speed with which the strike spread in Oriente, 
Camagüey and Pinar del Rio; an impressive achievement in the circumstances. A 
general strike may start more or less spontaneously in a single town, but to spread it 
across three provinces in a matter of days demonstrates a significant level of 
organisation and the foregoing description of the spread of the strike paints a useful 
snapshot of the state of oppositional working class organisation in August 1957.
April 9th 1958
The success, in Oriente, of the strike wave in protest at Frank País's murder quite 
eclipsed the subsequent failure to spread the action further west. This would encourage 
the leadership of the M-26-7 to call a general strike starting on April 9th 1958, which 
they envisaged as the final blow required to overthrow the dictatorship. However, it was 
627 Carta Semanal (21st August 1957)
628 Carta Semanal (28st August 1957)
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a complete disaster, begging the questions: How can we explain the success of the strike 
in some areas and the lack of response in others? What is its significance and what 
lessons were drawn from it by the opposition? 
The leaderships of both the PSP and the M-26-7 were extremely impressed by the 
impact of the August 1957 strike, but drew very different conclusions, both using the 
experience to reinforce an entrenched position. The M-26-7 leadership concluded that 
one more push was all that was required for victory, without fully realising the amount 
of work that still remained to be done in terms of building the networks, particularly in 
Havana, which was necessary to call a successful nationwide general strike. The PSP, on 
the other hand, having seen the widespread support of their proposals for a 20% wage 
claim, as well as the strikes against repression, felt that they had cause to believe that 
their approach, la lucha de masas, was bearing fruit. They concluded that the strike had 
weakened the government and had proved that strike action alone was the sufficient and 
only way to bring down the government.629 Moreover, the M-26-7 had not learned the 
lesson of the sugar strike, which had shown the importance of the economic struggles in 
radicalising workers, and thus ignored the PSP's insistence on the importance of raising 
"immediate demands"630. But with both organisations committed to a general strike, 
albeit with a completely different understanding of the term, there was some basis for 
the discussions between Fidel Castro and the veteran communist sugar workers' leader, 
Ursinio Rojas, which took place in the Sierra Maestra in October 1957.631
Following this meeting, an attempt was made 
to form a united workers front. There were several 
meetings in Havana, with the CNDDO represented 
by Carlos Rodriguez Cariaga, Miguel Quintero and 
occasionally Ursinio Rojas, while the M-26-7 was 
represented by Ñico Torres, Octavio Louit and 
Conrado Béquer. However, these meetings failed to 
reach agreement because, according to Torres, the 
PSP were opposed to the armed struggle.632 
Nevertheless, these discussions produced a softening 
629 Carta Semanal (21st August 1957) p.3
630 Rodriguez, José Antonio Echeverría y la clase obrera (1967) p.55;
Carta Semanal (28th August 1957) p.1
631 Anderson, Che Guevara (1997) p.297
632 Orozco, Interview with Ñico Torres (1990)
200
Figure 33: Cartoon from Carta 
Semanal (April 1958)
of the party's attitude to the guerrillas which, while it still extolled la lucha de masas 
(Figure 33) and condemned urban terrorism, pledged its support to the rebels in the 
Sierra Maestra in March 1958, with the reservation that armed action must support mass 
action rather than the other way round.633 It may also be significant that Carta Semanal 
started to take a much less hostile line when speaking of Conrado Béquer, having 
become aware that he was a member of the M-26-7.634 Furthermore, the PSP national 
committee decided, in February, to send one of its members, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, 
to the Sierra for face to face discussions, but before this could be arranged, the 26th July 
Movement unilaterally called a general strike.635
Bonachea graphically describes how, by the spring of 1958, the guerrillas in the 
Sierra Maestra had survived for over a year and had grown into an efficient disciplined 
fighting force. With the help of the urban underground, they had established control 
over their area, carried out many successful attacks on government forces and built up a 
considerable measure of support amongst the local campesinos.636 Their continued 
existence helped maintain the atmosphere of crisis and gave hope and inspiration to the 
regime's opponents, while the army's obvious inability to destroy them militarily 
undermined Batista's waning credibility. Add to this the fact that, by the beginning of 
March 1958, a student strike had managed to close most of the country's educational 
system, and a general strike call appeared be the logical next step.637 Faustino Pérez, 
who was in overall charge of the operation, said, in a later interview, that the success of 
the August 1957 strike convinced him that conditions existed for the final uprising 
which would overthrow the regime and that this led to an unrealistic view of the balance 
of forces.638 In a letter to Fidel Castro dated April 2nd 1958, Pérez states that "all sectors 
look favourably on the strike and are ready to support".639 Having previously seen that it 
was possible to organise a general strike in the east, all sides saw the success or failure 
of the strike in Havana as key to the situation. However, while the organisation of the 
FON had continued to grow and establish itself outside the capital, it had only made 
very limited inroads in Havana itself. This was in part, as Julia Sweig's researches show, 
because anti-communist elements in the Havana M-26-7 underground were unhappy 
633 "Porque nuestro partido apoya a la Sierra Maestra", Carta Semanal (12th March 1958)
634 Carta Semanal (22th January 1958)
635 Karol, Guerrillas in power (1970) p.153
636 Bonachea & San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection (1974) p.173
637 "Estudiantes" Bohemia (16th March 1958) 
638 Pérez, La sierra, el llano (1969) p.73
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with Castro's discussions with the PSP and, as a result, refused to organise joint strike 
committees in the capital with communists for sectarian reasons. It should be stressed 
that at this point the FON was far from being a unified organisation and its practice 
varied enormously from region to region, depending on the politics and previous 
experience of its leaders in any locality. In particular, there was an East-West split with 
the concept of sindicalismo beligerante being more dominant in the East, while in the 
West, the role of the workers was rather seen as supporting the militias and raising 
money. This would affect the course of the April strike as the importance of winning the 
capital meant that it was to be run from Havana. 
Faustino Pérez wrote to Fidel Castro at the beginning of April expressing 
unhappiness at the manifesto which Castro had issued on 26th March. This manifesto 
said that "the leadership of the FON will co-ordinate their efforts with the workers' 
sections of all political and revolutionary organisations"; a policy that was not popular 
with the Havana M-26-7 leadership.640 Nevertheless, in some of the industrial suburbs of 
Havana, San Miguel del Padrón, Guanabacoa, Regla, Bejucal, San Jose de las Lajas and 
Luyanó, joint committees had been established, but this was without the consent, 
perhaps without even the knowledge, of the Havana leadership of the 26th July 
Movement. 
The M-26-7, prior to April 1958, had an essentially military view of the general 
strike and workers were expected to place the "National Interest" above their perceived 
class interests.641 This caused the M-26-7 to give responsibility for the strike 
organisation to the Movimiento de Resistencia Cívica in Havana; an organisation which 
had neither the experience nor the networks capable of fulfilling their role. The national 
strike committee, which consisted of Faustino Pérez, Marcelo Salado, Manolo Rey, 
David Salvador and Marcelo Fernández, had little experience or understanding of labour 
militancy.642 Their conception of a general strike relied much more heavily on sabotage 
and the armed action of militia fighters than on the conscious self activity of rank and 
file workers, more of an armed popular insurrection than a traditional workers' strike. 
This was not the opinion of everyone in the M-26-7 Sección Obrera, as the bank worker 
640 Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution ( 2002) pp.126-131
Suaréz Collection "Letter from Faustino Pérez to Fidel Castro" (April 2nd 1958) [copy in author's 
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José María de la Aguilera made clear in an interview with an Argentine journalist later 
in 1958.643 
However, in the spring of that year, such voices as Aguilera were in a minority in 
Havana. From the end of 1957, with Ñico Torres incapacitated by illness, the FON itself 
had been under the leadership of David Salvador, a sugar worker from Ciego de Avila. 
He was an ex-communist and a founder member of the 26th July Movement. Despite 
his occupational background, his involvement had been mainly in the general political 
arena and his experience of the working class movement was limited. This inexperience 
prevented his appreciating the inadequacy of the organisation in Havana, while the 
hangover from his previous relationship with the PSP meant that he had little inclination 
to work with them.644 
Reading the communist party's literature of the time it is obvious that they thought 
the strike would start on Mayday.645 Communists in the industrial suburbs of Havana 
started agitating for a general strike from the beginning of March. Thus, for example on 
14th March, the Juventud Socialista (JS) in San Miguel del Padrón organised a march 
through the area shouting "¡Huelga General! (General Strike!)" and "¡Abajo Batista!" 
(Down with Batista!) in which they managed to involve some of the youth section of the 
July 26th movement.646 This agitation in support of a general strike was combined with 
a series of open letters and appeals calling for the unity of the FON with the CNDDO.647 
Nevertheless, the secrecy about the start of the strike obviously irritated the PSP who 
accused the M-26-7 of sectarianism on several occasions, even while calling for unity. 
Despite the insistence of many local FON organisers that they needed 72 hours 
notice to activate their networks, the strike organisers decided to keep the date of the 
proposed action secret, only telling M-26-7 militants in Havana on the morning of the 
9th April itself.648 If the date was secret, the fact that a strike was planned was not, Fidel 
Castro having announced a forthcoming revolutionary general strike when he made his 
declaration of "Total War" on 12th March. Thus forewarned, the government had 
643 Masetti, Los que luchan y los que lloran (1969) pp.169-172
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suspended the constitution and placed the army and police on a war footing. The CTC 
bureaucracy had stepped up its anti-Castro propaganda, accusing the M-26-7 of stabbing 
the working class in the back, while issuing threats that any workers supporting the 
strike would be dismissed and that the unions would not support them. To this end, the 
CTC bureaucracy drew up lists of suspected militants for the police and the 
employers.649
Thus, while the authorities were prepared, most workers were taken completely 
by surprise when the strike call came at 11am on the 9th April and were thereby denied 
that feeling of ownership that is so essential to the success of a strike. The police and 
army, supported by a pro-government militia, the Tigers, rampaged through the streets 
of Havana, discharging their weapons at random. The poorly armed M-26-7 militia were 
unable to wrest control, indeed most were not even in a position to defend themselves. 
In these circumstances, most workers found it impossible to leave their workplaces and 
the strike failed. 
In the Archivo Nacional in Havana, there is a typewritten account of the April 9th 
strike, written by Roger Venegas Calabuch, coordinator of the M-26-7 grouping in the 
port of Havana. He paints a graphic image of chaotic organisation; the first he hears of 
the strike is at half past ten on the morning of April 9th, when he is ordered by the 
clandestine M-26-7 leadership in Havana to "strike the port of Havana". He was 
astonished and replied that it was impossible to pull out 10,000 workers in thirty 
minutes. He says they had no weapons, while armed police were everywhere.650 
Meanwhile, the leaflets arguing for the strike did not arrive until 2 o'clock in the 
afternoon.651 In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the strike failed. The 
government television station was able to dismiss the affair as "isolated groups of 
criminal elements under the leadership of the communist party", despite the fact that, on 
the morning of the 9th April, PSP members had been as much at a loss as everyone 
else.652 There is, however, not the slightest evidence for Bonachea's unsubstantiated 
allegations that the PSP collaborated with the police on the day.653 
649 "El 9 de Abril de 1958" Bohemia (19th April 1959) pp.58-61&111-2
650 Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC) 15-26-1178 ,Venegas Calabuch, Carta Abierta: En memoria de un 
nueve de abril (1959)
651 ANC 6-180-2794 M-26-7 Instrucciones al pueblo para el día de la huelga (April 1958)
652 "El 9 de Abril de 1958" Bohemia (19th April 1959) pp.58-61&111-2
653 Bonachea & San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection, (1974) p.221
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The CNDDO kept a tactful silence on the disaster, but Carta Semanal was 
vitriolic, attacking the M-26-7 for sectarianism and for sterile commando raids 
producing the unnecessary deaths of brave young people.654 Nevertheless, they admitted 
that the limited but courageous response showed that the workers saw the necessity of a 
general strike. Carta Semanal also noted the relative greater success in the eastern 
provinces and condemned divisions in the opposition; the subtext here being that in the 
east there was a greater tradition of united working class action involving communist 
workers.655  Outside the capital, the response to the strike call was mixed but far from 
insignificant as Table 6 below indicates. 
Table 6: Strike activity outside Havana
Guanabacoa M-26-7 militia succeeded in sealing off the access roads, disarming 
the police and seizing control of the town, but had to disappear when 
it became clear that they were alone.
Matanzas 
province
Many agricultural workers stopped work in rural areas
La Rayonera Work stopped in the textile factory following sabotage of the water 
supply
Matanzas and 
Cardenas
Those workers who walked out in response to a strike call broadcast 
over the radio, quickly returned to work as news arrived from 
Havana
Las Villas 
province
Junta Patriótica de las Villas, which involved all sections of the 
militant opposition, had been formed earlier in the month
Sagua la Grande Town seized by the local rebel militia and only retaken following 
fierce fighting with the loss of 14 militiamen. Aircraft were used to 
bomb militia positions with much civilian loss of life.
Santa Clara Complete stoppage of the railway and intercity buses, along with a 
partial stoppage of commercial activity and some strike activity 
amongst carpenters and tobacco workers. Some fighting in the streets
Cabaiguán Strikes of bank, tobacco and telephone workers
Sancti Spiritus Electrical and telephone workers as well as central Vega
Yaguajay Complete stoppage
Camagüey city Strike started in the afternoon of the 9th and continued on the 10th. 
Railways - operating, workshops. permanent way and offices; Local 
buses; Banks; Telephones; Electrical plant; Shops; Restaurants and 
hotels; Taxis; Radio stations; Guarina and Pijuán factories; Catedral 
meat processing plant.
Bus drivers abandon buses to block roads - forced back to work at 
gunpoint. Police smash windows of closed shops.
654 IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/74, CNDDO "¡Viva el Primero de Mayo!" (1958);
Carta Semanal (23rd April 1958) pp.1-4
655 Carta Semanal (16th April 1958) p.4
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Camagüey 
province
centrales Jaronú, Siboney & Florida
Town of Nuevitas shut completely
Oriente 
Province
The major towns of the region came to a standstill - Santiago, 
Bayamo, Manzanillo Guantánamo
El Cobre Guerrillas take and hold the town of El Cobre on the outskirts of 
Santiago
Other Guerrilla 
actions
Guerrillas advanced to the outskirts of Manzanillo, Yara, Santa Rita, 
Baracoa
Santiago Santiago militias attack Cuartel de Boniato. Miguel Yero and Alvaro 
Alvarez call strike at 10.45am. Solid for 3 days, 11 dead.
Electrical workers take vital machine parts home to prevent 
strikebreakers.
Manzanillo Failure of communication meant that the strike did not start till the 
11th and was called off later that day following news from Havana 
and Santiago. However, was solid for its short duration.
Guantánamo Starts on railways, by 10th ciudad muerta. No press till 15th. Port of 
Boquerón closed. Guerrillas attack various army and police barracks, 
including central Jamaica on 12th and central Soledad on the 13th. 
Army forced to remain in barracks. Return to work after 5 days
This table was compiled from the following sources:
"El 9 de Abril de 1958" Bohemia (19th April 1959) p.112
Chávez Alvarez, Matanzas de rojo y negro (2007) pp.163-167
Carta Semanal (2nd. 9th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 23rd April 1958)
Cabrera, Sagua la Grande escribió su nombre en la historia (1959) pp36-38,122-3
Monserrat Iser, Luchas obreras en Manzanillo (2009) n.pag.
Orozco, Manzanillo: El Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio y el apoyo a la Sierra (1989) pp.77-78
Rodriguez Ramirez & Ramos Cabrales, El Movimiento Revolucionario en manzanillo de 1950 a 1959 
(1988) pp.76-78 
Mendoza Bú, El movimiento 26 de julio en el sector ferroviario en Santiago de Cuba (1988) p.57
Andrews, Tomás, La huelga de 9 de abril en Guantánamo (1982) pp.15-34
Rodrígiez López & Martínez Rodríguez, La huelga de 9 de abril de 1958 en la cuidad de Camagüey 
(1984) n.pag.
Coya, El movimiento obrero en Santiago de Cuba 1952-1958 (1982) p.103
Jorge Ibarra Cuesta argues that "the attempts to carry out a general strike in 
September 1957 and April 1958 were successful only in the towns of the interior but 
failed in Havana, fundamentally because of differences in living conditions".656 This 
argument needs to be nuanced. Many workers in Havana had been able to protect their 
living standards and staffing levels because of the nature of the predominant industries. 
We have discussed previously the port and tobacco industries, where the workers had 
avoided defeat. Another important sector in Havana was the tourist industry, to which 
the construction industry was closely linked, as the major building work in the capital 
was for new hotels. The tourist industry was still booming despite the growing crisis 
656 Ibarra Cuesta, Prologue to Revolution (1998) pp.126-7
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and US Mafia made use of their participation in tourism to launder money from their 
illegal activities at home. This meant that the economic crisis resulting from the 
fluctuations in the price of sugar did not affect the tourist industry in the same way, 
thereby reducing the imperative on their employers to raise productivity by reducing 
living standards. All of which meant that there were less reasons for some workers in 
Havana to support a revolutionary solution at this stage.
Guantánamo was again the last town to return to work; the order to resume 
working was given because the army was now free to concentrate as much force as 
would be required to make an example of the town. The strike here lasted as long as it 
did because the newly arrived rebel force in the Sierra Cristal, the Segundo Frente 
(Second Front) commanded by Raúl Castro, was able to engage the forces of repression 
and thereby provide cover for the strikers. While the guerrillas elsewhere were able to 
harass government forces, such as in El Cobre, this was as yet the only area in which 
rebel forces were sufficiently strong to neutralise the army locally; aided by the 
isolation of the region from the centres of power. The comparative success of the strike 
in the Guantánamo region would give those who advocated sindicalismo beligerante the 
credibility they needed to spread their approach to the rest of the island.
Picking up the pieces
The failure of the strike in Havana provoked an intense debate within the 
anti-Batista movement. The personal collection of Reinaldo Suaréz has contributed two 
documents which reflect this debate. The first is a letter to Fidel Castro, copied to the 
M-26-7 National Directorate and to the leadership of the FON, signed by various 
Havana workers' organisers and militia captains. It is written in a critical tone and 
complains that the strike has played into the enemy's hands. It goes on to say that the 
July 26th movement had insufficient penetration in the working class to call a general 
strike and had relied on armed action rather than the conscious will of the workers. 
However, this strategy was doomed because there were insufficient arms. Other 
problems outlined are that there was insufficient preparation, that important sectors such 
as the shop workers did not receive the strike call until too late, that there was a lack of 
communication between the leadership and local co-ordinators who had to organise the 
strike at base level and that there was a failure to co-ordinate with other organisations. 
The letter concludes that the organisation had lost touch with reality and had started to 
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believe its own propaganda about the balance of forces.657 Another letter, this one signed 
by the provincial leadership in Las Villas, made similar points, but in a much more 
measured tone, accepting that the failure was the fault of the whole organisation, not 
any particular leader. This difference may be explained by the fact that the strike in Las 
Villas had been considerably more successful than the previous attempt in August 1957 
and the authors had something to be proud of in a local context. It is worthy of note that 
the Las Villas letter starts by saying that the analysis it contains is the result of extensive 
consultation within the regional organisation.658 It is safe to assume that there would 
have been considerable debate within the M-26-7 and that when the national leadership 
met at the beginning of May, they would have been aware of the tenor of that debate.
The process of picking up the pieces therefore began with a meeting on May 3rd 
1958 at Los Altos de Mompié in the Sierra Maestra. From the point of view of working 
class involvement in the insurrection, two important decisions were taken, one of which 
was to give future priority to the guerrilla struggle, the other was to reorganise the FON. 
As part of this latter process, Ñico Torres, now recovered from his illness, was restored 
to the leadership of the FON, while David Salvador was given other responsibilities. 
Torres had been out of action for the early part of 1958, following an operation for a 
stomach ulcer and had only returned to activity when the plans for the April strike were 
well in train.659 The relatively greater success of the strike in areas that he had 
influenced and the particular success in his home town of Guantánamo must have given 
him the necessary credibility to reorganise the FON and he set about extending his 
network and methodology from Oriente towards the capital.
The FON showed an immediate change of style with the issue of a manifesto in 
May 1958 that took responsibility for the fiasco. Nevertheless, it maintained that a 
general strike was the most efficient way to defend and extend workers rights, as well as 
"curbing the sinister despotism that is strangling our republic".660 The manifesto 
attacked Mujal and the government in a detailed manner, highlighting the widely 
unpopular, corrupt practice of compulsory check-off of union subscriptions. It finished 
with a list of demands that mixed the economic and political in a way that is clearly 
designed to link the need for revolutionary change with workers' immediate concerns. 
An example of the new approach can be seen in a surviving FON leaflet calling for a 
657 Ignarra et al., Letter to Fidel Castro (19th April1958) Suaréz collection [copy in author's possession]
658 Dirrección provincial de Las Villas, Letter to the Dirrección Nacional (30th April 1958)
659 Orozco, Interview with Ñico Torres (1990) 
660 IHC 1/8:14/1.1/6, FON, "Manifesto del FON" (1958) 
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railway strike in Las Villas in protest at the late payment of wages, which relates 
directly to a matter of immediate concern and contrasts to the general exhortations 
contained in the FON leaflet calling the April 9th strike.661 This shows an increasing 
acceptance of the PSP's view of the importance of immediate demands and would have 
lent credibility to the other theme of the reorganised FON, the call to unity. This 
reflected the realignment towards the communists that was emerging with the 
discussions between Fidel Castro and the PSP delegate Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. 
In a much quoted article written in 1964, Che Guevara speaks of Ñico Torres 
being given instructions to work with the PSP in the labour movement and of his 
reluctant but disciplined agreement to do so.662 It is however likely that his reluctant 
attitude was shared by others in the leadership, who might have been convinced of the 
need to work with the PSP, but who were not happy with the prospect. The strained 
relationship between the PSP and the rest of the anti-government opposition 
demonstrates, in part, the divisive effect of Cold War anti-communist propaganda. The 
liberal opposition, often rather contemptuously referred to as "los partidos burgueses" 
(bourgeois parties) in PSP literature, did not wish to antagonise the USA by being seen 
to associate with the communists. Thus, for example, in November 1955, the fact that 
the PSP had organised a large turnout to support an opposition demonstration was 
condemned as "Communist sabotage" in the opposition press.663 The PSP wrote endless 
open letters to the "bourgeois opposition" proposing a united front, although nearly 
always in terms which invited rejection, but they rarely if ever received a reply.664 Of 
course the PSP's uncritical support of the USSR, in particular its support of the crushing 
of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, played into the hands of its enemies.665 These 
attitudes affected the relationship between the PSP and the July 26th Movement. Thus, 
the bad start to relations as a result of the condemnation of the Moncada attack 
continued and by the middle of 1958, a significant anti-communist faction had grown in 
the M-26-7, particularly in Havana.
However, it is important to differentiate between, on the one hand, right-wing 
anti-communism that is opposed to the potential threat that communists pose to property 
661 IHC 1/8:14/1.1/7, FON, "A los compañeros ferroviarios" (n/d) 
IHC 1/8:14/2.1/1-2, FON, "Huelga General Revolucionaria" (1958)
662 Thomas, Cuba, (1998) pp.1002-7
Guevara, Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (2001) p.245
663 "Sabotaje Comunista" Bohemia (November 27th 1955)
664 eg Carta Semanal (4th July 1956)
665 Carta Semanal (30th October 1956)
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relations, which is more common amongst the petit-bourgeoisie and the professions 
with property to lose and, on the other hand, left-wing anti-communism that saw the 
PSP as too moderate and overly prepared to make compromises, which is more common 
amongst working class militants. Torres as a sometime trotskyist falls into the latter 
camp.
The decision to work with the PSP had to be implemented in the aftermath of the 
failure of the April strike about which, as outlined above, the PSP had been given no 
details and had not been involved the planning process. The PSP leadership clearly felt 
considerable irritation at their exclusion from the strike, but this potential animosity 
seems to have been overcome by the decision of the July 26th Movement to begin 
serious negotiations. The PSP had been calling for unity for a long time and the 
approach from the rebels gave them reason to believe that their criticisms had been at 
least partially accepted. Moreover, the negotiations were given urgency by the ever 
increasing wave of state sponsored terror, which was widely reported in the party's 
press. The disappearance and subsequent murder of two of the most prominent and well 
known communist leaders, Paquito Rosales, ex-mayor of Manzanillo, and José María 
Peréz, a bus workers' leader who had also been a congressional representative, appears 
to have shocked the rest of PSP leadership.666 Blas Roca, PSP general secretary, tells us 
that this terror started to convince the party leadership that there was no possibility of a 
legal solution to the crisis and that there was a need for armed protection before workers 
would take further action.667 
Conclusion
The August 1957 strike occurred because of a convergence of the deeply felt 
anger of a mass of the population in eastern Cuba with the existence of a clandestine 
organisation capable of capitalising on the situation and spreading the action. The 
failure of the April 9th strike demonstrates that the "directing will of the centre" is 
insufficient without mass involvement.
If chaotic organisation and divisions within the opposition are a contributing 
factor in the failure of the April 1958 strike, they are a not sufficient explanation in 
themselves. The inability of the rebels to win a military confrontation with the 
666 Carta Semanal (12th March 1958)
667 Sims, Cuban Labor and the Communist Party (1985) p.55
Cuba Socialista (January 1964) p.22-3
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government's armed forces in Havana must be seen as being decisive. Of course, any 
government's power is always concentrated in the capital and this advantage was 
enhanced in this case by the fact that the influence of the trade union bureaucracy, upon 
which Batista depended so heavily, was also strongest in Havana. 
Despite the failure of the August and April strikes to reach Havana, they were 
nevertheless impressive displays of opposition. Their ability to generate such 
widespread action, combined with the survival and growth of the rebel army in the 
mountains, made it clear that the M-26-7 was now, irrespective of the defeated strike, 
the centre of opposition to Batista and other political organisations would have to 
orientate to them. The PSP therefore had an interest in coming to an understanding with 
the M-26-7 despite their annoyance at being excluded before the strike. With hindsight, 
it was probably politically fortunate for the PSP to have been so excluded, as it is 
unlikely that their involvement in the planning of the strike could have affected the 
outcome greatly, while their exclusion left them with the moral high ground.
The failure of the strike also convinced a significant group within the July 26th 
Movement that there would be advantages in working with the PSP, who still had 
sufficient roots in the labour movement to be of assistance. An analysis of the detail of 
both strikes certainly indicates that they were most successful in areas where militants 
of the two organisations worked together. The new leadership of the FON, while having 
no liking for the leadership of the PSP, were prepared to take a pragmatic approach and 
would begin serious negotiations over the summer of 1958. As we have seen from 
examining their agitational material, there was much common ground between the 
egalitarian nationalist politics of the M-26-7 and the communist notion of an "amplia 
coalición democrática" (broad democratic alliance), with both requiring a cross class 
alliance fighting for democracy and national independence. The differences between the 
two organisations were on the tactical rather than the strategic level and circumstances 
were pushing both organisations to adopting a more accommodating attitude. Thus, the 
failure of the strike on April 9th caused both the M-26-7 and the PSP to change their 
approach and we see the start of a process of tactical convergence between the PSP and 
the M-26-7, although the organisational convergence would be slower.
The historiography of the Cuban revolution concentrates, in relation to the April 
9th events, on apportioning blame for the failure, in particular discussing the role of 
Fidel Castro in calling the strike. In reality, this discussion has more to do with 
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post-1959 political considerations and, interesting as this may be, an investigation of the 
effect that the events had on the subsequent actions of the various protagonists is more 
useful in gaining an understanding of the revolutionary process. In this context, the 
other main decision taken by the M-26-7 at Altos de Mompié, to give priority to the 
guerrilla struggle, while at first sight looking like a turn away from the tactic of a 
general strike, in fact produced the conditions that would make such a strike possible.
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Chapter 7. Last days of Batista
In an interview published shortly after the rebel victory in 1959, Faustino Pérez 
asserted that one of the reasons for the failure of the April 9th strike was that workers 
would not strike without adequate armed support.668 The turn to a more militaristic 
approach by the M-26-7 was not taken with a view to rectifying this inadequacy, but it 
did have that effect in the long term. Going on strike in Batista's Cuba could be a life or 
death decision and workers had to feel some confidence in their chances of survival and 
in the possibilities of successfully gaining a result that would be in their political and 
economic interests. In the summer of 1958, however, the guerrillas still had to beat the 
encircling forces of Batista's army which outnumbered them enormously. The events of 
the victory of the rebel army are well known, hence this chapter will concern itself with 
the less well known contribution of the working class underground.
The rebel victory would give the M-26-7 the most prominent position in the 
opposition forces and pave the way for a general strike that would sweep the July 26th 
Movement to power at the beginning of January 1959. The significance of this strike 
has been widely underestimated and little work has been done to investigate how Fidel 
Castro was in a position to successfully call a strike when, only 9 months before, his 
previous call had fallen so flat. Of course the military victory was of great importance 
but was not sufficient by itself for the M-26-7 to win power. Rather the defeat of the 
government forces gave the workers the confidence to believe that they could go on 
strike without being brutalised by the security forces, who had been thoroughly 
demoralised by their treatment at the hands of a numerically inferior force. Moreover, 
nationwide general strikes require considerable organisation. As the August 1957 strike 
shows, such spontaneity required organisation.
This chapter will trace the development of that organisation, through the unity 
discussions between the July 26th Movement and the communists, the organisation of 
two workers congresses in rebel held territory and the marginalisation of the mujalista 
trade union bureaucracy. This shows the way in which the revolutionary general strike 
that overthrew Batista was organised and proved so powerful that it pulled the rest of 
the population in behind it. This revisionist narrative seeks to provide evidence for the 
assertion that there was a convergence between the PSP and the M-26-7 well before the 
rebel victory, that communists played a significant role in the success of the revolution 
668 Bohemia (19th April 1959) pp.111-2
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and that the general strike of January 1959 was the result of a high level of working 
class organisation and was crucial to the triumph of the revolution.
Summer Offensive
In April 1958, the British Vice-Consul in Santiago was quite clear that, in the 
provinces, the government's situation was increasingly precarious and that "everyone, 
rich as well as poor, appears to be in favour of Castro". 669 Despite thinking that "the 
present government has done more for Cuba than all previous administrations put 
together", he was clear that "one of the reasons that the rebels have enjoyed so much 
immunity is in the very poor type of man in the Cuban army. Being armed, they are 
living on the fat of the land, for every one of them is a grafter and has little inclination 
to get shot".670 The British Ambassador rather dourly added that "the Army is disinclined 
to undertake heroics".671 This negative assessment of the fighting ability and morale of 
Batista's armed forces was to be born out by the victory of the rebel forces over a 
government offensive launched in the wake of the failed strike of April 9th 1958. 
Bonachea recalls the parallel growth in financial support coming from workers through 
late summer and autumn, as well as the increase in membership of the M-26-7 Sección 
Obrera, which David Salvador estimated at 15,000 by the end of the year.672 The 
logistical support for the guerrillas that was provided by the workers' underground was 
vital to their ability to continue the fight, while the rebel victory and the demoralising 
effect it had on government armed forces gave ever increasing numbers of ordinary 
working class people the confidence to actively support the revolution. 
 The priority of the Sección Obrera during the fighting was to ensure the logistical 
support of the guerrilla fighters, but once their victory seemed assured, they turned their 
attention to the question of uniting all oppositional workers' organisations, which 
produced a united workers' organisation, the Frente Obrero Nacional Unido (FONU or 
United National Workers' Front), that strengthened the hand of the rebel movement 
immensely. 673This section recounts this summer unity drive, not only to rescue the 
events from their present obscurity, but also to support the argument that there was a 
669 FO371/132164 - AK1015/20 (April 2nd 1958)
670 FO371/132164 - AK1015/28 (May 9th 1958)
671 FO371/132164 - AK1015/44 (September 29th)
672 Bonachea & San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection, (1974) p.263
Interview with David Salvador (January 9th 1959) in Alexander, History of Organized Labor in Cuba 
(2002) pp.159&167
673 PCC, Historia del movimiento obrero cubano (1985) pp.352-360
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process of tactical and political convergence between the PSP and the M-26-7 and that 
this took an organisational form.
Following the defeat of the April 9th strike, Batista attempted to seize the 
advantage by means of a "summer offensive" which he dubbed Operación F-F 
(Fase-Final or Fin-Fidel). This offensive planned to use the army's greater fire-power 
and numerical superiority to militarily crush the rebels in the Sierra Maestra. Given that 
the dictatorship had somewhere in the region of 10,000 men at its disposal, supported 
by aircraft and artillery, while the rebels in the Sierra numbered only about 300 armed 
guerrillas, the outcome did not seem to pose any great problem for Batista. Fidel 
Castro's recently published account of the fighting from May to August 1958 fleshes out 
and largely agrees with Bonachea and San Martín's earlier book, showing both how the 
superior morale of the rebel fighters and intelligent tactical use of the mountainous 
terrain, enabled this small force to score victory after victory.674 
The fighting in the Sierra Maestra quickly became the centre of attention for all 
those opposed to the regime, overshadowing other matters. There is little record of any 
strikes or demonstrations over the summer of 1958, as it became clear that everything 
depended on the outcome of the battles in the mountains. In these circumstances, the 
priority for the M-26-7 Sección Obrera was in organising logistical support for the rebel 
army, sabotage and preparing for a general strike in the event of a rebel military success. 
In terms of logistical support, the guerrillas in the hills were almost totally dependent 
for food and clothing on supporters in the towns. Money could be raised from middle 
class supporters and by 'taxing' employers in the areas under rebel control, but this still 
had to be converted into material support. For this, workers in shops, warehouses and 
distribution depots proved valuable by large scale pilfering of essentials. Railway 
workers were able to move these supplies under the noses of the police, while bus 
drivers formed propaganda distribution networks. Telephone operators in Santiago and 
Guantánamo eavesdropped on police conversations, reporting the information thus 
gleaned to the rebels. One particularly useful source of supplies was the US base in 
Guantánamo Bay. In addition to the day to day items which could be pilfered, a quantity 
of arms and ammunition was purchased from US Navy personnel. There was a 
considerable level of sympathy among the US sailors on the base and many contributed 
financially to the cause, while some security guards were prepared to turn a blind eye to 
674 Castro, La Victoria Estratégica (2010)
Bonachea & San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection (1974) pp.226-265
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contraband material being smuggled out of the base.675 Without such support, the 
chances of the rebels resisting the regular army would have been slim indeed.
The government attempted to hide its failure to defeat the rebels by the imposition 
of strict media censorship. This was largely unsuccessful because the rebels had a radio 
station, Radio Rebelde, operating from the Sierra Maestra. This clandestine radio clearly 
had a powerful transmitter as its broadcasts were monitored by both the BBC World 
Service and at least one Mexican radio station.676 The script of one broadcast, in the 
name of Radio FON, survives. As well as appealing for support for the continuing 
struggle of the campesinos on land owned by King Ranch in Camagüey, it appeals to the 
common soldiers not to shoot their brother workers and either change sides or go home, 
saying that they were fighting for nothing in order to enrich their corrupt officers.677 
This appeal to the ordinary soldiers to change sides is a common theme at this time. In a 
similar vein, the Comité Obrero Revolucionario de San Miguel del Padrón issued a 
leaflet saying that not all the police were torturers and murderers, but those who did 
dishonour their uniform would be severely punished by future people's courts.678 The 
army and police, while they had demonstrated ruthless efficiency when shooting down 
poorly armed students or unarmed striking workers, were not nearly so determined 
when faced with well trained and politically motivated guerrillas. Army officers were 
frequently appointed and promoted more for their loyalty to Batista than for their 
martial competence. The rebel tactic of giving honourable and decent treatment to all 
military prisoners encouraged many to surrender or change sides. On the other hand, the 
well known brutality of the military caused many guerrillas to fight to the death rather 
than surrender and face possible torture. 
The rebel forces defeated the regime's summer offensive by August 1958, 
boosting the morale of the entire opposition and confirming the July 26th Movement as 
the real leader of the anti-Batista struggle. This position is highlighted by the terms of 
the Pact of Caracas, signed by all the opposition tendencies except the PSP on July 20th 
1958. This gave the M-26-7 complete freedom of movement, while agreeing a united 
front of the opposition; a position recognising the de-facto submission of the rest of the 
675 Toirac, El Movimineto Obrero en la Base Naval Norteamericana (1988) pp.3-8
Lipman, Interview with the co-ordinator of the M-26-7 in the US base at Guantánamo (2004)
Bornot, Esa tarde me pusieron a la frontera (1975) p.187
676 FO 371/132164/5 - AK1015/47 & AK1015/56
677 IHC 1/8:14/4.1/1-10, FON, "Radio FON" (1958)
678 IHC 1/8:13/27.1/2, Comité Obrero Revolucionario de San Miguel del Padrón, "¡No Hay Que 
Confundir!" (1958)
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opposition to rebel army leadership. The agreement spoke quite clearly of the tactic to 
be employed: "an armed insurrection culminating in a great general strike on the civilian 
front".679 The PSP was not included in the Pact of Caracas and protested loudly in Carta 
Semanal for three weeks, then said no more as moves started towards separate 
discussions between the CNDDO and the FON.680
While the national meeting of the M-26-7 leadership, held at Altos de Mompié, 
had decided to work together with the PSP, little progress was made over the summer. 
However there was one campaign on which both groups expended some energy, taking 
a very similar line: the long running dispute at Coca-Cola. Twenty-six workers in the 
soft-drinks company, some members of the PSP and others supporters of the M-26-7, as 
well as independent militants, were dismissed. Their offence, according to both 
Vanguardia Obrera and Carta Semanal, was to "be against the dictatorship and the 
corrupt and traitorous leadership of the CTC".681 This started a campaign to boycott 
Coca-Cola and the soft-drink workers dispatched committees to seek support from other 
workers. The CTC leadership tried to defuse the issue by negotiating the reinstatement 
of the 26, provided they signed papers renouncing all political activity; a compromise 
denounced as shameful by the workers concerned.682 The campaign was a live issue for 
the rest of the year and they were only reinstated following the fall of Batista. Such 
collaboration at rank and file level helped the arguments of those in both organisations 
who wanted joint activity. So, once the government's summer offensive was repulsed, 
the leadership of the M-26-7 turned its attention to the question of the workers' 
movement. 
Jesús Soto (Figure 34), a textile worker from the Havana suburbs and a strong 
advocate of collaboration, tells us that Raúl Castro called a meeting of the provincial 
leaderships of the FON in the Sierra Cristal.683 This took place on the 12th September 
1958 and consisted of, Eliseo Camaño, representing Pinar del Río, David Salvador, 
Jesús Soto and José María de la Aguilera, representing Havana, Quinto Torres 
representing Las Villas and Heriberto Hernández from Camagüey. By this stage, 
Octavio Louit had been arrested and Julián Alemán had been killed, while Ñico Torres 
679  Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution (2002) pp.172-4
680 Carta Semanal (August 6th, 13th & 20th 1958)
681 Carta Semanal (July 30th 1958)
Vanguardia Obrera (July 14th 1958)
682 Carta Semanal (August 27th 1958)
683 Soto, La consitución del FONU en la clandestinidad, (n/d) manuscript, collection of Vicente Pérez, 
copy in author's posession
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was now permanently stationed in the Segundo Frente Oriental "Frank País", as the 
area under the control of Raúl Castro's column in the Sierra Cristal mountains was 
called.684
Following this meeting, Jesús Soto and David Salvador returned to Havana and 
contacted the PSP to arrange a meeting. David Salvador was arrested before the meeting 
could take place and Jesús Soto and José María de la Aguilera led for the M-26-7, while 
Ursinio Rojas and Carlos Rodríguez Careaga spoke on behalf of the PSP.685 Sometime in 
October 1958, it was agreed to form a joint organisation to be known as the Frente 
Obrero Nacional Unido (FONU) but this was only made public on November 12th. Two 
committees were formed, one of which, comprising Miguel Quintero for the M-26-7 
and Carlos Rodríguez Careaga for the PSP was to tour the provinces, charged with 
bringing the trade union militants of both organisations together in the localities and to 
form regional, district and municipal sections of the FONU.686 However, Carlos 
Rodríguez Careaga became the first high profile martyr of the FONU, when he was 
caught up in a police raid at the house near Camagüey of a local communist sugar 
worker's leader, Saturnino Aneiro.687 Both were beaten to death. The other committee 
went to Las Villas to help with the organisation of a sugar workers' conference.
The political changes that happened within and between the M-26-7 and the PSP 
are of immense importance for the revolutionary process and it is significant that this 
coming together started at the working class base of both organisations. Indeed, the 
M-26-7 leadership in the Sierra still kept full knowledge of the rapprochement from 
their middle-class supporters. There was a solid base for unity, with the pressure coming 
from the already existing "committees of workers unity" discussed in chapter 5 above. 
This new-found collaboration would have its most complete expression in the "Workers' 
Congresses in Liberated Territory".
Two Workers' Congresses
Once formed, FONU occupied itself with preparations for a general strike to 
overthrow the regime. Of particular significance in this respect were the two workers' 
congresses organised in the Sierra Cristal mountains and in northern Las Villas. 
684 Figueras, Semblanza de Antonio Torres Chedebaux (n/d) 
685 IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/85 (October 28th1958) CNDDO, "Salvamos la vida de David Salvador"
Soto, La Constitution del FONU en la Clandestinidad (n/d)
686 Soto, La Constitution del FONU en la Clandestinidad (n/d)
687 IHC 1/8:15/3.1/24A.1 (November 28th 1958) FONU "Denuncia el asasenato de Carlos Rodriguez"
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Learning one of the lessons of the failures of April 1958, this next strike was planned to 
start in January 1959 to coincide with the start of the sugar harvest, thereby maximising 
its economic effect. In the event, these preparations had to be brought forward to take 
advantage of the opportunity afforded by the flight of Batista on New Year's Day 1959. 
Two "Workers' Congresses in Liberated Territory" took place at the end of 1958, 
one in the Sierra Cristal mountains in the area controlled by the Segundo Frente 
Oriental "Frank País", led by Raúl Castro, and the other in northern Las Villas province 
in the area controlled by rebel forces under the command of Camilo Cienfuegos.688 
Despite the fact that they give us a valuable insight into the state of working class 
politics at this crucial time, these two meetings have been largely ignored in the 
literature, perhaps overshadowed by the more dramatic events taking place on the 
guerrilla fronts as the rebel army turned the tide in its battles with Batista's forces. These 
two meetings were important events in themselves, the difficulties involved in 
assembling several hundred delegates in conditions of dictatorship and civil war 
showing an impressive level of organisation. Furthermore, these congresses gave the 
rebel movement considerably increased legitimacy in working class circles, showing 
that the opposition forces amongst organised labour were publicly united and capable of 
creating an alternative organisational structure.689 As such they played an important role 
in undermining the last remaining credibility of the mujalista CTC bureaucracy.
Soon after establishing the Segundo Frente Oriental 'Frank País' in March 1958, 
Raúl Castro set up a Buró Obrero (Workers' executive) to regulate industrial relations in 
the area under his command. In the early days of October of that year, Ñico Torres, in 
his role as national co-ordinator of the Sección Obrera, transferred to the Sierra Cristal 
to run the M-26-7's intervention in the labour movement from there, as well as heading 
the Segundo Frente Oriental Buró Obrero.690 Conrado Béquer, now a wanted man, 
joined him although, perhaps relieved to be able to discard the double life he had been 
living, expended most of his energy on a newly assigned combat role.691 A successful 
Congreso Campesino (Peasant congress) had been organised on September 21st, a few 
688 García Pérez, Insurrección y Revolución (2006) p.185
689 Poveda Díaz, Interview with Alcibíades Poveda Díaz  (2009) 
690 Soto, La Constitution del FONU (n/d)
Pérez Interview with Vicente Pérez (2008)
Figueras, Semblanza de Antonio Torres Chedebaux (n/d) 
Thomas, Cuba (1998) pp.1007&1010
691 Bohemia (January 11th 1959) p.102
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days before Torres's arrival, to discuss the problems of the peasant farmers of the 
region.692 It was decided to organise a similar event for the sugar workers and a 
preparatory plenary meeting took place in El Sigual on October 23rd.693 This was 
initially called to consider how to deal with those sugar plantations in the area under 
rebel control, particularly the refusal of the employers to start repairs on their refineries 
in advance of the coming zafra. This situation was causing immense concern amongst 
the region's 36,000 sugar workers who suspected that the employers were deliberately 
attempting to undermine support for the rebel army.694 In the event, the discussions at 
the plenary soon expanded and, given the imminent launch of the FONU, it was decided 
to call a delegate conference representing all workers opposed to the regime. 695 This 
meeting was significant in being one of the first such meetings open to all political 
tendencies, including the communists. However, when the practicalities of assembling 
the delegates in the far east of the island for a national meeting were considered by the 
national leadership of the M-26-7 Sección Obrera, now composed of Ñico Torres, 
Conrado Béquer and José Pellón, a distillery worker, it was decided to call two 
congresses, one near Guantánamo for delegates from Oriente and the other for sugar 
workers in the recently liberated area of northern Las Villas province.696 Meanwhile, on 
the question of starting the preparation for the sugar harvest, an "intervention 
committee", jointly staffed by rebel soldiers and sugar workers forced the issue. They 
toured the area under the control of the Segundo Frente Oriental 'Frank País', ensuring 
that repairs were started, at gunpoint where necessary.697
The Congreso Obrero en Armas, as the conference in the Sierra Cristal was called, 
started on December 8th. Delegates from areas under rebel control were elected in open 
assemblies but, where this was not possible, they were designated by local cells of the 
M-26-7 and/or the PSP. The industries represented included railway, sugar, ports, 
mining, pharmaceuticals, commerce, medicine, telephones, construction, printing, 
electricity, carpentry, baking and the US base; 110 delegates in all.698 Many had a great 
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deal of trouble getting there, for instance the delegates from the US base in Guantánamo 
had to walk and did not arrive until the 10th.699 Twelve delegates from Santiago 
attempted to have the communist delegates barred from the meeting and, when they lost 
the vote, withdrew.700 Following a report from Ñico Torres, the congress approved the 
formation of the FONU, pledged total support for the rebel army and set out a familiar 
list of economic demands.701 Given that the congress appears to have adopted very 
similar policies to the other conference in Las Villas, let us pass directly to a discussion 
of that event of which we have more details.
When the rebel detachment led by Camilo Cienfuegos 
arrived in Las Villas on October 7th 1958, he found a small 
PSP guerrilla group under the leadership of Felix Torres. 
Government repression had been particularly severe in the 
region and many communist militants had been forced 
underground, where they took up arms against the regime.702 
They had met with a certain hostility from the local M-26-7 
leadership, but Camilo Cienfuegos was au fait with the new 
policy of co-operation with the communists as his first 
proclamation indicates;703 indeed Osvaldo Sánchez of the PSP was acting as one of the 
liaison couriers linking Camilo Cienfuegos with Fidel Castro.704 The most public 
demonstration of the new approach was that Gerado Nogueras (Figure 34), an 
experienced PSP workers' leader was appointed to run the Comisión Obrera (Workers' 
committee), which the invading column set up upon its arrival.705 The agreement seems 
to have been that the PSP was given the chair of the workers' committee in return for 
Felix Torres and his group submitting to M-26-7 direction. Tito Igualada of the 26th 
July Movement was appointed Gerado Nogueras's deputy, while Ramón "Mongo" 
Simonaca of the PSP was given responsibility for organising the campesinos (Figure 
699 Lipman, Interview with the co-ordinator of the M-26-7 group in the US base at Guantánamo (2004)
700 Figueras, Semblanza de Antonio Torres Chedebaux (n/d) 
701 Cardona Bory, Memorias del Congreso Obrero en Armas (c 1995) n.pag
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Testimony of  Alberto Torres in Gávelz, Camilo (1979) p.374-376
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Figure 34: Gerado Nogueras in 
1972 from Bohemia (October 
27th 1972)
).706 The principal task of the workers' committee was to organise assemblies on the 
sugar plantations and in the centrales in the province in order to elect new union 
representatives and to prepare for a sugar workers' conference, as well as providing 
logistical support for the guerrillas from the local rural population.707 
When the column first arrived in northern Las Villas, delegations of sugar workers 
came looking for support for their demands, complaining of poor treatment by their 
employers and the army.708 William Gálvez, an officer in the invading column, recalls 
that the rebel soldiers, most of whom were from urban backgrounds, were shocked by 
the levels of rural poverty.709 While with hindsight we know the regime would only 
survive for another two months, the rebels were planning for a much longer campaign. 
It has already been mentioned that the founding meeting of the FONU had formed a 
committee to convene a conference of sugar workers.710 This was composed of Jesús 
Soto, Ursinio Rojas, José Maria de la Aguilera and Lila Léon, a Havana office worker 
and member of the M-26-7.711 At the beginning of December, they sent a letter to Che 
Guevara by the hand of Lila Léon requesting his support, which received a favourable 
response.712 Following discussions with Camilo Cienfuegos, it was decided to send 
Ursinio Rojas to Las Villas to help the local Comisión Obrera with the preparations.713 
The others followed on the 14th. 
As soon as local workplaces in the 
area under the influence of the rebels in 
northern Las Villas had started to 
reorganise, the Comisión Obrera called a 
series of district meetings to prepare for 
the congress. Camilo Cienfuegos 
personally chaired a meeting of workers 
from San Augustín and Adela centrales in 
the Alicante district in mid-November and planned to chair a larger meeting on the 
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Figure 35: Tito Igualada & Mongo Simonaca in 1972 
from Bohemia (October 27th 1972)
28th.714 In the event, he was caught in fighting in the Escambray mountains and 
delegated the responsibility to William Galvéz.715 There were many similar meetings 
held during the second half of November and the early part of December and Tito 
Igualada recalls a particularly militant assembly held in Güeba where 800 sugar workers 
elected new officials and planned the organisation of workers in areas not yet under 
rebel control.716 A similar assembly on the 7th December in Jobo Rosado was attacked 
by aircraft of Batista's air force, but continued after the all clear.717
The final resolution of the plenary held on November 28th survives and provides 
some indication of the political feelings amongst the sugar workers of north Las 
Villas.718 The resolution speaks of 728 delegates meeting under the protection of the 
invading column "Antonio Maceo", commanded by Camilo Cienfuegos, with the 
intention of discussing the demands for the forthcoming zafra as well as the wider 
political and social objectives of the Cuban people. It was resolved to:
1. Recognise the FONU as the leadership of the Cuban workers until such time as they  
might freely and democratically elect their leaders.
2. Declare the following 7th December a day of struggle against the dictatorship.
3. Call upon all sugar workers in Las Villas to prepare to fight for their demands for 
the forthcoming zafra. Call upon all other workers to fight for their own demands and 
in solidarity with the sugar workers.
4. Call upon all businessmen and industrialists to support the rebels' political 
demands, as this is the only way they can develop their businesses with prosperity, 
respect and peace.
5. Call upon the campesinos, small cane farmers and professionals to join the fight of 
the Cuban people.
6. Call upon all members of the armed forces who are not complicit in murder and 
other bestial activities to cross over to the ranks of the rebel forces.
7. Condemn all countries that sell arms to the dictatorship, particularly the United 
States and England. These weapons are used to bomb and kill peaceful citizens.
8. For all Cubans, irrespective of social or political divisions to unite against the 
blood-stained government.
9. To raise the following economic demands
•For a wage rise not less than 10%
•For a diferencial of 4.2%
•For the re-employment of all those dismissed or forced to leave their jobs by 
714 Testimony of Mongo Simanca in Sarusky, Camilo (1972) pp.59-65
715 Testimony of Felipe Torres and Alfredo Milán in Gálvez, Camilo (1979) pp.338-341
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repression
•For land to be given to those agricultural workers who wish to cultivate it 
during the tiempo muerto
•Against the compulsory payment of union dues, but in favour of voluntary 
payment
•For the payment of advances in wages free of interest
•For price reductions for basic household necessities
•For recognition of directly elected workers' representatives. Until elections are 
possible, recognition of the clandestine comités de lucha
•Clean up the living quarters and rebuild our houses
•For a general amnesty for all political and social prisoners, including those 
members of the armed forces who have been condemned for opposing the 
present regime
•For an end to censorship
•Re-establish constitutional guarantees
•For a provisional democratic government that will organise democratic 
elections as soon as possible in which all groups and parties opposed to the 
dictatorship may participate
•For the return of all exiles so that they may resume their political activities
•Dissolve the BRAC, SIM and all other repressive bodies
•For the detention and condemnation of the assassin Pilar García and all others  
in the uniform of the armed forces who committed crimes and atrocities against 
the Cuban people
•For the most energetic condemnation of any nation that sold arms to the 
Batista dictatorship which were used to instil terror in the civilian population719
The first thing which should be noted is that this is a significant number of 
delegates, particularly given the circumstances in which it was called. It represents a 
qualitative increase in the strength and influence of the rebels within the labour 
movement, when compared to April 1958. What is most striking about the list of 
demands is their essential moderation. There is nothing here which is incompatible with 
a capitalist economy.720 Given the earlier campaign for a 20% wage increase and a much 
larger diferencial than 4.2%, the comparatively low figures are surprising. The demands 
are posed in the context of a patriotic cross-class alliance and it may have been that the 
sugar workers did not wish to alienate potential middle-class support for the rebels. 
However, given that the FONU nationally was calling for a 20% increase and a 40% 
price cut on basic items, it is unlikely that the FONU leadership was trying to restrict 
workers' demands.721 It is more likely that, in the face of the brutality of a dying regime, 
the workers' main concern was indeed to overthrow the government. There is also 
719 IHC 1/8:15/4.1/1-2, FONU, "Resolución de la plenaria azucarera del Norte de Las Villas" (November 
30th 1958) [my translation]
720 Córdova, Clase Trabajadora y Movimiento Sindical vol.1 (1995) p.112
721 IHC 1/8:15/3.1/1, FONU, "Manifesto" (November 30th 1958)
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nothing in the list of demands which is incompatible with the previously held positions 
of either the M-26-7 or the PSP. There clearly was some debate over the forms of words 
to be used and the hand of the PSP can be seen in the detailed nature of many of the 
economic demands. Nevertheless, there are no substantive differences between this 
document and the previously issued statements of both parties, indicating that, at least 
amongst the militants active in the labour movement, political convergence had already 
occurred. The fact that there is little difference between the statements issued before and 
after the congress would seem to indicate that the rank and file delegates were also 
happy with the new situation.
This interpretation is born out by a manifesto issued the same day in the name of 
la Plenaria regional de trabajadores azucareros de la zona norte de Las Villas 
addressed to Los trabajadores azucareros de Las Villas. This manifesto closely linked 
the economic demands with the fight for the political demands of the whole Cuban 
people, saying how this link made the fight over that year's zafra the most crucial ever. 
It urged sugar workers to turn their struggle into a wave of unstoppable resistance, 
which would lead the rest of the working class and all other classes of patriotic Cubans 
into a battle to overthrow the regime. Only by this method, it continued, could workers 
regain their rights and their self-respect. The manifesto concluded by claiming the 
position of honour for sugar workers, the most oppressed by the regime, who can 
become the vanguard of the struggle against tyranny. Such stirring rhetoric is evidence 
of a confidence that was lacking before the arrival of the rebel column.722
Guerrilla fighters from the rebel column in Las Villas started visiting the 
employers in the region, assigning to each one a tribute or "revolutionary tax" that they 
would be required to pay before they would be allowed to start harvesting sugar.723  
Employers were also required to recognise the newly elected workers' representatives 
and meet them to discuss their demands.724 The position of the workers was further 
boosted by the rebels giving them arms recovered from supporters of the regime and 
forming them into militia companies, a move which must have further enhanced their 
position in negotiations with their employers.725 Under the protection of the rebel 
soldiers and their own militias, local union assemblies prepared for the congress with 
traditional formality. For example, the workers of central Natividad in Guasimal, Las 
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Villas, sent written motions to the congress calling for a 40% reduction in prices for 
basic items, for interest free loans during the dead season and for equality of pay for the 
office workers in private companies with those employed by the state.726 
It was in this atmosphere of excitement and tension that the "Congress of Sugar 
Workers in Liberated Territory" was summoned. Initially planned to take place in the 
Escambray mountains, the military situation forced a change of plan and its eventual 
location was the small town of General Carrillo where Camilo Cienfuegos had his 
headquarters. Between six and seven hundred delegates took part, coming from all over 
Las Villas, from Camagüey, Havana province, Matanzas and Pinar del Rio. There were 
no delegates from Oriente because of the travel difficulties in time of war but, as 
described above, they had already held their congress in the Sierra Cristal. Ursinio 
Rojas delivered the keynote address, while the platform consisted of both M-26-7 and 
PSP speakers.727
The report of the organising committee, which is paraphrased below, started by 
condemning Mujal's assertion that Cuba was prosperous due to rises in the price of 
sugar, arguing that the workers themselves had not benefited. The recent small salary 
increases that had been forced on the government had been eaten by inflation. 
Meanwhile mechanisation and intensivismo had increased productivity at the expense of 
thousands of jobs and accidents at work. While the workers' incomes between 1953 and 
1957 had reduced by a total of 753 million pesos, the employers' profits had gone up 
enormously. Comparison was made between the years 1957 and 1951, which both had 
the same harvest of about 5 million tons, while the sugar price for 1957 had risen back 
to 5.2¢ per pound, similar to the price of 5.29¢ per pound in 1951. The profits declared 
for 1951 had been 106 million pesos but this figure had risen to 135 million pesos in 
1957 while the total wage bill, at 321 million pesos, was 90 million pesos less. The 
report argued that this was partly because of wage cuts and partly because increased 
mechanisation had enabled the same volume to be harvested in thirteen days less. In the 
days before Mujal and Batista, there had been an agreement to compensate workers for 
such "superproducción", but they had only received compensation for 5 days loss of 
work rather than the 13 they were owed. The minimum wage had been reduced from 
$3.14 per day to $2.80. On top of this "official" reduction, union inactivity and state 
terror has permitted many employers to pay even less. The report concluded from this 
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that the zafra could not continue under these conditions and the list of demands adopted 
by the Plenaria regional de trabajadores azucareros de la zona norte de Las Villas 
(outlined above) was proposed.
The main question under discussion, the report continued, was to determine how 
to organise the struggle for these demands. Previous struggles had failed for lack of 
unity, which is why the FONU has been formed. It was seen as being of vital 
importance to build unity and a large number of Comités de Unidad (Unity committees) 
had already been set up. The other matter considered to be important was the 
development and strengthening of the rebel army. Important victories had been won 
over the army of the dictatorship and the rebels were dominant in Oriente, north and 
south Las Villas, parts of Camagüey, Matanzas and Pinar del Rio. The document 
therefore claimed that the conditions existed for a successful general strike which, 
combined with revolutionary military activity, could bring down the dictatorship.
In areas where the rebels were in control, the report argued that the struggle would 
be easy. As soon as the employers agreed to the workers' demands, and the presence of 
rebel soldiers would assist in this, there was no reason not to immediately start the 
harvest. Where the dictatorship was still in control, the fight would be more difficult, 
but sugar workers had great experience learned from previous struggles. The report 
continued by saying that an essential part of this struggle would be to build the FONU, 
firstly in the workplaces and then at municipal and district level, with a view to calling a 
strike of all the sugar workers who work in areas still under the control of the 
dictatorship. The sugar workers were described as the vanguard of workers' movement 
and solidarity would be sought from all other workers, as well as from small businesses, 
professionals and small farmers, leading to a revolutionary general strike. It concluded 
by saying that this strike would have the full support and protection of the rebel army 
and sugar workers would do all they can to assist the rebel victory.728
The hand of the PSP is clearly visible in the phrasing of this document. The close 
interlinking of immediate economic demands with anti-dictatorial political demands is 
typical of their approach to propaganda. The frequent references to "unity" and the 
formula of "a democratic patriotic government to implement agrarian reform, develop 
national industry, freely trade with all countries, end racial discrimination, for peace 
728 IHC 1/8:15/2.1/2-22, FONU, "Informe de la conferencia azucarera" (December 1958)
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and national progress" with which the report ends, also reflects communist political 
concerns.729 M-26-7 propaganda at this time tended to be much less specific in its 
demands and generally contained much more revolutionary rhetoric. Equally, the exact 
nature of the calculations of the amount of money lost as a result of mechanisation and 
wage cuts is also much more in the communist style. At this time, there was a 
clandestine member of the PSP, Alfredo Menéndez, working as an economist in the 
Ministry of Sugar, who had access to the data necessary to prepare such a detailed 
account.730 On the other hand, the call for a revolutionary general strike was the main 
priority of the M-26-7, who based all their propaganda around this slogan. The idea that 
the general strike should be started by the sugar workers around both their economic 
demands and as a clear attempt to overthrow the regime shows how much the rebels had 
learnt since the fiasco of the previous April. 
The congress obviously had a very real effect on the morale and politics of the 
participants. It gave a great boost to unity moves in the whole province and assemblies 
were held in many places to elect comités de unidad obrera (Committees of workers 
unity).731 These were decided on the basis of parity between the revolutionary 
organisations and places were also given to two other minor opposition groups, the 
Organización Auténtica (OA) and the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), who had little 
implantation in the working class, but who had made some contribution to the fighting. 
In Santa Clara, the Comité de Unidad Obrera allocated seats to the OA and DR even 
though there was no-one to fill them.732 In the period which followed, the idea of a 
united front between the PSP and the M-26-7 came under attack from some elements 
within the latter organisation, but was never seriously challenged in Las Villas province.
United Front
The nature of the alliance between the workers' organisations of the PSP and the 
M-26-7 took the form of a united front. The implementation of this was viewed 
differently by the two component parts and it may be useful to explore the nature of the 
relationships within the FONU as we find here the origins of the early disagreements 
between the parties during the first year of the revolutionary government.
729 [my translation]
730 Menéndez, Interview with Alfredo Menéndez (2009)
731 Soto, La Constitution del FONU en la Clandestinidad (n/d)
732 IHC 1/8:13/36.1/3, Comité de Unidad Obrera de Las Villas, "A Los Trabajadores" (January 6th 1959)
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The FONU did not become a real organisation 
at national level, but was an important ideological 
symbol of unity. The agreement formulated in 
October called for the setting up of a formal 
structure but, given the difficulties of clandestine 
organisation, this was not possible and the 
organisation was run on an ad hoc basis. Both 
Vanguardia Obrera and Carta Semanal continued 
publication. The CNDDO also continued to issue 
leaflets in its own name, but one of the first to 
follow the founding of the FONU was a leaflet 
calling for action to save the life of David Salvador, 
who was at that time still under arrest in Havana, saying that he was a workers' leader 
from the FONU. There were, however, no more statements issued in the name of the 
FON. It is interesting to compare two leaflets written about the murder of Carlos 
Rodríguez Careaga and Saturnino Aneiro. The first dated 27th November and published 
in the name of the national committee of the CNDDO, refers to Rodríguez as secretary 
general of that organisation and makes no mention of the FONU. The second, issued in 
the name of the national executive committee of the FONU, but clearly written by the 
same hand, stresses his contribution to workers' unity.733 Carta Semanal displayed its 
enthusiasm for the new strategy combining la lucha armada with la lucha de masas in a 
series of high profile articles and cartoons (Figure 36) Thus we see that, while they were 
sincere in their support for united action with the M-26-7, the PSP was intent on making 
sure that their contribution to the united effort was fully recognised. 
It was however not just the communists who were keeping their options open. The 
M-26-7, when announcing the formation of the FONU in the Santiago edition of 
Vanguardia Obrera, spoke glowingly of the benefits of unity without once mentioning 
that the unity of which they spoke involved the communists.734 The archives of the 
Institute of Cuban History contain the first page of a draft of a manifesto announcing the 
formation of the FONU, which has been hand annotated with suggestions for change. 
The final published version also survives. The draft starts with the fact that the FONU is 
733 IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/85, CNDDO, "Salvamos la vida de David Salvador" (October 28th1958)
IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/102, CNDDO, "A todos los trabajadores del país" (November 27th 1958)
IHC 1/8:15/1.1/1, FONU, "A todos los trabajadores del país" (1958)
734 Vanguardia Obrera [Santiago] (December 29th 1958)
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Figure 36: Carta Semanal (December 
10th 1958)
a result of an agreement between the CNDDO and the FON, while the published version 
merely refers to agreement between "distintas agrupaciones obreras " (different 
workers' groups).735 Yet given the effort involved and the considerable danger to which 
both organisations were exposing themselves, there can be no doubt about the 
commitment at national level to working together in the labour movement despite the 
apparent public reticence. One explanation for this seeming contradiction is that the 
other signatories of the Pact of Caracas were fiercely anti-communist, as were many of 
the M-26-7 members involved in the Civic Resistance Movement.736 There would have 
been little to gain from drawing their attention too forcefully to the arrangement with 
the communists which would operate within the labour movement. On the other hand, 
we have already seen that in many areas, there already existed a working relationship 
between communists and July 26th members in the workplace and neighbourhood. 
These people would know exactly what was meant by "unity" and it would not have 
been necessary to spell it out. We can see this as an example of the balancing act needed 
to keep a cross-class movement together in the face of different sectional interests.
It is hardly surprising that the FONU did not have the opportunity to establish 
itself as a functioning national organisation as, within two months of its formal launch, 
Batista fled and the regime fell. It was established as a regional entity only in Las Villas 
and in the area under the influence of the Segundo Frente Oriental "Frank País", where 
the two conferences and the success of the rebel forces gave the necessary impetus. In 
Las Villas, Vicente Pérez (Figure 37), a PSP tobacco workers' leader, was appointed 
regional organiser and there appears to have been a serious attempt to put the principles 
of uniting the workers' sections of the opposition movements into practice. The FONU 
became the heir to previous initiatives of its component organisations, for example, a 
short railway strike had been called by the FON a short time earlier to protest at the late 
payment of wages by the management of Ferrocariles Consolidados. The next leaflet in 
the dispute was then issued in the name of the Frente Obrero Nacional Unido, Comité 
Ferroviario (FONU railway committee), which speaks of the success of the strike, 
condemning the weakness of the mujalistas and calling on workers to build the FONU 
in preparation for the revolutionary general strike.737
735 IHC 1/8:15/1.1/1, FONU, "A todos los trabajadores del país" (1958)
IHC 1/8:15/3.1/1, FONU, "Manifesto" (November 10th 1958)
736 Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution (2002) p.159
737 IHC 1/8:14/1.1/7, FON Las Villas, "A los Compañeros Ferroviarios" (1958)
IHC 1/8:15/6.1/1, FONU Ferroviario, "A los Trabajadores Ferroviarios" (1958)
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Given the difficulties of communication in conditions of 
clandestinity, which were greatly exacerbated by the success of the 
rebel armies in cutting communications, the spread of a new 
organisation would necessarily have taken time. Carta Semanal 
did not publish the FONU manifesto until December 3rd 1958, 
while the local edition of Vanguardia Obrera in Santiago did not 
announce the formation of the FONU until December 29th 1958.738 
There is nothing sinister in this delay, which merely reflected the 
difficulties of communication and publication under a dictatorial 
regime. In areas where there were already working relationships between communist 
and July 26th Movement workers, particularly where there was some existing form of 
Comité de Unidad, the process would have been quick and easy. On the other hand, 
there was still considerable hostility towards the communist party in some sections of 
the M-26-7, particularly in Havana, and this would not have disappeared because of a 
change in line from above. The new approach would have caused debate, disagreement 
and, where there was a majority who were sceptical of the benefits of unity, there would 
have been no great urgency to start the process. Equally, some areas of the PSP were set 
in their ways and clung to the old "lucha de masas" approach, which had condemned 
armed action as terrorist. These would have viewed the new organisation with suspicion 
and been slow to embrace the new line. As a result, the establishment of local or 
workplace FONU groups or unity committees was a very varied patchwork, strongest in 
areas closest to the sites of the two workers' congresses and weakest in Havana.
The fact that the two organisations had agreed to work together did not mean that 
there was no longer any rivalry between them. The M-26-7 still had a view of unity that 
was based on their hegemony rather than consensus or compromise, while the PSP 
considered itself to be the only real "party of the working class".739 Such political rivalry 
is not unusual inside any united front, after all, if the constituent parts of an alliance 
agree completely, they might as well merge. In addition, the formation of a united front 
does not imply that the organisations involved will treat the new relationship as their 
highest priority. In this case, both organisations had ongoing projects within the milieu 
of the labour movement and, for the people involved, these would retain their priority. 
The initial reaction to the formation of the FONU at rank and file level inside the 
738 Carta Semanal (December 3rd 1958)
Vanguardia Obrera [Santiago] (December 29th 1958)
739 Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution (2002) p.157
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Figure 37: Vicente 
Peréz in 2009, photo 
by Angelina Rojas
M-26-7 and the PSP would be to see the new formation in terms of its contribution to 
those existing projects. Thus, for example, the December 10th edition of Carta Semanal 
does not mention the FONU until page two and then ignores it until the end of the 
statement on page 4 which places the slogan "Strengthen the FONU" amongst many 
others in a long list although, at the top, we find "Build Unity Committees in every 
workplace".740
Santiago provides us with an example of the reality of collaboration in an area 
where there was considerable history of united action, as we have seen earlier in the 
joint activity of the dockers and the Bacardí workers. However there were also those in 
the M-26-7 who were opposed to working with the communists, exemplified by the 12 
delegates from Santiago who walked out of the Congreso Obrero en Armas. A Comité 
Municipal de Unidad Obrera was operating in Santiago in October 1958 which issued a 
leaflet containing detailed accounts of the grievances of the workers in many local 
workplaces. It confined itself entirely to economic issues without any mention of the 
rebel army or a revolutionary general strike. From this it is safe to assume that, at this 
point in time, the Santiago unity committee was dominated by the PSP with little 
M-26-7 input. The next leaflet that survives, dated 1st December, is entitled "Against 
bombardments of the civilian population and against American intervention". It starts 
with a reference to Fidel Castro Ruz as "Commander in Chief of the Glorious Rebel 
Army" and roundly condemns the use of aircraft against civilians. It then immediately 
attacks the possibility of US intervention, as in Korea and Lebanon, and reminds the 
reader of the level of racial discrimination in the USA, citing the incidents in Little 
Rock as proof. The demands at the end are: for trade union democracy, united action to 
overthrow the dictatorship, for a general strike, donate a day's wages to the rebel army, 
reinstate all dismissed workers and long live the second anniversary of the revolution. 
This is a leaflet written by a committee, each wanting to get their particular policies 
included. Thus the anti-imperialist part undoubtedly comes from the PSP, while 
references to the rebel army are from the M-26-7.741 The "second anniversary of the 
revolution" refers to the November 30th fighting in Santiago, which was, as described in 
740 Carta Semanal (December 10th 1958) [my translations]
741 The M-26-7 stated in 1957 that the term "Imperialism" was "inappropriate to the American continent". 
See Nuestra razón: manifiesto-programa del movimiento 26 de julio. Reprinted in Gonzalez, La 
Revolución cubana (1959) p.124 
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Chapter 4 above, launched by the M-26-7, but supported by the Santiago PSP against 
the wishes of their national party leadership; now a point of regional pride.742 
The existence of the Santiago Comité Municipal de Unidad Obrera did not 
prevent either organisation continuing with their own propaganda, indeed it seems to 
have inspired the local M-26-7 to greater efforts. Vanguardia Obrera had published a 
special edition for Oriente province since February 1958. The first two issues were 
reproductions of the national paper. Thereafter it contained increasing numbers of local 
references, both to industrial matters and the doings of the rebel army.743 By December 
1958, it had moved from a mimeographed format to a much more professional 
publication. Late 1958 seemed to produce a flurry of sectional publications. Alcibíades 
Poveda Díaz, head of propaganda for the M-26-7 in Santiago, has examples of several 
mimeographed journals, La Voz for press and radio workers, Liberación Obrera for 
medical workers, El Portuario for the dockers and Pantalla for the cinematograph 
workers.744 The July 26th Sección Obrera also issued a considerable number of 
manifestos in December 1958 in the name of its various sectoral committees: 
Empleados Bancarios, Plantas Eléctricas, Refrescos Cerveza y Licores, del Puerto, del 
Comercio, Telefonico, del Transporte, Cinematógrafos, Prensa y Radio, de la 
Medecina, Gastronomico, Textilero, Tabaqueros and Cemento Titan.745 This surge of 
activity would partly have its origins in an attempt to gain advantage in the changed 
situation and partly in the enthusiasm generated by the new sense of unity. Such a 
mixture of co-operation and competition is typical of any united front. Moreover, no 
united front operates in isolation from the political circumstances in which it is formed. 
Thus, the feeling that things could not continue as they were, that change was 
immanent, which had in part been created by the forces of the opposition, in particular 
the guerrilla forces of the M-26-7, both provided that opposition with an opportunity to 
force the pace of change still further and the encouragement to attempt to do so. Now, 
the hope for a general strike, which for so long had been an empty slogan, had become a 
distinct possibility thanks to the successes of the rebel army.
742 IHC 1/8:13/40.1/1-2 - Comité Municipal de Unidad Obrero de Santiago, "Contra los 
Desplazamientos" (October 1958)
IHC 1/8:13/40.1/3-4 - Comité Municipal de Unidad Obrero de Santiago - "Contra los Bombardeos" 
(December 1st 1958) [my translations]
743 Vanguardia Obrera [Oriente] various editions from March to December 1958, most undated. Poveda 
collection [copies in author's possession]
744 Poveda, Propaganda y Revolución en Santiago (2003) pp.369-374 [copies of documents in the 
author's possession]
745 Poveda collection [copies in author's possession]
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The Last Days
The leaflets mentioned above, issued by the July 26th Sección Obrera and the 
Comité Municipal de Unidad Obrera, illustrate the crisis that was facing Cuban society 
in general and the working class in particular. They describe a situation in Santiago, 
confirmed by a report from the Santiago office of Cable and Wireless, where the 
Bacardí rum and Hatuey beer factories were virtually closed because the management 
claimed a shortage of bottles, most port workers were laid off because of a lack of ships 
coming into harbour, as well as job losses in public transport as a result of cuts in 
service and similar closures or redundancies in many other industries.746 While the 
propaganda material from the time relates to the anger of the workers at this situation, 
the lack of concrete proposals, other than a revolutionary general strike, reflects the 
difficulty faced in organising industrial action when the economy is barely functioning. 
In such circumstances, workers could react by either blaming the rebels or the 
government. In this case, the overwhelming majority seem to have held the government 
responsible and support for the rebels grew as they became seen as the only solution in 
desperate circumstances. Earlier in the year, following a rise in the official rate of 
inflation, the government had decreed a rise in the minimum wage and a 4% general 
wage increase. The Economist Intelligence Unit report saw this as "part of a campaign 
to keep them on the job and less open to the influence of the rebels". However, this 
approach by the government was so transparent that it increased M-26-7 influence 
rather than reducing it, as the rebels were generally given credit for forcing Batista to 
award the increase. In any case, the official rate of inflation may have been only 2 to 3 
%, but the rise in the cost of basic necessities was nearer 20 to 30%, particularly in the 
east where the fighting made transport difficult. The demand for a reduction in the price 
of basic items and an end to speculation figures highly on all list of workers' demands at 
this time. Moreover, any advantage the government might have gained from the 
increase was nullified by the fact that the increase was not enforced and many 
employers did not pay it, although they resented being placed in an awkward position.747
It has been argued in earlier chapters that support for Batista by employers was 
based on his ability to drive down wages, decrease staffing levels and generally increase 
productivity, thereby helping profit margins. In return for this, there was a general 
746 FO 371/132164 - AK1015/69, Report from Cable and Wireless manager in Santiago (November 25th 
1958)
747 FO371/132191 - AK2181/3, Trade Unions and Labour Situation in Cuba (August 21st 1958)
EIU, Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico (June 1958)
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acceptance by businessmen of the high levels of brutality and corruption associated with 
the dictatorship. By the end of 1958, a significant proportion of the employing class felt 
that the government had so mishandled the situation that any change, even a rebel 
victory, would be an improvement. The sugar magnate Julius Lobo is quoted as saying: 
"It did not matter to us who got rid of Batista, as long as somebody did".748 By 
December 1958, Batista's inability to ensure normal commercial activity, even to the 
extent of having lost control of the roads in the east of the island, meant that he had lost 
any usefulness to the business community. 
The pressure from employers to maintain communications in the face of rebel 
forces cutting roads and blowing bridges gave rise to an attempt to protect the railways 
by using an armoured train. This was being prepared in the Ciénaga railway workshops 
near Havana with the intention of transporting 700 soldiers to protect and repair the 
railway, initially between Havana and Santa Clara. The story behind this incident is a 
good example of the manner of involvement of revolutionary workers in the final stages 
of the insurrection, when they concentrated on propaganda, sabotage and aid to the 
guerrillas, rather than localised industrial action. The workers in the railway yard had 
considered refusing to work on the train, but following a meeting with the regional 
organiser of the July 26th underground, they decided to continue working, albeit slowly, 
while keeping the rebels informed of the progress and nature of their work. This gave 
them an opportunity to engage in propaganda work amongst the already demoralised 
748 Padrón & Betancourt, Batista: últimas días en el poder (2008) pp.234-236 [my translation]
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Figure 38: Derailed armoured train outside Santa Clara, 
from http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban-revolution.htm
soldiers who were to man the train and who were billeted in the works. This bore fruit 
and, before the train left on December 23rd, 39 soldiers deserted, aided by the railway 
workers who provided them with civilian clothing. Many more left the expedition on 
route, which arrived in Santa Clara with barely half its original complement. The train 
was finally derailed outside Santa Clara on the 30th during the final stages of the battle 
for that city (see Figure 38). At this point, most of the soldiers deserted to the rebels, 
leaving the officers and remaining soldiers little choice but to surrender. The rebel army 
gained a considerable amount of supplies, arms and ammunition from the ruined train.749 
The battle for Santa Clara also illustrates the confusing way that labour movement 
activity is described in much of the literature. In his biography of Che Guevara, John 
Lee Anderson informs us that Guevara was in contact with trade unionists in Santa 
Clara while preparing the assault.750 He neither tells us who they were nor gives us an 
idea of their politics or trades. The question of whether they were mujalistas attempting 
to save their skins or, alternatively, communist and M-26-7 militants, whether working 
together or separately, is not considered. This would not only be interesting for our 
study, it would also shed light on the development of Che's politics, which is directly 
relevant to Anderson's book. In the event, there are surviving documents that clarify the 
situation and it is clear that there was a functioning joint committee in Santa Clara 
composed of the local CDDO and M-26-7 Sección Obrera, the former based mainly 
among the gastronómicos (hotel, restaurant and catering workers), the latter among the 
bank workers. By the time the city fell, the mujalistas had already been purged, the local 
union offices seized and the gastronómicos had taken charge of the provision of 
supplies for the civilian population and the rebel troops.751 Previous chapters have dealt 
at length with the activity of the mujalista trade union bureaucracy and the role they 
played in sustaining the dictatorship. However, by the middle of 1958, they had become 
irrelevant to both sides. Corruption and open support for Batista had so undermined 
their influence that they were of little further use to the regime. As Cuban politics 
became completely polarised between supporters of Batista and the rebels, an 
organisation that relied for its existence on its ability to balance between capital and 
749 Barquín, Las luchas guerrilleras (1975) p.61
Padrón & Betancourt, Batista: últimas días en el poder (2008) p.128, 134
Guevara, Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (2001) p. 263 [Guevara gives the date of the derailment 
as the 30th December although other writers speak of the 28th]
750 Anderson, Che Guevara (1997) p.354
751 IHC 1/8:13/36.1/1-2, Comité de Unidad Obrera de Las Villas, "ACTA" (1958)
IHC 1/8:13/36.1/3 - Comité de Unidad Obrera de Las Villas, "A Los Trabajadores" (1958)
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labour was swept aside. On New Year's Day 1959, Cuba awoke to the news that Batista 
had fled, but so marginalised had Mujal himself become that Batista did not bother to 
inform the CTC general secretary, who had to hurriedly seek refuge in the Argentine 
embassy. 
The rebel army had driven the dictator from office, but it had not yet succeeded in 
seizing power or changing the political or economic system. The US embassy was 
holding emergency talks with those generals who had not fled in an attempt to find an 
officer, untainted by connection with the previous regime, who could lead a military 
coup to forestall a complete rebel victory. The columns led by Che Guevara and Camilo 
Cienfuegos were swiftly deployed to Havana, but were not sufficiently strong by 
themselves to overcome the enemy forces in the capital. There was a real possibility that 
an army coup, particularly if it was led by an honourable patriotic officer without 
previous close association with Batista, could have split some of the middle class 
support away from the M-26-7 and prolonged the civil war.752 Such an intervention was 
greatly feared at the time, as can be seen by Lazaro Peña, communist ex-secretary of the 
CTC, writing of his concerns the previous November.753 As the rebels moved in to seize 
Santiago on New Year's Morning, Fidel Castro spoke over the radio from Santiago to 
condemn the coup attempts and to call for a revolutionary general strike. This call was 
directed at all workers in territory not yet liberated and told them to follow the lead of 
the Sección Obrera del Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio, to seize all union 
offices and to organise in all workplaces to totally paralyse the country.754 From the 
moment the call went out, the strike was complete. Such a strike does not take long to 
describe; suffice to say that everything stopped and the scale of the action is evident 
from contemporary photographs, such as those of Bert Glinn (Figure 39). 
This strike is practically ignored in the literature, which concentrates on the more 
romantic and colourful actions of the rebel army. Even Julia Sweig and Ramón 
Bonachea, despite paying considerably more attention to the urban underground than 
most authors, only accord the strike a couple of lines each, while Hugh Thomas 
752 Karol, Guerrillas in power (1970) pp.167-168
753 Peña, Cuban Workers and People Resist Batista's Brutal Dictatorship (1958) p.18 
754 "Alocución del Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro, por Radio Rebelde, el 1ro. de enero de 1959" cited 
in Bell, Lara et al., Documentos de la Revolución cubana 1959 (2006) pp.11-14
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mentions it only in passing.755 It is discussed at slightly greater length by Samuel Farber 
who argues: 
The general strike called by Castro after Batista's overthrow was almost 
superfluous. In fact the completely successful 1959 strike was called to ensure 
the consolidation of the new revolutionary regime and was aimed at no one in 
particular, because Batista and his cohorts had already fled the country, and no 
one else dared challenge Castro.756
This evaluation is completely contradicted by Fidel Castro himself, who affirms 
that the general strike was decisive in delivering the fortresses of the capital of the 
Republic, in defeating the final manoeuvres of the enemies of the people and in giving 
all power to the revolution.757 Farber's dismissal of the strike's importance begs a 
question. In the light of the author's view of the revolution as a personal seizure of 
power by Castro, why would he call the strike if he was already in control and thereby 
risk stirring up popular demands for power that could menace what Farber refers to as 
his "revolutionary Bonapartism"?758 It is a more logical proposition to argue that the 
rebel army had driven Batista to flee and created a situation where a general strike was 
possible, but it was that general strike itself that ensured the "Triumph of the 
Revolution".
755 Bonachea & San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection (1974) p.322
Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution (2002) p.179
Thomas, The Cuban Revolution (1986) p.248
756 Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba (1976) p.202
757 Castro, Discursos del comandante Fidel Castro (1959) p.8
758 Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba (1976) p.197
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Figure 39: January 1959 from Glinn, Havana (2001)
The strike provided such powerful evidence of the overwhelming popularity of 
the rebel victory that the army chiefs quickly abandoned their plans for a military coup. 
Furthermore, the strike gave an authority to and freed personnel for the M-26-7 militias 
that were keeping order in the streets of Havana for that first week in January, thereby 
preventing the scenes of violent disorder and lynch mob rule that had followed the 
downfall of Machado.759 Another important aspect of the general strike was the way in 
which it placed the M-26-7 in complete control. The popular reaction to Fidel Castro's 
triumphant passage from Santiago to Havana demonstrated quite clearly who was the 
new power in the land. Equally significant was the way in which Castro was able to call 
for a return to work when he arrived in Havana, thereby demonstrating his authority 
once and for all.
Conclusion
Following the failure of the attempted general strike on April 9th 1958, the 
prospects of the revolutionary opposition must have seemed very bleak indeed, yet 
within a year, the regime had been overthrown and the rebels were in complete control 
of the country. The decisions taken at Altos de Mompié, to give priority to the guerrilla 
struggle and to work with the communist party in the labour movement, had born fruit.
The success of the rebel army in repulsing the government's "Summer Offensive" 
heartened everyone who was opposed to Batista and established the July 26th 
movement as the most important component of the opposition. Within the labour 
movement, this new prestige was reflected in increasing support for the M-26-7 Sección 
Obrera. The centre of gravity within the labour movement had now decisively shifted to 
the rebel side. This chapter contains virtually no reference to Mujal and, in truth, he had 
become irrelevant. In the early days of the dictatorship his control of the CTC had 
provided important cover for Batista. As late as April 1958, he had provided valuable 
service to the regime in undermining the rebels' attempted general strike, but by the end 
of 1958, he was so discredited that he was a positive liability. The ability of the rebels to 
organise large scale workers' congresses in territory under their control marked the final 
transfer of working class legitimacy from Mujal to the rebels. Everywhere they had the 
opportunity, aided by the rebel army, ordinary workers quickly removed Mujal's 
appointees. Where they could not, they simply ignored them. The April 9th failed strike 
had proved that workers were reluctant to take action when faced with security forces 
759 Hart-Phillips, Cuba (1959) pp.38-43
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that were prepared to use deadly violence to maintain order. The situation changed so 
dramatically over the summer that, by the autumn, there seemed little point in taking 
industrial action for narrow economic ends when the prize of a new political order 
suddenly appeared within reach. This enhanced standing of the M-26-7 within the 
working class made an alliance with them more attractive to the communist party, who 
adopted a position of uncritical support for the rebel army and its tactical approach 
based on the armed struggle.
What therefore is the balance sheet of communist involvement in the Cuban 
insurrection? The main accusation of their enemies is that the PSP only jumped on the 
rebel bandwagon when victory was assured.760 This ignores the fact that, when the PSP 
first publicly announced its support for the guerrilla war, in March 1958, rebel victory 
was far from a foregone conclusion. It also ignores the work of ordinary rank and file 
communists, who risked their lives distributing a constant stream of leaflets and 
underground newspapers, which contributed to maintaining and building a level of 
working class discontent that responded so overwhelmingly to Fidel Castro's call for a 
general strike in January 1959. It is true that the communists did not make a great 
contribution to the guerrilla struggle, but that was never their area of strength or 
expertise. The communist party's main influence was in the working class movement 
and it was this that they offered when negotiating with Fidel Castro. The course of those 
negotiations are shrouded in mystery as both parties played their cards close to the 
chest, while Castro had the added difficulty of trying to get the PSP into the alliance 
without alienating his more anti-communist supporters. It is also true that, after they 
decided to support the guerrilla campaign, the PSP were much keener on reaching an 
agreement than was the M-26-7, who correctly recognised the relatively small 
contribution the communists could make to the advance of the rebel army which was 
their main area of interest.
Nevertheless, the PSP did contribute a considerable amount to the growth of the 
revolutionary working class movement, in particular by helping to organise the two 
labour congresses in Las Villas and in the Sierra Cristal. The difficulties encountered in 
organising such meetings have been widely underestimated. A workers' conference with 
600 in attendance, which is organised in opposition to the official trade union 
760 This position is perhaps best articulated in Sims, Cuban Labor and the Communist Party (1985). For a 
more balanced view see: Farber, The Cuban Communists in the Early Stages of the Cuban Revolution 
(1983) pp.59-83 or Massón Sena, Proyectos y accionar del Partido Socialista Popular (2009)
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bureaucracy, would be significant at any time, to do it in the middle of a civil war, with 
many of the delegates coming from areas still under government control, is really quite 
impressive. One of the principal themes of these congresses was the Huelga General 
Revolucionaria, the revolutionary general strike. This final general strike was 
instrumental in preventing the projected coup and elevated the M-26-7 to a position of 
hegemony. Without this strike, it is unlikely that the rebel victory would have been 
either so swift or so complete. Such general strikes do not materialise out of thin air, 
they have to be organised. As has been argued in the case of the strike which started in 
Santiago at the funeral of Frank País, apparent spontaneity in fact requires considerable 
prior organisation combined with a readiness to profit from a rapidly changing situation. 
Two of the main arguments in this chapter, that the PSP made a significant 
contribution to the rebel victory and that the general strike of January 1959 played a 
vital role in the final victory of the revolutionary forces, run contrary to the majority 
historiographical view. The other theme of this chapter has been the convergence of the 
politics and tactics of the PSP and the M-26-7. This had been accompanied by the start 
of the organisational convergence of their work in the labour movement in the form of 
the FONU. This new-found unity was to prove very fragile.
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Chapter 8. The First Year of the New Cuba
With the overthrow of the Batista regime a new chapter in Cuban history began. 
However, the early period of the revolutionary government was deeply affected by the 
means by which it came to power. This chapter will therefore examine the changes 
which occurred in the world of organised labour over first year of the new regime. In 
particular it will examine the way in which the recently established alliance between the 
July 26th movement and the communist party did not survive the arrival of the rebels in 
Havana, as well as providing an explanation of this rupture. Given that the two 
organisations eventually merged, we shall consider the realignment of forces within the 
M-26-7, in particular discussing the contradictions between a new CTC bureaucracy and 
revolutionary elements who wished to move the revolution in a more radical direction. 
The future Cuban Communist Party would emerge from the victory of the radicals in 
this faction fight, this is yet another example of the way in which an analysis of the 
social role of the trade union bureaucracy can aid our understanding of the working 
class role in history.
Division
As soon as it was known that Batista had fled, David Salvador was appointed the 
new general secretary of the CTC, an action which marked the end of the united front 
with the communist party. During the January 1959 strike, the FONU called for a mass 
meeting in the Parque Central in Havana on the 2nd January 1959 and another on the 
8th to support the revolutionary government. This last appeal, signed by José Maria de 
la Aguilera for the M-26-7 and Carlos Fernandez Rodriguez for the CNDDO is the last 
statement issued in the name of the FONU as a joint body, although Octavio Louit was 
still using the title Secretario de Organización del FONU in an interview on the 17th 
January.761 Meanwhile, Ñico Torres and Conrado Béquer, the latter still in his olive 
green uniform as a comandante of the Rebel Army, flew directly from Santiago to 
Havana where they supervised the seizure of the CTC headquarters. This they did in the 
name of the Sección Obrera of the M-26-7, whose leaders took all the seats on the CTC 
provisional executive committee, with David Salvador as secretary general (Figure 
40).762 The PSP were completely shut out and, on the 13th January, the CNDDO wrote a 
761 IHC 1/8:15/1.2/1-2, FONU, "Llamamento del FONU" (January 1959)
IHC 1/8:15/1.2/1-2, FONU, "Manifesto a la Clase Obrera" (January 1959)
Revolución (January 17th 1959)
762 Bohemia (January 11th 1959) p.102
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furious letter to David Salvador complaining that Torres and Béquer had told them that 
the FONU was now dissolved and excluding them from decision making and even from 
entering the building.763 Receiving no reply, the CNDDO, this time invoking the name of 
Lazaro Peña, called for a demonstration on the 21st only to be outflanked by David 
Salvador, who called a demonstration on the same day demanding justice for the 600 
workers victimised by the Compañía Cubana de Electricidad and to celebrate the end of 
the compulsory check-off of union dues that the government had decreed on the 20th.764 
With the establishment of the revolutionary government in Havana, the centre of 
attention moved to the capital and it was here that sentiment in the July 26th Movement 
was most hostile to working with the PSP. The journals Bohemia and Revolución 
became the mouthpieces for this approach, with frequent articles attacking communism 
in general and the Cuban communists in particular.765 In a long interview published in 
Cueto, El 26 de Julio en la dirección sindical (1959) pp.50-51
763 IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/104-6, CNDDO, "Carta a David Salvador" (January 13th 1959) 
764 IHC 1/8:13A1/1.1/107, CNDDO, "Llamamiento a Concurrir" (January 18th 1959)
Revolución (January 21st 1959)
Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, no. 8, (January 23rd)1959.
765 eg. Pares, Estrategia Comunista en la Revolución Cubana (1959)
"Fuera del FONU los comunistas" Revolución (January 26th 1959)
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Figure 40: Provisional CTC Executive, from Bohemia (January 1959)
Bohemia in February 1959, David Salvador argues that the FONU was a good idea, but 
the efforts spent trying to build it were a waste of time, that the communists were not a 
significant factor in the labour movement and that only the M-26-7 had any real 
implantation in the working class; a sentiment which has had considerable influence on 
the established historiography.766 The new leadership of the CTC set up the Frente 
Humanista (Humanist Front) and using this name succeeded in winning the 
overwhelming majority of the union elections.767 Whatever Fidel Castro's personal 
views on relations with the communists may have been, and he was careful not to be too 
specific, his first priority was to keep his own organisation together. Thus, when a group 
of angry communist railway workers knocked on the door of his apartment to denounce 
what they saw as undemocratic behaviour by David Salvador, he listened politely, 
expressed his interest, but did not pursue the matter further.768 
As part of the attempt to reassure the more right wing elements of the M-26-7 and 
to confuse the US government, the early "Revolutionary Government" was headed by a 
former judge, known for his honesty and his opposition to corruption rather than his 
radicalism, and many of the new ministers were equally moderate. The appointment of 
David Salvador, whose personal hostility to the PSP was well known, was the 
implementation of this strategy within the labour movement.
Bureaucracy
A galloping bureaucratisation of the CTC took place in the first months of 1959; 
many of the new officials quickly made themselves comfortable and began to resent the 
constant mobilisations and calls for action. They gravitated towards David Salvador and 
his associates in the anti-communist wing of the M-26-7, who started to use crude 
anti-communism to attack those who wanted to push the revolution to take more radical 
steps. The more radical elements became known as the "unitario" group within the 
M-26-7 Sección Obrera, among whose most prominent members were those who had 
been involved in the Las Villas congress: Jesús Soto, Lila León and José Maria de la 
Aguilera. These unitarios soon attracted others in the CTC leadership, mainly those 
with long term clandestine revolutionary experience such as Ñico Torres and Octavio 
Louit, who were disturbed by the growing bureaucratisation. Seeking allies, they found 
766 "Entrevista", Bohemia (February 15th 1959) n/pag.
767 "Victoria Democrática en el Campo Obrero", Bohemia (September 27th 1959) p.67
768 Hoy (January 31st 1959)
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them in the PSP, who both agreed with the need to push the revolution further and who 
resented being excluded from the leadership of the labour movement.
The basis of the orthodox communist political approach was the theoretical 
position that history moved in stages and that it was first necessary to complete the 
"bourgeois democratic" phase of the revolution before moving to socialism. The Cuban 
revolution was therefore defined as being "popular, patriotic, democratic, agrarian and 
for national liberation".769 In line with this analysis, the leadership group of the PSP 
around Blas Roca were content to engage in the revolutionary process as it unfolded 
and, in particular to support the wing of the M-26-7 that seemed most progressive. This 
was also the section of the leadership that was most sympathetic to their inclusion, 
primarily those around Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, who condemned sectarianism and 
spoke publicly for unity of all revolutionary forces including the PSP.770 They continued 
working with those M-26-7 trade unionists who had wished to carry on the united 
approach implied by the FONU.
What was the reaction of the rank and file workers to this? The first demands to 
be raised were for the reinstatement of those workers victimised for their militancy or 
made redundant as part of the old regime's productivity drive. There was particular joy 
at the reinstatement of those bank workers sacked for their strike in 1955 and the 100 
bus workers dismissed after the coup in 1952.771 Then there were wage claims, 10 or 20 
percent, sometimes enforced by short strikes, more often just won by the threat of 
action. Some Shell refinery workers managed to double their wages.772 Throughout 
1959, the CTC was the main mobilising force of the revolution and all of the major 
demonstrations were called in its name. Mayday 1959 saw a million workers on the 
march, while hundreds of thousands went on strike and demonstrated on the streets to 
protest at the October airborne attack launched by right-wing exiles from Miami.773 
During the government crisis of July 1959, workers' protests and a strike on the 26th 
July were important factors in enabling Fidel Castro to remove Manuel Urrutia from the 
Presidency and to secure the post of Prime Minister for himself. Thus, we see a growing 
769 IHC 10-126/2/62-92, PSP, "La Revolución cubana, su carácter, sus fuerzas y sus enemigos" (May 
1959) cited in Rojas, El Primer Partido Comunista de Cuba, vol.3 (2011) p.265
770 "Charla del Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara", cited in Bell Lara et al., Documentos de la 
Revolución cubana 1959 (2006) p.34
771 Revolución (February 14th 1959)
772 Revolución (February 7th 1959)
773 Revolución (October 23rd 1959)
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rift between the increasing radicalism amongst ordinary workers contrasting with a 
tendency to bureaucratisation amongst a section of the CTC officialdom.
Within the CTC, matters came to a head at the 10th Congress of the CTC held in 
Havana in November 1959. The delegates were 90% 26th July, but were deeply split 
between the anti-communist faction lead by David Salvador and the unitarios fronted 
by Soto and Aguilera. Conrado Béquer, who chaired proceedings had some difficulty in 
maintaining order. Fidel Castro opened the proceedings and spoke of the need for unity. 
Both sides interpreted this to suit their own entrenched position and matters were no 
nearer a resolution as the the closing session approached. Castro returned, upbraided the 
delegates for their uncomradely behaviour and it was agreed that a committee composed 
of Fidel Castro, David Salvador, Conrado Béquer, José Pellon and Jesús Soto should 
compose a compromise list for the executive. The posts were divided between the two 
factions with, an anti-communist deputy to a unitario executive officer, or vice-versa in 
most positions. Two notable absences are Béquer and Torres, now leaders of the FNTA 
and the railway federation respectively. This list was carried by acclaim, with the 
communist delegates abstaining, and the congress ended in relative harmony.774
Che Guevara called the tenth congress "an arduous war against the representatives 
of mujalismo, representative of the old CTC gang".775 Modern Cuban writing tends to 
adopt this line, although this was not the case at the time, even in the heated atmosphere 
of the congress hall, with neither of the newspapers of the PSP and M-26-7, Hoy nor 
Revolución, using the term mujalista.776 On the other hand, anti-Castro writers such as 
Robert Alexander and Efrén Córdova discuss the 10th congress of the CTC entirely at 
the level of the bureaucracy itself and see the fight as being between honest officials 
who respect private property and what Alexander refers to as "Melons", green on the 
outside, red on the inside. The eventual triumph of the unitarios is seen as an imposition 
by Castro as part of his plot with the communists.777 Neither of these explanations are 
satisfactory. In January 1959, the CTC bureaucracy was effectively purged both de jure 
and de facto. Mujal himself had sought refuge in the Argentine embassy, from where he 
was allowed to leave for Miami. The rest of his bureaucratic apparatus were removed 
from office and were well enough known by the ordinary membership to have no 
774 "El X Congreso Obrero" Bohemia (November 29th 1959) pp.59-62&78-9
Revolución (November 23rd 1959)
775 O'Connor, The Origins of Socialism in Cuba (1970) p.193
776 eg. Bell Lara et al. , Documentos de la Revolución cubana 1959 (2006) pp.23-24&324
777 Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in Cuba (2002) pp.198-203
Córdova, Clase Trabajadora y Movimiento Sindical en Cuba (1959-1996) (1996) pp.67-78
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chance of regaining their positions. However, many of those who took their place 
quickly adopted bureaucratic attitudes and started using some of the old mujalista 
techniques such as voting irregularities and anti-communist demagogy. In a manner 
commonly found amongst opportunist trade union bureaucrats, they resented the work 
implied by constant mass mobilisation. Aquilera and Louit were particularly vocal in 
criticising this trend. The right wing of the bureaucracy, in return, used the accusation of 
growing communist influence to attack those who wanted a more radical approach to 
running the economy. Thus, one can say that they adopted similar bureaucratic methods 
to the mujalistas, but we have to be clear that they did not represent the return to office 
of the old mujalista bureaucrats themselves. 
David Salvador himself did not last long as general secretary. Events outside the 
union forced the pace of change and 1960 was a year in which, following the obvious 
popularity of the agrarian reform programme of the previous year, there were large scale 
nationalisations of foreign-owned enterprises. These, if the size of the demonstrations in 
their support are anything to go by, were very popular and this radical economic 
approach, combined with the hostile reaction from the US, seemed to launch a new 
wave of popular nationalism amongst the working class. The more radical political 
circumstances, combined with the threat of US intervention, pushed the balance inside 
the CTC in the direction of the unitarios. David Salvador disappeared from view almost 
immediately after the 10th congress and for the rest of 1960, the most prominent CTC 
spokesman was Conrado Béquer, with Jesús Soto and Octavio Louit also much in 
evidence. David Salvador resigned in February 1960 and in June joined the "30th 
November Movement", which was linked to the right-wing guerrillas operating in the 
Escambray mountains. He was arrested in November of that year, expelled from the 
CTC and charged with treason. The victory over the US supported invasion at Playa 
Girón in April 1961 sealed the dominance of the unitarios within the CTC and in July 
1961 Lazaro Peña, the communist tobacco worker who had been ousted in 1948, 
assumed leadership of the federation. A final word about Ñico Torres, who has played 
such an important part in this story. He remained as leader of the railway workers 
federation, played a part in the early contacts with  the USSR, visiting Moscow in 1960 
and, on his retirement, became an active member of the National History Commission. 
He died in Havana in 1991 at the age of 79.778
778 Figueras, Semblanza de Antonio Torres Chedebaux (n/d)
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Conclusion
How can we account for this sudden about face from the apparently genuine 
attempt to build a united front in the labour movement? Firstly, it is in the nature of 
united fronts which have a limited goal that they fall apart in the face of the political 
differences of the participants when that goal has been achieved. The goal of the FONU 
had been the overthrow of the dictatorship; when that had been achieved, many in the 
M-26-7 saw no further use for the alliance with PSP. The July 26th Movement had a 
hegemonic view of revolution; they sought unity under their unchallenged leadership. 
On the other hand, in colonies or countries considered to be "semi-colonial", like Cuba, 
orthodox communist policy called for an alliance between the working class and the 
progressive, patriotic bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie with the aim of achieving full 
national independence. It is easy to see how an alliance with the M-26-7 could be seen 
to fit this model. The PSP therefore consistently called "for a broad coalition 
government of all democratic forces", which was not at all what the M-26-7 leadership 
had in mind. Both Conrado Béquer and David Salvador pointed out that the old 
communist party newspaper, Hoy, had been permitted to resume publication without 
censorship and that democratic elections would be held in the not too distant future. The 
implication was that the PSP should be thankful for this and stop complaining. 
Furthermore, it was not only the PSP who were excluded, the Directorio 
Revolucionario fared no better; its leader, Faure Chaumón, was denied a platform at the 
first Mayday celebrations on the grounds that there was not enough time.779
Secondly, the July 26th Movement was itself a coalition of different class interests 
and political opinions, united by a hatred of the dictatorship, but with very different 
ideas about the future direction of the revolution. There was a clear division within the 
movement between a right and left wing, with many of the better off supporters of the 
movement being opposed to the communists for fear that they might represent a 
challenge to their economic and property interests. Amongst this faction, the use of the 
expression "growing communist influence" became a stick with which to beat the more 
radical sections of the 26th July movement. 
Thirdly, there was a very real fear of US intervention and the feeling that, if the 
US government felt that the revolution was under communist influence, they would be 
more likely to intervene. It was considered prudent therefore to distance the leadership 
779 "Desfile" Bohemia (May 10th 1959) p.102
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from an association with the PSP. The M-26-7 trade union cadres' use of crude 
anti-communism during the the trade union elections which took place throughout the 
early part of 1959 helped to buy time for the revolutionary regime. The British and US 
governments were unsure, but on balance thought that Castro was not influenced by 
Communists; he was considered to be an "extremist", but they were not sure of what 
type.780 
So, why did the M-26-7 subsequently split and its left wing realign with the 
communist party? Revolutions never stand still. The increasing radicalisation of the 
revolution alienated many of the middle and upper classes who wished that change 
could have stopped with the removal of Batista and who stood to lose money from the 
reductions in rent and utility charges, as well as fearing the effects on business profits 
from workers' wage increases. This was reflected inside the M-26-7 and the 
Revolutionary Government, but also had repercussions in the labour movement. 
Fidel Castro worked with the more radical elements 
of the M-26-7 to move the CTC to the left. In part, this 
was done by using his both his undoubted popularity and 
considerable political manoeuvring skills to secure 
leadership positions for his supporters amongst the new 
trade union leaders. The outcome of the elections at the 
10th Congress of the CTC is a good example of this.781 
The purges of the rightist elements from the bureaucracy 
in 1960 aroused no particular outcry from the rank and file 
membership, but to merely describe these officials as "the 
old CTC gang" is inaccurate, as the old mujalistas had 
already been comprehensively removed in early 1959. I 
would argue that more convincing explanation can be found in the nature of trade union 
bureaucracy. 
The trade union bureaucracy is an inherently conservative force which balances 
between capital and labour, gaining privileges and a certain independence in the 
process. Moreover, the CTC under Eusebio Mujal was also thoroughly corrupt and 
completely undemocratic. However, removing the abuse and corruption did not deal 
with the essential nature of trade union bureaucracy; that required a political 
780 FO 371/148178 - AK1011/1 Annual report for 1959  (January 1960)
781 FO 371/148342 - AK2181/1 Labour - Trade Unions (December 1959)
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Figure 41: Telephone workers 
support state intervention from 
Bohemia (March 13th 1959)
understanding. In the second half of 1959, the national leadership of the revolution were 
grappling with the problems they faced in attempting to take hold of a state structure 
that had developed to serve the interests of capitalism; a situation further complicated 
by the domination of the economy by foreign, mainly US, capital. It was becoming 
obvious that merely correcting the abuses of the Batista regime was not enough, if 
Cuban society was to change, the core nature of the state had to change as well. This 
battle was reflected in the CTC and fought out at the tenth congress. 
There was considerable popular support for the revolutionary government as the 
state took increasing command of the economy. Nationalisation of foreign owned 
enterprises had long been a popular demand in the Cuban labour movement and the 
large turnouts for the demonstrations in support of the nationalisations in 1960 would 
seem to indicate the widespread popularity of these moves (Figures 41 & 42).782 The 
CTC was one of the prime movers in these demonstrations and the ascendency of the 
left following the 10th Congress was a significant factor in providing an institutional 
vehicle for the expression of this support.
782 U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 1290 (Dec. 18, 1950) Cuban labor leader suggests nationalization 
of American-owned Electric and Telephone Companies
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 1384 (Jan. 3, 1951) Progress reported in nationalization of 
Autobuses Modernos S.A.
U.S. Embassy Havana, Despatch 1178 (Jan. 18, 1952) Weeka No. 3; Railway union threatens general 
strike if government does not nationalise United Railway
FO 371/139488 (1959) Expropriation of British property in Cuba
"Sucedio el 7 de agosto de 1960" Bohemia (August 14th 1960)
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Figure 42: Rally in support of nationalisations from Bohemia (August 14th 1960)
Just as the revolutionaries found that they could not achieve their ends by merely 
taking over the old state machine, so revolutionary workers' leaders found that they 
could not just take over the old CTC structure. Revolutionary change of both the state 
and the unions was necessary if they wanted to revolutionise society as a whole. 
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Findings and Conclusions
The untold history of working class involvement in the Cuban insurrection of the 
1950s emerges from the archives as a fascinating story of courage and organisation. 
Recovering from the defeat of an important series of industrial battles in 1955, a small 
but determined group of workers managed to build a clandestine labour movement in 
the face of an entrenched trade union bureaucracy and a brutal military dictatorship. 
This movement refused to accept the logic of capitalist industrial relations, which 
relates workers' demands on the employers' ability to pay. They organised unofficial 
strikes, produced a lively underground press and combined industrial action with 
sabotage and armed conflict, thereby providing valuable support for the rebel guerrillas. 
By the end of 1958, they were able to organise two revolutionary workers' congresses 
composed of hundreds of delegates and, finally, the most complete general strike in 
Cuban history. 
Given such an impressive record, one wonders why this story is "untold", 
particularly as the evidence is available in the archives for any researcher who cares to 
look. Perhaps it is because so much historical writing prefers to concentrate on the 
actions of "great men" and is blind to the ability of ordinary workers to take an 
independent and often decisive collective role in the development of events. In 
attempting to bring this hidden history to light and to provide an answer to the question 
"What was the role of organised labour in the Cuban insurrection?", several subsidiary 
questions arose. In answering these, a fuller picture of the actual role played by the 
workers emerges.
What were the problems facing Cuban workers during the 1950s?
There was a profound contradiction at the heart of the Cuban economy: the 
national income, principally derived from the export of sugar, which provided 80% of 
the country's exports, was insufficient to maintain the wage rates and staffing levels 
historically expected by the workers while, at the same time, providing the profit 
margins the employers expected. In order to maintain their profits, business interests 
needed to increase productivity, which they sought to do by cutting wages, decreasing 
staffing levels and introducing new machinery. Such a re-division of the national 
income in favour of capital at the expense of labour did not prove possible under a 
democratic regime. This caused significant sectors of Cuban and US business to support 
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the authoritarian solution offered by Fulgencio Batista, in the expectation that an 
authoritarian regime would break workers' resistance to the implementation of cost 
cutting measures. 
The Batista government supported and co-ordinated an offensive by the main 
groups of employers aimed at reducing wage costs, having first secured the support of 
the trade union leadership by corruptly advancing the personal interests of the 
bureaucracy. This productivity drive was conducted sector by sector, ensuring that no 
two significant groups of workers came under attack at the same time, thereby 
undermining the possibility of generalised resistance. This process was aided by the 
trade union bureaucracy, who played a moderating and conservative role. Whenever 
there was a danger of groups of workers bypassing the limits set by the bureaucracy, the 
government used repressive force to defeat them. This dual strategy of repression and 
corruption, which was employed throughout 1955, succeeded in defeating workers in 
the railway, banking, textiles and brewing industries as well as, most importantly, the 
sugar workers. The tobacco workers and the dockers, however, managed to resist the 
increased mechanisation of their industries. As a result of the defeats of 1955, important 
sections of the Cuban working class adopted other methods of organisation and struggle 
to defend their interests.
How was the Cuban working class organised?
 The trade union bureaucracy under capitalism is predominantly a conservative 
social group, with interests independent of the workers they purport to represent. This 
results in a tendency to accommodate to the status quo. This conservative self-interest 
made the trade union officials around Mujal susceptible to the offers of corruption 
coming from the regime. Up to 1955, the CTC bureaucracy had appeared to defend 
wages and conditions and had largely maintained its hegemonic position. However, in 
the face of the concerted employers' offensive, which started in earnest that year, it 
revealed itself as unable or unwilling to safeguard working class living standards and 
was increasingly seen as part of the problem rather than contributing to a solution. 
The term "organised labour" can be used to describe working class organisation at 
a number of levels. There are the formal structures of the trade unions and then there are 
a multiplicity of unofficial, informal structures through which ordinary workers defend 
their interests, often in the face of obstruction from the official bureaucracy. The role 
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played by the mujalistas in undermining working class resistance has led to an 
underestimation of the role played by workers in the insurrection. However when the 
division of interest between the bureaucracy and the rank and file is taken into account, 
the way is opened to search for evidence of involvement by workers that is distinct from 
the conventional view obtained by merely considering official union activity. 
Thus, the categorisation of the general strikes of August 1957 and January 1959 as 
"spontaneous" is an example of the tendency for historians to see an event as 
spontaneous when in reality they just do not know, or do not wish to admit, who 
actually organised it. This use of the idea of "spontaneity" to dismiss events for which 
an author has no explanation, ignores and dismisses grass-roots organisation. These two 
strikes, as well as a large amount of other militant working class activity, were the work 
of the network of activists linked to the rebel movement. This organisation, which was 
started by revolutionary militants from Guantánamo, drew on pre-existing unofficial 
relationships within the labour movement and spread westwards to cover much of the 
island. As well as organising strikes and demonstrations, these activists engaged in 
sabotage and provided logistical support for the guerrillas. This network was organised 
in some areas on the basis of a formal cell structure, in others less formally. These 
activists sometimes collaborated with communist party members and supporters, 
according to local circumstances, traditions and personal relationships. Sometimes this 
network operated under the name of the Frente Obrero Nacional, sometimes under the 
name of a local committee of workers unity or some such, and sometimes was 
completely anonymous. Whatever form this network took in the localities, it proved 
very effective in organising material and political support for the rebels in the hills, as 
well as localised industrial action. The most significant achievement, however, was that 
these activists provided the basis for Fidel Castro to call the most complete general 
strike in Cuban history in January 1959.
What political forces were active in working class politics ?
It can be confusing to refer to the "labour movement" as if it were a single entity, 
as there were clearly a variety of different movements operating within the working 
class in Cuba during the period under consideration. It may be more helpful to refer to 
"poles of political attraction" within the wider context of organised labour. There were 
three such poles of attraction within the broad labour movement: the communist 
Partido Socialista Popular, the Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio led by Fidel 
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Castro and the trade union bureaucracy led by Eusebio Mujal. From 1955 onwards, the 
main question in working class political life was the competition for support between 
the PSP, the M-26-7 and the official union machine.
The mujalista trade union bureaucracy started to lose credibility after the defeats 
of 1955 and became increasingly dependent on state intervention to maintain its 
position. There were some splits in the union leadership which took two forms: on the 
one hand internal jealousies and arguments over the division of the spoils of corruption 
and, on the other hand, honest officials who opposed what they saw as a sell-out of 
workers' interests. The latter group, small in number but significant in their 
effectiveness, moved towards the M-26-7. By the end of 1958, Mujal and his associates 
were effectively marginalised.
The PSP found its main support in those industries that were able, for various 
reasons, to resist the employers' offensive of 1955-56 and defend their conditions of 
employment, principally the docks, tobacco and hotel and catering. In these industries, 
the communist line of "Mass Struggle" still appeared to provide a way forward. 
However, in those industrial sectors which suffered defeat in the class battles of 
1954-1955, particularly railways, banking, textiles and sugar, small but growing nuclei 
of local workers' leaders turned to a more radical policy. They became convinced that 
the only way that workers could reclaim their rights and regain democratic control over 
their trade unions was by the revolutionary overthrow of the regime. These militant 
workers were attracted to the armed struggle approach advocated by the July 26th 
Movement. Of particular importance were a group of railway workers from 
Guantánamo, in the extreme east of the island, who developed a tactical approach which 
they called sindicalismo beligerante, combining traditional industrial action, such as 
strikes, go-slows and demonstrations, with sabotage, bombing and other armed actions. 
This dovetailed with the M-26-7's revolutionary approach, which relied on a general 
strike supported by guerrilla action to overthrow the dictatorship. The fact that these 
workers adopted revolutionary tactics did not affect their basic demands, which were 
reformist in the sense that they sought improvements within capitalism rather than its 
overthrow. 
What was the relationship between the PSP and the M-26-7?
The growth of the M-26-7 Sección Obrera, inevitably brought them into contact 
with PSP militants at workplace level. The dynamics of workplace organisation forced 
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these two groups of militants to interact and, while there was continued political debate 
and disagreement, a process of convergence started to occur, which was considerably in 
advance of the developing relationship at leadership level. The two organisations had 
much in common politically, both advocating an egalitarian nationalist solution to the 
social and economic crisis, assuming the necessity of a cross-class alliance and seeing 
the revolutionary process as one that progressed by stages. Neither grouping openly 
advocated socialism. Their differences were largely tactical, with the PSP promoting 
unarmed mass struggle, while the M-26-7 saw the need for armed action to defeat the 
forces of state repression. Both organisations placed the general strike at the centre of 
their approach, but they had a very different conception of the tactic. To the PSP it 
represented a traditional stoppage of work by the overwhelming majority of workers, 
who would thereby achieve their objective by sheer weight of numbers and by 
paralysing the economy. To the M-26-7, the general strike was more akin to a mass 
armed popular insurrection. As opposition to the Batista regime grew, the difference 
between these tactical approaches was tested in practice. The PSP leadership learnt the 
need for armed support, while the M-26-7 leadership realised that popular support could 
not just be summoned, but had to be built by relating to workers' economic and social 
interests.
The process of tactical convergence began first at workplace level, as local 
solidarity pushed militants from both organisations to work together. This convergence 
was boosted by the increasing brutality of the regime, particularly in the east. As the 
army and police became frustrated by their inability to defeat the guerrillas, they vented 
their feelings on the civilian population. In addition to this random unofficial violence, 
there was increased activity by government death squads which targeted all sections of 
the opposition, but made a particular target of known working class activists, including 
communists, despite their opposition to the armed struggle. The sheer horror of the state 
violence meted out by the Batista dictatorship has dropped from sight in recent studies, 
but it needs to be remembered as an important factor contributing to the increasing 
popular hatred of the regime. The common danger was another factor in pushing rank 
and file communists and fidelistas together as well as producing a feeling amongst 
many ordinary PSP supporters that they needed to arm themselves, if only in self 
defence. 
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While there was a political convergence between the two organisations, the 
process of organisational convergence was slower, in part due to anti-communist 
attitudes within sections of the M-26-7, particularly in Havana. However, 
anti-communism takes different forms and there are both right-wing and left-wing 
varieties, with the former being opposed to the communists because of opposition to the 
collectivisation of property, while the latter frequently feel that the communists are 
insufficiently militant and overly bureaucratic, with a poor commitment to democracy. It 
is important to differentiate between these two phenomena, as left-wing critics of the 
communist party were frequently prepared to collaborate with communist militants once 
these adopted a more radical approach, while the right wing were generally resolutely 
opposed in all circumstances. The leading members of the M-26-7 Sección Obrera, with 
the notable exception of David Salvador, fell into the left-wing category and, following 
the PSP acceptance of armed action, did work with the communists. 
A view of the Cuban revolution which sees the rebel victory as entirely the work 
of the guerrilla army will necessarily see little contribution from the communists. If the 
role of organised labour is taken into account, the communist contribution becomes 
considerably more significant, as this is the area in which they operated most 
effectively. Thus, their systematic agitation and propaganda was a key factor in helping 
maintain independent working class organisation, while their organisational experience 
and pre-existing militant networks complemented the work of the M-26-7 Sección 
Obrera. 
To what extent were regional differences important?
In all of this, there was a regional dimension and opposition to the regime was 
generally stronger in the east of the island and least pronounced in Havana. The arrival 
of the nucleus of the rebel army in the Granma gave the advocates of sindicalismo 
beligerante their first test. There were strikes and sabotage in Guantánamo in solidarity 
with the armed actions in Santiago in November 1956. This drew the attention of 
leadership of the M-26-7 to the contribution that could be made by organised labour and 
the Guantánamo workers were encouraged to spread their organisation and activities. 
Relationships between the M-26-7 and the PSP were also better in the east of the island 
and, in a parallel move, the local communist leadership in Santiago supported the 
M-26-7 armed actions of November 1956 by organising a dock strike in solidarity. This 
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aided the process of convergence between the two organisations, which was slow and 
uneven, but was most pronounced amongst workers in the east and centre of the island.
Moreover, the importance and influence of working class members of the M-26-7 
was greater in Oriente, Matanzas and Las Villas provinces, while the leadership of the 
urban underground in Havana tended to be drawn more from professional and petty 
bourgeois backgrounds. Partly as a result of this, there was a better relationship between 
the M-26-7 and the PSP in the provinces than in the capital for, as previously stated, 
workplace solidarity and the pressure of unaligned workmates tends to lessen sectarian 
party differences. Another factor in considering regional differences was that the 
influence of the trade union bureaucracy diminished away from the capital, where the 
head offices of the federations were situated. On the other hand, government capital 
expenditure was concentrated in Havana, with such projects as the Havana Bay Tunnel 
providing employment, while the tourist industry and its associated hotel building 
programme were also concentrated here and in nearby Varadero. As a result, there was 
less economic pressure on workers in the capital and therefore less reason to seek a 
revolutionary solution. Recognition of these regional differences is crucial to 
understanding the course of the insurrection.
How significant was the involvement of organised labour in determining the 
outcome of the conflict?
As the crisis deepened, the army and police engaged in a campaign of terror, 
including the use of death squads and torture, which was particularly fierce in Oriente 
province. Militant workers, even when unconnected to the rebels, were a particular 
target of this state repression. The initial working class response to state terror 
comprised a series of strikes in Manzanillo, Bayamo and Santiago. These, while helping 
to raise levels of opposition to the regime, proved ineffective in preventing government 
violence, with the result that many workers, including sections of the communist party, 
were drawn to support the rebel forces. Even the August 1957 strike, despite being the 
biggest demonstration against Batista before he fled, did not seriously threaten the 
regime. In circumstances where a regime is prepared to use high levels of brutality to 
suppress workers' attempts to defend their wages and conditions, then conventional 
methods of mass action, such as the strike, the demonstration, the boycott etc., are 
insufficient. Equally, armed guerrilla action without mass support normally leads to 
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isolation and defeat. The victory of the revolutionary forces in Cuba in 1959 was due to 
a successful combination of these tactics. 
The failure of the regime's summer offensive of 1958 gave the rebel forces 
immense prestige and resulted in the loss of support for Batista from within the business 
class. The subsequent rebel advances led Batista to flee the country but, while this 
removed the dictator, it did not ensure the victory of the revolutionary forces. Rather, 
the general strike called by Fidel Castro at the beginning of January 1959, was crucial in 
preventing an army coup that would have prolonged the war. This general strike was in 
no way spontaneous, but was the result of careful preparation. The FONU was 
responsible for convening two well-attended workers' congresses in rebel held territory 
in December 1958. These congresses agreed to organise a general strike at the start of 
the next sugar harvest, due to begin in the following January. However, Batista fled 
before this and the general strike had to be brought forward to prevent a military coup 
designed to prevent a rebel victory. This strike was the most complete in Cuban history 
and ensured the overthrow of the old regime. The importance of this in determining the 
future course of events cannot be underestimated.
How can the Cuban Revolution be characterised?
In common with many conflict situations, there were a number of struggles taking 
place in parallel and most combatants participated in some elements but not others, 
according to their political beliefs and class interests. The insurrection was a civil war, a 
class struggle, an anti-imperialist movement, a democratic revolution, a fight for 
national independence against neocolonialism, a campaign against corruption and an 
episode in the Cold War. However, in the period between 1952 and the end of 1958, 
there was no faction or interest group publicly arguing for socialism. Many supporters 
of the revolution from petty bourgeois, professional and managerial social strata were 
concerned with democracy and anti-corruption, as well as being sickened by the 
regime's brutality, but had an economic interest in the productivity measures enforced 
by the government. Those big business elements who came to support the revolution, 
switching their allegiance from their previous support for Batista and his productivity 
drive, did so because they felt that matters could not continue as they were and any 
solution which promised a return to stability on any terms was an improvement over the 
prevailing chaos. To this may be added that there would have been personal reasons for 
many, reacting against the repressive violence which left few families untouched. These 
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pro-capitalist sectors would have had little interest in the anti-imperialist and Cold War 
aspects of the conflict, although many outside the sugar oligarchy may have been 
attracted to economic nationalist arguments, while they were mainly hostile to increased 
workers' rights.
The workers who supported the rebel cause did so on a number of levels. As 
citizens they were party to the general revulsion with corruption and a desire for the 
return of democracy. In working class politics, this was reflected in demand for the 
cleansing of the trade unions and the right to elect their chosen leaders. This was not an 
abstract demand, but linked to re-establishing the CTC as a vehicle to defend wages, 
jobs and workplace rights and it was thus inextricably linked with the class struggle. 
The publicly expressed demands of the rebel workers' movement were, in themselves, 
reformist and related to a return to earlier, higher wage and staffing levels. However, 
while there was nothing intrinsically incompatible with capitalism in the workers' 
demands, these demands were not affordable for Cuban capitalism in the light of its 
position in the world capitalist economic order. International competition meant that 
they were effectively pricing themselves out of a market which was able to tour the 
world seeking the lowest wage costs. This contradiction would lead to working class 
support for anti-capitalist measures following the rebel victory.
Finally, can the insurrection be considered to be a workers' revolution? I would 
conclude that, in the period 1952-1959, working class involvement in the 
insurrectionary process took place as part of a cross-class alliance, within which 
specifically working class forms of struggle made a vital contribution to the success of 
the rebellion. Without this contribution from organised labour, the insurrection might 
have failed, but this does not make it a workers' revolution. 
What contribution does this research make to the historiography of the Cuban 
Revolution?
Very little has been written on working class responses to authoritarian and 
repressive regimes and even less that describes a successful outcome from the workers' 
point of view. In the case of Cuba in the 1950s, organised workers were able to defy 
their corrupt official leaders and form an alliance with armed guerrillas in such a way 
that they made an important contribution to the overthrow of an authoritarian regime 
which used repressive violence in an attempt to increase labour productivity in a time of 
economic crisis. The examination of this self-organised activity, which has been largely 
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overlooked in the literature, sheds light on the relationship between working class 
identity and the class struggle, showing the role of revolutionary nationalist politics in 
overcoming divisions based on race and trade. The addition of an analysis of the role of 
the trade union bureaucracy adds a further dimension to the more common explanations 
of the role of organised labour by going a step beyond mere considerations of class 
treason or corruption. 
While women only made up 10% of the Cuban workforce and many of those were 
in the notoriously difficult organisational territory of domestic service, the 
comparatively few trade unionised women workers in the Cuba of the 1950s played a 
vital role in initiating and sustaining militant action out of all proportion to their 
numbers. There is still much work to be done in this area and it is my intention to 
undertake further archival research in this under-explored area.  
I believe this to be the first systematic examination of the available primary 
sources that originate in the Cuban clandestine organised labour movement of the 
1950s. The history which has come to light as a result of my research paints a very 
different picture from the standard historiography. It does not underestimate the well 
known achievements of the rebel army, but rather offers an explanation of the way in 
which these guerrillas interacted with a mass-based revolutionary working class 
organisation. This interaction, I have argued, was essential for the victory of the rebel 
movement and the overthrow of Batista. In the process of this investigation, the buried 
history of an impressive revolutionary working class organisation has emerged, the 
contribution to the Cuban revolution made by working class women has been given 
greater significance and the role of the communist party reassessed. There is much more 
work to be done, but I hope that this thesis has made a significant contribution to the 
demystification of the revolutionary process.
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